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Foreword: 
Inclusive Value-Chain Development 
through the Lens of Direction, 
Distribution, and Diversity
In order to stimulate critical thinking on innovation, sustainability, and devel-
opment, in 2010 the STEPS Centre (Social, Technological and Environmental 
Pathways to Sustainability) at the University of Sussex published its New 
Manifesto.1 The main objectives of this manifesto were to introduce the ‘3D 
Agenda’—a new way of thinking about inclusive innovation and develop-
ment—and to suggest ways for enacting this agenda. The three Ds stand for
• direction (what is innovation for development for, what goals should it 
serve?),
• distribution (who benefits from innovation and how can innovation 
become more inclusive for marginal people?), and
• diversity (how can a portfolio of innovation pathways be fostered to 
develop a range of resilient production systems and value chains?).
While not composed having the 3D Agenda explicitly in mind, the empiri-
cal research on inclusive value-chain development reported in the chapters of 
this book shows how the 3D Agenda can be implemented in practice. It does 
so by looking at experiences with technological, institutional, and social inno-
vations to foster inclusive value-chain development. It presents a variety of 
1 STEPS Centre. 2010. Innovation, Sustainability, Development: A New Manifesto. Brighton, UK: 
STEPS Centre. http://steps-centre.org/anewmanifesto/wp-content/uploads/steps-manifesto_
small-file.pdf
discussions of different ways to approach inclusive value-chain development; 
lessons from interventions to support combined technological, social, and 
institutional innovation to support value-chain development (through such 
approaches as multistakeholder platforms); and ways of monitoring and eval-
uating value-chain development interventions and their impacts on  specific 
elements of value chains (for example, contract forms and gender issues). 
By presenting this range of approaches to understanding inclusive value-
chain development, the chapters in the book touch in several elements of  
the 3D Agenda (direction, diversity, and distribution), as well as how the  
New Manifesto proposes to enact the 3D Agenda.
This being a foreword and not an overall summary of the book, I will 
not enter into the details of how inclusive value-chain development is being 
 captured in different ways, as readers can discover for themselves in the book’s 
overview (Part 1), the introductions to Parts 2, 3, and 4, and the individ-
ual chapters that present empirical research. Instead, I will briefly discuss the 
book’s (probably unplanned and unintended) contributions in terms of the 
different elements of the 3D Agenda. 
In Part 2 of the book, the issue of direction is dealt with in terms of how 
to shape inclusive value chains, and what form these can have. This part also 
touches on the issue of diversity of value-chain development pathways. The 
chapters critically discuss such questions as what real inclusion is, and to  
what extent such real inclusion can be sustainably realized given the web of 
relationships in value chains and the many interlocking factors that deter-
mine the scope for change and the effort this takes from interventions. This 
 discussion also relates to issues of distribution.
Part 3 of the book, which focuses on different examples of inclusive value-
chain development interventions, connects to several important elements 
for enacting the 3D Agenda—or, put another way, how to organize collec-
tive  processes that support democratic articulation and implementation of an 
agenda for technological, social, and institutional innovation. Such an agenda 
would include capacity building for and proper organization of inclusive 
 innovation and value-chain development processes. Part 3 also provides many 
examples of multistakeholder platforms, which are analyzed from different 
angles. Though multistakeholder platforms—which include learning alliances 
and innovation platforms—have been characterized as “wheelbarrows full of 
frogs” and their facilitation has sometimes been denoted as “herding cats,” they 
are key in coordinating many stakeholders in addressing complex problems 
and challenges. The chapters in Part 3 of the book show how multistakeholder 
xx
platforms provide direction to inclusive value-chain development processes and 
enable more democratic decisionmaking and collective action. The cases also 
touch on issues of distribution, as they empower those in weaker positions and 
achieve outcomes that ideally benefit all the different stakeholder groups rep-
resented on the platform. The chapters in Part 3 identify critical factors that 
impact on the performance of multistakeholder platforms and reflect on what 
could be called the dark side of multistakeholder platforms, which should by 
no means be seen as a development panacea. The element of distribution is also 
scrutinized and de-romanticized, in line with thinking in the New Manifesto 
on being aware of the political side of innovation for development.
Part 4 of the book focuses on issues of monitoring and evaluating inclu-
sive value-chain development interventions, issues that are seen as highly 
important in the New Manifesto, to increase transparency and  accountability 
in innovation for development processes, and also to enable benchmark-
ing. The chapters show that, in order to assess the extent to which the 3 Ds 
have been enacted, it is essential to develop reliable metrics as well as qualita-
tive indicators to monitor progress and evaluate impacts of inclusive value-
chain development interventions. This can provide a reality check for program 
progress and impacts, which may also lead to reassessment of development 
pathways and adaptation of inclusive value-chain development interventions. 
Monitoring and impact evaluation of inclusive value-chain interventions are 
needed to determine whether intended distribution of benefits is realized, 
and can also help prioritize within a diversity of intervention approaches and 
 development pathways. Ultimately, this may help determine the most fruit-
ful direction for inclusive value-chain development. Part 4 shows that, whereas 
current monitoring and evaluation methods have been useful, there is still 
much to be done to become better at whole value-chain assessment and at 
measuring welfare impacts.
To conclude this foreword, I wish to congratulate the authors and editors 
of this book on the result of their work. In coherent parts, the book provides 
a collection of robust peer-reviewed research, which is rich in methodological 
diversity as well as in its variety of geographical foci. On the basis of the cases 
and different perspectives on inclusive value-chain development, an agenda for 
future research is provided. Thus, by taking stock of what we have learned so 
far about inclusive value-chain development, this well-timed book is likely to 
be a valuable reference for those working in inclusive value-chain development 
and also for those researching this topic. To stay in line with the  terminology 
of the 3D Agenda, I hope the book will have a wide distribution among 
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scholars and practitioners of inclusive value-chain development, will give them 
direction to orient their work, and will help them to appropriately address the 
diversity of situations they may encounter in supporting or researching innova-
tion for inclusive value-chain development.
Laurens Klerkx 
Associate Professor 
Knowledge, Technology and Innovation Group 
Wageningen University 
The Netherlands
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Preface
This book—Innovation for Inclusive Value-Chain Development: Successes and Challenges—presents concepts and frameworks for designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies for promoting pro-poor innova-
tion in value chains. Based on 14 case studies, the editors formulate a  number 
of general propositions, present lessons about interventions that work well 
under various circumstances, and identify key areas for future research. The 
latter include developing methods for implementing asset-based approaches; 
improving the application of a “gender lens” in value-chain interventions; 
 constructing practical approaches for evaluating action and change models and 
measuring impacts of complex value-chain interventions; clarifying principles 
underlying platform membership, management, and facilitation; and formu-
lating approaches for upscaling successful interventions.
This publication is one of the important outputs of the CGIAR Research 
Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM). The Program  provides 
targeted analysis to strengthen the evidence for better policies, stronger 
 institutions, and well functioning markets. The Program’s Inclusive Value 
Chains and Efficient Trade flagship analyzes the changing international, 
regional, and local contexts of agricultural markets; identifies interventions 
in value chains that increase efficiency and inclusion, particularly of poor 
and marginalized groups; and studies successful approaches to scaling up 
improvements in value chains.
This book will be a valuable reference for all those working to improve 
policies and strengthen institutions, helping them to introduce and facilitate 
innovation in value chains for inclusive agricultural growth.
Shenggen Fan, Director General
International Food Policy Research Institute
Barbara Wells, Director General
International Potato Center
Karen Brooks, Director
CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets
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INNOVATION FOR INCLUSIVE VALUE-CHAIN 
DEVELOPMENT: HIGHLIGHTS
Douglas Horton, Jason Donovan, André Devaux, and Maximo Torero
Summary
Despite increasing use of innovation-system and value-chain approaches to 
promote rural income growth, poverty reduction, and greater gender equity, 
there is little systematic knowledge about how to operationalize value-
chain approaches in different contexts and how best to evaluate innovation 
and value-chain development. In this book, we bring together 14 papers 
(chapters)—of which 12 were previously published as journal articles—that 
present results of recent work associated with CGIAR and its partners 
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The papers assess the opportunities 
emerging from new and expanding markets for agricultural produce and 
identify challenges to smallholder participation in these markets and the 
resulting benefits. They illustrate how interventions have fostered agricultural 
innovation and inclusive value-chain development, and the extent of 
their impacts. Methods for evaluating complex interventions that involve 
innovation and value-chain development are presented, along with empirical 
results of evaluation studies. From an analysis of the cases presented, we 
discuss emerging issues and policy implications, and identify knowledge gaps 
and priorities for future applied research and evaluation.
Introduction
For agricultural research to benefit the rural poor, it needs to complement 
other efforts that improve the policy environment, alleviate resource con-
straints, and build local capacity for responding to changing technological and 
economic challenges and opportunities. Action may also be needed to influ-
ence the incentives and constraints faced by large-scale retailers and buyers, for 
them to engage more effectively with smallholder producers and build mutu-
ally beneficial business relationships that are able to stand the test of time. 
Together, such efforts can lead to tangible improvements in smallholders’ pro-
duction and marketing practices, which benefit smallholders as well as other 
Part 1
3
market participants. The Inclusive Value Chains concept developed in this 
book shows by practical examples that it is possible to link smallholder pro-
ducers, including a gender and minorities focus, to modern integrated markets.
This book has been prepared by a Value Chains Flagship team of the 
CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), to 
take stock and learn from current knowledge on linking international agri-
cultural research, innovation, and value-chain development (VCD) to benefit 
the rural poor. It brings together 14 papers that grapple with the complexity 
of VCD in developing countries and the potential to link agricultural research 
more effectively with development processes through joint learning and 
shared approaches to fostering innovation among stakeholders. The chapters 
present applied research carried out by professionals in centers affiliated with 
CGIAR and partner organizations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The 
book identifies emerging themes and offers recommendations for policymak-
ers and decisionmakers, and identifies priorities for future research and devel-
opment (R&D) work in this area. 
Value-chain researchers from throughout CGIAR were invited to propose 
papers for inclusion in this book. More than 30 submissions were received and 
reviewed for their relevance to current debates on how agricultural research, 
innovation, and VCD can benefit smallholders, and for their scientific qual-
ity. After careful review, 14 papers were selected for the book, of which 12 
were previously published as journal articles. The primary intended users of 
the book are researchers, policymakers, and development professionals work-
ing in the spheres of agricultural research, innovation systems, and VCD, 
who are often isolated from one another and have limited access to state-of-
the-art knowledge on these subjects. The book is linked to the ValueChains 
Knowledge Clearinghouse website (tools4valuechains.org) as part of the 
Value Chain Flagship integrative strategy to reach a network of practitioners, 
researchers, and policymakers.
The book has four parts.
Part 1, Highlights, outlines the context and purpose of the publication and 
identifies the intended audiences. It sets the stage for the work reviewed and 
presents an overview of each chapter in Parts 2–4. It then identifies themes 
and policy implications that emerge from the chapters, and identifies priori-
ties for future R&D work to advance inclusive VCD.
Part 2, Challenges and approaches for inclusive value-chain development, 
contains four chapters that discuss approaches for implementing VCD with 
the rural poor and the various issues and challenges that can arise in the pro-
cess. The first chapter reviews well-known guides for value-chain analysis, 
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often the first step in the implementation of VCD interventions. It compares 
the assumptions underpinning their design, the recommended methods for 
data collection and analysis, and their effectiveness across different contexts 
in which VCD takes place. This is followed by another review of literature, 
which presents new insights and perspectives on issues related to stakeholder 
learning in VCD. The third chapter sheds light on how smallholders accu-
mulated their livelihood assets in response to interventions for building cer-
tified-coffee value chains in Central America. The final chapter reviews 
experiences with contract farming, an approach frequently used by large pri-
vate firms to ensure adequate supplies of high-value produce, for processing or 
marketing operations. 
Part 3, Integrating agricultural innovation and inclusive value-chain devel-
opment, contains six chapters that report on experiences with integrating 
approaches for innovation with those for promoting inclusive VCD in Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa south of the Sahara. The first three chapters focus 
on the interface between technical R&D work and VCD, and highlight the 
importance of a systems view of innovation that accords importance to both 
supply and demand factors. The remaining three chapters focus more specifi-
cally on the role of multistakeholder platforms in fostering innovation. 
Part 4, Evaluating inclusive value-chain development, contains four chap-
ters that present approaches for evaluating complex interventions aimed at 
inclusive VCD, including quantitative tools for measuring gender differ-
ences within value chains. The Introduction provides a brief overview of each 
method, as well as its benefits and limitations, and the scenarios in which it 
should and should not be used.
Perspectives on agricultural research and 
Innovation
Views on the role of agricultural research, innovation, and VCD in reduc-
ing rural poverty, and on their interrelationships, have evolved substantially. 
Agricultural research has often been confused with innovation. However, 
there are important differences between them. Research is concerned with 
the production of new knowledge, which may or may not be used in prac-
tice. Innovation, on the other hand, is concerned with processes of change in 
the production and marketing of goods and services—changes that may or 
may not be driven by research. A sourcebook on agricultural innovation sys-
tems published by the World Bank (2012, 2) defines innovation as “the pro-
cess by which individuals or organizations master and implement the design and 
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production of goods and services that are new to them, irrespective of whether 
they are new to their competitors, their country, or the world.”
When CGIAR was established in the early 1970s, its strategy was “to use 
the best science in advanced countries to develop technologies for the benefit of 
food-deficit countries and populations” (Lele 2004, 3). At that time, agricul-
tural research was viewed as the principal source of farm-level innovation 
to increase productivity and benefit poor farmers as well as consumers. In 
essence, research results were assumed to flow through an “innovation pipe-
line” from basic research conducted by advanced research institutes, to strate-
gic research conducted by CGIAR centers, to applied and adaptive research 
conducted by regional and national programs, and finally through outreach or 
extension programs to farmer adopters (Biggs 1990; Ashby 2009).
Over time, the limits of the pipeline model have become apparent as 
our understanding of innovation processes has improved, more actors have 
become involved in research and innovation processes, and stakeholders have 
begun to expect agricultural research to solve more complex problems of 
rural poverty, food insecurity, nutrition, and sustainable management of nat-
ural resources. As a result, after the 1970s, priorities shifted from building 
agricultural research institutes to strengthening research systems, improving 
technology transfer, linking researchers with farmers, and most recently to 
strengthening agricultural innovation systems (Pant and Hambly 2009).
An agricultural innovation system is much broader and more complex than 
an agricultural research system. As defined by the World Bank (2012, 2) an 
agricultural innovation system is “a network of organizations, enterprises, and 
individuals focused on bringing new products, new processes, and new forms of 
organization into economic use, together with the institutions and policies that 
affect their behavior and performance.” Such a system is concerned not only 
with the production, exchange, and use of new knowledge, but also with fos-
tering entrepreneurship, developing a vision for change, mobilizing resources, 
and overcoming resistance to change (Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009, 411).
The innovation capacity of a country, sector, or market chain depends on 
the capacity of its researchers and development programs, and also on effec-
tive linkages and information flows among public and private actors, incen-
tives for cooperation, and the policy environment (Hall 2006). Innovation is 
stimulated by the interaction of individuals and organizations with diverse—
sometimes conflicting—stakes in the management of scarce resources or the 
governance of productive processes. For this reason, successful interventions 
often involve brokering or facilitation of group processes that enable diverse 
stakeholders to interact, experiment, and learn together in ways that stimulate 
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innovation (Dror et al. 2016; Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009, 413). R&D 
professionals and especially CGIAR centers played crucial roles as innovation 
brokers or facilitators in the cases presented in Part 3 of this book.
One institutional arrangement for enhancing interactions that can lead to 
innovation is the multistakeholder platform, which provides a space for inter-
action among different stakeholders; to improve mutual understanding, cre-
ate trust, define roles, and engage in joint actions related to a common interest 
or production process. Chapter 8 (Thiele et al.) describes two types of plat-
forms. The first can operate at a national or sector level, bringing traders, pro-
cessors, supermarkets, and others together with farmer associations and R&D 
organizations to foster the development of new market opportunities through 
commercial, institutional, and technological innovation. The second type 
is structured around geographically delimited supply areas, operating more 
locally, meshing farmers and service providers to address market governance 
issues in assuring volumes, meeting quality and timeliness constraints, and 
empowering farmers.
The institutional arrangements and standard operating procedures of most 
agricultural R&D organizations have lagged behind the evolution of think-
ing on innovation processes and systems (Hall 2009, 30). Nevertheless, project 
teams charged with using research to benefit the poor have experimented with 
new ways of strengthening the contribution of research to agricultural inno-
vation processes (see Part 3 of this book). One weakness of many attempts to 
link research with development is a focus on the supply of innovations, rather 
than on the demand for new products, processes, or institutional arrange-
ments. The cases presented in this book show how programs have moved 
beyond supply-driven approaches, developing more demand-oriented and sys-
temic approaches for facilitating innovation and inclusive VCD.
Perspectives on Value-Chain Development
Reardon and Timmer (2012) highlight the revolutionary nature of the trans-
formation of food systems in developing countries since the mid-1980s. The 
recent transformation of supply chains includes shifts from traditional mar-
kets to modern retail formats (be they regional supermarket chains or local 
corner markets), and rapid institutional and organizational change (including 
extensive consolidation of ownership and modernization of procurement sys-
tems, through integration of supply chains or contract farming). A study in 
Asia (Reardon et al. 2012) indicates that the value chains for both high-value 
products and domestic staples are undergoing a “quiet revolution” in their 
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structures and performance. High-value chains that originate in developing 
countries can provide a more profitable outlet for smallholders, but require 
that they commit to producing and delivering pre-identified volumes in the 
proper form and quality. The extensive discussion on value chains that has 
emerged in recent years aims to understand the changes in rapidly changing 
markets for agriculture products and the implications for poor market actors 
(namely smallholders, rural laborers, and small and medium-sized enterprises) 
and effective options for governments, development organizations, and the 
private sector to support poor value-chain actors.
Value-chain concepts represent an important change in thinking about 
development and the relationships among agricultural producers, traders, pro-
cessors, and consumers. The term “value chain” is used in different ways in 
the professional literature. In this book, a value chain refers to the sequence 
of interlinked agents and markets that transforms inputs and services into 
products with attributes that consumers are prepared to purchase. Millions 
of low-income people, a large proportion of whom are women, participate in 
agricultural value chains as producers, traders, processors, and retailers. Many 
millions more, including most of the developing world’s poor, participate in 
agricultural value chains as laborers or consumers. As Haggblade, Hazell, and 
Reardon (2010, 1429) note, “landless and near-landless households every-
where depend heavily on non-farm income for their survival, while agricul-
tural households count on non-farm earnings to diversify risk, moderate 
seasonal income swings, and finance agricultural input purchases.” Therefore, 
improving the performance of agricultural value chains stands to benefit 
large numbers of people (Reardon and Timmer 2012; Reardon et al. 2012; 
Aramyan, Lansink, and van Kooten 2005; Lohman, Fortuin, and Wouters 
2004; Lambert and Pohlen 2001).
Agroprocessing is a key component of the rural non-farm economy. Most 
studies of VCD associate “modern” enterprises with “large-scale” ones, which 
are highly visible in and around cities in the processing and retail sectors—
employing large numbers of workers and serving large numbers of (mainly 
urban) consumers. In contrast, most of the chapters in this book highlight 
modernization processes that are taking place among small and medium-sized 
agro-enterprises located in rural areas and small towns. These enterprises 
often face the double challenge of responding to the demands of buyers and 
processors that purchase their outputs, as well as supporting their smallholder 
input suppliers in upgrading their capacity to deliver quality inputs in suffi-
cient volumes. Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) note that promoting growth of 
the rural non-farm sector can have several benefits, including 
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• providing employment for the poor; 
• smoothing employment and income over seasons and years, for people who 
have limited access to other risk-coping mechanisms; 
• tightening rural labor markets, raising wages, or reducing unemployment; 
and
• lowering prices to the poor. 
The term value-chain development describes a type of intervention that 
aims to address poverty through improved linkages between businesses and 
poor households. In contrast to development approaches that focus narrowly 
on improving the capacities of smallholders to increase their productivity or 
better manage natural resources, VCD challenges development organizations 
to work with diverse stakeholders to understand the performance of the value 
chain and identify mutually beneficial options for improving chain perfor-
mance. It is reasoned that by working in closer collaboration with private-sec-
tor actors, VCD can increase the benefits for the poor and enhance the 
prospects for sustaining operations and benefits after the termination of an 
intervention. For smallholders, benefits may include increased income, more 
secure market linkages, and access to new services for production. For whole-
salers, processors, and other downstream enterprises, benefits may include 
improved quality and flow of raw material, reduced transaction costs, and 
enhanced environmental and social credentials.
VCD often targets marginalized actors in a value chain, such as small-
holders, small-scale businesses, and landless laborers. Such “inclusive” val-
ue-chain development has been defined as a “positive or desirable change 
in a value chain to extend or improve productive operations and generate 
social benefits: poverty reduction, income and employment generation, eco-
nomic growth, environmental performance, gender equity and other devel-
opment goals” (UNIDO 2011, 1). It is from this perspective that many 
development agencies, donors, and governments have adopted VCD as a 
key element of their rural poverty-reduction strategies (Humphrey and 
Navas-Alemán 2010).
There is reason for both optimism and concern regarding the poverty-re-
duction potential of VCD. While globalizing markets offer opportunities for 
marketing higher-value products that simply did not exist before, these mar-
kets generally demand considerably more in terms of business acumen, effi-
ciency, and attention to quality and food-safety standards than markets for 
traditional products (Reardon et al. 2009).
INNOVATION FOR INCLUSIVE VALUE-CHAIN DEVELOPMENT 9
Not all poor farming households can benefit from access to value chains 
for higher-value agricultural products. Value-chain participation in more 
demanding markets requires smallholders to deliver regular supplies of pro-
duce of consistent quality and sufficient quantity. Meeting these conditions 
requires access to land, inputs, technology, knowledge, organization, capacity, 
skill, and infrastructure, which may not exist in some communities or among 
some groups of asset-poor producers.
Research indicates that farming households require a minimum asset 
endowment to participate successfully in value chains (Chapters 2 and 3). For 
those who fall below minimum asset thresholds, it is unclear whether pub-
lic- or private-sector interventions can create the necessary preconditions for 
their long-term participation in value chains. Similarly, cooperatives and other 
forms of collective enterprise may lack certain assets needed to develop viable 
business operations that are able to facilitate the participation of smallholders 
in value chains and to respond to the needs of buyers and processors further 
down the chain.
The asset endowment of an individual farm family is not the only thing 
that determines the benefits it derives from market participation. An analysis 
of data from Latin American countries (Berdegué, Bebbington, and Escobal 
2014) indicates that the opportunities and performance of family farmers who 
are integrated into agricultural markets but face constraints because of their 
asset endowments are largely determined by the local economic environment, 
or “proximate context.” Smallholders who operate in areas experiencing open, 
dynamic development—for example, near provincial towns with growing 
incomes, markets, and employment—are likely to have more market oppor-
tunities and take better advantage of them than farmers in less economically 
dynamic areas.
There is an urgent need for learning from experiences to improve the 
design of VCD interventions. This reflects both the inherent complexity of 
designing interventions with small businesses and with the rural poor, and 
contemporary pressures to achieve greater outcomes from external assistance 
in less time and with fewer resources. This highlights the need for incorporat-
ing learning-oriented monitoring and evaluation into VCD interventions.
the Chapters in this Book
Since the 1970s, international centers affiliated with CGIAR have worked 
with national and regional partners to stimulate agricultural innovation 
and growth. In many cases, the benefits derived by smallholders have been 
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constrained by these farmers’ limited opportunities to market their products. 
In an attempt to expand the benefits of agricultural R&D for smallholders, 
since 2000, R&D organizations have experimented with approaches for pro-
moting innovation and inclusive VCD. This book presents several cases that 
have been documented and published in professional journals. Other experi-
ences are now being documented and prepared for publication. Interested read-
ers are encouraged to visit the websites of individual CGIAR centers and the 
PIM ValueChains Knowledge Clearinghouse (http://tools4valuechains.org).
With roughly three-quarters of the world’s poor living in rural areas, 
addressing global poverty requires paying attention to rural populations, 
especially smallholders in developing countries (Torero 2014, 155). One 
reason for the continuing poverty of smallholders is their limited asset 
endowments—not only their landholdings, but also their human, financial, 
social, and other forms of capital (Donovan and Stoian 2012). Another crucial 
reason is that most smallholders practice subsistence farming or operate 
largely in local markets, rather than in lucrative provincial, national, or global 
markets. Consequently, smallholders have few economic incentives to adopt 
new technologies or invest in productive assets that could raise their levels of 
productivity and incomes.
Two types of intervention appear critical for allowing smallholders to par-
ticipate in growing markets: 
1. ones that provide physical infrastructure and information technology to 
connect smallholders to markets; and 
2. ones that create or strengthen complementary institutions that reduce the 
high marketing risks and transaction costs faced by smallholders, due to 
their small production surpluses. 
The chapters in this book present various approaches for providing the 
institutional arrangements that can allow smallholders to participate more 
advantageously in growing markets.
As illustrated in Table P1.1, Part 2 of this volume discusses the opportu-
nities created by VCD and the challenges smallholders face in participating 
more advantageously in this development. It includes a comparative review 
of guides for value-chain analysis and reviews of experiences with VCD 
approaches, as well as a review of the literature on experiences in contract 
farming with smallholders. One case study in Part 2 includes the impacts 
of interventions to improve access to coffee markets in Nicaragua. One gen-
eral conclusion of the chapters in Part 2 is the need for VCD stakeholders to 
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understand the local context in which VCD takes place, including the liveli-
hood strategies and asset endowments of smallholders, and how this shapes 
the opportunities for achieving genuinely inclusive VCD interventions.
TAbLE P1.1 Summary information on the chapters in this book
Chapter title Reference 
(original 
publication 
date)
Value chain, 
country, or
region
Approach Main contribution
Part 2. Challenges and approaches for inclusive value-chain development
1. Guides for value-
chain development: A 
comparative review
Donovan et 
al. (2015)
General Comparative 
review of 
guides for 
value-chain 
analysis
Summarizes the main features, 
strengths, and weaknesses of 
11 guides. Provides recommen-
dations for guide use by context, 
and identifies priorities for 
reflection and debate
2. Value-chain 
development for rural 
poverty reduction: A 
reality check and a 
warning
Stoian et al. 
(2012)
General Review of 
literature 
and authors’ 
experience
Extracts lessons for improv-
ing design of inclusive VCD. 
Makes a plea for integrating a 
livelihoods focus into VCD, with 
a particular focus on farmer 
asset endowments
3. Changing asset 
endowments 
and smallholder 
participation in 
higher-value 
markets: Evidence 
from certified-
coffee producers in 
Nicaragua
Donovan 
and Poole 
(2014)
Certified 
green coffee 
in Nicaragua 
for export
Case study Gauges outcomes of access 
to certified-coffee markets, 
noting limitations for achieving 
poverty-reduction goals posed 
by limited asset endowments 
of smallholders
4. Contract farming in 
developing countries: 
Theory, practice, and 
policy implications
Minot and 
Sawyer 
(2015)
General Review of 
literature
Presents an extensive review of 
literature on contract farming 
with smallholders in developing 
countries. Notes relevant 
theory and identifies policy 
implications
Part 3. Integrating agricultural innovation and inclusive value-chain development
5. Enhancing innova-
tion in livestock value 
chains through net-
works: Lessons from 
fodder innovation case 
studies in developing 
countries
Ayele et al. 
(2012)
Livestock 
products in 
Ethiopia, Syria, 
and Vietnam
Comparative 
case studies
Illustrates the value of 
integrating innovation-system 
and value-chain approaches, to 
enhance smallholder innovation 
and market success
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Chapter title Reference 
(original 
publication 
date)
Value chain, 
country, or
region
Approach Main contribution
6. Transformation 
of smallholder beef-
cattle production in 
Vietnam
Stür, tan 
Khanh, and 
Duncan 
(2013)
Beef in 
Vietnam
Case study In addition to the underlying 
driver of strong market demand 
for quality meat, identifies key 
aspects of the context and the 
intervention that contributed to 
the transformation of beef-cat-
tle production and marketing in 
a Vietnam case study
7. Collective action 
for market-chain 
innovation in the 
Andes
Devaux et 
al. (2009)
Potato 
products 
in Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and 
Peru 
Comparative 
case studies
Develops a framework for 
analyzing collective action in 
value-chain innovation, taking 
advantage of potato diversity to 
improve smallholder access to 
markets. Applies the framework 
to identify early results and 
policy implications of Andean 
work
8. Multistakeholder 
platforms for linking 
small farmers to value 
chains: Evidence from 
the Andes
Thiele et al. 
(2011)
Potato 
products 
in Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and 
Peru
Comparative 
case studies
Identifies two types of 
multistakeholder platform 
based on differences in 
characteristics of the value 
chains, the participating actors, 
and institutional arrangements. 
Analyzes platform performance, 
and presents preliminary 
results and implications
9. Unraveling the 
role of innovation 
platforms in 
supporting coevolution 
of innovation: 
Contributions 
and tensions in a 
smallholder dairy-
development program
Kilelu, 
Klerkx, and 
Leeuwis 
(2013)
Dairy 
products in 
Kenya
Case study Highlights the dynamics, inher-
ent tensions, and unexpected 
results of innovation processes, 
and the need to strengthen 
feedback, learning, and adap-
tive management of innovation
10. Dealing with 
critical challenges 
in African innovation 
platforms: Lessons for 
facilitation
Swaans et 
al. (2013)
Several 
chains 
addressed by 
11 programs, 
mainly in 
Africa south 
of the Sahara
Synthesis 
of authors’ 
experience 
and literature 
review 
Highlights critical issues for 
effective platform facilitation, 
related to: platform dynamics, 
power differentials, gender, 
external vs internal facilita-
tion, sustainability, scale, and 
evaluation
Part 4. Evaluating inclusive value-chain development
11. Impact of third-
party enforcement 
of contracts in 
agricultural markets: 
A field experiment in 
Vietnam
Saenger, 
Torero, 
and Qaim 
(2014)
Dairy 
products in 
Vietnam
Case study Demonstrates the methodology 
and presents results of a field 
experiment (randomized control 
trial) to study the effect of elim-
inating information asymmetry 
in contract farming
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Chapter title Reference 
(original 
publication 
date)
Value chain, 
country, or
region
Approach Main contribution
12. Linking 
smallholders to the 
new agricultural 
economy: The case 
of the Plataformas 
de Concertación in 
Ecuador
Cavatassi 
et al. 
(2011)
Potato 
products in 
Ecuador
Case study An exemplary evaluation, apply-
ing multiple methods to identify 
program impacts. Provides 
evidence of the effects of com-
bining production support with 
facilitating market access
13. Lapses, infidelities, 
and creative 
adaptations: Lessons 
from evaluation of a 
participatory market 
development approach 
in the Andes
Horton et 
al. (2013)
Coffee, potato, 
and yam in 
the Andes
Comparative 
study of four 
cases
Examines issues in the evalua-
tion of participatory VCD inter-
ventions, related to action and 
change models and the fidelity 
of implementation. Identifies 
three types of deviation from 
the intervention design and the 
implications for managers and 
evaluators
14. Using quantitative 
tools to measure 
gender differences 
within value chains
Madrigal 
and Torero 
(2015)
General Review of 
literature 
Presents four quantitative 
tools, widely used elsewhere, 
that could be used to study 
gender-related questions in 
agricultural value chains
Source: Authors. 
Note: Original publications are listed in the References for their respective chapters.
Traditionally, different groups based in different types of organization 
have designed and implemented interventions that focused on either agricul-
tural innovation or VCD. Part 3 presents several cases in which CGIAR cen-
ters and national collaborators have developed integrated interventions that 
involved both innovation-system and VCD approaches. The papers in this 
part identify factors that have influenced the performance of these integrated 
interventions, and provide important lessons for facilitating processes of inno-
vation and VCD.
Evaluation is commonly identified as an area that requires strengthen-
ing in complex interventions, such as those that promote agricultural inno-
vation and VCD. Part 4 reviews evaluation issues and experiences, and 
presents methods for improving evaluations that support learning and adap-
tive management, as well as accountability for the resources used in com-
plex interventions.
Chapters on Challenges and Approaches for Inclusive Value-
Chain Development (Part 2)
The first set of papers discusses the challenges facing and approaches available 
for smallholders, businesses, and external supporters for achieving inclusive 
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VCD. This includes a comparative review of available guides for value-chain 
analysis, a review of literature on VCD for rural poverty reduction, an anal-
ysis of asset endowments and smallholder participation in coffee markets in 
Central America, and a review of experiences with contract farming.
Chapter 1 (Donovan et al.) provides a comparative review of tools available 
for designing VCD interventions. It reviews 11 guides for value-chain 
analysis—a first step in the design of VCD strategies. The guides provide 
a useful framework for understanding markets and engaging with value-
chain stakeholders. However, the guides often overlook a critical issue for 
achieving inclusive VCD: the basic conditions necessary for VCD to advance 
development objectives and achieve sustainability. The authors suggest three 
areas for future critical reflection and debate on the design of guides for VCD: 
(1) concepts, methods, and tools for addressing the specific challenges and 
needs of the poor in value chains; (2) tools for identifying important factors 
in the context of value chains and the implications for interventions; and 
(3) mechanisms for mutual learning on the design and implementation of 
VCD interventions.
Chapter 2 (Stoian et al.) reasons that those engaged in VCD will achieve 
greater impact when they consider the bottlenecks, tradeoffs, and dilemmas 
that can arise when attempting to link poor farming households with 
higher-value markets. The authors’ plea for a sharper focus on the needs 
and circumstances of local actors, which also serves as “a reality check and a 
warning,” draws on their own experiences in working with nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the private sector, as well as an overview of recent 
experiences with VCD. The design of VCD interventions often assumes that 
poor households have sufficient resources to participate effectively in VCD, 
do not face substantial trade-offs when using these resources, and can assume 
higher risks when reinvesting capital and labor. However, these assumptions 
often do not reflect the realities and needs of the poor. The authors encourage 
donor agencies and development practitioners to adopt asset-based approaches 
to the design, implementation, and assessment of value chains, and to identify 
the nonmarket interventions needed for enabling disenfranchised groups to 
meet the minimum asset thresholds for their successful participation in value-
chain initiatives. 
Chapter 3 (Donovan and Poole) analyzes changing asset endowments 
and smallholder participation in Nicaragua’s certified-coffee market in 
response to interventions that aimed to ameliorate the negative impacts 
of the “coffee crisis.” The authors’ analysis suggests that most small-scale 
coffee farmers built particular elements of their asset base and increased 
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their resilience to future shocks through access to value chains for certified 
coffee. However, households struggled to make effective use of the gains to 
improve their livelihoods. Few of the least-endowed households increased 
the scale or productivity of coffee, and most continued to depend heavily on 
subsistence production and seasonal off-farm income. The authors conclude 
that improved market access alone, even under relatively favorable market 
conditions and with considerable external support, may have uncertain 
impacts on rural poverty if the underlying constraints on household assets and 
investments are not addressed concurrently.
Contract farming is one way to address market failures by integrating 
smallholders into modern agricultural value chains, providing them with 
inputs, technical assistance, and market access. However, critics are concerned 
about the imbalance of power between farmers and the companies that 
organize and manage contract-farming schemes. Chapter 4 (Minot and 
Sawyer) reviews the theory and practice of contract farming in developing 
countries and their policy implications. Most empirical studies suggest that 
contract-farming schemes raise the incomes of participating farmers by 
25–75 percent. The evidence is less clear on the degree to which buyers are 
willing to contract smallholders. In some cases, contractors accept or even 
prefer working with smallholders. Nevertheless, contract farming cannot 
serve as a broad strategy for rural development because it is economically 
justifiable mainly for certain high-value commodities in certain markets. In 
those circumstances, however, it can be an effective institution for helping 
smallholders raise productivity and access more remunerative markets.
Chapters on the Integration of Agricultural Innovation and 
Value-Chain Development (Part 3)
The practical application of innovation-system and VCD approaches—and 
particularly the integration of these two approaches—is challenging, and 
there are few well-documented cases of their successful application. The chap-
ters presented in Part 3 show how agricultural researchers and development 
professionals in national and regional organizations associated with CGIAR 
programs have grappled with fundamental issues of linking research with 
action, how they interpreted and applied innovation-system and VCD think-
ing, and the results that have been obtained in Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa south of the Sahara.
Fodder scarcity is a perennial problem for many smallholders in develop-
ing countries. Chapter 5 (Ayele et al.) presents lessons from fodder innovation 
studies in Ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam. Fodder innovation is triggered and 
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diffused by actors interacting and learning in networks, and on farms. Fodder 
innovation, being only one element of livestock value chains, is sustainably 
enhanced when linked to other innovations and market-oriented activities 
that optimize productivity gains. Yet smallholders face systemic constraints 
to accessing markets, and need to organize in groups to exploit opportunities. 
The authors conclude that rather than treating innovation-system and val-
ue-chain approaches as separate tools, the integration of their complementary 
features enhances smallholders’ innovation and market success.
Chapter 6 (Stür et al.) analyzes the transformation of smallholder beef-
cattle production in rural Ea Kar, Vietnam, where smallholder crop–livestock 
farmers were able to take advantage of the rising demand for meat in urban 
centers and transform cattle production from a traditional, extensive grazing 
system to a more intensive, stall-fed system that supplies quality meat to 
urban markets. Introduction and expansion of farm-grown fodder production 
enabled farmers to produce fatter animals, achieve higher sale prices, and 
reduce labor inputs by moving from grazing to stall feeding. These benefits 
convinced farmers, traders, and local government that smallholder cattle 
production could be a viable enterprise. Within 10 years, the way that cattle 
were produced and marketed changed significantly in the area. In addition to 
the underlying driver of strong market demand for quality meat, several key 
factors contributed to this transition:
• a convincing innovation that provided immediate benefits to farmers and a 
vision for local stakeholders;
• a participatory, systems-oriented innovation process that emphasized 
capacity strengthening; 
• a value-chain approach that linked farmers and local traders to markets;
• formation of a loosely structured coalition of local stakeholders that 
facilitated and managed the innovation process; and
• technical support over a sufficiently long period to allow innovation 
processes to become sustainable.
Chapter 7 (Devaux et al.) presents the case of the Papa Andina network, 
which used collective action in two approaches for fostering market-chain 
innovation: the Participatory Market Chain Approach (PMCA) and 
stakeholder platforms. Both of these approaches bring small-scale potato 
producers together with market agents and agricultural service providers 
to identify common interests, share market knowledge, and develop new 
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business opportunities. These forms of collective action help to overcome 
market failures by strengthening linkages among smallholders, service 
providers (including researchers), and market agents. The facilitated 
interactions have stimulated innovation and helped to create new market 
niches for native potatoes grown by poor farmers in remote highland areas. 
The authors describe Papa Andina’s experiences with innovation in value 
chains and discuss the policy implications for R&D organizations and the 
need for R&D organizations to have the capacity to diagnose innovation 
systems and facilitate group processes involving people with diverse stakes in  
a commodity’s production, marketing, and use.
Chapter 8 (Thiele et al.) focuses on multistakeholder platforms for linking 
smallholders to value chains in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Although value 
chains linked to urban markets and agro-industry present new opportunities 
for adding value and raising rural incomes, smallholders struggle to enter 
these markets, and a lack of trust among value-chain actors increases 
transaction costs and short-circuits innovation. Differences in characteristics 
of value chains, participating actors, and institutional arrangements have 
led to the emergence of two types of platform. One type brings traders, 
processors, supermarkets, and others together with farmer associations and 
R&D organizations to foster commercial, institutional, and technological 
innovation. The other type is structured around geographically delimited 
supply areas, meshing farmers and service providers to address market-
governance issues in assuring volumes, meeting quality and timeliness 
constraints, and empowering farmers. The cases studied indicate that 
platforms that bring stakeholders together around value chains can result 
in new products, processes, norms, and behaviors that could not have been 
achieved otherwise and that benefit poor farmers.
The agricultural innovation-system approach emphasizes the collective 
nature of innovation and stresses that innovation is a coevolutionary process. 
These insights are increasingly informing interventions that focus on setting 
up multistakeholder initiatives, such as innovation platforms and networks to 
enhance agricultural innovation. A number of studies have addressed issues 
of platform organization, but there has been limited analysis of how platforms 
shape innovation processes. Chapter 9 (Kilelu, Klerkx, and Leeuwis) attempts 
to unravel the role of innovation platforms in supporting innovation through 
an in-depth case study of a smallholder dairy-development program in Kenya. 
The findings indicate that highly dynamic innovation processes produce 
interactional tensions and unexpected effects, and that intermediation and 
facilitation are crucial for resolving tensions that emerge at different actor 
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interfaces. Chapter 9 also notes that platforms are not always able to adapt 
adequately to emerging issues. This points to the need to look at platforms 
dynamically and pay more attention to mechanisms that strengthen feedback, 
learning, and adaptive management in innovation processes.
Innovation platforms are increasingly used by R&D initiatives to engage 
the poor in agricultural innovation processes. These platforms are forums 
for action and learning, in which different types of actors come together to 
address issues of mutual concern. The dynamic nature of the innovation pro-
cess and the differences in interest, capacity, and power among the actors 
involved make facilitation of innovation platforms challenging. Based on 
group reflection on their personal experiences in facilitating innovation plat-
forms, Chapter 10 (Swaans et al.) analyzes seven key issues critical to effective 
platform facilitation:
1. the dynamic and evolving nature of platforms,
2. power dynamics,
3. gender equity,
4. external versus internal facilitation,
5. sustainability of the process,
6. issues of scale, and
7. monitoring and evaluation.
Chapters on the Evaluation of Inclusive Value-Chain 
Development (Part 4)
Part 4 addresses several issues related to the evaluation of complex interven-
tions aimed at inclusive VCD. Some examples of these interventions are trade-
offs between ensuring the fidelity of the intervention and promoting local 
adaptation of intervention protocols, identification of programs’ economic 
impacts, use of experimental evaluation approaches, and quantitative tools for 
measuring gender differences within value chains.
Using a randomized field experiment in Vietnam, Chapter 11 (Saenger, 
Torero, and Qaim) examines the effect of alleviating the information asym-
metry regarding product quality that is widespread in contracts between agri-
cultural producers and buyers in developing countries. In contract farming, 
opportunistic buyers may underreport quality levels to farmers to reduce the 
price that they have to pay. In response, farmers may curb investment, thereby 
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negatively affecting farm productivity. In the experiment, the authors entitled 
randomly selected smallholder dairy farmers in Vietnam, who are contracted 
by a large company, to independently verify milk-testing results. Results indi-
cate that treatment farmers used 12 percent more inputs, and they also signifi-
cantly increased their output. Some wider research and policy implications 
are discussed.
Chapter 12 (Cavatassi et al.) presents an economic analysis of the use of 
multistakeholder platforms (plataformas de concertación) to link smallholders 
to high-value food markets by looking at the experience of a platform program 
in the Ecuadorian highlands. Multiple evaluation methods are used to ensure 
identification of program impact. The findings suggest that the program suc-
cessfully improved the welfare of beneficiary farmers, as measured by yields 
and gross margins. These benefits were achieved through improving the effi-
ciency of agricultural production and selling at higher prices. No significant 
health or environmental effects were found. Overall, the program provides 
clear evidence that combining production support with facilitating market 
access can be successful.
Participatory approaches are frequently recommended for international 
development programs, but few have been evaluated. To contribute to knowl-
edge on the use and results of participatory methods, from 2007 to 2010 
the Andean Change Alliance evaluated the Participatory Market Chain 
Approach (PMCA). Chapter 13 (Horton et al.) examines the fidelity of 
implementation, factors that influenced implementation and results, and the 
PMCA change model and four applications of it in Bolivia, Colombia, and 
Peru. The authors identify three types of deviation from the intervention pro-
tocol—lapses, creative adaptations, and true infidelities—and discuss the 
implications for intervention design and implementation. They also identify 
five groups of variables that influenced PMCA implementation and results:
1. Attributes of the macro context
2. Attributes of the market chain
3. Attributes of the key actors involved
4. Local rules in use
5. The intervention’s capacity-development strategy.
Although there was insufficient information to test the validity of the 
PMCA change model, results were greatest where the PMCA was imple-
mented with highest fidelity. The case analysis suggests that the single most 
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critical component of the PMCA is engagement of market agents—in addi-
tion to farmers—throughout the intervention. Lessons for planning and eval-
uating participatory approaches relate to the use of action and change models, 
the importance of monitoring implementation fidelity, the limits of baseline 
survey data for outcome evaluation, and the importance of capacity develop-
ment for implementers.
Chapter 14 (Madrigal and Torero) explores the use of quantitative tools to 
measure gender differences within value chains, and argue that using quan-
titative tools to study gender-related questions in a value-chain context can 
encourage gender inclusion and promote economic growth in developing 
countries. Four tools are proposed, based on widely known methods in gen-
der and labor economics literature, that have straightforward empirical imple-
mentation. These tools—which have been tested and proven useful for gender 
analysis in other settings—could help researchers identify critical issues and 
value-chain bottlenecks to pinpoint more effective and inclusive policies and 
development strategies.
Emerging themes and Policy Implications
The chapters in this book deal with many aspects of agricultural innovation 
and VCD in different geographic, social, economic, and institutional contexts. 
From this broad range of experiences, six common themes emerge, which 
relate to
• Opportunities created by the expansion of markets for agricul-
tural products,
• Challenges for smallholders,
• Characteristics of agricultural innovation and VCD,
• Attributes of successful interventions,
• Centrality of institutional innovation, and
• Role of multistakeholder platforms in VCD.
Opportunities Created by the Expansion of Markets for 
Agricultural Products
The chapters in this book reinforce the view that access to lucrative mar-
kets for agricultural products can benefit smallholders in developing 
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countries, and interventions that address technical, economic, and institu-
tional challenges can help smallholders take advantage of these opportunities. 
Nevertheless, VCD is not a panacea that alone can solve rural poverty prob-
lems. In many cases, inclusive VCD interventions that support small-scale and 
rural enterprises will have little impact unless they are complemented with 
policy changes that create a more conducive environment for enterprise devel-
opment and help smallholders gain a foothold in lucrative value chains. 
In recent years, the policy and agribusiness environments of most coun-
tries have become more open, liberal, and dynamic (World Bank 2014). There 
has been rapid growth in urban demand for high-value foodstuffs in both 
developing countries and foreign markets. Niche markets in advanced urban 
economies continue to generate strong demand, especially for organic and fair-
trade items.
Smallholders can supply markets with diverse food products (Hazell and 
Rahman 2014) and they may have a comparative advantage in producing high-
value, labor-intensive products, such as perishable fruits, vegetables, and spe-
cialty crops (Chapter 4). Farmers in remote areas often have a deep knowledge 
of neglected and underutilized species, such as quinoa, amaranth, and native 
potatoes in the Andes, for which lucrative new markets are being developed 
(Giuliani et al. 2012). Improvements in transportation are reducing marketing 
costs, and information technology is helping reduce the asymmetries in mar-
ket information that have traditionally put rural smallholders at a disadvan-
tage vis-à-vis large farmers and market agents (Webb 2013).
Challenges for Smallholders
Smallholders often find it difficult to exploit the opportunities presented by 
expanding markets. Concerns over the scarcity of agricultural raw materials in 
rapidly growing markets, coupled with more stringent food-safety and quality 
standards enforced by government agencies and supermarkets, have spurred 
market integration and increased coordination and collaboration among pro-
ducers, processors, and retailers (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Reardon and 
Timmer 2012). But smallholders are often excluded from these increasingly 
complex and dynamic markets.
Smallholders often have limited access to land, credit, technical advice, 
basic knowledge of the market system, and current information on market 
prices and conditions—all of which restrict their capacity to invest, expand 
their market surplus, and add value to their produce. The limited market sur-
pluses of individual smallholders raise the unit cost of assembling, handling, 
and transporting their products. These common attributes of smallholders 
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highlight the importance of policies and programs that strengthen farmer 
associations and collective marketing. The research reported in this book indi-
cates that poor households require minimum assets to successfully participate 
in VCD. Women are especially disadvantaged when it comes to access to land, 
labor, credit, and infrastructure. The implication is that gender issues need 
to be considered specifically in the design, implementation, and evaluation 
of interventions.
Characteristics of Agricultural Innovation and Value-Chain 
Development
Agricultural-innovation and VCD processes are highly complex.1 So many 
factors and variables are interacting in these processes, and there are so many 
unknowns, that there is no single recipe for success and the outcomes are 
unpredictable. This complexity has important implications for the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of interventions, which are discussed in the 
following section.
Different types of intervention, and innovation, often reinforce each other. 
For example, separate interventions that focus on improving the productiv-
ity of dairy cattle, on milk marketing, on credit, on farmer organization, or on 
policies may produce some benefits for smallholders on their own. But when 
combined, they may produce much more substantial and long-lasting benefits. 
The experiences with dairy development in Kenya and Vietnam reported by 
Kilelu, Klerkx, and Leeuwis (Chapter 9) and Stür et al. (Chapter 6) illustrate 
this point. The implication is that those who design and implement applied 
R&D programs should seek to combine efforts that promote agricultural 
innovation and VCD, rather than work in isolation.
The benefits of agricultural innovation and market development are 
unequally distributed. It has long been understood that early adopters stand 
to gain more from innovation processes than late adopters. The studies pre-
sented in this book indicate that the distribution of benefits in VCD depends 
in part on the initial asset endowment of participating farmers. Lower and 
upper asset thresholds are crucial for the distribution of benefits. Below a 
lower threshold, smallholders may have insufficient resources to participate 
in dynamic value chains and may be negatively impacted by VCD interven-
tions. Between the lower and upper thresholds, participants may benefit sig-
nificantly from the intervention. Above the upper threshold, participants 
1 The distinctions between simple, complicated, and complex situations and interventions are 
discussed by Patton (2011, chapter 4). 
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may benefit little from the intervention, since they were already participating 
actively in markets and deriving significant benefits prior to the intervention.
The livelihood strategies and asset endowments of individual farming 
households are not, of course, the only aspects that determine the benefits 
derived from market participation. As Berdegué, Bebbington, and Escobal 
(2014) conclude in a regional study in Latin America, the benefits that farm-
ing households reap from engagement in agricultural markets are strongly 
influenced by the local economic environment. Recent trends in the inter-
national markets for coffee, cocoa, oil palm, and other crops have shown the 
major implications that sustained fluctuations in prices can have on the live-
lihoods of farming households. Approaches to promote innovation and VCD 
should take into account smallholders’ livelihood strategies and asset endow-
ments, as well as the local economic context. VCD interventions should apply 
asset-based approaches to identify the nonmarket interventions needed to 
enable the poorest groups to meet minimum asset thresholds to participate 
successfully in VCD initiatives, or transition out of agriculture. It is especially 
important to pay attention to the needs and opportunities of women and 
other marginalized groups, who may benefit from, or be adversely affected by, 
innovation and VCD. Identifying gender imbalances and designing appropri-
ate interventions or components are necessary to achieve gender inclusion.
Attributes of Successful Interventions
In the context of this book, a successful intervention is one that generates sig-
nificant and potentially lasting benefits for the rural poor at scale. As noted 
at several points, few rigorous evaluations of VCD interventions exist, limit-
ing the extent to which we can draw firm conclusions based on experiences to 
date. Nevertheless, our review of the cases presented in this book supports the 
following general propositions, which we hope will be tested in future applied 
research and evaluation studies: 
• Interventions that have focused narrowly on either expanding production 
or developing value chains have had limited benefits for the poor.
• Interventions that combined agricultural innovation and VCD have had 
synergistic effects. 
• Multistakeholder platforms that fostered commercial, technical, and insti-
tutional innovation have had more significant and lasting impacts than 
those focused on governance and coordination issues. 
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• Inclusivity is an elusive ideal. Effective participation in VCD requires a 
minimum set of assets (not only land and financial capital, but also knowl-
edge, skills, social capital, and access to sources of technical support), 
which the poorest of the poor lack. So, while successful interventions 
broaden participation in VCD, benefitting the poor, they should not be 
expected to produce significant direct benefits for the poorest of the poor. 
• The main benefits of VCD for the poorest rural groups—those with very 
small parcels or no land at all—come from expanded employment in pro-
duction, processing, and marketing activities and in reduced prices of agri-
cultural products. 
• There is no single recipe for inclusive VCD. Interventions need to be 
tailored to fit the opportunities and constraints of particular places and 
targeted to reach specific groups. 
• Flexibility of intervention design and implementation is crucial for success. 
Since innovation and VCD processes are inherently unpredictable and 
evolve over time, program managers need the flexibility to respond quickly 
to changing conditions. 
• Project-based interventions are not enough. VCD interventions have been 
most successful where the economic and policy environments have sup-
ported rural enterprise development or where appropriate policy changes 
accompanied the interventions. 
• Time is essential for results to emerge. The most successful interven-
tions reviewed in this book benefitted from continuous support—from 
donors, international organizations, and national partners—over a 
decade or more. Follow-up studies show that the benefits of VCD inter-
ventions often continue to emerge years after the interventions terminate, 
through successive waves of innovation and change (Mayanja et al. 2012; 
Devaux et al. 2013) 
Until recently, interventions have tended to focus either on agricultural 
research and farm-level innovation or on VCD. However, frustrations with 
traditional interventions, particularly with those focused on increasing 
production, have led to the development of more integrated interventions 
involving both agricultural innovation and VCD. Examples of successfully 
integrated interventions reported on in this book include the International 
Livestock Research Institute’s (ILRI) work with the Smallholder Dairy 
Development Project in Kenya, their work with fodder innovation and 
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beef production in Vietnam, and the International Potato Center’s (CIP) 
work with PMCA. Several other CGIAR centers and partner organizations 
have also implemented initiatives that have attempted to combine both 
agricultural-innovation and VCD approaches, but, to date, few of these cases 
have been documented in peer-reviewed publications.
Interventions that combined innovation systems and VCD approaches 
generally began with technical research, which was later complemented with 
participatory approaches involving farmers, and later yet addressed issues 
of market access and VCD. They were flexible and adapted to needs and 
opportunities as they emerged.
As the scope of work broadened from conducting research to facilitating 
innovation and then embraced VCD, the number and diversity of stakehold-
ers increased and coalition building and facilitation became more important.
Based on their work with local Vietnamese researchers, development pro-
fessionals, government officials, farmers, market agents, and others, over more 
than a decade, ILRI researchers have identified the following components of 
an emergent strategy:
• A convincing technical innovation
• A participatory, systems-oriented innovation process
• A VCD approach that links farmers and local traders to growing markets
• Formation of loosely structured coalitions of local stakeholders
• Provision of technical support over an extended period—perhaps a decade 
or more.
CIP’s work with PMCA in South America also began with techni-
cal research. Early on, researchers incorporated participatory approaches to 
engage farmers in applied R&D. Later they began to work with other service 
providers and groups of market-chain actors to develop new products. Early 
marketing efforts stimulated innovation in both institutional arrangements 
and production technology—for example, contracts between farmer groups 
and processors, and use of new varieties and postharvest methods.
Interventions that have stimulated innovation processes that produced 
substantial benefits for smallholders have had to overcome numerous chal-
lenges. One set of challenges in public-sector agricultural research organiza-
tions relates to the limited availability of work vehicles, fuel, and per diems 
needed for work off station. Additionally, public research organizations are 
often hesitant to work with large private firms or NGOs. Researchers may 
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also be wary of “getting bogged down in development work” or discouraged 
from doing it because of the traditional research mandate of their organiza-
tion. To cope with these challenges, international organizations have often 
taken the lead in facilitating innovation and VCD processes, and they have 
provided essential resources for off-station work. In some cases, they have 
enlisted the collaboration of NGOs to play leadership roles. Local ownership 
of, and responsibility for, interventions has been cultivated via the develop-
ment of coalitions or platforms, discussed in a separate section below.
A second set of challenges concerns the involvement of large private firms. 
Creativity is positively associated with the diversity of stakeholders involved 
in innovation processes. In many cases, large marketing or processing firms 
could play important roles in innovation processes. But it has been difficult 
to encourage these firms to invest the time needed in what they often feel are 
unproductive meetings that produce few immediate results for them. For this 
reason, there has been a tendency for platforms to work initially with small 
entrepreneurs, and bring larger businesses on board once they can see the 
potential value of early innovations.
The lack of well-trained local facilitators or innovation brokers has been 
another common challenge, and this is an important reason why international 
organizations have often—at least initially—led the process of facilitating 
innovation, and then prioritized capacity strengthening for local facilita-
tors. Development of methodological guides and capacity building have been 
among the most important contributions of international organizations to 
local innovation capacity. It is important to note, however, that it has been 
easier to strengthen the capacity of individuals than to bring about changes 
in their parent organizations to take full advantage of their newly developed 
capacities. This point is discussed more fully in the section on the importance 
of institutional innovation (below).
A final challenge has been to overcome donor demands for quick results. 
CGIAR, national, and regional R&D programs have been under increasing 
pressure from donors to produce quicker results with more limited resources 
(Pingali 2010; McCalla 2014). Interventions that have generated significant 
benefits have generally been carried out over a decade or more, with support 
from international donors and the stable organizational environments pro-
vided by CGIAR centers. The policy implication is that donors that wish to 
generate significant returns on investments in inclusive VCD should under-
stand that external support is likely to be needed for a number of years—prob-
ably at least a decade.
INNOVATION FOR INCLUSIVE VALUE-CHAIN DEVELOPMENT 27
Centrality of Institutional Innovation
Existing institutional arrangements with buyers often limit the ability of small-
holders and small market agents to increase their benefits from value-chain 
participation. Smallholders often distrust local buyers, which increases their 
transaction costs and reduces their incentives for investing in yield-increasing 
technologies. Product quality is increasingly important for determining farm-
ers’ pay in high-value markets, and costly technology is needed to assess invis-
ible quality attributes, such as nutrient content and pesticide residues. In this 
context, weak institutions for ensuring the fair measurement of product quality 
and for enforcing contracts can negatively impact smallholders.
Institutional innovations—such as multistakeholder platforms, farmer 
organizations, innovative contract-farming arrangements, independent bod-
ies for product quality verification, and new R&D approaches—have played 
key roles in inclusive VCD. Multistakeholder platforms will be discussed in 
the following section. Several chapters in this book show how farmer organi-
zations have aided in reducing transaction costs in input and product markets, 
by improving product assembly and quality assurance, and by organizing sup-
plies of inputs, credit, and technical assistance. They have also aided in nego-
tiating more favorable contract terms and conditions for smallholders. It is 
important to note, however, that farmer organizations often require long-term 
external support (Berdegué 2001).
Contract farming has helped farmers overcome market failures by link-
ing them with output markets for high-value foods and guaranteeing them a 
market for their produce. When contractors provide inputs, credit, or tech-
nical advice, contract farming can also help farmers to access technology and 
input markets. Contract farming can raise the incomes of participating farm-
ers. But its application is limited to high-value crops and livestock products 
sold in quality-sensitive markets. Where market institutions are weak, inde-
pendent bodies for product-quality verification can improve contract enforce-
ment, benefitting both buyers and sellers. Strengthening local institutional 
arrangements (for example, to enforce contracts and provide independent ver-
ification of product quality in contract-farming schemes) can contribute sig-
nificantly to the development of agricultural markets and the benefits reaped 
by smallholders. Innovations in contract design are important to balance the 
power between smallholders and the monopsonistic power of contracting 
companies. One example is the third-party certification proposed by Saenger 
et al. (Chapter 11). Other innovations are mentioned by Minot and Sawyer 
(Chapter 4).
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Innovations in R&D approaches are an important way to foster innova-
tion processes in the productive sector, benefitting smallholders and other 
economic actors. Several chapters in this book show how the participation of 
research organizations in multistakeholder platforms and acting as innovation 
brokers has improved the linkages between researchers and other service pro-
viders and value-chain actors. This has contributed both to innovations in the 
productive sector and to improving the focus of applied research on challenges 
and opportunities identified by value-chain actors.
As a cautionary note, it is important to realize that institutions—be they 
market institutions or the rules and procedures of agricultural R&D organiza-
tions—are often highly resistant to change. This resistance is one reason why 
some promising new innovation systems or VCD approaches developed with 
support from externally funded “special projects” were not mainstreamed in 
the parent R&D organizations.
Role of Multistakeholder Platforms in VCD
Many of the interventions presented in this book have involved the develop-
ment of multistakeholder platforms that provide opportunities for interaction 
among individuals with different stakes in a common resource or process, to 
interact, improve their mutual understanding, create trust, and engage in joint 
activities. Some platforms have been primarily concerned with fostering mar-
ket innovation, others with improving market-chain governance and coordi-
nation, and yet others with both innovation and chain governance.
Effective facilitation, or innovation brokerage, is crucial for the success 
of multistakeholder platforms, and involves not just the coordination of 
interactions, but network formation, technical backstopping, mediation of 
disputes, advocacy, capacity building, and documentation of results. In recent 
years, many NGOs have developed their own capacity for facilitating events, 
which provides a base for further developing their capacities for innovation 
brokerage. These skills are scarcer in publically funded agricultural research 
institutes, highlighting the need for investments in capacity development 
if agricultural research organizations are expected to facilitate the work 
of platforms.
Since innovation and VCD are complex processes, platforms may take 
different forms, and tend to evolve over time. The platforms analyzed 
in this book generally played different roles at different times and their 
structures evolved accordingly. Mechanisms for platform funding, planning, 
management, and governance need to allow for continual adaptation to 
emerging challenges and opportunities.
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Platforms need to be flexibly managed, learn from experience, and adapt 
to unfolding events. Platform managers need the support of learning-oriented 
monitoring and evaluation. They also need evidence of impacts to justify 
platform funding. Since platforms facilitate processes but do not themselves 
produce tangible results, it is difficult to prove their value through impact 
studies. Developing the capacities needed for learning, documentation, and 
impact assessment remain challenges for many platforms.
Platforms have various degrees of formality and longevity. Some platforms 
have written charters and official government recognition, but most have less 
formal structures and operate through more informal interactions among 
actors for specific purposes. Where platforms are concerned with natural- 
resources management, their sustainability is crucial for achieving sustainable 
results. But transitory development coalitions can play useful roles in promot-
ing innovation and inclusive VCD.
The chapters in this book illustrate how widely socioeconomic, institu-
tional, ecological, and technical conditions vary over time and space, and how 
interventions that promote inclusive VCD need to be tailored to fit specific 
local conditions and need to be flexible enough to evolve in response to chang-
ing conditions, opportunities, and threats. For this reason, platforms also vary 
significantly over time and space. The policy implication is that while general 
principles of agricultural innovation and VCD are broadly applicable, rigid 
models for platforms and broader interventions cannot simply be scaled up or 
transferred from one area to another.
The need for flexible arrangements and quick responses can make it dif-
ficult for R&D programs in public agricultural research institutes to partic-
ipate effectively in platforms. For this reason, organizational reforms may be 
needed for some public-funded agricultural research organizations to be able 
to play more effective roles in promoting innovation and inclusive VCD.2
Conclusion
The chapters in this book suggest a number of priorities for future research to 
advance inclusive VCD. They are summarized in five points:
1. Methods for implementing asset-based approaches to value-chain devel-
opment. There is a broad consensus that the asset endowments of 
smallholders and other market-chain actors influence their ability to 
2 For a discussion of the types of organizational changes that may be needed, see Horton (2012). 
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participate in and benefit from VCD interventions. It is, however, less 
clear how to practically assess initial asset endowments and implement 
asset-based approaches. Practical methods are needed for applying  
asset-based approaches for VCD, in particular, for determining the  
“value-chain readiness” of potential participants and capturing gender 
differences along the value chain.
2. Platform membership, management, and facilitation. Comparative 
assessment of experiences with different types of platform, management 
systems, and facilitation arrangements is needed to clarify how such 
aspects as member diversity, the formality of management structures 
and systems, and different facilitation arrangements influence platform 
performance in different contexts.
3. Evaluation approaches and testing of action and change models. Applied 
research and evaluation are needed to draw lessons from experience and 
test the (often implicit) action and change models that guide complex 
integrated interventions that promote inclusive VCD. Complex 
interventions such as inclusive VCD present evaluators with numerous 
challenges. Common themes in this book are the importance of 
improving evaluation to support adaptive management of interventions; 
to provide the information on cost-effectiveness needed for improved 
accountability for the resources used; and to answer more fundamental 
questions related to the effectiveness of inclusive VCD interventions, 
vis-à-vis alternative approaches for improving the lot of the rural poor. It 
is also important to reduce the cost of evaluations and identify practical 
methods for assessing changes along the entire value chain, and to guide 
efforts to scale up promising pilot schemes. 
4.  Upscaling. Most of the experiences with interventions that integrate 
innovation-system and VCD approaches documented to date have 
been at the level of pilot projects. Many questions remain concerning: 
(1) the feasibility of expanding and extending these pilots to achieve 
greater impact; and (2) as to how best to scale up successful promising 
approaches while taking into consideration the heterogeneity of condi-
tions in which VCD takes place.
5.  Application of a “gender lens.” Women participate in many activities 
along value chains, and VCD initiatives may have differential impacts 
on women and men. More applied research and systematic evaluation 
is needed to offer donors, practitioners, and researchers in the field 
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practical and effective methods and tools for designing and implement-
ing intervention strategies that enhance the benefits realized by women 
who participate in value chains. Some experiences have been docu-
mented and offer recommendations for mainstreaming gender in agri-
cultural innovation processes (for example, Polar et al. 2015). These 
should be reviewed with an eye to developing more inclusive agricultur-
al-innovation and value-chain development processes. Deeper insights 
into the opportunities to improve the returns to women from VCD 
may provide guidance on how to incorporate youth, ethnic minorities, 
and other underrepresented groups in VCD. 
references
Aramyan, L., A. Lansink, and O. van Kooten. 2005. “Testing a Performance Measurement 
Framework for Agri-Food Supply Chains.” (abstract) In Developing Entrepreneurship  
Abilities to Feed the World in a Sustainable Way. 15th International Farm  
Management Conference, São Paulo, Brazil, August 14–29.  
www.ifmaonline.org/pages/con_full_articles.php?abstract=213.
Ashby, J. 2009. “Fostering Farmer First Methodological Innovation: Organizational Learning and 
Change in International Agricultural Research.” In Farmer First Revisited: Innovation for 
Agricultural Research and Development, edited by I. Scoones and J. Thompson, 39–45. Rugby, 
UK: Practical Action Publishing.
Berdegué, J. 2001. “Cooperating to Compete: Associative Peasant Business Firms in Chile.” PhD 
Thesis, Wageningen Agricultural University.
Berdegué, J., A. Bebbington, and J. Escobal. 2014. “Conceptualizing Spatial Diversity in Latin 
American Rural Development: Structures, Institutions, and Coalitions.” World Development 
73: 1–10. www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X1400326X.
Biggs, S. 1990. “A Multiple Source of Innovation Model of Agricultural Research and Technology 
Promotion.” World Development 18 (11): 1481–1490.
Devaux, A., M. Ordinola, S. Mayanja, D. Campilan, and D. Horton. 2013. The Participatory 
Market Chain Approach: From the Andes to Africa and Asia. Papa Andina Innovation 
Brief 1. Lima, Peru: International Potato Center.
Dolan, C., and J. Humphrey. 2000. “Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: Impact of UK 
Supermarkets on Horticulture Industry.” Journal of Development Studies 37 (2): 147–176.
32 PART 1
Donovan, J., and D. Stoian. 2012. 5Capitals: A Tool for Assessing the Poverty Impacts of Value  
Chain Development. Technical Series, Technical Bulletin no. 55, Rural Enterprise 
Development Collection No. 7. Turrialba, Costa Rica: Tropical Agricultural Research and 
Higher Education Center (CATIE). www.worldagroforestry.org/downloads/Publications/
PDFS/B17400.pdf.
Dror, I., J. Cadilhon, M. Schut, M. Misik, and S. Maheshwari. 2016. Innovation Platforms for 
Agricultural Development: Evaluating the Mature Innovation Platforms Landscape. Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge.
Giuliani, A., F. Hintermann, W. Rojas, and S. Padulosi, eds. 2012. Biodiversity of Andean Grains: 
Balancing Market Potential and Sustainable Livelihoods. Rome: Bioversity International. 
Haggblade, S., P. Hazell, and T. Reardon. 2010. “The Rural Non-farm Economy: Prospects for 
Growth and Poverty Reduction.” World Development 38 (10): 1429–1441.
Hall, A. 2006. “Public–Private Partnerships in an Agricultural System of Innovation: Concepts 
and Challenges.” International Journal of Technology Management and Sustainability 
Development 5 (1): 3–20.
Hall, A. 2009. “Challenges to Strengthening Agricultural Innovation Systems: Where Do We Go 
from Here?” In Farmer First Revisited: Innovation for Agricultural Research and Development, 
edited by I. Scoones and J. Thompson, 30–38. Rugby, UK: Practical Action Publishing. 
Hazell, P., and A. Rahman, eds. 2014. New Directions for Smallholder Agriculture. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Horton, D. 2012. “Organizational Change for Learning and Innovation.” In Agricultural 
Innovation Systems: An Investment Sourcebook. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Humphrey, J., and L. Navas-Alemán. 2010. Value Chains, Donor Interventions and Poverty 
Reduction: A Review of Donor Practice. IDS Research Report 63. Brighton, UK: Institute of 
Development Studies.
Klerkx, L., A. Hall, and C. Leeuwis. 2009. “Strengthening Agricultural Innovation Capacity: Are 
Innovation Brokers the Answer?” International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance 
and Ecology 8 (5/6): 409–438.
Lambert, D., and T. Pohlen. 2001. “Supply Chain Metrics.” International Journal of Logistics 
Management 12 (1): 1–19.
Lanjouw, J., and P. Lanjouw. 2001. “The Rural Non-Farm Sector: Issues and Evidence from 
Developing Countries.” Agricultural Economics 26: 1–23. 
Lele, U. 2004. The CGIAR at 31: An Independent Meta-Evaluation of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research. Washington, DC: World Bank.
INNOVATION FOR INCLUSIVE VALUE-CHAIN DEVELOPMENT 33
Lohman, C., L. Fortuin, and M. Wouters. 2004. “Designing a Performance Measurement System: 
A Case Study.” European Journal of Operational Research 15 (6): 267–286.
Mayanja, S., B. Akello, D. Horton, D. Kisauzi, and D. Magala. 2012. “Value Chain Development in 
Uganda: Lessons from the Participatory Market Chain Approach.” Banwa 9 (1 & 2).
McCalla, A. 2014. CGIAR Reform—Why So Difficult? Working Paper No. 14-001. Davis, CA, 
US: Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California. 
Pant, L., and H. Hambly. 2009. “Innovation Systems in Renewable Natural Resource Management 
and Sustainable Agriculture: A Literature Review.” African Journal of Science, Technology, 
Innovation and Development 1 (1): 103–135. 
Patton, M. 2011. Developmental Evaluation. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Pingali, P. 2010. “Global Agriculture R&D and the Changing Aid Architecture.” Agricultural 
Economics 41 (s1): 145–153. 
Polar, V., C. Babini, and P. Flores. 2015. Technology for Men and Women: Recommendations  
to Reinforce Gender Mainstreaming Inagricultural Technology Innovation Processes for  
Food Security. La Paz, Bolivia: AGRIDEL SRL, International Potato Center.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.4160/9789290604655.
Reardon, T., and P. Timmer. 2012. “The Economics of the Food System Revolution.” Annual 
Review of Resource Economics 2012 (4): 225–264. 
Reardon, T., C. Barrett, J. Berdegué, and J. Swinnen. 2009. “Agrifood Industry Transformation and 
Small Farmers in Developing Countries.” World Development 37 (11): 1717–1727.
Reardon, T., K. Chen, B. Minten, and L. Adriano. 2012. The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food 
Value Chains: Enter the Dragon, the Elephant, and the Tiger. Mandaluyong City, Philippines 
and Washington, DC: Asian Development Bank and International Food Policy Research 
Institute. 
Torero, M. 2014. “Targeting Investments to Link Farmers to Markets: A Framework for Capturing 
the Heterogeneity of Smallholder Farmers.” In New Directions for Smallholder Agriculture, 
edited by P. B. R. Hazell and A. Rahman, 155–183. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization). 2011. Pro-Poor Value Chain 
Development: 25 Guiding Questions for Designing and Implementing Agroindustry Projects. 
Vienna, Austria.
Webb, R. 2013. Conexión y Despegue Rural. Lima, Peru: Instituto del Perú de la Universidad de San 
Martín de Porres.
World Bank. 2012. Agricultural Innovation Systems: An Investment Sourcebook. Washington, DC. 
—. 2014. Agribusiness Indicators: Synthesis Report. Agriculture Global Practice Discussion 
Paper 01. Washington, DC.
34 PART 1
Part 2
Challenges and Approaches 
for Inclusive Value-Chain 
Development 

CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES FOR 
INCLUSIVE VALUE-CHAIN DEVELOPMENT: 
INTRODUCTION
Jason Donovan, Dietmar Stoian, and Mark Lundy
Summary
Growing demand for higher-value agricultural products presents new 
opportunities for smallholders and market agents in developing countries. 
However, responding to these opportunities can require significant 
investment for enhancing productive capacities, business skills, and 
infrastructure. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government 
agencies, and food processors recognize the opportunity—and need—to 
support the integration of smallholders and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) into value chains. Chapters in this part shed light on 
critical issues for the design, implementation, and assessment of programs 
that support value-chain development (VCD). Chapter 1 (Donovan et al.) 
identifies the strengths and limitations of widely used methodological guides 
for designing value-chain interventions. Chapter 2 (Stoian et al.) stresses the 
importance of adopting a livelihoods perspective when engaging smallholders 
in VCD and advocates an asset-based, multi-chain approach toward this end. 
Chapter 3 (Donovan and Poole) applies an asset-based approach to assess 
smallholder capacity-building interventions for participation in certified-
coffee markets. Chapter 4 (Minot and Sawyer) reviews experiences with 
contract farming—a specific private-sector-initiated intervention in value 
chains, the inclusive nature of which has been questioned in the literature. 
These chapters provide guidance on the design of future value-chain 
interventions and investments for smallholders and SMEs.
Introduction 
Growing demand for higher-value agricultural products, abroad and 
increasingly at home, presents smallholders and agriculture-based SMEs 
in developing countries with new opportunities to add value to their 
primary production. However, responding to the opportunities can require 
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significant investment for enhancing productive capacities, business skills, 
and infrastructure. Government agencies, NGOs, and the private sector have 
recognized the opportunity, as well as the need, to support smallholders 
and local enterprises to effectively participate in agrifood value chains. In 
some cases, government agencies and NGOs target their interventions at 
smallholders, with the aim of building smallholders’ capacity to respond 
to the growing demand for high-value agricultural products and services in 
international markets. In other cases, they seek out options for enhancing the 
policy and institutional environment in which smallholders and their business 
partners operate, with emphasis on removing political–legal barriers and 
institutional bottlenecks to increased productivity and profitability. Agrifood 
companies may support smallholders and SMEs in their efforts to obtain 
better access to raw materials and semi-finished products, and to enhance 
their social and environmental credentials (“sustainable sourcing”). While 
poverty reduction may not be the primary goal when companies invest in their 
smallholder suppliers, such engagement may have important implications 
for pathways out of poverty and overall rural development (Humphrey and 
Memedovic 2006; Barrett et al. 2011). From a bi- and multilateral donor 
perspective, the promotion of VCD is explicitly geared toward poverty 
reduction, and related investments are made across a range of subsectors, 
developing regions, and actors (e.g. government agencies, NGOs, cooperatives, 
large-scale buyers, and processors) (DFID and SDC 2008; Humphrey and 
Navas-Alemán 2010).
Behind development organizations’ interventions in value chains lies a 
desire to stimulate economic growth and, in some cases, enhance the envi-
ronmental and social performance of value chains. Organizations have put 
particular emphasis on inclusion of the rural poor and expanded business 
opportunities for women, often in combination with incentives for environ-
mentally friendly production technologies (UNIDO 2011). The term “inclu-
sive value-chain development,” frequently used by organizations working in 
VCD, denotes the expanded set of expectations surrounding such value-chain 
interventions. Building inclusive value chains is an inherently complex pro-
cess. It involves value-chain actors with different and often divergent interests, 
entrepreneurs and businesses of different sizes, farmers with a variety of assets 
and productive capacities, and an array of input and service providers, all oper-
ating in a dynamic business environment with severe limitations in terms of 
infrastructure and services. Despite anecdotal evidence regarding progress in 
VCD to extend benefits to the rural poor, the inclusive value-chain approach 
is fairly new, rigorous impact assessments are scant, and learning is still 
38 PART 2
emerging (Garloch 2012). Critical questions remain regarding the potential 
for poor farmers—including women, youth, and indigenous communities—
to benefit from their participation in value chains: (1) How are interventions 
designed to meet the needs of the poor and advance business along the chain? 
(2) Who is excluded from participating in and benefitting from more demand-
ing value chains? and (3) What are the underlying reasons for such exclusion, 
including those related to poverty, age, sex, and ethnicity?
Part 2 of this book, presented in four chapters, sheds light on some of 
these questions by exploring the conceptualization and implementation of 
VCD and its contribution to rural poverty reduction. Chapter 1 (Donovan 
et al.) compares VCD tools geared toward development agencies and the pri-
vate sector with emphasis on methodological guides for designing value-chain 
interventions. Chapter 2 (Stoian et al.) questions the assumptions underlying 
VCD interventions in terms of smallholders’ access to livelihood assets, their 
investment in value-chain activities, and the associated risks of specialization 
for livelihood resilience, particularly as regards market shocks, natural disas-
ters, and crop losses due to pests and diseases. Chapter 3 (Donovan and Poole) 
explores how differences in asset endowments and livelihood strategies influ-
ence the outcomes of external interventions to build the capacity of smallhold-
ers in Nicaragua to participate in value chains for certified coffee. Chapter 4 
(Minot and Sawyer) shifts the focus to private-sector-driven VCD in the form 
of contract farming, drawing lessons on the conditions under which private 
companies organizing smallholder production contribute to income and other 
benefits for smallholders.
Opportunities and Challenges for Developing 
Inclusive Value Chains
Chapter 1 (Donovan et al.) reviews the concepts and methods embraced by 11 
value-chain guides, and assesses their strengths and limitations for designing 
value chain interventions. The review is timely, as in recent years there has been 
a proliferation of guides to support the design of VCD. Guides differ in their 
developmental goals (for example, poverty reduction, economic growth, or 
“decent work”), their approach to achieving those goals (for example, a focus on 
better market links versus improved business environment), and their targeted 
users (government agencies, NGOs, or private sector). All of the guides place 
strong emphasis on institutions for the production and marketing of agricul-
tural products and achieving sustainability of interventions through a strong 
demand orientation. The scale of intervention varies: some guides focusing on 
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the national level (with an orientation toward economic development or more 
affordable food for urban populations), while others zoom in on a particular 
group of smallholders and businesses (with an orientation toward improving 
commercial relations among the actors). The review sheds light on certain gaps 
and limitations in the guides for achieving rural poverty goals. First, greater 
attention must be given to understanding poor households and their capac-
ity to engage in new market-oriented endeavors. Important questions need to 
be addressed regarding households’ access to sufficient productive resources, 
potential for substantial trade-offs when using these resources, and their abil-
ity to take on higher risks when investing their capital and labor. Second, the 
guides should provide deeper guidance for dealing with variations in the con-
text. Most guides assume that users will identify critical elements of the con-
text, understand their relevance for VCD, and make the necessary adjustments 
in data collection and analysis. These contextual differences may relate to scale 
in shipping and processing (and the related need for smallholder organization), 
the pre-existing asset endowments of smallholders and local businesses (and the 
related need for investments in asset building prior to VCD), and the overall 
business environment (and the related need for advocacy as part of the VCD). 
Finally, more attention should be given to the capacities of those who imple-
ment the guides. Greater discussion on how to deal with complex research 
design and implementation issues, such as variability in returns, may help to 
improve the overall rigor of assessment and usefulness of VCD strategies. New 
debates and interactions among tool designers and users are needed to identify 
the costs and benefits of additional tools and their rigor, and to promote learn-
ing for improved design and implementation of VCD guides.1
Chapter 2 (Stoian et al.) draws attention to the link between VCD and 
smallholder livelihood strategies that comprise a complex mix of subsistence 
and market-oriented activities and that are diversified to meet multiple live-
lihood goals and mitigate risks;2 and the authors address the related impli-
1 Recent experiences by the Central American Learning Alliance (Lundy and Gottret 2007; 
Faminow, Carter, and Lundy 2009; Lundy, Gottret, and Best 2012) provide insights into the 
opportunities for collective learning around VCD. This collaboration between researchers 
and development practitioners has enabled them to collectively address critical questions and 
knowledge gaps, develop and test tools to fill those gaps, and document outcomes and collective 
learning about what works and why. After a decade of practice, evidence has shown that VCD 
practices and knowledge management have improved, as shown by increased effectiveness in 
existing projects and more strategic new projects.
2 Other authors have also stressed the need to integrate a livelihoods framework with a value-
chain framework (Dorward et al. 2003; Neilson and Shonk 2014). It is the focus on asset 
building at the level of both smallholder households and their businesses, as well as the direct 
link to development practice—design, implementation, and monitoring of VCD, and learning 
around its outcomes and impact—that sets Chapter 2 apart.
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cations for the design and assessment of value-chain interventions. They 
question some of the underlying assumptions of NGOs, government agencies, 
and private-sector agents seeking to link smallholders to higher-value markets, 
namely: (1) smallholder households have sufficient resources to participate 
effectively in more demanding markets; (2) they do not face substantial trade-
offs when aggregating these resources in a given value chain; and (3) they are 
able to assume higher risks when reinvesting their assets and labor in such a 
way. In reality, however, smallholder households carefully balance subsistence 
and market-oriented agriculture with off-farm labor and other nonagricul-
tural income-generating activities, and highly constrained assets for many of 
these households. The crux of the authors’ argument is that most strategies for 
VCD, with their focus on a single chain, steer smallholders to adopt specializa-
tion strategies, with higher investments of capital, labor, and other resources 
directed toward activities in a specific value chain. Such strategies may lead to 
higher returns, but they also imply greater risk and potentially higher trade-
offs between economic growth and livelihood security.3 The authors also 
argue that smallholders need to be endowed with a minimum amount of 
livelihood assets to participate successfully in value chains, and that small-
holders below minimum asset thresholds require specific, nonmarket inter-
ventions to become “value chain ready.” They advocate an asset-based, 
multi-chain approach to VCD in response to the shortcomings of conven-
tional VCD interventions focused on a single value chain. Such an approach 
would take into account diverse options across a portfolio of value chains 
in a given territory, and intervention strategies would be adjusted to diverse 
asset endowments among smallholder households. Multi-chain VCD would 
also allow for access to and control over household assets to be differenti-
ated by gender and age across a number of subsistence and market-oriented 
livelihood activities. This would imply greater coordination among those 
engaged in VCD in a given area to ensure complementarity among VCD 
3 The capacity of smallholders to participate in higher-value markets has been discussed at length 
in the debate on nontraditional agricultural exports (NTAE). Between the late 1980s and late 
1990s, agricultural development strategies prioritized the promotion of NTAE. Multilateral 
and bilateral donors helped identify lucrative markets and provided technical assistance and 
the means for meeting market requirements (for example, training, subsidized credit, farming 
inputs, and infrastructure development). In Latin America, NTAE promotion involved fresh 
fruits and vegetables (for example, in Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras), fresh cut 
f lowers (for example, in Colombia and Ecuador), and processed products such as frozen con-
centrate organic juice (for example, in Belize and Brazil). However, researchers have strongly 
criticized these programs for their perceived lack of sustainability, inattention to poverty and 
the environment, and negative effects on gender relations (Stonich 1991; Carter et al. 1996; 
Donovan and Poole 2008).
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interventions—investments that could deliver more sustainable outcomes and 
impacts over the long term.
Chapter 3 (Donovan and Poole) analyzes the accumulation of livelihood 
assets among smallholders producing certified coffee in Nicaragua. The 
authors are particularly interested in the capacity of resource-poor small-
holders who pursue diversified livelihood strategies and operate in adverse 
conditions to significantly increase their income and build their asset base 
through engagement with more demanding markets. There is growing con-
sensus that asset accumulation plays a critical role in providing a pathway out 
of poverty (Carter and Barrett 2004). However, the authors’ case underscores 
that smallholder endowments with critical livelihood assets are overall lim-
ited and often imbalanced. They also show the implications of the fact that 
access to these assets is differentiated by gender and age. Results among the 
coffee-growing households in Nicaragua suggest a pattern of significant, but 
incomplete, asset building across critical livelihood assets. In terms of human 
capital, for example, most households acquired new skills that improved cof-
fee quality, but few households developed more complex skills for improved 
plantation management—a critical determinant of coffee productivity 
through plant-disease control. The ability to intensify production practices 
was linked to endowments of human and financial capitals that were severely 
constrained in many cases. The results also highlighted the considerable het-
erogeneity in smallholders’ capacity to build assets through new market link-
ages. Households with relatively low asset endowments prior to engaging in 
certified-coffee markets were the least likely to achieve major advances in 
asset building. These households benefitted from certified-coffee markets 
mainly through access to safety nets that helped reduce vulnerability to exter-
nal shocks (through membership of a cooperative). The work reported in 
Chapter 3 suggests that much remains to be learned about how interventions 
for VCD that involve poor farmers can deliver lasting change in production 
systems and marketing options that positively impact rural livelihoods.
The review of existing studies on the impact of contract farming and 
smallholder access to contract farming (Chapter 4) sheds light on the role of 
the private sector in supporting smallholder access to lucrative value chains. 
Contract farming schemes typically involve a contractor company that pro-
vides producers with technical assistance, seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs 
on credit, and offers a guaranteed price in exchange for agricultural products 
that meet specified quality and volume requirements. The debate around con-
tract farming and its potential to advance rural development goals is extensive, 
with strong proponents of contract farming as a facilitator of development 
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outcomes and a fair number of skeptics. Chapter 4 (Minot and Sawyer) pro-
vides clarity on the opportunities and limitations of contract farming as an 
institution that facilitates agricultural intensification by smallholders. They 
find that contract farming is more viable in value chains of fruits and  
vegetables for quality-sensitive markets, commercial dairy and poultry pro-
duction, and certain cash crops (for example, tea, tobacco, sugarcane, and cot-
ton). In terms of income benefits for smallholders, most case studies found 
considerable increases in income, in the range 25–75 percent. On the ques-
tion of whether companies were willing to invest in building commercial 
relations with smallholders, the evidence was inconclusive. In general, how-
ever, larger companies seem to be willing to work with smallholders, but some 
crops benefit from economies of scale and other characteristics that tend to 
favor medium- to large-scale farmers. The literature points to contract breach 
by contractor companies, “side-selling” by producing households, and the high 
costs of working with large numbers of smallholders as major limitations to 
the growth of contract farming. This chapter stresses that contract farming, as 
a private-sector-led approach to linking smallholders with value chains, is not 
a broad-based solution to rural development, as only a small fraction of poor 
farmers in developing countries have access to contracts.
Conclusion
The chapters in Part 2 of this book shed light on some important challenges 
facing efforts to encourage smallholder participation in higher-value mar-
kets. Chapter 1 identifies the gaps in a set of methodological guides for the 
design of VCD interventions that include the rural poor. These include scant 
attention to the needs and circumstances of diverse types of smallholders to 
be involved in VCD, and limited guidance on how to handle variations in the 
context that influence the activities, investments, and strategies of value-chain 
actors. Chapter 2 stresses the poverty conditions in which many small holders 
realize their livelihoods and seek to mitigate risks, and the resulting need for 
broader interventions for rural development that go beyond VCD interven-
tions addressing production, processing, and marketing issues for a single 
crop. Chapter 3 highlights the importance of pre-intervention asset endow-
ments for VCD-related asset building, with the lowest levels of asset build-
ing observed among those farmers who were least endowed with assets prior 
to the interventions in the value chain of certified coffee. Participating in 
and benefitting from interventions for VCD pose considerable challenges 
to resource-poor farmers when certain preconditions for success are not met. 
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Preconditions relate to asset endowments, access to sufficient and effective 
services and affordable inputs, and minimum degrees of smallholder business 
organization. Chapter 4 provides a persuasive argument that contract farm-
ing is not a solution to broad-based rural development as it only involves a 
small fraction of smallholder households. This, in turn, can be seen as a con-
sequence of high transaction costs resulting from poor infrastructure and 
services, underdeveloped grading and standards systems, and inconsistent vol-
umes and quality of raw materials provided by smallholders and their busi-
nesses. From a private-sector perspective, these costs are often prohibitive and 
limit active engagement in VCD, either in the form of “embedded services” or, 
particularly, in the spread of contract farming. Even in those cases where these 
costs are manageable, the private sector has very limited capacity to address 
the needs of most resource-poor populations, including landless people, and 
smallholders with minimum landholdings and other assets.
On the whole, the chapters in this part suggest an urgent need for deeper 
coordination and collaboration among those who intervene in value chains 
in support of smallholders and rural development. Intensive collaboration 
between researchers and VCD stakeholders will open the door to more inno-
vative approaches, methods, and tools that respond to the various realities and 
needs of smallholders and other resource-poor people. Evidence-based learn-
ing provides the best chance for expanding the options for inclusive VCD 
and achieving higher impact on poverty reduction and rural development 
in less time with fewer resources. Better investments in VCD will emerge 
from deeper links between development agencies, governments, and those 
engaged on the ground in support of VCD building based on shared objec-
tives, joint learning, and mutual accountability. Finally, the farmers, buy-
ers, processors, and input and service providers engaged in value chains will 
benefit from improved collaboration among themselves. Identifying critical 
elements for forging such innovative alliances, crafting the underlying insti-
tutional arrangements, making joint investments, and developing related risk- 
and benefit-sharing mechanisms are critical areas for future research in direct 
collaboration with stakeholders inside and outside of the value chain. Critical 
reflection, innovation, and risk-taking will be required among these actors to 
enable the shift in focus from short-term outputs to long-term development 
processes, and from one-size-fits-all approaches to strategies designed around 
the particular realities and needs of smallholders and other weaker actors 
engaged in a value chain.
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GUIDES FOR VALUE-CHAIN DEVELOPMENT: 
A COMPARATIVE REVIEW1
Jason Donovan, Steve Franzel, Marcelo Cunha, 
Amos Gyau, and Dagmar Mithöfer 
Introduction and Background
Value-chain development (VCD) features prominently in development pro-
gramming aimed at stimulating economic growth and increasing the com-
petitiveness of the agricultural sector (Humphrey and Navas-Alemán 2010; 
Staritz 2012). The approach challenges governments and civil society to look 
beyond individual actors, such as smallholders or cooperatives, when consid-
ering how to achieve development goals. It is argued that by focusing on the 
value chain and the links between the actors spread along it, development 
interventions can better identify common problems among actors in the chain 
and solutions that generate win–win outcomes. Improved chain relations and 
overall chain performance are expected to yield tangible benefits in terms of 
economic performance and, in some cases, poverty reduction. The potential 
to include medium- and large-scale businesses as active partners in VCD offers 
development agencies opportunities for achieving outcomes at greater scale, 
with potentially increased impact and sustainability. For many development 
agencies, donors, and governments, VCD has become a principal element of 
their poverty-reduction strategies.
Interest in VCD stems, in large part, from an increased awareness among 
development organizations that success in increasingly complex agrifood 
markets often requires stronger collaboration among chain actors, includ-
ing producers, processors, and retailers (Hobbs, Cooney, and Fulton 2000; 
1 The authors thank the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation, and the 
CGIAR Research Programs on Forests, Trees and Agroforestry (FTA) and PIM for providing 
the financial support that allowed us to carry out this study. Special thanks to Veronica Gottret, 
Douglas Horton, Mark Lundy, Andrew Shepherd, Felicity Proctor, and Anne Terheggen for 
their comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank the following authors of guides 
for value-chain analysis and development for their comments and suggestions: Thomas Bernet, 
Ruth Campbell, Carlos A. da Silva, Jeanne Downing, Veronica Gottret, Frank Hartwich, and 
Graham Thiele.
This chapter was originally published as an article in the Journal of Agribusiness in Developing and Emerging 
Economies 5 (1): 2–23 (2015).
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Humphrey and Memedovic 2006). Important factors that have spurred 
interest in VCD include growing urban demand for added-value food-
stuffs in developing countries, more stringent quality and food-safety stan-
dards by governments and private firms, the growth of niche markets (for 
example, organic and fair trade), and concern over the scarcity of agricul-
tural raw materials. In some cases, VCD responds to the need to reinvigo-
rate development processes that led to the formulation of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which view increased income as a precursor 
to livelihood security and a decent standard of living. The rapid growth in 
demand for agrifood products in which smallholders are considered to have 
a comparative advantage—for example, specialty crops like coffee and horti-
culture that require high labor inputs—has been considered an opportunity 
to combine economic growth and poverty-reduction goals (Bacon 2005; 
Weinberger and Lumpkin 2007).
With the emergence of value chains in development programming came a 
burst of activity to develop guides and diagnostic tools to help practitioners 
conduct value-chain analysis, usually as input for the design of interven-
tions. Guides for VCD are analytical tools to design interventions on behalf 
of smallholders and small rural businesses that are affected by the expansion 
of international agribusiness (Haggblade 2007). In some cases, these tools 
respond to shifting power structures in global agribusiness markets, which 
have led to both opportunities and threats for small players in developing 
countries. However, recent studies have shown that significant differences 
exist in how the guides interpret chain-related concepts (Altenburg 2007; 
Nang’ole, Mithöfer, and Franzel 2011; Proctor and Lucchesi 2012), which 
can have important repercussions for how interventions are designed and 
their potential development impacts. Guides differ in their developmental 
approach (for example, a focus on better market links versus improved busi-
ness environment), their developmental goals (poverty reduction, economic 
growth, decent work), and their targeted users (government agencies, NGOs, 
private sector). Guides also vary in terms of their information requirements, 
objectives and overall complexity, conceptualization of value-chain con-
cepts, and incorporation of local actors into research and strategy formulation, 
among other factors.
This chapter reviews 11 guides for value-chain analysis and develop-
ment. It compares the guides’ concepts, objectives, and methods and identi-
fies strengths, weaknesses, and gaps. The assessment characterizes the state of 
the art for designing interventions and interactions that seek to build value 
chains with smallholders. The chapter is organized as follows: the next section 
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presents the methodology applied in carrying out the review, the following 
section presents the results of this review, and the final section provides con-
cluding comments.
Guide Selection and Comparison
For the purposes of this review, we considered a guide to include a book, docu-
ment, or Internet-based platform that provides users with a logical sequence of 
activities for designing and implementing VCD with smallholders and other 
chain actors. At a minimum, implementation of a guide must contribute to 
the generation of a strategy for (1) the design of interventions by development 
organizations for building mutually beneficial chain relations, (2) the design 
of new interactions between resource-poor chain actors (often smallholders 
and businesses in the upstream chain segment) and larger, better-endowed 
businesses further downstream, and/or (3) the design of policies that improve 
the institutional environment in which value-chain actors operate. Guides 
whose primary audience is researchers rather than development organizations 
or private-sector representatives were excluded in this review. In some cases, 
guides may aim to facilitate the building of value chains with smallholders 
without actually applying the concept of value chain or VCD. For example, 
guides built around the concept of “making markets work for the poor” (for 
example, DFID 2008; SDC 2008) aim to identify opportunities for improv-
ing the business environment in which the poor operate, and thus, for the pur-
poses of this review, would constitute a guide for VCD.
This review looked at 11 guides for value-chain analysis and development2 
(Table 1.1). Selection considered previous work by Nang’ole, Mithöfer, and 
Franzel (2011), who identified 32 guides, tools, and manuals related to value 
chains that were available on the Internet in 2010. We selected eight guides 
that were the most comprehensive in the design of VCD (CIP 2006; FAO 
2007; CIAT 2007; IIED 2008; M4P 2008; GTZ 2008; ILO 2009; World 
Bank 2010). These guides were complemented with three others: USAID 
(no date), an Internet-based portal that provides a comprehensive collection 
of tools and concepts related to VCD; DFID (2008), which describes how 
to design policies that improve the participation of the poor in markets; and 
 2 For the sake of brevity, the guides are referenced in this article according to the organization 
that backed development of the guide. The authors of each guide are identified in Table 4.1. 
Citations for each guide (by authors’ name) are included in the reference section.
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TAbLE 1.1 Guidelines for value-chain analysis and development reviewed
Guideline (abbreviation within 
this chapter)
Authors Sponsoring organization
Participatory market chain 
approach
(CIP 2006)
Thomas Bernet,  
Graham Thiele,  
Thomas Zschocke
International Potato Center (CIP)
Guidelines for rapid appraisals 
of agrifood chain performance in 
developing countries
(FAO 2007)
Carlos A. da Silva,  
Hildo M. de Souza Filho
Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO)
Participatory market chain 
analysis for smallholder 
producers
(CIAT 2007)a
Mark Lundy,  
Veronica Gottret,  
Carlos Ostertag,  
Rupert Best, Shaun Ferris
International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT)
The operational guide for the 
making markets work for the 
poor (M4P) approach
(DFID 2008)
Authors not specified Department for International 
Development (DFID), Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC)
Chain-wide learning for inclusive 
agrifood market development
(IIED 2008)
Sonja Vermeulen,  
Jim Woodhill,  
Felicity Proctor, Rik Delnoye
International Institute for Environment 
and Development (IIED)
Making value chains work 
better for the poor: A toolbook 
for practitioners of value chain 
analysis
(M4P 2008)
Tim Purcell, Stephen Gniel, 
Rudy van Gent
Making Markets Work Better for the 
Poor (M4P) Project, UK Department for 
International Development (DFID)
ValueLinks manual
(GTZ 2008)
Andreas Springer-Heinze German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ), now German Agency 
for International Cooperation (GIZ)
Value chain development for 
decent work
(ILO 2009)
Matthias L. Herr,  
Tapera J. Muzira
International Labour Organization (ILO)
Building competitiveness in 
Africa’s agriculture: A guide 
to value chain concepts and 
applications (World Bank 2010)
Martin Webber,  
Patrick Labaste
World Bank
Pro-poor value chain 
development: 25 guiding 
questions for designing and 
implementing agroindustry 
projects
(UNIDO 2011)b
Lone Riisgaard,  
Stefano Ponte
United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), International 
Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), Danish Institute for International 
Studies (DIIS)
Value chain development wiki
(USAID no date)
Not specified United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID)
Source: Authors.
Notes: a CIAT’s guide for value-chain development was first published in Spanish in 2003. A revised version was published 
in 2007 in English and Spanish. The revised English version was assessed for this review; b The guide reviewed here, UNIDO 
(2011), is part of a toolkit for understanding and diagnosing value chains. See www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/MDGs/
IVC_Diagnostic_Tool.pdf.
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UNIDO (2011), which provides guidance on important issues for the design 
of interventions for VCD.
Table 1.2 presents the parameters by which the guides were assessed. 
The parameters aimed to capture important elements of guide design and 
implementation, including (1) objectives and motivations for using the guides, 
including expected results and outputs; (2) key elements of methodological 
design, for example, chain selection, and recommended steps in data 
collection and analysis; and (3) the interpretation of key concepts that 
underpin guide design, such as value chain and VCD. Information on these 
parameters was used to understand the extent to which the guides allowed 
users to understand the needs and circumstances of resource-poor actors in a 
given value chain (for example, smallholders, small and medium enterprises, 
including cooperatives), the business environment in which chain actors 
operate, and the access by chain actors to various types of services (for example, 
technical assistance, credit, inputs). Discussions and recommendations on the 
design of guides were inspired by debates in the literature which highlight the 
challenges faced by smallholders and other resource-poor actors attempting 
to participate in more demanding agrifood markets (Dolan et al. 1999; 
Reardon et al. 2003; Zylberberg 2011), and the related need for more tailored 
development interventions involving poor rural households with diversified 
TAbLE 1.2 Parameters for the review of guides for value chain development (VCD)
General Specific
Objectives and motivations • Development objective (the expected result of guide implementation)
• Expected outputs from guide implementation
Definitions • Definition of value chain
• Definition of VCD
Methodological design • Key concepts applied
• Key methodological steps and components
• Chain-selection process
• Expected outputs from guide implementation
• Expected participation of stakeholders in implementation
Data collection and analysis • Recommendations for data collection from household member 
(including issues related to gender), households, businesses, facilitating 
organizations
• Recommendations for data collection on market environment
Methods and tools for data 
collection and analysis
• Prescribed data-collection methods
• Prescribed data-analysis methods and tools
Assessing and monitoring 
outcomes and impacts
• Suggested indicators
• Suggested methodology
Source: Authors.
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livelihood strategies (Dorward 2009; Stoian et al. 2012; Donovan and 
Poole 2013).
Multiple reviews of the information on the parameters and the assessment 
of the information were carried out to achieve accuracy and objectivity. A 
coauthor of this chapter carried out a first review of a guide, collecting 
information on the parameters. This review was then examined by two other 
coauthors, to ensure accuracy and objectivity. The review was then passed 
to the guide author(s) for feedback. Authors were asked to identify potential 
misunderstandings or omissions and to highlight any disagreements with the 
information collected. Feedback was received from authors of eight of the 
guides. Their comments and suggestions were incorporated into the final 
dataset. Preliminary versions of the assessment were shared with all authors of 
the guides. Five authors provided feedback on the assessment. Draft versions 
of this chapter were reviewed by three external reviewers.
Our methodology has limitations. There are likely to be guides that 
meet the selection criteria yet were not included in this review. Nonetheless, 
our selection of guides is broad enough to provide a strong indication of 
the overall state of the art. Our review is based exclusively on the guides 
themselves—it does not present information from other sources on 
experiences with the application of the guides and the subsequent results.  
In general, case studies with critical feedback on tool design and application 
are scarce.
Results
Objectives and Outputs
DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
In general, the interventions or changes in business relations that result from 
a VCD strategy are expected to yield tangible benefits for actors in the chain 
as well as for the overall business environment. The discussion here focuses 
on the specific development objectives to be achieved when the VCD strategy 
is implemented.
Seven guides include a development objective that focuses on improved 
income for marginalized populations. Examples include DFID (2008), which 
considers that VCD offers opportunity to “effectively and sustainably improve 
the lives of poor people by understanding and influencing market systems,” 
and IIED (2008, 11), which argues that “with the right support, small-scale 
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producers can be efficient and reliable providers of quality produce.” Other 
development objectives are also specified. ILO (2009) includes an overall 
improved business environment, as well as increased employment and income, 
as outcomes of VCD. UNIDO (2011) considers that guide implementation 
will result in VCD with a greater likelihood of achieving positive impacts on 
poverty and gender equity.
Exceptions to the strong emphasis on poverty reduction are the guides 
by FAO (2007) and World Bank (2010), which emphasize the economic-
development aspects of VCD. FAO (2007) conceptualizes that guide 
implementation will contribute to the economic growth of a given subsector, 
with no direct mention of smallholders or small businesses. The World Bank 
(2010, 2) recognizes that “The value chain approach is being used to guide 
and drive high-impact and sustainable initiatives focused on improving 
productivity, competitiveness, entrepreneurship, and the growth of small 
and medium enterprises.” While the guide also recognizes that “enhancing 
value chain competitiveness is increasingly recognized as an effective 
approach to generating growth and reducing rural poverty” (World Bank 
2010, 2), the tools presented and the related discussions focus on business and 
chain performance.
EXPECTED OUTPUTS
At a minimum, implementation is expected to yield a strategy for tailoring 
VCD to a specific situation that includes inputs from chain actors and from 
organizations that are external to the chain, such as service providers. For 
example, FAO (2007, 2) states that implementation allows for the formulation 
of a “general approach toward the definition of chain interventions aiming 
at performance improvement, with the identification of stakeholder 
responsibilities for implementation.” Similar approaches to conceptualizing 
the outputs of guide implementation are taken by DFID (2008), ILO (2009), 
World Bank (2010), and UNIDO (2011).
In other cases, implementation is also expected to result in new or stron-
ger business relationships that emerge from the sustained dialog among chain 
actors during the guide-implementation process. The design of these guides 
places greater emphasis on the participatory process for implementation. A 
focus on both strategy formulation and relationship building is clear in the 
guide by CIP (2006, 16), which considers that “building trust among mar-
ket chain actors is a prerequisite for successful collaboration.” The design 
of guides by CIAT (2007) and IIED (2008) also relies heavily on sustained 
engagement with smallholders and other chain actors to understand the chain 
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and facilitate negotiations and interactions between actors. GTZ (2008) and 
USAID (n.d.) provide guidance for the elaboration of a strategy with chain 
stakeholders, as well as guidance on how to implement VCD, with modules, 
for example, on strengthening public–private partnerships, financing value 
chains, and improving the business environment of value chains.
Key Definitions
Concepts related to value chains and VCD have been debated in the fields 
of business management, sociology, and development studies. Consensus has 
yet to emerge on the definitions of these concepts. This review examines the 
guides to understand how they define chain-related concepts.
VALUE CHAIN DEFINITION
The reviewed guides utilize different terms to describe market actors and 
the arrangements for production and marketing of agricultural products 
and services. Among the terms used are value chain, supply chain, market 
system, market chain, and agrifood chain. For the purpose of this review, the 
term value chain will be used independently of the particular term used in 
the guide.
There are major differences in the understanding of the value-chain con-
cept among the selected guides. Value-chain definitions can be divided into 
three groups:
1. Value chain as a set of activities. Various guides base their definition on 
activities. World Bank (2010, 9) provides an illustrative example:  
“The term value chain describes the full range of value adding activities 
required to bring a product or service through the different phases of 
production, including procurement of raw materials and other inputs.” 
The same definition, or definitions similar in nature, are offered  
by FAO (2007), IIED (2008), GTZ (2008), ILO (2009), and 
USAID (n.d.).
2. Value chain as a set of actors. Other guides base their definition on actors. 
For example, UNIDO (2011, 3) defines a value chain as “actors con-
nected along a chain producing, transforming, and bringing goods and 
services to end-consumers through a sequenced set of activities.” CIP 
(p. 159) defines a value chain as “all the actors, and the entirety of their 
productive activities, involved in the process of adding value to a specific 
crop or product.”
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3. Value chain as a strategic network. In this case, value chains do not 
simply exist in a particular space, but are built for the purpose of 
responding better to consumer demand. Borrowing from Hobbs, 
Cooney, and Fulton (2000), CIAT (2007, 25) defines value chains 
as a strategic network among a number of independent business 
organizations, where network members engage in extensive 
collaboration. DFID (2008, 6) defines a market system as a “multi-
player, multi-function arrangement comprising three main sets of 
functions (core, rules, and supporting) undertaken by different players…
through which exchange takes place, develops, adapts, and grows.”
The variation in definitions reflects the evolution of the chain concepts 
from the different strands of debate (for example, agribusiness systems and 
supply-chain management, world systems theory, participatory appraisal, 
and French research on filières). The definitions are complementary to some 
degree: activities are carried out by actors, and actors of different types 
comprise a strategic network. That said, the chain definition applied has 
theoretical implications for the design of interventions that follow the chain 
assessment. With an activity-related definition, one may assume that VCD 
would focus on improving the efficiency of production processes, logistics, or 
the regulatory framework—farmers and businesses may not be central to the 
process. A focus on the “full range of activities” implies that the selected chain 
is local or national in reach, as interventions rarely extend beyond countries 
where the primary production takes place. With an actor-based definition, 
the focus is on actors, usually resource-poor actors, which are often among 
the weaker links in a chain. It follows that interventions for VCD would aim 
to strengthen the capacity of these actors to participate in the chain, with 
the idea that strengthening the weaker links provides benefits to all involved. 
With a network-based definition, value chains do not simply exist, but are 
cultivated over time. In this case, the formation of a value chain becomes 
the actual goal of interventions, which will be possible only in certain 
market contexts.
DEFINITION OF VCD
Two general types of definition for VCD can be drawn from the guides:  
(1) an actor/chain type that focuses on strengthening certain actors and 
improving relations between smallholders and other actors in a chain, and 
(2) a business-environment type that focuses on improving the business 
environment in which chain actors operate. Seven of the guides include a 
GUIDeS FOr VaLUe-ChaIN DeVeLOpMeNt 55
more actor/network-focused VCD definition. For example, CIAT (2007) 
suggests that VCD aims to increase competitiveness for a subset of chain 
actors, which results in higher income for smallholders and small businesses. 
USAID (n.d.) considers that VCD is achieved by establishing win–win 
relationships among chain actors. The World Bank (2010, 12) defines VCD 
as actions that “upgrade the whole system to the benefit of all value chain 
participants.” Other guides with similar definitions for VCD include CIP 
(2006), FAO (2007), GTZ (2008), and ILO (2009). However, some of the 
guides that utilize an actor-focused definition of VCD employ an activity-
based definition for value chain. Examples include USAID (n.d.), ILO (2009), 
and GTZ (2008). This suggests that greater clarity is needed in the conceptual 
frameworks that underpin guides aimed at achieving rural-development goals 
through work with resource-poor actors. In general, we consider an actor- or 
network-based definition to provide a more coherent conceptual framework 
when VCD is focused on a targeted group of chain actors.
DFID (2008), IIED (2008), and M4P (2008) consider improving the 
environment in which the smallholders and other chain actors produce 
and market agricultural products as the basis for achieving VCD. The 
guides facilitate the identification of options to enhance opportunities for 
smallholders’ participation in chains by influencing the political, legal, and 
business environment and by establishing new linkages between smallholders 
and promising markets. For example, M4P (2008, 4) considers that analysis 
should focus on gaining an understanding of the context in which producers 
and/or small traders operate as participants in the value chain. Similarly, 
IIED (2008) considers VCD to center on understanding the institutional 
framework in which smallholders and other chain actors operate and 
identifying options for influencing institutional change in a way that creates 
smallholder opportunities and benefits. A focus on the business environment 
reflects the influence of debates on globalizing food markets (Reardon et al. 
2003) and discussions among practitioners about making markets work for 
the poor (Ferrand, Gibson, and Scott 2004).
56 Chapter 1
Conceptual and Methodological Frameworks
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
Several guides build their conceptual framework around the concepts of 
governance3 and upgrading. These guides include ILO (2009), GTZ (2008), 
World Bank (2010), and USAID (n.d.). These guides help users to formulate 
a VCD strategy for building or improving relations between smallholders 
and other chain actors, taking into account (1) the existing governance 
patterns, and (2) the political, legal, and market context in which the chain 
actors operate. The guides assume that a clear governance pattern can be 
identified and that chain-development prospects are present within existing 
patterns that provide meaningful benefits to smallholders and other actors. 
Guides by CIAT (2007) and IIED (2008) do not use the terms governance or 
upgrading, but contain conceptual frameworks that are similar in nature. For 
example, IIED (2008) builds its conceptual framework around the formal and 
informal institutions that make up “modern markets” and the potential for 
smallholders to respond to the demands of these markets.
Other guides are constructed around a conceptual framework that pays 
attention to the political, legal, and market context in which chain actors 
operate. For example, DFID (2008) aims to understand the “market system” 
(that is, the actors that make the production of final products possible and 
the set of rules that they follow) and identify options for addressing “systemic 
constraints” (that is, the underlying reasons for underperformance and possi-
ble intervention points). Unlike the value-chain concept, the market-system 
concept does not explicitly include an element of vertical coordination. FAO 
(2007) also focuses attention on understanding the political, legal, and mar-
ket environment in which firms operate as a basis for promoting synergies and 
increased competitiveness in a chain. Particular areas of focus include the reg-
ulatory environment, technologies and inputs available to chain actors, and 
the degree of competition in the subsector.
 3 Chain governance often refers to the vertical coordination by firms in one node of the chain 
with firms in other chain nodes. Coordination can assume various modalities that include 
strategic alliances and contractual partnerships. These determine how product f lows are reg-
ulated in terms of prices, quality, quantity, and delivery specifications, among other aspects 
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2005). Governance structures are considered to have important conse-
quences for the access of chain actors in developing countries to markets and the range of activ-
ities that developing-country actors can undertake. A wider framing of the governance concept 
includes legislative aspects that shape business interactions, such as food safety and environ-
mental standards (Kaplinksy and Morris 2002; Tallontire et al. 2011). The concept of upgrading 
refers to the potential of businesses and producers in developing countries to improve their per-
formance and obtain greater benefits from value-chain participation.
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Among the guides that focus on governance and upgrading, two important 
questions remain largely unaddressed in the guides. First, how can an upgrad-
ing strategy be defined in cases where no clear or uniform governance pattern 
is discernible? Clear governance patterns do not always exist, as holds true for 
undifferentiated crops sold in local markets, for example. In other cases, gover-
nance patterns may differ within a given node in the chain as well as between 
different nodes in a chain. At times, government policy in producing coun-
tries may be the most important determinant of development options, rather 
than rules established by value-chain actors (Cramer 1999). Where weak ver-
tical relationships exist and unclear governance patterns prevail, a focus on 
a market structure–conduct–performance framework or the supply-chain 
concept may be a more appropriate framework for diagnostics. Second, when 
does upgrading represent an opportunity for smallholders or other marginal-
ized actors? For some smallholders, the potential benefit from upgrading (for 
example, improved prices) may be less than the costs (such as increased labor 
allocation, collective action), particularly in the absence of support from devel-
opment organizations and/or downstream chain actors.
None of the guides discusses how guide implementation leads to devel-
opment outcomes and impacts for smallholders, other actors in the chain, or 
the chain itself. For example, the guide by CIP (2006), which conceptualizes 
VCD around innovation, says little about the potential returns from inno-
vation or the conditions under which innovation by one actor could lead to 
innovation and improved outcomes for others in the chain. In a similar fash-
ion, the guide by ILO (2009), which considers VCD in the context of decent 
work, does not discuss which chain actors are more likely to promote decent 
work and how such outcomes would contribute to VCD. Guides by CIAT 
(2007), FAO (2007), GTZ (2008), and IIED (2008) consider the potential to 
achieve VCD based on investments by smallholders and other chain actors but 
do not describe the actor-specific conditions under which these investments 
are most likely to take place (for instance, investment needs, potential costs 
and benefits, and the risks related to investment).
ATTENTION TO THE CONTEXT
The context in which farmers and businesses operate has important implica-
tions for the design and implementation of strategies for VCD. For instance, 
comprehensive strategies to develop value chains that link smallholders 
with international markets for specialty products will likely discuss issues 
related to certification compliance and the ability of cooperatives and pro-
ducer associations to meet the demands of their members and of downstream 
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buyers. Alternatively, strategies to develop value chains in local markets will 
likely focus attention on understanding consumer demand and the oppor-
tunities for value adding with local processors and intermediaries. Context 
is also important when considering the ability of smallholders to participate 
in VCD. In cases where VCD requires relatively large investments by small-
holders, understanding their interests and capacities will be important for the 
design of sustainable interventions. The greater a guide’s focus on issues par-
ticular to a given context, the greater its potential to provide tailored guidance 
to its users. Many of the guides recognize the overall importance of the con-
text and provide guidance on how to assess the marketing and business con-
text (for example, CIAT 2007 and DFID 2008). However, none of the guides 
discusses its implementation according to the key element of the marketing or 
business context. Potential guide users are left to contemplate the benefits and 
strengths of a particular guide in the context in which they are working. At 
the level of producing households, some guides stipulate that the value chain 
selected for analysis and development should be relevant to rural livelihoods. 
However, there is limited discussion on how to measure differences in the 
interests and capacities among households, or on the implication of these dif-
ferences for achieving the reported goals of VCD.
CHAIN SELECTION
Value-chain selection has important implications for the households and busi-
nesses involved, as well as for the external organizations that aim to facilitate 
the development process. Some guides identify steps for chain selection, while 
others assume that a chain has already been selected (Table 1.3). Where steps 
for chain selection are provided, decisions on chain selection rest mainly in 
TAbLE 1.3 Approach to chain selection
Selection led by local 
stakeholders
Selection led by external 
experts
Assumption that chain has 
already been selected
• CIAT
• M4P
• FAO
• DFID
• GTZ
• ILO
• World Bank
• UNIDO
• CIP
• IIED
• USAID
Source: Authors.
Note: CIAT = International Center for Tropical Agriculture; CIP = International Potato Center; DFID = Department for 
International Development; FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; GTZ = German Technical 
Cooperation Agency; IIED = International Institute for Environment and Development; ILO = International Labour Organization; 
M4P = Making Markets Work Better for the Poor; UNIDO = United Nations Industrial Development Organization; USAID = 
United States Agency for International Development.
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the hands of chain stakeholders or with NGOs and others that are external to 
the chain, often with validation from local stakeholders. In general, steps for 
chain selection involve the selection of indicators/criteria, an extensive period 
of data collection and analysis, and one or more workshops to present results 
and make decisions. Most guides include criteria related to market poten-
tial. Those guides aiming to address rural poverty also include criteria on the 
potential of the value chain to improve rural livelihoods. Few guidelines deal 
with how to collect and analyze the data. In some cases, effectively responding 
to a criterion would require complex data collection and analysis, for example, 
assessing the “potential of the product/activity for poverty reduction” (M4P 
2008, 20) and identifying the “markets with potential for achieving improved 
growth and access” (DFID 2008, 24).
RECOMMENDED DATA COLLECTION
Depending on the objectives of the guide and its intended users, data col-
lection at some levels (for example, household, business, value chain) may be 
more relevant than at others. The guides therefore differ markedly in their 
attention to data collection at different levels of value-chain analysis. Some 
guides place more emphasis on understanding actors in the chain and their 
perspectives on opportunities for VCD, while others concentrate data collec-
tion on understanding the value chain itself and the overall context in which 
it operates. Table 1.4 compares the recommended data collection at five lev-
els of value-chain analysis: intrahousehold, household, business, chain/market, 
and service provider.
Few guides consider data collection at the intrahousehold level. As a result, 
the strategies that emerge from guide application may overestimate the poten-
tial for women and other disadvantaged members to participate in and bene-
fit from VCD. In case of VCD aiming at inclusive or pro-poor development, 
this omission may also result in outcomes below their potential. UNIDO 
(2011) addresses the lack of attention by existing guides to specific social 
issues, including gender equity. With regard to gender, UNIDO (2011) iden-
tifies various important issues that should be considered as part of value-chain 
analysis when marginalized producers are involved, including access to assets, 
social roles, and risks faced specifically by women. The guide does not provide 
suggestions on how to collect or analyze gender-related information, but it 
does provide various references to gray literature where issues related to gender 
and VCD are addressed.
Attention placed on issues at the household level varies considerably. Three 
guides stand out for paying relatively strong attention to household-level 
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production and marketing issues: CIAT (2007), M4P (2008), and UNIDO 
(2011). In addition to basic information on output and income, these 
guides recommend data collection on livelihood strategies, capacities and 
asset endowments, and perceptions on benefits and challenges in chain 
TAbLE 1.4 Data collection recommended (indicators, guiding questions) by the guides,  
by level
Level of data collection Limited or no data 
recommended
Moderate amount of 
data recommended
High amount of data 
recommended
Intrahousehold • CIP
• CIAT
• FAO
• DFID
• GTZ
• IIED
• M4P
• ILO
• World Bank
• USAID
• UNIDO
Household • CIP
• DFID
• IIED
• World Bank
• FAO
• GTZ
• ILO
• USAID
• CIAT
• M4P
• UNIDO
Businesses, including  
cooperatives and 
producer groups
• DFID
• IIED
• World Bank
• UNIDO
• GTZ
• ILO
• USAID
• CIP
• CIAT
• FAO
• M4P
Chain/market • CIAT
• UNIDO
• CIP
• FAO
• DFID
• GTZ
• IIED
• M4P
• ILO
• World Bank
• USAID
Service provider • CIP • CIAT
• FAO
• DFID
• GTZ
• IIED
• M4P
• ILO
• World Bank
• UNIDO
• USAID
Source: Authors.
Note: CIAT = International Center for Tropical Agriculture; CIP = International Potato Center; DFID = Department for 
International Development; FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; GTZ = German Technical 
Cooperation Agency; IIED = International Institute for Environment and Development; ILO = International Labour Organization; 
M4P = Making Markets Work Better for the Poor; UNIDO = United Nations Industrial Development Organization; USAID = 
United States Agency for International Development.
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participation. In most cases, however, detailed information on how to collect 
and analyze these data is not provided (for example, assessment of livelihood 
strategies), although some references to important articles in gray literature are 
provided. In general, neither the academic nor gray literature provides exten-
sive insights into rural livelihoods in the context of value chains and VCD 
(Stoian et al. 2012). Four guides (FAO 2007; GTZ 2008; ILO 2009; USAID 
n.d.) recommend data collection on basic issues related to producing house-
holds (such as income, productivity, and farmgate prices), while the remaining 
four guides do not discuss the role of households in value chains and VCD.
Attention placed on businesses4 and producer groups also varies 
considerably. Four guides focus considerable attention on these actors: 
CIAT (2007), M4P (2008), FAO (2007), and CIP (2006). Data collection 
recommended by these guides focuses on businesses, their capacities and 
access to resources, and their incentives to invest in upgrading and/or 
increased collaboration with chain actors. These guides do not distinguish 
data-collection methods or indicators according to the type of business, for 
example, smallholder-managed cooperatives or privately owned industrial 
processors. Guides that briefly discuss data collection on businesses are 
USAID (n.d.), ILO (2009), and GTZ (2008). These guides recommend a 
basic set of assessment indicators, including annual income and sales, export 
prices, and business functions. Four guides forgo data collection on businesses 
as part of the strategy formulation for VCD: DFID (2008), IIED (2008), 
World Bank (2010), and UNIDO (2011).
All of the guides place a moderate to high level of attention on data 
collection at the level of value chain and market. Those that place relatively 
less attention on data collection at the chain and market level were those 
that focus relatively more attention on individual actors in the chain (CIAT 
2007; UNIDO 2011). Most of the guides also recommend data collection on 
service providers. Data collection is basic, often focusing on the identification 
of existing service providers in a given area and generally avoiding more 
complex issues, such as the need for services by chain actors, gaps in service 
provision in a given territory to meet these needs and how to resolve the latter, 
and the overall suitability of existing services. CIAT (2007) provides the 
 4 The term business refers to privately owned small, medium, and large businesses, as well 
as community-based businesses such as cooperatives, producer associations, and farmer 
organizations that are commercially active. In some cases, businesses may receive VCD 
assistance from governments and civil society (for example, cooperatives with links to 
smallholders) and, in other cases, businesses may support VCD, for example, through their 
investments in more intensive relations with smallholders and upstream businesses (for 
instance, large-scale retailers, exporters, and processors).
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most extensive coverage on service provision, giving guidance on methods 
for assessing the quality of service provision and identifying the unfulfilled 
demand for services.
Recommended Methods and Tools
METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION
The guides provide various indicators or research questions for the collection 
of data for value-chain analysis. Recommendations emphasize both qualitative 
and quantitative data, although there is a strong inclination toward qualitative 
data. As for the type of methods prescribed, the guides vary little. These 
methods include: review of existing information, key-informant interviews 
with chain actors and participatory chain mapping, as well as workshops and 
focus groups with chain actors. In some cases, methods are also provided for 
carrying out a market assessment, either as an annex to the guide (CIP 2006) 
or as a separate, but linked, guide (CIAT 2007). Three guides (DFID 2008; 
World Bank 2010; UNIDO 2011) omit information on how to collect or 
analyze data, perhaps reflecting an orientation toward researchers.
The guides suggest that tool users increase the rigor or depth of data 
collection and analysis through triangulation and participatory workshops. 
However, no guide provides in-depth discussions on the optimal levels of rigor 
and depth or on the various practical options for achieving them. Discussions 
on practical options for sampling (both how to sample and how many units 
to sample), data management, and questionnaire design are also scarce among 
the guides. A salient gap in virtually all guides is the issue of variability in 
costs and returns for farmers and business that invest in upgrading their 
operations and the implications of these for decisionmaking.
METHODS AND TOOLS FOR DATA ANALYSIS
All of the guides seek data from chain stakeholders for the design of VCD 
strategies. The two most commonly recommended methods for analyzing 
data are participatory workshops and key-informant interviews. During 
participatory workshops, tool users report raw and processed data on 
chains, markets, and chain actors to stakeholders for discussion, analysis, 
and decisionmaking. Most guides provide questions and templates for 
preparation of workshops. Workshops and key-informant interviews form the 
methodological pillar of CIP (2006), CIAT (2007), IIED (2008), and ILO 
(2009). In some cases, guides provide additional support for data analysis as 
input for participatory workshops, such as value-chain mapping (GTZ 2008), 
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participatory rural appraisal tools (CIAT 2007), and analysis of strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (CIP 2006; FAO 2007; USAID n.d.). 
Involving stakeholders in the process serves two purposes: participatory 
analysis for decisionmaking and encouraging buy-in to the strategy-
formulation process.
In general, these guides offer relatively simple analytical tools and meth-
ods that allow users to obtain a rough idea of the value chain and the needs 
and circumstances of its participants. In some cases, the outputs of imple-
mentation are likely to be insufficient for the design of development strate-
gies among actors with different interests and varying capacities to invest in 
more intensive value-chain participation. When VCD does involve resource-
poor households and businesses, then the case for careful exploration of the 
needs and capacities of resource-poor chain actors becomes more pressing. 
An expanded set of tools and methods could improve the outcomes of guide 
implementation. These might include tools for assessing the return and vari-
ability in return on investments, incorporating risk into decisionmaking, scor-
ing investment options by households, assessing the viability of small and 
medium enterprises, and drawing inferences from quantitative data. In some 
cases, participatory research tools designed for farm and natural-resource 
management may be applicable (for example, Dorward, Shepherd, and Galpin 
2007). In other cases, new tools specific to the context of VCD may be needed. 
Discussions are needed among tool designers and tool users about the applica-
bility of different tools under different conditions.
Other guides offer a greater selection of methods and tools for data analy-
sis. M4P (2008), World Bank (2010), UNIDO (2011), and USAID (n.d.) pro-
vide the most extensive sets of methods and tools for analysis of value chains, 
value-chain actors, and markets. For example, USAID (n.d.) includes knowl-
edge assessment, cost and margin analysis, distribution of income analysis, and 
competitiveness analysis. M4P (2008) stands out for its discussion of a range 
of qualitative tools for understanding value-chain relations and the financial 
implications of investments in value chains. Among the tools presented by 
UNIDO (2011), a particularly noteworthy one is the tool for incorporating 
gender issues in the analysis. In general, for each method or tool presented in 
the guides, authors provide an overview of the method or tool to be applied, 
as well as examples of its use and results. In most cases, however, discussion is 
brief and examples lack detail. The lack of discussion about options for adjust-
ing the methods and tools to different contexts may frustrate implementation 
by some users given the diversity of contexts in which VCD is carried out and 
the difficulty of collecting data from households and the private sector.
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Following a discussion on data collection and analysis, the guides present 
a process for the actual design of the interventions for VCD. The process usu-
ally begins by organizing a subset of chain actors into a “task force” or “work-
ing group” or something similar in nature. Most guides suggest that “key actors” 
from one or more chain nodes be included in the process, although criteria 
for identifying key actors are often left to the discretion of those implement-
ing. The guides recommend one or more workshops be carried out with the 
selected actors. During these meetings, results from prior data collection and 
analysis are presented: the chain is described, the end market discussed, bottle-
necks presented, and in some cases, potential solutions are presented for vali-
dation (for example, FAO 2007). More participatory guides consider strategy 
development as a separate and final step in the process. This may consist of a 
single workshop (for example, CIAT 2007, which recommends a “negotiation 
workshop”) or a more elaborate process (for example, CIP 2006, which rec-
ommends various sessions over several months). Guides may warn users on the 
potential for conflicts during the process (for example, IIED 2008). In general, 
however, discussion on the process by which actors come together to negotiate 
solutions and pursue common interests, and how this process evolves over time, 
is lacking (see Staatz and Donald 2010, for discussion). Under what condi-
tions is joint strategy development and implementation most likely to succeed? 
What options exist when win–win solutions fail to emerge? How does the pro-
cess vary according to differences in the local context? Looking beyond the 
actual workshops, the guides avoid challenging users to question the strategy 
itself: What worked? What did not work? And how could strategies be rede-
signed (improved) for future work? This would imply a strong focus on joint 
reflection and learning to be carried out throughout the strategy-implementa-
tion process.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Five of the guides do not discuss monitoring and evaluation (CIP 2006; FAO 
2007; IIED 2008; M4P 2008; World Bank 2010). Thus, the following analy-
sis focuses on the six guides that do.
CIAT (2007), GTZ (2008), and USAID (n.d.) provide the most extensive 
set of indicators for monitoring and evaluation. Most of their indicators focus 
on data collection at the chain and market levels. Among the recommended 
indicators are sales volumes and values, production costs, yields, profitabil-
ity, product offer, and technologies applied. CIAT (2007) and GTZ (2008) 
also suggest indicators at the household level. In both cases, indicators relate 
mainly to income and the contribution of the value chain being developed to 
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household income. UNIDO (2011) includes the largest selection of indica-
tors at the household level, with indicators on skills and capacities, productive 
assets, and women’s control over income. ILO (2009) suggests various indica-
tors related to the concept of decent work, including employment creation and 
labor conditions. The indicators suggested by the guides provide relevant and 
important information for understanding the outcomes and, in some cases, 
the impacts of VCD. With the exception of UNIDO (2011), these guides are 
not designed to provide a deep understanding of the needs and circumstances 
of more vulnerable actors in a given chain, including household producers and 
small businesses, or how VCD-related interventions shape their ability to par-
ticipate and benefit from deeper engagement with markets.
Guidance on how to collect and analyze information for monitoring 
and evaluation is limited. GTZ (2008) stands out for presenting a rigorous 
approach to monitoring and evaluation, with recommendations for the elab-
oration of an impact pathway, formulation of impact hypotheses, and use 
of control groups for attribution. However, given the complexity of the sug-
gested approach, the guide does not provide sufficient help to practitioners in 
its implementation. In general, users are expected to already understand the 
basics of monitoring and evaluation in a VCD context or apply readily avail-
able monitoring and evaluation guides designed for project assessment (for 
example, Baker 2000; Grun 2006). However, guides designed for the moni-
toring and evaluation of project assessment are likely to fall short in the con-
text of VCD, given the multiple levels at which VCD takes place and the 
possibility that changes result from multiple sources (see Stoian et al. 2012).
Recommendations for Using the Guides
Based on the results from our analysis of guides, we provide recommendations 
for tool users according to the context in which they are working, their objec-
tives in pursuing VCD, and the methods for data collection and analysis that 
best suit their needs and interests (Table 1.5). For example, some guides are 
particularly suited to developing value chains that link smallholders to local 
markets (CIP 2006; CIAT 2007; IIED 2008) whereas others are especially 
appropriate for links to export markets (World Bank 2010).
Conclusion
The guides provide a framework for development practitioners to engage with 
market actors and set the stage for collaboration in VCD following guide 
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TAbLE 1.5 Recommendations to users on which guides are most appropriate for particular 
objectives, contexts, and methods
Area of interest Recommended 
guides
Remarks
Value-chain development (VCD) for specific contexts
Design of policies for VCD at the 
macro level (covering all actors 
involved in the production and mar-
keting of a given product)
FAO, DFID, M4P, 
USAID
Considerable attention to understanding the 
political, legal, and marketing context in which 
value-chain actors operate
Design of interventions and new 
chain interactions among a selected 
group of actors in a given subsector
CIP, CIAT, GTZ, 
ILO
Implementation involves considerable 
participation from selected value-chain actors, 
to include analysis of the chain and the design 
of interventions for chain development
Development of value chains that link 
smallholders to export markets
World Bank 11 detailed case studies on VCD oriented 
toward export markets
Development of value chains that link 
smallholders to local and national 
markets
CIP, CIAT, IIED Considerable attention given to understanding 
the circumstances of actors in a chain and the 
overall marketing context in a given area
Conceptual frameworks (CF)
CF built around governance and 
upgrading
GTZ, ILO,  
World Bank, 
USAID, M4P
Designed to assess existing chain governance 
and opportunities for upgrading by 
smallholders and other chain actors
CF based on synergy, efficiency, and 
competitiveness
FAO, CIAT Bottlenecks in chain performance and options 
for increasing chain competitiveness through 
improved cooperation and coordination 
identified by users
CF based on political, legal, institu-
tional, and market context
DFID, IIED Assistance with identifying options to design 
policies that offer smallholders greater 
development opportunities in regional and 
national markets
CF based on innovation and potential 
to achieve innovation
CIP Implementation aimed at identifying 
opportunities for innovation within a given 
market context
CF that address issues related to the 
conditions of labor in a value chain
ILO Help with focusing attention on the conditions 
of labor in a value chain and methods 
provided for identifying opportunities to 
improve conditions for labor
Methodological elements
Selecting a chain for VCD using 
outside experts
FAO, DFID, ILO, 
GTZ, USAID
Parameters for data collection recommended 
that inform the decision on which chain to 
engage
Selecting a chain for VCD with local 
stakeholders
CIAT Steps suggested for carrying out interviews 
with actors in selected territories for selection 
of chain
Participatory and practitioner-friendly 
approach to VCD
CIP, CIAT Relatively easy-to-follow text, with numerous 
examples complemented by simple figures 
and tables; strong focus on participatory 
workshops and key-informant interviews for 
data collection
GUIDeS FOr VaLUe-ChaIN DeVeLOpMeNt 67
implementation. They prioritize the institutions that shape the actions and 
interactions of chain actors and the related implications for chain development. 
Institutions of particular interest are those governing the relationships, 
agreements, and interactions among chain actors, the informal and formal 
Area of interest Recommended 
guides
Remarks
Innovative methods and tools for an-
alyzing value chains and chain actors 
and for designing VCD strategies
World Bank, 
USAID, M4P
Most complete selection of concepts and tools 
for value-chain analysis and VCD provided by 
USAID, followed by M4P and World Bank
Detailed and well-structured ap-
proach to value-chain mapping and 
analysis
GTZ, USAID Detailed discussion of tools and methods for 
understanding and mapping the value chain 
provided by GTZ
Monitoring and evaluation CIAT, GTZ,
USAID
Indicators recommended for data collection for 
monitoring and evaluation; limited  discussions 
on methodology—for more detailed discus-
sions on monitoring and evaluation in a VCD 
context, see Tanburn and Sen (2011), and 
Donovan and Stoian (2012)
Focus on circumstances of house-
holds, businesses, and individuals
USAID, UNIDO Module with general guidance on VCD in 
conflict zones in USAID; discussion of options 
for addressing risks and gender in UNIDO
Data collection at different scales
Gender and intrahousehold UNIDO A short discussion of intrahousehold data 
collection and analysis—see Mayoux and 
Mackie (2008), Rubin et al. (2009), Riisgaard 
et al. (2010), and Coles and Mitchell (2011) for 
more detailed discussions on gender and VCD
Household-scale production and 
marketing
CIAT, M4P,
UNIDO
Most in-depth discussion on household-level 
data collection in UNIDO
Businesses and producer groups CIAT, M4P, FAO, 
CIP
Most data collection from key-informant 
interviews with business leaders—more 
detailed assessments likely to require 
additional resources—for an example see 
Ortiz-Marcos, Naranjo, and Cabo (2011)
Chain and business environment CIP, FAO, DFID, 
GTZ, IIED, M4P, 
ILO, World Bank, 
USAID
Most detailed discussion of assessment at the 
level of chain and business environment in 
GTZ, DFID, and USAID
Service providers CIAT Methods to assess the quality of service 
provision and to identify services without 
demand, and demands without services
Source: Authors.
Note: CIAT = International Center for Tropical Agriculture; CIP = International Potato Center; DFID = Department for 
International Development; FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; GTZ = German Technical 
Cooperation Agency; IIED = International Institute for Environment and Development; ILO = International Labour Organization; 
M4P = Making Markets Work Better for the Poor; UNIDO = United Nations Industrial Development Organization; USAID = 
United States Agency for International Development. 
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rules that determine what individuals and organizations should or can do, 
and the recurring actions carried out by individuals or organizations (such as 
provision of services, functions, and products). The implementation process 
brings chain actors and development organizations together to seek answers 
to questions of common interest, including inquiry into the limitations to 
chain growth and potential solutions that benefit all stakeholders. The guides 
embrace the use of participatory research methods, including key-informant 
interviews, participatory workshops (participatory chain mapping), and 
focus groups, thus facilitating their implementation by practitioners working 
in environments where data are scarce and large-scale sampling may be 
prohibitively expensive.
The guides reflect the interest of development organizations in achieving 
greater sustainability for their interventions. An underlying premise is that 
sustainability can only be achieved with a strong focus on consumer demand 
and the needs of certain chain actors (for example, supermarkets or overseas 
importers) for quality, volume, and social and environmental responsibility. 
By focusing attention on demand, the guides recognize that smallholders 
and other upstream chain actors must be able to respond to the demands of 
consumers, which opens the door for building more productive dialog and 
interactions with the private sector. The role of support services in helping 
smallholders better meet the needs of downstream chain actors is another 
aspect in which the guides address sustainability.
The review also sheds light on certain gaps and limitations in the guides 
related to VCD design. First, greater attention must be given to the needs 
and circumstances of poor households. The guides often implicitly assume 
that rural households are a homogeneous group and have sufficient resources 
to participate in VCD, do not face substantial trade-offs when using these 
resources, and are able to assume higher risks when investing their capital 
and labor. Insights from the literature show that these assumptions often 
do not reflect the needs and conditions of the poor. Recent publications 
have highlighted the need for greater attention to the needs and interests of 
smallholders when considering options for VCD (Seville, Buxton, and Vorley 
2010; Stoian et al. 2012; Vorley, Pozo-Vergnes, and Barnett 2012). The design 
of strategies for VCD that include poor and vulnerable populations may 
require additional concepts and tools that take these aspects into account. This 
will increase the complexity of tool implementation; however, it also offers the 
opportunity to design more viable and efficient strategies. Debate continues as 
to which concepts and tools are most useful and how to incorporate them into 
guides without alienating users.
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Second, the guides should provide deeper guidance for dealing with 
variations in the context. Most guides assume that users will identify critical 
elements of the context, understand their relevance for VCD, and make the 
necessary adjustments for data collection and analysis. These contextual 
differences may relate to scale in shipping and processing (and the related 
need for smallholder organization), the pre-existing asset endowments of 
smallholders and small businesses (and the related need for investments in asset 
building prior to VCD), and the overall business environment (and the related 
need for advocacy as part of the VCD). Future guides would benefit from 
increased attention to critical contextual issues related to VCD—for example, 
the need for collective business development, the existing governance pattern 
along the chain (or lack thereof), and the reach of the chain (international 
versus national/regional/local). Alternative implementation pathways based on 
differences in the context may increase the complexity of the guides themselves 
but should result in more tailored strategies for VCD.
Finally, more attention should be given to capacities of those who imple-
ment the guides. More discussion on how to deal with complex research 
design and implementation issues, such as variability in returns, may help 
to improve the overall rigor of assessment and usefulness of the VCD strat-
egies. The incorporation of fully developed case studies (rather than snap-
shots of good practices from diverse sites) will also help to inform users about 
potential implementation pitfalls and options for avoiding them. Conceptual 
frameworks should explicitly show the relationships between tool implemen-
tation and the ultimate development goals to be achieved. Guides would ben-
efit from a conceptualization of how guide implementation leads to outcomes 
and impacts for different types of chain actors. The incorporation of new tools 
and methods must recognize the trade-offs faced by users between ease of use 
and rigor. New debates and interactions among tool designers and users are 
needed to identify the costs and benefits of additional tools and rigor and pro-
mote learning for improved design and implementation of VCD guides. While 
individual authors and organizations have developed learning groups around 
specific guides, a wider group of users and guide designers is needed to address 
important issues and dilemmas facing tool design and implementation.
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VALUE-CHAIN DEVELOPMENT FOR 
RURAL POVERTY REDUCTION: 
A REALITY CHECK AND A WARNING
Dietmar Stoian, Jason Donovan, John Fisk, and Michelle F. Muldoon 
Introduction
In the late 1990s, a sense of urgency over the need to reinvigorate develop-
ment processes led to the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals, 
which incorporated the view that increased income is a prerequisite to live-
lihood security and a decent standard of living. To date, however, notable 
progress in poverty reduction—measured in terms of income and passing the 
US$1 a day absolute poverty threshold—has mainly been made in Southeast 
and East Asia, especially China, while significant poverty pockets continue 
to persist in the rural areas of Africa south of the Sahara, and in South Asia, 
and Central and South America (UN 2011). In search of viable alternatives 
to reducing poverty, value-chain development (VCD) emerged in the early 
2000s as (1) a market-based approach to meet poverty-related Millennium 
Development Goals, and (2) a response to new opportunities in international 
markets signaling stronger demand for agricultural and forest products and 
services produced with environmental and social responsibility.
VCD has generally been defined as an “effort to strengthen mutually 
beneficial linkages among firms so that they work together to take advantage 
of market opportunities, that is, to create and build trust among value 
chain participants” (Webber and Labaste 2010). Key concepts related to 
VCD are win–win relationships, upgrading, innovation, and added-value. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, VCD may be promoted with a view to 
the competitiveness of a given sector or subsector. From a microeconomic 
perspective, VCD may target marginalized actors in the upstream segments 
of a value chain. Such “pro-poor” VCD has been defined as a “positive or 
desirable change in a value chain to extend or improve productive operations 
and generate social benefits: poverty reduction, income and employment 
generation, economic growth, environmental performance, gender equity  
This chapter was originally published as an article in Enterprise Development and Microfinance 23 (1): 54–69 
(2012).
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and other development goals” (UNIDO 2011). It is principally from the latter 
perspective that many development agencies, donors, and governments have 
adopted VCD as a key element of their rural poverty-reduction strategies (see 
DFID and SDC 2008; Humphrey and Navas-Alemán 2010). In addition 
to targeting poor and vulnerable populations in the rural sector as primary 
beneficiaries, some value-chain initiatives seek to link to the macroeconomic 
environment by broadening their approach toward resource-constrained 
enterprises in the upstream segments of a value chain, and the promotion of 
changes in the political–legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks (see 
Kula, Downing, and Field 2006).
Despite the prominent role of the VCD approach in current development 
agendas, surprisingly little is known about its impacts on rural poverty. The 
urgency of making tangible progress toward the poverty-related Millennium 
Development Goals and the uncertainty about the actual and potential 
contributions from VCD call for taking stock in terms of what we already 
know about its design, implementation, and impact; and what we have yet to 
learn to direct growing investments in such initiatives and ensure substantial 
effects on poverty. In this chapter, we first present those claims regarding 
VCD that are backed by clear evidence or broad consensus (“what we know”), 
followed by a discussion of issues where more evidence and consensus are 
needed (“what we think we know”). Next, we examine those questions where 
current knowledge falls short and where innovative action is needed (“what 
we still need to know and do differently”). We conclude with a call for an 
asset-based approach to design, implementation, and assessment of VCD and 
the need for nonmarket interventions to help particularly disenfranchised 
groups to meet the minimum asset thresholds for their successful 
participation in VCD.
What We Know
Actors promoting VCD vary widely, as do their motives. NGOs often pur-
sue explicit poverty-reduction goals, while the private sector may see them as a 
by-product.
The strengthening of mutually beneficial business relationships between 
two or more chain actors, including producers, distributors, processors, 
wholesalers, and/or retailers, requires improved interactions between them, 
often facilitated by the provision of technical, business, and financial services 
from outside of the chain. Related interventions aim at strengthening 
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capacities and enhancing mechanisms for sharing information, benefits, and 
risks. The stronger the win–win nature of such relations, the more likely 
they are to endure over time. While pro-poor value-chain initiatives have 
an explicit focus on poverty reduction, other value-chain initiatives may 
not. This, however, does not mean that they could not have an important, 
though unintended, poverty impact. Further, in many cases a diverse set of 
stakeholders from within and outside of the value chain invest in the chain, 
at times with little or no coordination between them. Private companies, for 
example, may invest in their relationships with poor producers to improve 
their environmental and social credentials, while an NGO may provide 
technical and financial assistance to the producers and other chain actors. 
From the company’s perspective, VCD is one among several types of business 
strategies pursued to ensure a positive image, market positioning, and the 
sourcing of scarce raw materials (Box 2.1). From the NGO’s perspective, 
their work with upstream chain actors is in explicit pursuit of poverty-
reduction goals.
VCD involving the poor needs to account for their diversified livelihood strategies 
and related risks and trade-offs.
A review of value-chain methodologies and case studies (see, for example, 
Kula, Downing, and Field 2006; Tanburn and Sen 2011) shows that the 
poverty-reduction potential of VCD is often based on the assumption 
that poor households (1) have sufficient resources to effectively participate 
in VCD, (2) do not face substantial trade-offs when using these resources, 
and (3) are able to assume higher risks when reinvesting capital and labor. 
In reality, however, many poor households pursue diversified livelihood 
strategies by combining subsistence and market-oriented agriculture with 
off-farm labor and other nonagricultural income-generating activities. In 
the attempt to spread risk and smooth incomes, they optimize their overall 
livelihood system rather than one of the subsystems (for example, coffee 
production). In contrast, the participation in VCD often requires them to 
pursue a specialization strategy, with higher investments of capital, labor, and 
other resources in a given chain. Involving the rural poor in VCD therefore 
calls for a sound approach to address the complex trade-offs between 
income generation, food security, gender equity, sustainable natural resource 
management, and overall livelihood resilience.
According to empirical evidence, threats for the rural poor are much 
greater and opportunities more limited where the competitiveness of the 
domestic business sector lags far behind international standards (Altenburg 
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2007). Under these conditions a “multi-chain approach” to VCD, as suggested 
by Stoian and Donovan (2007) for agricultural and forest sectors, helps to 
minimize risks and maximize poverty-reduction potential by strengthening 
not only the most promising, often export-oriented value chain, but 
also a variety of domestic or regional chains to which smallholders have 
access. Charette (2011) argues similarly, advocating a “portfolio approach” 
to VCD programs that stretches across sectors, in particular where the 
BOx 2.1 Private-sector initiatives that link to the poor
Value-chain development is but one approach to involve the poor in private-
sector initiatives. An alternative approach is the base-of-the-pyramid 
(BoP), where large companies aim to involve the poor in markets either as 
providers of raw materials or as customers of affordable products. Such 
approaches often aim at producing more with less and ensuring long-
term business viability. Concerns have been raised that BoP approaches 
underappreciate heterogeneity among the poor, as well as the intricacies 
of participatory partnerships between transnational companies and poor 
communities (Arora and Romijn 2009). Other approaches go beyond 
economic goals by incorporating environmental and social goals. Corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) strategies call for exceeding legal mandates by 
involving ethical standards, stakeholder claims, and international norms in 
the business model. Pioneers of CSR have made notable investments in 
determining and improving their carbon, poverty, and other environmental 
or social footprints in pursuit of company or industry-wide goals. Lately, 
though, CSR has been criticized by Porter and Kramer (2011) for not 
being a solution as social issues remain at the periphery, not at the 
core. Instead, they advocate creating shared value (CSV) as a strategy 
to generate value for both companies and the society by reconceiving 
products and markets, redefining productivity in the value chain, and 
enabling local cluster development. The adoption of BoP, CSR, and CSV 
approaches signals private-sector interest in alternative ways of doing 
business in an era of increased competition for nonrenewable resources 
and unprecedented social change. These approaches share relevant 
features of VCD and, in theory, can facilitate asset building, generation 
of higher value-added, and win–win relationships involving the rural poor. 
However, more critical analysis and mutual learning are needed to ensure 
that economic, social, and environmental goals are adequately addressed, 
and that trade-offs encountered along the way will be minimized through 
continuous improvement.
Source: Authors
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agricultural sector is highly subject to price and weather shocks, and where 
the manufacturing and/or services sectors show strong potential for growth 
and development. Despite these recent conceptual advances in VCD, it is 
still common practice to focus on a single value chain without due attention 
to the impact of value-chain participation of the rural poor on overall 
livelihood resilience and related trade-offs. In any case, VCD is only part of 
achieving rural poverty reduction. A comprehensive strategy should include a 
complementary focus on rural infrastructure and services; food security; and 
local markets for traditional products, such as basic grains. 
Pro-poor VCD has both advocates and skeptics. Either side lacks sound evidence 
to substantiate their claims.
Given the intricacies of VCD, the diverse nature and interests of the 
stakeholders, and a general dearth of sound evidence of related impact, it 
does not come as a surprise that this approach has both advocates and 
skeptics. The former argue that the most promising option for lifting rural 
people out of poverty, other than rural–urban migration, is linking poor 
farming households to lucrative markets through skills development and 
new institutional arrangements along the chain. Skeptics, on the other hand, 
regard VCD as unsuitable for working with the very poor, given its perceived 
emphasis on risk-taking and entrepreneurship, and the additional challenges 
faced by the very poor when responding to economic incentives (Fowler 
and Brand 2011). The history of stimulating export-oriented production of 
nontraditional agricultural products illustrates some of the challenges faced 
when seeking to integrate the poor into more demanding markets (although 
not all VCD programs target export markets). From the skeptics’ perspective, 
such an approach may be seen as an example for failed pro-poor VCD, while 
advocates would hold that precisely the absence of good VCD practice has 
limited the impact of nontraditional agricultural export programs on poverty 
(Box 2.2).
When looking for evidence of the impact of poverty-focused programs, it 
becomes evident that “despite the pressure for measuring and reporting on 
results, most development agencies have in effect failed to measure and report 
on significant results in eradicating poverty” (Tanburn and Sen 2011). As 
a result, neither advocates nor skeptics can base their claims regarding the 
efficacy of VCD on sound impact assessment. In fact, most methodologies 
used for assessing the impact of VCD on poverty are fairly simplistic and 
yield partial information on its strengths and limitations as a pathway out 
of poverty. Assessments typically focus on the generation of employment 
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and income, rather than broader changes in terms of critical livelihood and 
business assets (see Humphrey and Navas-Alemán 2010). Resulting reports 
thus provide an incomplete and potentially biased picture of VCD impact 
on the livelihoods of the poor and the viability of smallholder enterprises 
of which they may be a part. For example, a given initiative may have 
increased the income derived from commercializing crop production, while 
simultaneously it had compromised household food security and induced 
gender inequalities in terms of labor division and decisionmaking; or a 
smallholder enterprise may have increased permanent staff, though increased 
payroll costs undercut the prices paid to producer members.
BOx 2.2 Struggles of smallholders to participate in nontraditional 
agricultural exports 
Beginning in the 1970s and through the 1990s, governments and donor 
agencies promoted nontraditional agricultural exports (NTAE) in Latin 
America and Africa through trade liberalization, cooperative development, 
export promotion, fiscal incentives, subsidized credit, technical assistance, 
and infrastructure development. These initiatives were often geared toward 
medium- and large-scale agribusinesses, while smallholders participated 
with varying levels of intensity without being the primary beneficiaries 
of NTAE interventions. In some cases, the private sector has taken the 
lead in organizing the production of nontraditional export products. Food 
processors and supermarkets in Europe and the United States have 
redirected part of their sourcing of raw materials to traders, processors, 
and producers in developing countries. There is ample evidence that the 
conditions for smallholder participation in NTAE were often inadequate to 
allow for poverty reduction, and many of them dropped out of programs 
due to low productivity, high input costs, falling export prices, and limited 
access to farming inputs and credit. In other cases, smallholders were 
pushed out due to their limited ability to meet the quality or volume 
requirements of traders and processors. Over the years, consensus has 
emerged that NTAE development programs lacked economic sustainability, 
and did not adequately address poverty or the environmental and social 
costs of export-oriented production by large agribusinesses. VCD today, 
with its focus on both supply and demand factors for the design of 
sustainable market linkages, responds to the lessons learned from earlier 
NTAE experiences. However, there is an urgent need for those that fund and 
implement value-chain initiatives to address the poverty implications of their 
interventions in a more integrated way.
Source: Authors
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Current assessments of VCD tend to provide an incomplete picture of 
their impact.
The limited utility of one-dimensional assessments follows a general trend 
of ineffective design and implementation of monitoring and evaluation 
for development interventions, including those in agriculture (Haddad, 
Lindstrom, and Pinto 2010). Discussions in the gray literature on private-sector 
development have advocated traditional logframe-based project assessment 
for understanding VCD poverty implications, with emphasis on enterprise 
rather than household-level impacts (see Tanburn and Sen 2011). While 
logframes and similar tools for “rigorous” planning and monitoring and 
evaluation may serve the reporting needs of project managers and donors, they 
are inappropriate for understanding complex development processes (Jones 
2011), as they assume that the implementing organization can achieve the 
targeted outcomes and impacts on its own. The failure to adequately account 
for external factors, such as changes in the political–legal or market context, or 
the effects of value-chain interventions by others, provides an incomplete and 
potentially distorted picture of VCD impact. The reported impact is made 
more questionable if household-level impacts are deducted from enterprise-
level outcomes rather than measured.
What We Think We Know
Unlike the previous section, where we summarized views of VCD for which 
clear evidence or broad consensus exists, this section addresses our insights 
or those of others that are yet to become part of the mainstream discussion 
on VCD.
Conceptual models underlying pro-poor VCD tend to lack a holistic perspective.
Many value-chain initiatives involving the poor are based on fairly simple con-
ceptual models focusing on a few variables (output, employment, income, pro-
duction practices, infrastructure), while minimizing or omitting other critical 
albeit complex factors (for example, social and human capital building, vul-
nerability). Such initiatives often aim for greater productivity and better prices 
for poor households, and the resulting increase in income is seen as a proxy 
for poverty reduction, if not overall development. On the upside, the simpli-
fied design of a value-chain initiative reduces both monitoring and evaluation 
and implementation costs, and makes the results easy to communicate across 
the chain and to other stakeholders. On the downside, such an approach does 
not recognize the full set of assets needed by poor households to effectively 
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participate in VCD, nor does it address how these assets can be built over time 
to escape poverty and ensure livelihood resilience, or deal with the trade-offs 
the rural poor face when making decisions about their allocation of time and 
resources between a specific value chain and other livelihood activities.
Poor households and smallholder enterprises require minimum assets to success-
fully participate in VCD.
Despite the warning that poor households vary in their asset levels, income 
flows, social networks, and abilities to cope with shocks (Fowler and 
Brand 2011), many value-chain initiatives treat poor rural households as a 
uniform stakeholder group with the same response capacity. In reality, both 
external factors, such as access to basic infrastructure and services, common 
pool resources, and social stability, as well as internal factors, such as asset 
endowments, interests, and power, ultimately determine the extent to which 
poor households are “ready” to participate in specific value chains. Similarly, 
the “value chain readiness” of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
requires adequate policies to improve overall investment conditions, attract 
foreign investment, and provide better business services to increase their 
competitiveness (Altenburg 2007). Minimum asset thresholds for successful 
participation in VCD apply at both household and enterprise levels, as 
illustrated by an example of a coffee cooperative in Nicaragua (Box 2.3). 
Below these thresholds, specific, nonmarket-based interventions are needed 
to create the necessary preconditions for poor households and resource- 
constrained enterprises to become value-chain ready.
VCD stakeholders would benefit from an asset-based approach, clear impact 
models, and sound metrics for understanding poverty impacts and identifying 
options for improved pro-poor VCD.
There is a growing consensus that conventional poverty definitions need to be 
broadened to take account for critical livelihood assets and vulnerability (for 
example, McKay 2009). These definitions allow for the endowments of and 
changes in human, social, natural, physical, and financial capital, and their 
effects on livelihood resilience. When applied in VCD, such an asset-based 
approach is critical to determine whether value-chain readiness is reached by 
meeting minimum asset thresholds. It can also prove the existence of positive 
feedback loops; that is, processes in which the building of one asset (for exam-
ple, financial capital) leads to the building of others (for example, human or 
physical capital). These would be understood as indicators of broad-based and 
lasting impact on rural livelihoods in pursuit of well-being and resilience.
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Despite advances in thinking about the nature and causes of poverty, most 
skeptics and advocates of VCD rely on a limited set of indicators and data to 
BOx 2.3 Evidence of asset thresholds for successful participation in 
certified coffee markets
The Nicaragua-based coffee cooperative Soppexcca links roughly 500 
smallholder producers to international buyers of certified fair-trade and 
organic coffee. Following the coffee crisis—a period between 1999 and 
2004 when prices fell below the cost of production for many producers in 
Central America—donors and NGOs invested $2.1 million in building the 
capacity of Soppexcca and its members to expand their output and bet-
ter meet the quality demands of international buyers. Donovan and Poole 
(2011) assessed the changes in tangible and nontangible assets for both 
Soppexcca and a representative sample of its members between 2006 
and 2009. For the cooperative, interventions enabled major expansion of 
infrastructure and processing machinery, increased coverage of its techni-
cal assistance, and increased the ability to engage with new fair-trade cof-
fee buyers in the United States. Related investments provided an option for 
generating income through expanded service provision to members, and 
thus were considered critical for the co-op’s long-term survival. Most co-op 
members benefitted in terms of increased income flows and greater resil-
ience through their membership in the cooperative. Nearly a fourth of the 
households were able to take advantage of credit provided by Soppexcca 
and others to expand their landholdings, diversify their agricultural pro-
duction, and/or rejuvenate their coffee plantations. However, important 
weaknesses and gaps in assets remained unaddressed by the interven-
tions and by Soppexcca itself. For example, financial assets remained seri-
ously underdeveloped during the assessment period, while long-term debt 
increased significantly. Extension services expanded during the period, but 
had difficulties in responding to members’ needs. One-third of the sam-
pled households faced major barriers to intensify coffee production, access 
crucial inputs and services, and increase or diversify their production of 
basic grains. These households tended to be strongly constrained in their 
endowment with or access to assets, as reflected in very small landhold-
ings, insecure land tenure, and high dependence on off-farm income for 
their livelihoods. They were also more likely to have older household heads 
or to be headed by a female. The Soppexcca case shows that greater atten-
tion needs to be paid to the asset endowments of smallholders and the 
related dynamics, if VCD is to reduce rural poverty in an integrated and sig-
nificant way.
Source: Authors
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substantiate their poverty claims. The former tend to describe the limited 
poverty impact of VCD by focusing on either the limited relative share of 
benefits captured by the poor in a given chain or the exclusion of the poorest 
sections of the rural population. Advocates, on the other hand, argue that 
the contribution of VCD to poverty reduction needs to be measured as an 
absolute increase in income through interventions in a value chain, and that 
employment effects among the poor are relevant irrespective of the overall 
distribution of benefits. In both cases, clear impact models with plausible 
cause–effect relationships, or refined metrics that allow for both positive  
and negative effects of VCD, are largely absent.
There is an urgent need and an opportunity for public and private 
investors in VCD to promote the adoption of an asset-based approach to 
the design and implementation of value-chain initiatives, based on well-
defined impact models, and to the development of sound metrics that help 
demonstrate under which conditions VCD generates high poverty impact. 
Recent work by an international coalition of development practitioners and 
researchers highlights the opportunities and the challenges for the application 
of an asset-based approach to VCD (Box 2.4).
VCD requires adequate linking of technical, business, and financial services.
In addition to successful collaboration between public and private sectors 
and civil society, pro-poor VCD requires a combination of technical, 
business, and financial services. Some of these services are available from 
within the chain, particularly those that help improve quality or efficiency. 
Such “embedded services,” typically provided by downstream actors to 
their upstream business partners, have the advantage of focusing on clearly 
identified needs and upgrading opportunities in the chain. On the other 
hand, certain services may not be readily available from within the chain, 
especially those that help improve environmental and social performance 
or that address long-term issues related to capacity building and skills 
development among the poor. These services may need to be sourced from 
external service providers, such as government agencies, NGOs, development 
projects, and consulting firms. The diverse nature of the services needed 
poses a challenge to their effective and efficient delivery. Technical services 
related to production and, to a lesser extent, processing technologies tend to 
be readily available for traditional products, from either downstream actors 
or external service providers. Financial services may be provided in the form 
of advance payments or credits within the chain, or through  government 
programs and microfinance projects from outside of the chain. Usually, 
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however, they are not available to highly resource-constrained smallholders. 
Business services often turn out to be the Achilles’ heel in  VCD as 
specialized business service providers for the rural sector are largely absent. A 
further challenge for VCD-related services is their provision in an isolated 
BOx 2.4 International collaboration to design an asset-based approach to 
value-chain development assessment
Between 2008 and 2011, an international group of development practitioners 
and researchers, representing Bioversity International, the Tropical 
Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE), Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS), the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), HELVETAS 
Swiss Intercooperation, Lutheran World Relief (LWR), Mennonite Economic 
Development Associates (MEDA), Swisscontact, TechnoServe, and 
Winrock’s Wallace Center, among others, collaborated on the design and 
testing of the 5Capitals Toolkit—an asset-based approach assessing the 
poverty impacts of VCD (see Donovan and Stoian 2010). In collaboration 
with local NGOs and consultants, and with financial support from the Ford 
Foundation, the toolkit was designed and validated through 23 case studies 
in Latin and North America, Africa, and Asia. The aim was to design a tool 
that would (1) assess the impact of a whole set of VCD interventions, rather 
than that of a particular intervention; (2) consider changes in assets among 
both households and the enterprises that maintained links with them; and 
(3) differentiate between the impacts of the combined VCD interventions 
and those induced by external factors. Experiences gained in tool testing 
demonstrated the potential of an asset-based approach to VCD assessment, 
along with related challenges. Case-study collaborators agreed that (1) such 
an approach is very useful to gain in-depth insight on VCD-related poverty 
impacts; (2) the focus on both household and enterprise assets sheds 
additional light on poverty impacts; (3) the context analysis as the first step 
of the methodology is critical to isolate VCD-related impact from context-
induced change; and (4) the results of impact assessment have highest 
value when used for redesigning VCD interventions. At the same time, they 
found that this approach (1) implies investments of human and financial 
resources that are reasonable but not low-cost, (2) requires a flexible 
handling of the enterprise assessment due to the varied nature of “linked 
enterprises,” and (3) depends on systems thinking to make the most out of 
it. The final version of the toolkit (in English and Spanish) and an edited case 
study volume are available on the CATIE and ICRAF websites (Donovan and 
Stoian 2012).
Source: Authors
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fashion. Service providers are typically specialized in one of these three types 
of services and rarely make an effort to partner with those who provide 
complementary services. Effective and efficient services for VCD require a 
sound demand analysis and a concerted approach to the delivery of technical, 
business, and financial services that are well-linked and complement each 
other in a logical fashion. Following the subsidiarity principle, that is, that 
all functions in the chain should be performed on the “lowest” level possible, 
only those services that cannot be sourced from within the chain would be 
provided from outside of the chain.
What We Still Need to Know and Do Differently
Despite the increasing focus on poverty by governments, development agen-
cies, and civil society organizations, and some tangible success stories, the 
number of rural people living in desperate conditions under various degrees of 
vulnerability remains high. Undoubtedly, we have advanced our understand-
ing of poverty issues and there is a growing consensus on the importance of 
pro-poor interventions in value chains. There are a number of crucial issues 
on which our knowledge is still insufficient. In the absence of an asset-based 
approach to designing, implementing, and monitoring value-chain initiatives, 
related impact models and theories of change are incomplete. Under these 
conditions, it is virtually impossible to identify the best options for helping 
poor people to exit out of poverty, let alone to stay out of poverty. In addition 
to these knowledge gaps, there are a number of “action gaps” related to areas 
that require forms of engagement in value chains in addition to, or other than, 
those applied to date.
Need for Improved Knowledge
• How to determine value-chain readiness? If the goal of the intervention is to 
reduce vulnerability and lift people out of poverty, how can we determine 
whether poor households and their business organizations are ready to par-
ticipate in VCD? Which minimum asset thresholds do they need to meet 
and, if not available, what are the best options to help them become val-
ue-chain ready?
• Can asset building at the level of smallholder enterprises spur asset building 
at the household level? Since business organization of smallholders is often 
considered a prerequisite for their successful participation in value chains, 
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we need to understand under what conditions asset building at the level 
of the smallholder enterprises positively influences household assets and 
reduces vulnerability; and how VCD can help to create more synergy in 
this respect.
• How to ensure that assessing VCD impact is both effective and efficient? 
Current impact assessment of value-chain programs tends to be low-cost 
and fairly one-dimensional, whereas an asset-based approach to assess-
ment yields more robust results while requiring higher investments. There 
is a clear need for experimenting with differentiated approaches to impact 
assessment; for example, the routine measuring of outputs, the assessing 
of outcomes to the extent possible, and full-fledged impact assessment 
through in-depth case studies. The Donor Committee for Enterprise 
Development (DCED), for example, recommends three “universal” 
impact indicators (scale, income, and jobs) for ongoing results measure-
ment; at the same time, it acknowledges that this cannot replace rigor-
ous impact assessments, nor evaluations, as these ask broader questions 
(Tanburn and Sen 2011).
• How best to use an asset-based approach for planning, implementing, and 
assessing VCD? This question is at the heart of any improvements in VCD. 
In particular, we need to understand what indicators within each asset 
type—typically including human, social, natural, physical, and financial 
capital—tell us the most about reducing poverty and vulnerability. Which 
proxies can be used to make assessment manageable and cost-effective? 
How do we adapt or tailor VCD to different contexts and varying asset 
levels in given populations? How can we best deal with nonlinear asset 
pathways (asset building followed by asset erosion or vice versa)?
• Which roles correspond to private, public, and civil society sectors in 
promoting VCD? What can the private sector do alone? Under what 
conditions will the private sector invest in the long term, or go the 
extra mile for pro-poor VCD? What can realistically be expected from 
private-sector initiatives, such as base of the pyramid,  corporate social 
responsibility, or creating shared value? Where and how do public–private 
partnerships work best, and where are their limits? What is the specific 
role of NGOs in helping build assets beyond the contributions from public 
and private sectors?
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Need for Improved Action
• Account for the evolution of income and asset objectives. VCD programs 
need to account for the dynamics and variations of asset endowments and 
livelihood objectives among poor and vulnerable populations. Different 
measures are needed in each stage when following a pathway out of pov-
erty from “(i) stabilizing household consumption/stemming asset loss, to 
(ii) smoothing household consumption/protecting assets, to (iii) smooth-
ing household income/acquiring assets, to (iv) expanding household 
income/leverage assets, and to (v) stabilized income-generation and asset 
accumulation” (Fowler and Brand 2011).
• Differentiate between those who are value-chain ready and those who are 
not. Market-based interventions work for those who meet minimum asset 
thresholds and, therefore, are value-chain ready. Those who do not meet 
those thresholds require specific, nonmarket-based interventions to create 
the necessary preconditions for their participation in VCD. These include, 
but are not limited to, customized technical assistance and training to 
build human and social capital, rehabilitation of natural capital where 
eroded, investments in basic infrastructure and services, and resolution of 
land-tenure conflicts where they exist. These interventions fall outside the 
realm of VCD, but are critical for its success if the poorest sections of the 
rural population are to benefit.
• Follow logical sequence of asset building. There are plenty of examples of 
programs where donors have given processing equipment to farmer organi-
zations, but the initiatives have failed because of lack of business skills. In 
many cases, human and social capital need to be built before considering 
investments in physical capital. In other cases, eroded natural capital needs 
to be rebuilt before meaningful business development is possible.
• Ensure synergies among public and private sectors and civil society promot-
ing VCD. Based on the subsidiarity principle, public sector and civil soci-
ety should only engage in those interventions that cannot be performed 
by the private sector. This requires determining which services can be pro-
vided from within the chain (“embedded services”) and which need to be 
sourced from external service providers (in many cases government agen-
cies or NGOs). For example, rather than donating equipment, donors 
might link farmers to credit agencies to buy the equipment. If necessary, 
agencies could subsidize the cost of credit.
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• Improve the quality of and the linking between technical, business, and finan-
cial services. In the absence of integrated service providers, we need to make 
major efforts to link technical, business, and financial services in ways that 
allow for meaningful asset building at household and smallholder-enter-
prise levels. At the same time, we need to ensure that the linking of these 
services is geared to the requirements identified by the chain actors rather 
than outside agents from the public sector or civil society.
• Create awareness among donors and development practitioners about the 
advantages of adopting an asset-based approach to the design, implementa-
tion, and assessment of VCD. There is a need to provide evidence that the 
increased costs and complexity of an asset-based approach are outweighed 
by tangible benefits in terms of higher impact on poverty reduction, liveli-
hood resilience, and viability of smallholder enterprises.
• Promote comprehensive strategies for rural development. There is both a 
need and an opportunity to combine VCD with other approaches to rural 
development, such as sustainable rural livelihoods, territorial development, 
and investments in rural infrastructure and services.
• Innovate in partnerships for joint learning and continuous improvement. 
The diverse nature of stakeholders in VCD provides a great opportunity 
for joint learning. Each of them brings specific perspectives, skills, and 
experiences to the table, but we need to define appropriate forums and 
mechanisms for sharing and capitalizing on these. The outcome of such 
learning alliances and communities of practice will be highest if nurtured 
by genuine interest in learning and authentic commitment to continu-
ous improvement.
Conclusion
Our current knowledge of the poverty impacts of VCD is limited. Regardless 
of whether related initiatives are driven by private, public, or civil society sec-
tors, the use of sound metrics to determine their impact at both enterprise and 
household levels, and to isolate VCD from context-induced change, should 
be the rule rather than the exception. If VCD is to be effective in address-
ing rural poverty, it must embrace the complex needs and realities of the rural 
poor. This includes the recognition that market-oriented activities are import-
ant but not exclusive elements of rural livelihood strategies. Particular atten-
tion needs to be paid to the specific challenges and needs of the very poor, 
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given their higher risk and vulnerability. Otherwise, there is a substantial risk 
that pro-poor VCD does not live up to expectations and causes undue trade-
offs in the livelihood strategies of the rural poor.
An asset-based approach to the design, implementation, and assessment 
of VCD is a powerful vehicle to address these challenges and risks. Not only 
does it provide an appropriate measure of the multiple dimensions of poverty 
and vulnerability, but it also helps to determine which households and small-
holder enterprises are ready for VCD, and which require specific preparatory 
interventions to become value-chain ready. An asset-based approach to VCD 
comes at a price, however. Related planning, data collection, and analysis are 
relatively time-consuming, complex, and costly. At the same time, such an 
approach helps forgo higher expenses to mitigate unintended effects of inter-
ventions in value chains. It provides public-sector and civil society organiza-
tions with the necessary information to justify the investment of taxpayers’ 
money, and holds the potential to improve the environmental and social cre-
dentials of private-sector companies pursuing base of the pyramid, corporate 
social responsibility, creating shared value, or similar strategies.
VCD is not a panacea to rural development. When seeking impact beyond 
poverty reduction on resilience of livelihoods and ecosystems, it needs to be 
paired with complementary approaches. Comprehensive strategies for rural 
development would include improvements in local infrastructure and ser-
vices, political–legal frameworks, food security, local markets for agricultural 
and forest products, and income generation through services and off-farm 
employment. Appropriate design, implementation, and monitoring and eval-
uation of such strategies, again, will best be achieved by pursuing an asset-
based approach.
Much remains to be learned about the best possible design and imple-
mentation of value-chain programs and pertinent combinations with other 
approaches. Undoubtedly, however, an asset-based approach to pro-poor VCD 
is a critical element of such strategies. Governments, donors, development 
agencies, NGOs, and private-sector agents committed to poverty reduction 
will need to invest in pilot projects, tool development, and capacity building; 
engage in multistakeholder platforms for joint learning; and commit to con-
tinuous improvement. Without the adoption of an asset-based approach to 
VCD, poor households and smallholder enterprises in the upstream segments 
of the chain will continue to be exposed to high uncertainty and risk and, in 
particular, to potentially harmful trade-offs between value-chain optimiza-
tion and resilience at the household and business levels.
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CHANGING ASSET ENDOWMENTS AND 
SMALLHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN HIGHER-VALUE 
MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM CERTIFIED-COFFEE 
PRODUCERS IN NICARAGUA
Jason Donovan and Nigel Poole
Introduction
Intensify, innovate, and specialize—this was the essential message for govern-
ments and donors looking to address the devastations of the coffee crisis in 
Central America and other coffee-producing regions. Between 1999 and 
2005, prices paid for green coffee did not allow producers in Central America 
to cover their variable costs of production (IADB 2002). Most smallholders 
reduced investment in coffee productivity, while others abandoned coffee 
plantations altogether, or uprooted plantations in favor of basic grains and 
other crops (Castro, Montes, and Raine 2004). Influential publications 
argued that smallholders had limited opportunities to increase their share 
of the benefits from trade in commodity coffee markets, given that the over-
whelming proportion of economic returns flowed to actors in developed coun-
tries (Oxfam 2001; Ponte 2002; Gibbon and Ponte 2005).
Consensus emerged that support for building smallholders’ links to 
specialty coffee markets, including those for certified fair-trade and organic 
coffee, would improve the prospects for smallholders in the short and long 
term (USAID 2003; Varangis et al. 2003; IICA 2004; Bacon 2005; Kilian et 
al. 2005). The specialty market exhibited rapid demand growth, in contrast 
to slow growth for bulk coffees. Access to these markets required that small-
holders meet stricter quality requirements and, in some cases, obtain access to 
certification. Subsequent development interventions aimed to improve coffee 
quality and productivity, facilitate access to certification, strengthen collective 
enterprises in regions where the production of high-quality coffee was most 
viable, and promote diversification out of coffee for regions with less potential.
Recently, however, various studies have tempered expectations regarding the 
poverty-reducing potential of access to markets for fair-trade and organic coffee. 
Arguments have centered on the persistence of low yields and relatively high 
This chapter was originally published as an article in Food Policy 44: 1–13 (2013).
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labor requirements (Valkila 2009; Barham et al. 2011; Beuchelt and Zeller 
2011), declining prices relative to conventional coffee (Weber 2011), and the 
limits of smallholders to intensify coffee systems given their livelihood insecu-
rities and rising production and household-consumption costs (Raynolds 2002; 
Bacon et al. 2008; Mendez et al. 2010; Wilson 2010). These findings on coffee 
echo those of well-documented studies in the Mediterranean, Africa, and Latin 
America on the struggles of smallholders to meet stricter buyer demands for 
product quality, volume, and timeliness of delivery across a range of agrifood 
sectors (for example, Reinhardt 1987; Dolan et al., 1999; Reardon, Humphry, 
and Harris-Pascal 2003; Garcia-Martinez and Poole 2004).
While nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), donors, and development 
agencies have maintained their enthusiasm for facilitating smallholder links 
to higher-value markets (Devaney 2011), few value-chain studies or assess-
ments of value-chain interventions have explicitly documented the impact 
of improved market access on poverty, gender, or the environment (Bolwig 
et al. 2010; Stoian et al. 2012). Project assessments generally have relied on 
only a few generic impact indicators (for example, output per unit area, size 
of holding, income gained) and thus have provided limited understanding of 
the determinants of household participation and the benefits across different 
types of households (for example, Zandniapour, Sebstad, and Snodgrass 2004; 
Humphrey and Navas-Alemán 2010). As a result, policymakers and develop-
ment practitioners have inadequate guidance for the design of the necessarily 
complex interventions that seek to help farmers benefit more from their link-
ages with higher-value markets.
Deeper insights into how smallholders benefit from linkages to higher- 
value markets can be obtained by adopting a livelihoods perspective, with 
special emphasis on households’ assets and the ability of households to build 
their endowments over time. In this chapter, we undertake an analysis of 
household asset building to explore how differences in market participation 
reflect variations in households’ endowments of livelihood assets, namely 
natural, human, social, physical, and financial capitals. We consider:
• initial asset endowments of producing households,
• the contribution of development interventions to household asset building, 
and
• how initial asset endowments and subsequent household changes deter-
mine smallholders’ participation in high-value export markets.
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We describe the asset-building framework; provide contextual information 
on the case study in Nicaragua; discuss the methods used for data collection; 
present the results on asset changes by coffee-producing households; and then 
discuss the implications of the findings for the design of development inter-
ventions aimed at linking smallholders to higher-value food markets.
An Asset-Building Framework
Poverty debates reflect a growing interest in the importance of assets for 
understanding poor people’s ability to respond to shortages and shocks and 
generate future income and consumption (for example, Moser 1998; Rakodi 
1999; Anderson 2012). Economists have argued that a focus on assets provides 
a better option for understanding the underlying causes and the dynamics of 
poverty than a focus on income or consumption variables alone (for example, 
Birdsall and Londono 1997; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2000). Carter and 
Barrett’s (2006) theoretical work on asset thresholds and poverty traps drew 
attention to how insufficient access to assets jeopardizes the long-term ability 
of households to pull themselves out of poverty. An understanding of asset 
endowments and interactions forms a core element of the frameworks for live-
lihood conceptualization and analysis (for example, Carney 1998; Ellis 2000).
Academic discourse on the links between poverty reduction and access to 
higher-value markets suggests that the poorest smallholders often have too 
few assets to effectively participate over time. However, such insights into the 
roles of assets in shaping rural livelihoods have yet to translate into the design 
and assessment of interventions for linking smallholders to higher-value 
markets (Stoian et al. 2012). For example, the various methodologies for 
designing strategies that better link smallholders to markets pay little atten-
tion to households’ capacities, needs, and circumstances, thus making the 
implicit assumptions that households (1) have sufficient assets to effectively 
participate in higher-value markets, (2) do not face substantial trade-offs when 
using these assets, and (3) are able to assume higher risks for their investments 
(Donovan et al. 2013). Making such assumptions reduces the complexity for 
methodological implementation, but runs the risk of formulating intervention 
strategies that provide limited long-term benefit to the rural poor.
More effective policies, programs, and projects for linking smallholders to 
globalizing food markets will require that key aspects of the development chal-
lenge be addressed in formal tools and frameworks. The framework presented 
here stresses the relationships between a household’s endowment of liveli-
hood assets and its ability to engage in various livelihood activities (Figure 3.1). 
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Livelihood assets, namely natural, physical, social, financial, and human capi-
tals, may be individual or collectively owned. These are built up through returns 
from market activities, remittances and inheritances, and inputs and services 
provided by NGOs and other external actors. Variations in asset accumulation 
may be explained, in part, by variations in the overall political, legal, and institu-
tional context that shapes the decisions of producers and buyers. The stronger a 
household’s asset base, the greater is its ability to expand and intensify livelihood 
activities and thus benefit from links with more demanding markets.
Households maintain different types of commercial relations with buyers 
linked to local, national, and international food markets. In addition, house-
holds may engage in seasonal and year-round labor provision. Investments in 
household labor and financial resources and returns to those investments vary 
according to the market and over time. To the extent that new (more inten-
sive) market linkages require new (increased) investments, trade-offs are likely 
between assets and among activities required to implement other livelihood 
activities, including subsistence production. Opportunities to reduce the costs 
and risks related to market investments may originate from collective enterprises, 
other buyers, and nonmarket actors (for example, NGOs, government agencies).
FIGURE 3.1 Household asset allocations and linkages with markets and service providers
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This framework suggests that the design of pro-poor interventions in value 
chains must progress beyond the categorization of the types of capital to iden-
tify priorities for policy and interventions supporting asset building. Such prior-
itization should relate poor people’s access to different types of assets to the 
functions of those assets within changing and dynamic livelihood strategies, 
identifying the most effective livelihood-development paths and the changing 
roles of different assets within those paths. The framework and methodological 
approach used here enables a systematic analysis of asset endowments and the 
diverse livelihood strategies of the poor. It will help policymakers assess whether 
access to new or higher-value food markets will help households climb out of 
poverty, and address questions such as which households are more able to build 
their asset bases? How are assets built up over time? Which households are best 
able to invest in new or more intensive market linkages?
Case Study Background
Coffee is the most important agricultural product exported by Nicaragua, 
accounting for 37 percent of the total value of agricultural exports in 2008 
(CEPAL 2009). With an average (green) coffee productivity of 672 kg/ha, 
Nicaragua is the least efficient producer in Central America. Its coffee produc-
tivity is roughly 50 percent of Costa Rica’s and 40 percent of Guatemala’s 
(Varangis et al. 2003). There are about 48,000 coffee farmers in Nicaragua, 
80 percent of whom are producers with less than 3.5 ha under cultivation 
(Flores et al. 2002). Despite the large number of smallholders, farms larger 
than 3.5 ha produce more than 85 percent of the Nicaraguan coffee harvest 
due to higher intensity of management and better access to purchased inputs. 
In general, coffee producers are better-off than the landless or those who 
produce basic grains and tubers mainly for subsistence. That said, the poorest 
of coffee farmers often lack resources for coffee production and basic living 
expenses, and are vulnerable to negative changes in output and input prices, 
production risks, and other shocks.
The research examined asset building by smallholders in north-central 
Nicaragua who were linked to certified fair-trade and organic coffee markets 
through the cooperative Soppexcca. Soppexcca has roughly 500 members. 
It emerged in 2001 from the ashes of its predecessor cooperative, which 
dissolved due to unpaid debts owed to international coffee buyers. Soppexcca’s 
membership more than doubled during the coffee crisis, as smallholders 
sought credit and higher coffee prices. In addition to providing access to certi-
fied markets, Soppexcca offers annual credit for coffee production, multiyear 
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credit for strategic coffee-related investments, technical assistance for 
increasing coffee productivity and reducing environmental impacts of coffee 
production, and some forms of social protection. In 2009, all of Soppexcca’s 
coffee exports were fair-trade certified, and approximately 15 percent were 
certified for both fair trade and organic. Since its beginnings, Soppexcca has 
maintained strong ties with a small group of European coffee buyers. Recently, 
the cooperative has forged ties with US coffee buyers.
Soppexcca, like other relatively large and well-established cooperatives 
in Nicaragua, maintains close links with NGOs and development projects. 
Between 2003 and 2009, Soppexcca received about US$2.1 million from 
NGOs and development projects to build its infrastructure, strengthen its 
internal organization, and expand its service offer to members. Soppexcca 
maintains links to alternative lending institutions for access to low-cost credit 
for infrastructure development and the purchase of coffee from its members. 
In addition, Soppexcca receives support from coffee buyers in the form of fair-
trade contracts (with social premium and floor prices) and zero-interest credit 
for purchase of coffee from its members. On average, in 2009, buyers offered 
Soppexcca prices that exceeded by 5 percent to 15 percent those established by 
fair-trade standards.
Study Design and Methods
Data collection focused on identifying changes in endowments of liveli-
hood assets among coffee-producing households affiliated with Soppexcca 
during the four-year period between 2005–2006 and 2008–2009. 
Quantitative and qualitative data were collected to understand the changes 
in assets, and qualitative information was used to understand the relevance 
of—and the reasons for—the changes. Feasibility of empirical research and 
the tractability of analysis required a focus on specific elements of the five live-
lihood assets rather than undertaking a comprehensive analysis of all asset 
concepts. After exploratory and participatory research among producers to 
validate asset concepts and methodology, the most important asset changes 
were assessed using the following set of indicators:
• Natural capital: access to land and area under coffee production, land-
tenure arrangements, access to fertilizers (proxy for soil fertility), and 
waste management
• Human capital: management skills in coffee production, ability to partici-
pate in cooperative governance
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• Social capital: linkages and reciprocity in relationships with coffee buyers
• Physical capital: capital for production and processing
• Financial capital: access to credit, income benefit from coffee sales 
to Soppexcca.
In most cases, what we observed and measured provided a partial under-
standing of the five assets and their relevance for livelihood strategies. This 
is especially true in the case of social capital, the concept of which admit-
tedly has been much contested (for example, Fine 1999). In research on 
smallholders, social capital has been explored in various ways, including inter-
actions with neighbors (for example, Elder, Zerriffi, and Le Billon 2012) and 
links with farmer organizations (for example, Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000). 
In this study, the assessment of social capital focuses on relations between 
Soppexcca members, the cooperative itself, and transactions with other coffee 
buyers, with special attention to the formation of mutually beneficial trading 
relationships. The data collected focused on the services and inputs received 
by smallholders from buyers, and, in the case of Soppexcca, the ability of the 
cooperative to service, and source raw material from, its members.
Environmental-sustainability issues were addressed under the management 
of natural asset (soil fertility) and human asset (waste-management practices). 
Commercial sustainability was subsumed within concepts of social and 
financial capital. Equity issues, such as differential impacts and outcomes for 
households, were addressed through the clustering approach.
In addition to information on assets, data were collected on other major 
income sources, on contextual factors that could have facilitated or hindered 
asset building, and members’ insights into the reasons why a given change did 
or did not take place.
The sample comprised 292 coffee-producing households—about 
95 percent of the membership of 11 of Soppexcca’s 18 base cooperatives. 
Criteria for base cooperative selection included distance from Soppexcca’s 
headquarters and geographical concentration of members in a given base 
cooperative. To facilitate data collection, preference was given to those 
cooperatives with a higher concentration of households. Unless otherwise 
indicated, coffee quantities are presented as pre-dried parchment coffee—
the semiprocessed state of coffee when it is sold by producers to buyers such 
as Soppexcca. One hundred pounds (45.4 kg) of export-ready (green) coffee 
is commonly processed from roughly 200 pounds (90.7 kg) of pre-dried 
parchment coffee produced by farmers in north-central Nicaragua.
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Data collection was conducted in Jinotega and Matagalpa districts during 
a nine-month period in 2009–2010. Primary data from household surveys 
and key-informant interviews were supplemented by secondary information 
from Soppexcca staff. Twenty key-informant interviews were conducted with 
Soppexcca leaders, international coffee buyers, certification agents, and other 
chain actors. Recall information was used to identify current asset endow-
ments and changes in asset endowments over the assessment period.
Cluster analysis allowed for understanding the potential for asset building 
by different types of households. Clusters were formulated using a two-step 
clustering technique using SPSS. Two variables with strong correlation that 
formed the basis for formation of the clusters were: (1) area under coffee 
production in 2008–2009, and (2) percentage of total household income 
derived from off-farm sources in 2008. A three-cluster solution emerged from 
this analysis, with household livelihoods descriptors and cluster characteriza-
tion as follows:
• Small-scale diversified livelihoods (SDL) (n=77): relatively small area under 
coffee production; high dependence on income derived from off-farm 
labor activities (often as wage labor for other, usually larger, farmers); some 
contribution from other crops.
• Small-scale specialized livelihoods (SSL) (n=162): relatively small area under 
coffee production; majority of income derived on-farm from coffee, with 
contributions from banana, citrus, beans, and other products.
• Large-scale specialized livelihoods (LSL) (n=53): relatively large area under 
coffee production; majority of income derived from coffee, with contribu-
tions from livestock, banana, citrus, and other products.
Table 3.1 provides insights into the differences between the clusters. 
The mean total annual income for the sample was $4,969 (or, given an 
average household size of 5.2, $956 per capita). Pushing up the average was 
total income for LSL households, which at $14,627 was several-fold higher 
than that of other households. For both LSL and SSL households, coffee 
contributed between 85 percent and 93 percent of total income. For SDL 
households, coffee contributed approximately 33 percent of total income, 
with 5 percent coming from other farming activities and 62 percent from 
off-farm. In most cases, these households depended on short-term, low-skill 
jobs in the agricultural sector. Across all the clusters, cash income derived 
from agricultural sources other than coffee was generally a small share of total 
income. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) results suggest that the cluster 
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solution was robust and thus provided a solid basis for analysis of changes in 
livelihood assets.
Changes in Assets of Coffee-producing 
Households
Natural Capital
ACCESS TO LAND AND AREA UNDER COFFEE PRODUCTION
The expansion of landholdings and the area under coffee production provide 
important indicators of natural capital management and the overall ability 
of smallholders to improve their well-being through access to specialty coffee 
markets. For both indicators, results suggest a notable improvement in 
natural capital for a broad section of the sample. Eighty households, or nearly 
TAbLE 3.1 ANOVA results comparing selected indicators across clusters
Variable
Cluster
Total 
(SD)
Small-scale 
diversified 
livelihoods (SDL) 
(SD)
Small-scale 
specialized 
livelihoods (SSL) 
(SD)
Large-scale 
specialized 
livelihoods (LSL) 
(SD)
Total income 2008 ($)
F (2, 292) = 80.98, p <.05
2,617
(±2,557)
2,927
(±2,730)
14,627 
(±13,221)
4,969 
(±7,605)
Income from sale of coffee 
2008 ($)
F (2, 292) = 50.73, p <.05
867
(±1,033)
2,486
(±1,828)
13,474
(±8,579)
4,053 
(±4,543)
Income from off-farm 
sources 2008 ($)
F (2, 292) = 61.79, p <.05
1,618
(±1,651)
157
(±466)
304
(±757)
569
(±1,154)
area under coffee 
production (ha) 2008–2009
F (2, 290) = 96.98, p <.05
1.5
(±0.4)
1.8
(±1.5)
6.3
(±6.8)
2.5
(±2.9)
highest education achieved 
Soppexcca-registered 
household member 
(highest grade achieved)
F (2, 290) = 0.34, p >.10
3.6
(±3.8)
3.0
(±2.2)
3.3
(±2.5)
3.2
(±2.7)
age of household head 
registered with Soppexcca
F (2, 290) = 2.84, p <.10
44.1 
(±12.2)
42.0 
(±13.3)
48.6 
(±10.7)
43.3 
(±12.6)
Source: authors.
Note: aNOVa = analysis of variance; SD = standard deviation.
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one-third of the sample, expanded their landholdings. The average land-
holding increased from 4.6 ha to 5.1 ha (Figure 3.2). Among the clusters, the 
largest percentage increase in landholdings, at 15.4 percent, was recorded by 
households from the SDL cluster. Households from the SSL cluster increased 
their landholdings, on average, by 11.8 percent, while, on average, households 
from the LSL cluster experienced limited change in landholdings.
Many households also increased their area under coffee production 
through new land purchases or the conversion of existing land to coffee 
production. Roughly half the sample, or 158 households, expanded coffee 
production. The average area increased from 1.9 ha to 2.5 ha (Figure 3.3). 
Households from the LSL cluster increased area under coffee, on average, 
by 1.4 ha (28 percent increase over the pre-existing area). Households from 
the SSL cluster increased area under coffee, on average, by 0.4 ha (31 percent 
increase over the pre-existing area), while households from the SDL increased 
their area under coffee by an average of 0.29 ha (26 percent increase over the 
pre-existing area).
Expansion of landholdings and area under coffee represent consider-
able investments over multiple years. Households often identified a mix 
of factors that allowed for expansion in coffee area, including access to 
credit with extended repayment periods, income from coffee sales, and 
income from other sources, including that generated off-farm. Soppexcca 
was the only source of multiyear credit identified by sampled households. 
Fifty-six percent of the sample received three-year credit for land purchases 
FIGURE 3.2 Change in total land area, by cluster, 2004–2005 to 2008–2009
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and renovation of coffee plantations (for details, see the financial capital 
section). Logistic regression showed the relative importance of credit, 
off-farm income, and pre-existing land size in predicting the expansion of 
coffee production. The strongest predictor of coffee expansion was access to 
multiyear credit. For each $500 installment of credit obtained, households 
increased their odds of expanding their area under coffee production by 
nearly five times (Table 3.2).
FIGURE 3.3 Change in area under coffee production, by cluster, 2004–2005 to 2008–2009
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TAbLE 3.2 Multiple logistic regression showing effects of credit, off-farm income generation, 
and pre-existing land ownership on coffee expansion 
Variable (N = 292)a B SE Sig. Odds ratio
pre-existing landholding 
(2004–2005)
–0.065 0.025 0.010 0.937
percentage of income generated 
off-farm
–1.230 0.525 0.019 0.292
age of Soppexcca member –0.028 0.013 0.030 0.972
Total credit received between 
2004–2005 and 2008–2009 
($500 units)
1.589 0.282 0.000 4.897
N household members –0.038 0.065 0.561 0.963
Constant 1.532 0.572 0.007 4.627
Source: authors.
Notes: B = coefficient for the constant; Se = standard error around the coefficient of the constant; Sig. = significance level;  
N = size of sample.
a The model as a whole correctly classified 77.2 percent of all cases.
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LAND-TENURE ARRANGEMENTS
Land-tenure insecurity is a legacy of the agrarian reform, which left many 
potential coffee farmers in ambiguous legal positions regarding landowner-
ship, vulnerable to appropriation of land titles by banks. This situation has 
long challenged rural development in Nicaragua (Broegaard 2005; Fraser, 
Fisher, and Arce 2013). For some Soppexcca-affiliated households, uncertain 
tenure arrangements before joining the cooperative severely restricted invest-
ments in farm production. These households belonged to two Soppexcca-
affiliated base cooperatives, which, when combined, formed roughly one-third 
of the SDL cluster. For members of one of these two base cooperatives, Julio 
Hernández, considerable progress was achieved in building natural capital and 
other assets during the period. However, for members of the base cooperative 
El Esfuerzo, insecure tenure persisted and would likely constrain their invest-
ments in coffee into the distant future.
The cooperative Julio Hernández illustrates key points in asset manage-
ment and building. Before 2001, the members lived and worked on a state-
owned coffee enterprise. In 2001, a collective title was obtained for the 
plantation and, soon after, individual plots were distributed among the 
former plantation workers. With individual plots came the urgent need for 
members to build skills in coffee production, renovate coffee plantations, 
and link with coffee buyers. Soppexcca facilitated the organization of the 
base cooperative and provided technical assistance and credit for coffee reno-
vation. Productivity levels for Julio Hernández members increased signifi-
cantly during the period, from a two-year average of 314 kg/ha in 2004–2005 
and 2005–2006 to 503 kg/ha in 2008–2009 and 2007–2008. Anecdotal 
evidence suggested that the advances in productivity were linked to services 
provided by Soppexcca: pre-existing assets among members were relatively low 
and no other provider of technical assistance or credit was identified during 
the period. Moreover, Julio Hernández members emphasized the role of 
Soppexcca in building their natural and financial capitals during interviews.
However, the case of El Esfuerzo illustrates the vulnerability of house-
holds where members had yet to overcome power abuse and conflict related to 
land tenure. During the 1990s, the households that would form El Esfuerzo 
farmed collectively titled land and sold their coffee through a collective enter-
prise. The coffee was sold to an exporter who provided credit in exchange for 
a set amount of green coffee. In 1999, the exporter failed to provide credit, 
and households struggled to collect sufficient coffee to meet their delivery 
quota. In response, the exporter took possession of their land. The households 
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retained a lawyer and fought the case for nine years before achieving success. 
Currently [2013], the lawyer holds the collective land title and will release it 
to the households when she is paid the $80,000 owed for her services. By 2009, 
El Esfuerzo members continued to rank among the least productive coffee 
farmers and were among the least able to sustain their livelihoods through 
on-farm production.
ACCESS TO FERTILIZERS (PROXY FOR SOIL FERTILITY)
Coffee production mines nutrients from the soil, which, if not replaced 
through organic or inorganic fertilizers, results in gradually declining produc-
tivity (Van der Vossen, 2005). Thus, use of fertilizers and maintenance of 
soil fertility are key indicators of resource management and sustainability. 
Evidence from long-term experiments in Nicaragua suggests that shade-grown 
organic and conventional coffee production can reach productivity levels of 
1,487 kg/ha and 1,927 kg/ha, respectively, with ‘moderate’ levels of fertiliza-
tion (Haggar et al., 2011). However, the average productivity for the sampled 
organic and conventional producers, at 726 kg/ha and 1,278 kg/ha, fell far 
below these estimates. Among households in the SDL cluster, results were 
more discouraging still, at 552 kg/ha for organic producers and 582 kg/ha for 
conventional producers. This suggests that lack of access to fertilizers remains 
a barrier to building and maintaining natural capital.
All organic producers applied coffee pulp to their plantations as a source 
of fertilizer. For some, it was the main fertilizer. However, the coffee pulp 
available from a given farm likely provided only a fraction of the soil nutri-
ents lost through coffee production.1 For some organic coffee producers, 
processed chicken manure, sold under the brand name Biogreen, provided an 
important organic source of nutrients. One 45-kg sack of Biogreen provides 
1 kg of nitrogen. However, between 2006–2007 and 2008–2009, on average, 
only 36 percent of organic producers applied Biogreen to their coffee planta-
tions. Moreover, among these households, few were able to purchase enough 
Biogreen to achieve reasonable productivity levels.2 The mean number of bags 
of Biogreen applied per hectare ranged from a high of 21.9 in 2006–2007 to 
 1 To achieve reasonable yields from organic coffee production in Nicaragua, Haggar et al. (2011) 
reported the use of nearly 9 metric tons of coffee pulp per ha/year. This is roughly two to three 
times as much pulp as just returning the pulp from the coffee produced.
 2 To keep coffee yields at a reasonable level and to maintain soil fertility, a minimum of 36 kg of 
nitrogen/ha need to be supplied annually (Valkila 2009). This assumes that producers recycle 
their coffee pulp and use nitrogen-fixing shade trees—both of which are common practices 
among smallholders in Nicaragua.
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a low of 16.7 in 2008–2009. These results suggest that soil nutrient require-
ments for organic coffee production are not being met, and therefore natural 
assets are being depleted.
Among households that produced conventional coffee, the relatively 
high cost of inorganic fertilizer (Ganes-Chase 2009) presented a challenge 
to replenishing soil nutrients lost to coffee production for cash-strapped 
producers. Data on inorganic fertilizer utilization (‘complete’ and urea) 
were collected from 152 households between 2006–2007 and 2008–
2009. Twenty-two households, or 14 percent of those sampled, reported no 
purchase of inorganic fertilizer during the entire period. For any one year, 
the percentage of households that reported inorganic fertilizer usage varied 
from a high of 79 percent in 2008–2009 to a low of 61 percent in 2006–2007. 
Evidence suggested that overall fertilizer usage by households in the SDL and 
SSL clusters was on the rise. The number of SDL households that applied at 
least one bag of complete fertilizer increased from 21 percent in 2006–2007 
to 42 percent in 2008–2009. Similarly, 75 percent of SSL households applied 
at least one bag of ‘complete’ in 2008–2009, compared to only 53 percent 
in 2006–2007. No major change was reported in fertilizer use for LSL 
households. On average, 92 percent of LSL households applied ‘complete’ 
fertilizer between 2006–2007 and 2008–2009. Despite the overall increase 
in fertilizer application, however, households in the SDL cluster generally 
did not reach the estimated nitrogen threshold (39 kg of nitrogen/ha) for 
achieving reasonable productivity levels. Most households identified annual 
credit from Soppexcca and other coffee buyers as the main contributing factor 
to increased fertilizer purchases.
Human Capital
MANAGEMENT SKILLS IN COFFEE PRODUCTION
One important element of human capital for coffee growers is the knowl-
edge, skills, and capacity to manage plantations sustainably and produce 
uniform, high-quality beans. In general, smallholders in Nicaragua do not 
practice regular pruning or other forms of improved crop management on 
their coffee plantations (Rice 1999). This, combined with knowledge that 
several of Soppexcca’s base cooperatives had only recently gained land titles 
and thus the opportunity to invest in their coffee production, suggests that 
overall human-capital endowments in this context were low prior to the 
period. Before joining Soppexcca, most interviewed households reported 
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not having access to technical assistance for coffee production. Technical 
assistance and training by Soppexcca in shade management and pruning 
techniques aimed to support their members to sustain coffee yields, while at 
the same time enhancing natural capital (for example, reduced contamina-
tion, protection from erosion, enhanced nutrient recycling).
Results among the sample were mixed. On one hand, most house-
holds acquired new skills for reducing contamination from coffee milling 
and providing higher-quality coffee. Fifty-four percent of the households 
reported the application of selective harvesting (of mature beans) during the 
period. Most of these households were from the SSL cluster (n = 31) and 
the LSL cluster (n = 12). Six households from the SDL cluster reported the 
implementation of selective harvesting. Similarly, 66 percent of the house-
holds disposed of wastewater in infiltration pits in 2008–2009 (compared 
to only 11 percent of the sample three years prior). SSL households were the 
most likely to have adapted the new techniques for wastewater treatment 
(74 percent), followed by LSL households (70 percent), and SDL households 
(58 percent).
The overall low coffee productivity suggests that improper planta-
tion management may continue to be a genuine concern. While it was not 
possible to observe or measure plantation-management practices for this 
study, insights were gained on the effectiveness of technical assistance 
through interviews with technical assistance staff and from Soppexcca 
members. The evidence suggests that Soppexcca’s technical assistance 
program struggled to provide the coverage and quality of services needed for 
upgrading the production skills of poor coffee farmers. According to one 
key informant, efforts to encourage more intensive plantation management 
have been ineffective, due in part to (1) a reluctance by producers to trim or 
stump coffee trees that are productive, and (2) the inability of Soppexcca 
staff to work intensively with producers to upgrade their crop management 
skills (Pinedo, pers. comm.). Soppexcca had yet to implement a monitoring 
system for plantation management. Moreover, there was no link between 
Soppexcca technical assistance and the credit department.
Households reported their perceptions of the value of technical assis-
tance for coffee production between 2007–2008 and 2008–2009. For most 
households, Soppexcca was the only provider of training and on-site tech-
nical assistance. Forty-four percent (n = 129) reported being dissatisfied or 
highly dissatisfied with technical-assistance provision. Selected household 
responses shed light on the nature of the problem:
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• Household #26: “We were visited once in 2008, but the extensionist 
didn’t provide technical advice; he arrived to inform us of a meeting at 
the cooperative.”
• Household #265: “I lack advice when I need it: on one occasion, I 
requested a visit from the extensionist because the coffee berries were 
falling off the branches, but he never came.”
• Household #187: “He only comes to estimate the harvest. I am only able 
to consult with the extensionist during training events—that is how I have 
obtained technical assistance.”
• Household #277: “Visits are only for estimating the harvest—the exten-
sionist does not know my coffee plantation. He sends others from the 
community to assist me and does not provide advice.”
• Household #282: “Sometimes he indicated which product I should use, 
but the extensionist did not indicate the doses and I burned the plants.”
SKILLS FOR COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE
A share in ownership and governance by members is an important cooperative 
principle and feature of human capital. Findings showed that representation 
of members on the board of directors was mostly tokenism. The main 
reasons were insufficient skills by the board and lack of information from 
Soppexcca. The former president of the board noted that she received no 
training in basic business or cooperative management prior to assuming her 
post as the board president. During her period on the board she had limited 
understanding of how Soppexcca formulated its prices for parchment coffee, 
nor did she participate in setting the agenda for board meetings. Other 
informants noted that the board and Oversight Committee did not have 
access to timely financial information, due mainly to the absolute lack of 
the information, rather than inaccessibility of the information. Interviews 
highlighted the board’s reluctance to question, debate, or probe Soppexcca’s 
executive management on strategic decisions and investments. External 
service providers remained distant on the empowerment of Soppexcca’s 
members and engaged directly with Soppexcca’s professional management.
Strong professional leadership—combined with a long-term commitment 
from buyers and NGOs to its development, and the institutional framework 
provided by fair-trade certification—has played an important role in 
building Soppexcca’s organizational asset base, but this has come through 
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external investment rather than organic human-capital growth among the 
membership. Limitations to building effective internal leadership within the 
cooperative have resulted in a high concentration of power and information in 
the professional manager, hence vulnerability of the organization and all the 
value-chain relationships.
Social Capital
From an individual or household perspective, the extent to which linkages 
with coffee buyers generate tangible benefits for maintaining and improving 
livelihoods forms an important element of social capital (Portes 1998). Our 
discussion of social capital focuses on the supply-chain relationship benefits 
derived from collaboration with Soppexcca and the significance of institu-
tional arrangements for reducing transaction costs.
Smallholders rarely have access to affordable credit in Nicaragua 
(Bastiaensen 2005). Before joining Soppexcca, most households from the 
SDL and SSL clusters (69 percent and 67 percent, respectively) sold their 
coffee exclusively to buyers in the towns of Jinotega and Matagalpa. In 
contrast, only 36 percent of households from the LSL employed intermedi-
aries for marketing their coffee prior to joining Soppexcca. Few households 
reported access to buyer-provided credit in the year before joining Soppexcca 
(20 percent) and even fewer reported access to buyer-provided technical assis-
tance (9 percent). Households from the LSL cluster were more likely to have 
forged linkages with direct exporters before their having joined Soppexcca, 
and thus were more likely have access to credit and higher prices.
Having forged new linkages with Soppexcca, most households retained 
their previous relationships with pre-existing coffee buyers. Buyers differed 
in terms of services offered and the transaction costs of doing business 
(Table 3.3). Relative to other buyers, Soppexcca was the most demanding 
in terms of quality but also offered the most extensive range of services. In 
2008–2009, credit was available for most members without formal land titles 
or other forms of collateral at an annual interest of 16 percent for annual 
credit and 14 percent for multiyear credit. Soppexcca was the only buyer that 
offered protection from future downturns in coffee prices through the fair-
trade floor price.
Soppexcca provided other valuable services. Beginning in 2007, the coop-
erative employed a team of eight extensionists to provide technical assis-
tance. In addition, Soppexcca provided safety nets for its members (vehicular 
transport for emergencies, donation of a coffin on the death of a member 
or member’s spouse, credit/donations for medical expenses), and access to 
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development projects. However, doing business with Soppexcca was rela-
tively costly. Payment for coffee was made in three installments, the final 
installment (approximately 20 percent of the total price) being delayed until 
May–June. All credit and payment transactions required travel to Soppexcca’s 
office in Jinotega and producers assumed all risks for transport of coffee to 
the warehouse.
TAbLE 3.3 Characteristics of trading relationships for coffee sold by Soppexcca members
Buyer
Two-year average 
farmgate price 
(2007–2008 to 
2008–2009)
Payment conditions in 
2008–2009
Services offered in addition to 
coffee marketing in 2008–2009
Soppexcca Organic: $136
Conventional: $109
• Floor price (fair trade)
• Interest rate 1.2%/month
• Initial payment with short-
term credit (20%), partial 
payment upon delivery to 
warehouse (60%), final 
payment in June (20%)
• Technical assistance
• Certification
• Fertilizer for purchase (delivered 
to farm)
• Short- and long-term credit (no 
collateral required, interest rate 
between 1.2% and 1.3% per 
month)
• emergency credit
• Other servicesb
Market 
buyersa
Conventional: $97 • Full payment upon delivery
• price to producer: direct 
exporter price, minus 
commission
• purchase of coffee
• exchange of basic food items 
for parchment coffee (before 
and after harvest)
• Short-term credit (no interest 
on credit taken prior to harvest; 
5%/month interest on all other 
credit)
• Flexibility in credit repayment 
(paying coffee debt with basic 
grains production)
Community-
based 
buyers
Conventional: $97 • Land title not required for 
credit
• Full payment upon delivery, 
price based on New York 
market price
• Technical assistance
• Short-term credit (interest rate 
at 1.5% to 2%/month)
• Fertilizer for purchase (delivered 
to farm)
• Transport of coffee to ware-
house
Direct 
exporters
Conventional: $99 • Contract required for credit 
(with collateral)
• Final payment upon delivery, 
priced based on New York 
market price
• Short-term credit (interest rate 
1.5% to 2%/month)
Source: authors.
Notes: a Information based on results from 18 key-informant interviews carried out on site with buyers of coffee at the 
markets of Jinotega and Matagalpa in august 2009; b For example, emergency transport to hospital, contributions to meeting 
funeral expenses, assessment with land-tenure disputes.
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Compared to Soppexcca, transactions with market buyers offered faster 
payment, with cash upon delivery of coffee and credit on demand; however, 
producers had to trade off ease of sale and timeliness of payment against 
generally slower business processes and higher costs for credit.
Few sampled households sold to direct exporters of coffee (n = 5). 
Exporters provided annual credit on a contract basis, with land titles gener-
ally required as collateral unless producers had a history of compliance with 
contractual obligations. Annual credit during the 2008–2009 season was 
offered at a 17 percent annual interest rate. Producers had the option to 
receive final payment (market price minus amount of annual credit) upon 
delivery of parchment coffee. Additional services, such as on-site technical 
assistance and pick-up of parchment coffee, were not reported.
Side-selling is a common but complex phenomenon affecting cooperative 
operations and relationships with members. Data on coffee sales by buyer indi-
cated Soppexcca’s difficulty in increasing its capture of raw material from its 
members. For organically certified households, the mean percentage of coffee 
sold to Soppexcca between 2007–2008 and 2008–2009 was 73 percent, while 
for conventional producers, the mean percentage was 57 percent (Table 3.4). 
This suggests that price was not the major factor behind selling to buyers 
other than Soppexcca. Responses presented below illustrate the diversity of 
reasons. The most common response hinged on the need to cover production 
expenses for the coffee harvest (n = 31). In other cases, households identified 
TAbLE 3.4 Percentage of coffee sold to Soppexcca, by producer type and cluster
Cluster Average percentage of production sold to Soppexcca from 
2006–2007 to 2008–2009 (SD)
N
Conventionala
SDL 54.6 (±32.8)   50
SSL 59.5 (±30.9) 128
LSL 53.5 (±33.9)   43
all 57.2 (±31.9) 221
Organic
SDL 70.1 (±33.3)   27
SSL 74.5 (±22.5)   32
LSL 77.0 (±30.0)   10
All 73.2 (±27.8)   69
Source: authors.
Notes: SD = standard deviation; N = number; SDL = Small-scale diversified livelihoods; SSL = Small-scale specialized 
livelihoods; LSL = Large-scale specialized livelihoods. 
a Differences between the means for conventional and organic producers were significant at the .05 level.
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emergencies and expenses as the main reason for selling to other buyers 
(n = 8), poor quality (n = 4), and restricted access to credit (n = 2). Below are 
quotes from households in SDL cluster (emphasis added):
• Household #190: “Don Osman pays better than Soppexcca; Soppexcca has 
too many price deductions, and he is less concerned with quality.”
• Household #24: “Because my brother needed money, I sold coffee in the 
market to resolve his need.”
• Household #188: “Due to delays in the provision of credit—the inter-
mediary is much quicker. Soppexcca always delivers credit in June, while 
the intermediary delivers in May.”
• Household #19: “The amount of credit offered by Soppexcca is very small … 
from Atlantic [direct coffee exporter] I receive $10,000 and Soppexcca has 
not provided any. Soppexcca also demands too much in terms of quality.”
• Household #194: “Transport is very difficult from our farm to the road. 
The other buyer collects our coffee at the farm.”
Physical Capital
CAPITAL FOR PROCESSING
Improvements in infrastructure at the household level played a major role in 
Soppexcca’s strategy for improving coffee quality. Physical capital for wet mill-
ing includes the construction/refurbishment of mill enclosures, construction/
refurbishment of fermenting tanks, and the purchase/repair of machines for 
depulping and pumping water. The average investment by households from 
the SDL cluster was $198 during the period, skewed upward by a few house-
holds; among the 72 households in the cluster, only 12 reported cash invest-
ments for improved wet milling. Investments by SSL, while significantly higher 
than those of the SDL cluster, remained low at $593. Moreover, 70 SSL house-
holds, or nearly half the cluster, reported no cash investments during the period. 
Investments by LSL households, at nearly three times those of SSL households, 
showed considerably less variation within the cluster. Credit by Soppexcca con-
tributed roughly 48 percent of the total reported household expenditure.
CAPITAL FOR PRODUCTION
Households also reported their acquisition of machinery, tools, and infra-
structure for agricultural production in addition to those used for wet milling. 
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Notable is the extremely low investment by households in the SDL cluster, at $91 
(Figure 3.4). When investments were made by SDL households, they were gener-
ally confined to basic tools for production of coffee and basic grains (machetes, 
shovels, sprayers). Similarly to experiences in the building of physical capital for 
wet milling, households in the SSL cluster achieved higher investments than 
their SDL counterparts, but the absolute level of investments was low. Findings 
suggest that households from SDL and SSL clusters generally struggled to build 
their physical-capital endowments for farm production compared to the level of 
productive investments made by LSL households. These included relatively large 
purchases of machinery for the production of coffee, investment in livestock, 
and generation of off-farm business activities.
Financial Capital
ACCESS TO CREDIT
The ability of households to build natural and physical capital was strongly 
related to their access to multiyear credit. Between 2004–2005 and 2008–
2009, some 56 percent of the sample, or 164 households, received credit for 
the purchase of land or expansion of coffee production. SDL households 
(36 percent) were the least likely to have received access to multiyear credit 
during the period, compared to SSL households (65 percent) and LSL house-
holds (58 percent). The average amount of credit was $1,271. Among the 
FIGURE 3.4 Capital expenditures by cluster
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clusters, the average amount varied from a low of $889 for households in the 
LSL cluster to a high of nearly $1,319 for households in the SSL cluster. Among 
households in the SDL cluster, an average of $957 in credit was received, all of 
which Soppexcca provided.
As noted previously, many sampled households (57 percent) reported 
no access to annual credit before joining Soppexcca. During the assessment 
period, opportunities for obtaining annual credit increased, in part due 
to linkages with Soppexcca, with only 12 percent of sampled households 
reporting no access to annual credit. Among the households that received 
annual credit, most (n = 160, fifty-five percent) reported Soppexcca as their 
only source of credit. Other sources included specialized lending organi-
zations, coffee buyers, NGOs, and, to a lesser extent, informal lenders and 
commercial banks. Collateral requirements varied.
While the terms offered by Soppexcca were relatively favorable, the average 
amount provided by Soppexcca was small. For example, in 2007–2008, the 
mean credit value was $197 for SDL households, $390 for SSL households, 
and $1,805 for LSL households. Even for households with relatively small 
coffee holdings, credit from Soppexcca was unlikely to cover variable produc-
tion costs, much less facilitate more strategic investments in asset building. 
Moreover, few households were able to access credit consistently: only 
9.3 percent, 11.3 percent, and 25 percent of the SDL, SSL, and LSL house-
holds, respectively, were able to access annual credit for each year of the assess-
ment period. Between 20 percent and 55 percent of SDL households ended 
the production year with debt to Soppexcca, with similar results recorded for 
SSL households.
INCOME BENEFIT FROM COFFEE SALES TO SOPPEXCCA
Findings regarding benefits of coffee sales through Soppexcca are illumi-
nating. As noted above, it is not uncommon for smallholders to divert sales 
from formal to informal channels. Table 3.5 presents estimates of the income 
benefit for Soppexcca members from coffee sales, taking into account sales 
to Soppexcca and other buyers, and allowing for the differences in farmgate 
prices between coffee buyers. Among households from SDL and SSL clusters 
that produced conventional coffee, the actual income benefits from partici-
pation in Soppexcca were small, at $32 and $87, respectively. These income 
estimates reflect that 41–45 percent of the potential income benefit from the 
sale of fair-trade coffee was lost due to the selling of coffee to other buyers. 
Certified-organic households from the SDL and SSL clusters experienced 
higher income benefits than their conventional counterparts, at $77 and $94, 
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respectively. However, these households also struggled to maximize their 
income benefits from participation in formal markets. On average, 27 percent 
of the total potential income benefit from the sale of fair-trade organic 
coffee was lost due to the selling of coffee to other buyers. For producers of 
conventional coffee, the small size of the price benefit generated through 
sale of coffee to Soppexcca may have facilitated their decision to sell to other 
buyers. For both types of producers, the strong need to sell coffee outside of 
Soppexcca often reflected farmers’ urgent needs for annual credit linked to 
coffee production, for the ability to respond to shocks, and to smooth income 
generation over the year.
Discussion
For poor smallholder coffee growers, research has highlighted both the poten-
tial and the limitations of asset building by coffee growers in Nicaragua in 
TAbLE 3.5 Estimated income (US$) benefit from coffee sales to Soppexcca, by cluster 
(average, 2007–2008 to 2008–2009)
Cluster Average 
total coffee 
production 
(45 kg 
sack green 
coffee)
Potential 
income if 
all coffee 
sold to
Soppexccaa
Potential 
income 
benefit if 
all coffee 
sold to 
Soppexccab
Actual 
income 
taking into 
account 
sales to 
other buyers
Income 
forgone due 
to sales to 
other buyers
Percentage 
income 
benefit 
forgone due 
to sales to 
other buyers
Conventional
SDL 5.9 643 71 611 32 45
SSL 18.0 1,962 216 1,875 87 41
LSL 100.2 10,922 1,202 10,363 559 46
all 31.3 3,412 376 3,251 161 43
Organic
SDL 6.6 898 257 821 77 30
SSL 9.5 1,292 371 1,198 94 26
LSL 49.4 6,718 1,927 6,275 443 23
All 14.0 1,904 546 1,758 146 27
Source: authors.
Notes: SDL = Small-scale diversified livelihoods; SSL = Small-scale specialized livelihoods; LSL = Large-scale specialized 
livelihoods. 
a The following two-year average farmgate prices were offered by Soppexcca: $109/45-kg sack for conventional coffee and 
$136/45-kg sack for organic coffee; b Difference in income generated from 100 percent of coffee production being sold to 
Soppexcca versus income generated from 100 percent of coffee being sold to other buyers. a two-year average farmgate 
price of $97/45-kg sack was used for estimating income from sales to other buyers.
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response to more intensive value-chain interactions and development inter-
ventions. Our discussion begins with a look at the overall changes in asset 
endowments and then examines the differences in asset building based on 
cluster affiliation.
Many households built up key elements of natural capital, including 
expanded areas under coffee production and renovated coffee trees. These 
investments helped to overcome the erosion of natural capital that took 
place during the coffee crisis. For households that depend on coffee produc-
tion for most of their income, these investments are likely to have positive 
future impacts on rural livelihoods. Access to credit with extended repayment 
periods played a critical role in expanding and improving natural capital. On 
the other hand, lack of progress in addressing other dimensions of natural 
capital, such as nutrient mining due to lack of affordable fertilizers and 
insecure land tenure, is likely to diminish hopes that poor households will 
improve their coffee productivity in the future.
A similar pattern of significant, but incomplete, asset building was 
detected for the other capitals. In terms of human capital, evidence suggests 
that most households acquired new skills that improved coffee quality, but 
few households had acquired the more complex skills for improved planta-
tion management—a critical determinant of coffee productivity and disease 
resistance. The ability to implement more intensive production practices was 
also linked to endowments of human and financial capitals, which were also 
severely constrained in many cases.
Results suggest that there were limited impacts to build human capital 
through cooperative-provided technical assistance. Soppexcca had no moni-
toring system in place nor had it attempted to link technical assistance 
with its other services (for example, credit) or external services (for example, 
specialized providers of business development and technical services). Donors, 
projects, and NGOs that financed technical assistance by Soppexcca were 
reluctant to insist on accountability or engage Soppexcca in identifying 
outcome-enhancing measures.
Results also draw attention to challenges faced by Soppexcca’s volunteer 
leadership to participate effectively in Soppexcca’s governance. Volunteer 
leaders lacked basic business skills prior to assuming their posts, as well as 
access to critical information on business performance. They indicated appre-
hension about confronting authority, and conflicts emerged among members 
when professional managers were questioned. Reluctance to challenge the 
management was likely enhanced by the failure of Soppexcca’s predecessor 
cooperative, juxtaposed with its success in expanding sales of certified coffee 
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and securing support from NGOs and projects.3 Results here support previous 
findings on the autocratic nature of cooperative governance in Nicaragua and 
the distant engagement of NGOs in the development process (Kroeker 1996).
Links to Soppexcca and markets for certified coffee resulted in an 
important increase in social capital for households. Soppexcca offered some 
protection from the recurrent economic, social, and environmental uncertain-
ties that characterize coffee production in Nicaragua. Technical assistance and 
credit allowed households to rebuild assets that were eroded during the coffee 
crisis. For many households, Soppexcca offered the first opportunity to access 
credit and technical assistance since they initiated coffee production. Despite 
the importance of links to Soppexcca, most households diverted considerable 
quantities of coffee to local intermediaries or direct exporters. Mujawamariya, 
D’Haese, and Spellman (2013) suggest that smallholders’ decisions to deal 
with buyers outside the cooperative likely respond to their trust relations 
with local buyers based on repeated transactions in credit. Evidence from 
Soppexcca supports this argument. The use of credit for meeting consump-
tion needs, combined with the relatively high costs of selling to Soppexcca (for 
example, high quality demands, delayed payment, transport to warehouse) 
also encouraged side selling by Soppexcca members. Households managed a 
portfolio of buyer relationships that took into account farmgate prices, access 
to credit and other services, and buyer demands for quality.
Most households struggled to build physical capital for agricultural 
production in general, and coffee production in particular. The expansion 
of wet-milling infrastructure and equipment was one element of physical 
capital where considerable investments were detected. Multiyear credit by 
Soppexcca facilitated these investments. The credit was provided to Soppexcca 
by NGOs looking to support the cooperative in its efforts to enhance coffee 
quality and reduce water consumption and contamination in the processing of 
coffee cherries.
The income benefits from access to certified-coffee markets were gener-
ally limited during the period under assessment, reflecting the high prices 
of conventional coffee relative to those for certified coffee. At the time of 
data collection (2009–2010), international commodity prices for coffee 
 3 During the coffee crisis, Soppexcca used half of the social premium from fair-trade coffee 
sales to pay down the debt with coffee buyers. In 2009, the decision was made to apply half the 
social premium to pay down the new debt acquired in the purchase of the processing plant. 
Both uses of the premium can be justified from a business perspective; however, concerns arise 
as to whether an empowered board of directors would have invested the premium in the same 
manner, especially after having paid off the initial debt to buyers.
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were higher than at any period in the past 20 years. However, boom and 
bust are recurrent features of coffee markets, suggesting that a future anal-
ysis of income benefits from another crisis would present strikingly different 
findings. Indeed, Soppexcca’s initial growth occurred before the period of 
this study when the price premium for certified coffee was very attractive to 
smallholders struggling with the aftermath of the coffee crisis. Despite rela-
tively small income benefits, engagement with the cooperative was important 
for other reasons: access to credit facilitated coffee production and provided 
a form of insurance against shocks such as illness, death, and crop failures, 
which otherwise would have resulted in asset erosion. While many households 
received credit for coffee production for the first time through Soppexcca, 
access to credit was often inconsistent and the amount of credit was insuffi-
cient to intensify coffee production or make longer-term strategic investments 
in asset building.
This study offers a cautious but positive view on the potential of poor 
smallholders to improve livelihood security through links to cooperatives 
and higher-value coffee markets. Feasibility constraints limited the chosen 
set of indicators of livelihoods assets, but the most significant changes have 
been captured. Improvements in natural, social, and financial capital ensured 
that households had the minimum endowments needed to participate in 
the Soppexcca value chain. Access to Soppexcca offered safety nets, lower 
marketing risks, and access to inputs, which have important positive implica-
tions for livelihood maintenance and security. On the other hand, there was 
little evidence that interventions by the cooperative and its NGO and donor 
partners allowed households to intensify production or to generate new prod-
ucts and services outside of the coffee value chain. The extent to which poten-
tially greater gains in livelihood security could have been achieved through 
physical capital expansion aimed at increased efficiency and productivity of 
other crops, such as bananas, beans, and maize, remains to be explored by 
Soppexcca and its external partners. Thus complex business skills remained 
undeveloped. This may be explained by the incomplete nature of asset 
building during the assessment period, the overall weak household asset 
endowments before the assessment period, and the time it takes to develop 
individual human and collective social capital.
Heterogeneity in Asset building
Significant variation due to pre-existing endowments was evident in the 
ability of households to build assets. Table 3.6 summarizes and compares 
asset building among the three clusters. In general, SDL households were 
118 ChapTer 3
TAbLE 3.6 Differences in asset building in response to new links to certified coffee markets 
Cluster Social capital Natural capital Human capital Physical capital Financial 
capital
Small-scale diversified livelihoods (SDL)
evidence of 
considerable 
asset building
N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a
evidence 
of low to 
moderate 
level of asset 
building
New links to 
Soppexcca—a 
trusted buyer of 
coffee and provider 
of marketing, 
technical assistance, 
and credit services
Generally able to 
expand area under 
coffee production 
and renovate 
existing plantations 
through Soppexcca 
credit
N/a N/a Limited income 
benefits from 
certified coffee
Little/no 
evidence of 
asset building
Lack of 
complementary 
assets implied 
that households 
struggled to benefit 
significantly from 
new links; links 
maintained with 
local coffee buyers
Major limitations 
for improving soil 
fertility
Least likely to 
have upgraded 
knowledge 
and skills for 
improving coffee 
quality; few able 
to modernize 
plantation 
management 
practices
Least able to 
reinvest gains 
from higher 
coffee prices or 
improved credit 
access into the 
accumulation of 
physical assets 
for on-farm 
production
Least likely to 
have access to 
multiyear credit; 
access to annual 
credit limited 
due to low 
productivity
Small-scale specialized livelihoods (SSL)
evidence of 
considerable 
asset building
Links to Soppexcca 
provided first-time 
access to credit, 
technical assistance, 
and other services; 
greater capacity to 
leverage Soppexcca 
access for building 
of other assets (for 
example, natural 
capital)
N/a N/a Major gains in 
machinery and 
infrastructure for 
wet milling, often 
with assistance 
from Soppexcca 
credit
N/a
evidence 
of low to 
moderate 
level of asset 
building
Links maintained 
with local coffee 
buyers, due to 
stronger pre-existing 
links and inability to 
fully take advantage 
of Soppexcca access
possibility to 
expand area under 
coffee production, 
renovate existing 
coffee plantations, 
and expand 
total agricultural 
area, often with 
Soppexcca-
provided credit
Likely to have 
upgraded 
knowledge 
and skills for 
improving coffee 
quality
Limited 
investments 
in other tools, 
equipment, 
and machinery 
for on-farm 
production
Limited income 
benefits from 
certified coffee; 
most households 
with new access 
to multiyear 
credit; limited 
amount of 
annual credit 
accessible
Little/no 
evidence of 
asset building
N/a Major limitations 
for improving soil 
fertility
Difficulty to 
modernize 
plantation 
management 
through access 
to technical 
assistance
N/a N/a
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Cluster Social capital Natural capital Human capital Physical capital Financial 
capital
Large-scale specialized livelihoods (LSL)
evidence of 
considerable 
asset building
N/a N/a Generally able 
to upgrade their 
knowledge and 
skills for coffee 
production; 
effective 
access to 
complementary 
assets (social 
and financial 
capitals) for 
modernizing 
production 
system
Significant 
increase in 
physical capital 
through higher 
coffee prices 
and long-term 
credit; average 
investments 
for wet milling 
exceeded 
those of SSL 
households by 
twofold
Some income 
benefits from 
certified coffee; 
access to 
multiyear and 
annual credit 
was favorable
evidence 
of low to 
moderate 
level of asset 
building
pre-existing 
endowments were 
relatively high, with 
strong links to local 
intermediaries and 
direct exporters of 
coffee; Soppexcca 
offered an additional 
source of credit
relatively large 
pre-existing areas 
of agricultural 
production; area 
under coffee 
production 
increased, on 
average
N/a N/a N/a
Little/no 
evidence of 
asset building
N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a
Source: authors.
Note: N/a = not applicable.
the least likely to have achieved major advances in asset building. This 
was especially true regarding human, physical, and financial capitals. SDL 
households benefitted from certified-coffee markets mainly through access 
to Soppexcca safety nets and reduced vulnerability to external shocks. The 
experiences of SDL households that seem to fall below a responsiveness 
threshold showed that rural poverty goals might best be achieved by helping 
those households with the smallest asset endowments to transition out of 
agriculture. SSL households experienced altogether greater gains in asset 
building, and the gains were more evenly spread across the different types of 
capital. Nevertheless, the better-endowed LSL households were the primary 
beneficiaries in terms of financial capital and most of the other areas of 
asset building.
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Conclusion
This study applies a livelihoods framework to understand smallholder asset 
building in response to new links with a coffee cooperative that enabled partic-
ipation in high-value certified-coffee markets. Embedded in these links were a 
set of interactions, interventions, and processes that shaped how smallholders 
participate in the value chain. This use of a livelihoods asset framework marks a 
conceptual and methodological contribution to the literature through its explo-
ration of how households are able to benefit from new links to markets, the 
differences in household participation based on variations in livelihood strate-
gies and initial asset endowments, and the role of cooperatives and development 
interventions in creating important linkages between producers and interna-
tional markets.
How did initial asset endowments and subsequent household changes 
determine smallholders’ participation in high-value export markets? In 
short, did the access to certified-coffee markets help the poorest? The anal-
ysis presented here suggests that the institutions, interventions, and processes 
related to participation in certified-coffee markets did achieve a broader set 
of outcomes than merely accessing favorable prices, including building a 
sustainable and more competitive value chain, the building of more viable 
cooperatives, and building of specific assets by some of the poorest farming 
households. It was shown that all of these outcomes were important to 
creating a viable coffee value chain providing some livelihood improvements 
and even a pathway out of poverty for many of the households linked to it.
However, even a cursory examination of Table 3.6 shows that those 
with better initial asset endowments (that is, the LSL households) gained 
the most from the interventions and new opportunities accessed through 
Soppexcca. This conclusion, together with the evidence that the least well- 
endowed experienced the least asset building in absolute terms, suggests that 
a multiple threshold concept of asset endowments is likely to operate: that is 
to say, there are likely to be multiple thresholds, such as an upper threshold 
above which the better-off producers benefit little, an intermediate threshold 
above which producers can take advantage of the opportunities, and possibly 
a lower threshold below which the poorest may experience asset depletion 
resulting from development interventions that increase risk and vulnerability 
(Donovan and Poole 2013). The Soppexcca experience also shows that 
achievements do not come cheaply or quickly; they result from years of 
investments by coffee buyers, donors, and civil society, Soppexcca,  
and cooperative members.
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Conclusions on economic and environmental sustainability are tentative 
because sustainability was not the focus of the study and changes will only be 
demonstrated over the long term.
This study—even using a reduced set of livelihood-asset indicators—high-
lights the challenges and dilemmas for poverty-reduction policies based on 
more intensive links to higher-value markets. It suggests a development strategy 
that recognizes the complexities and trade-offs among asset types that are by 
no means discrete, but often are complementary and sometimes antagonistic. 
The study highlights the important role that cooperatives play in building the 
capacities of the poor to participate in higher-value markets. It also suggests that 
cooperatives will benefit from greater attention to the consolidation of their 
internal governance mechanisms, as well as support in the design, implementa-
tion, and monitoring of cooperative-provided services. Finding viable solutions 
to the complex problems facing cooperatives and their members will require 
deeper engagement with stakeholders, including NGOs, buyers, and govern-
ment agencies.
There are additional lessons: first, the notion of asset complementarities. 
For example, a clear conception of financial capital is important. Financial 
capital is more than income or credit arrangements. Working financial capital 
underpins investment in other livelihood assets, particularly natural and 
physical, such as fertilizer (for maintaining natural capital) and agricultural 
equipment and roofing (for physical capital). It is also an important 
entitlement mechanism to meet general household expenses and other human 
capital-building pathways such as educational expenses for children. Thus 
financial capital has two important characteristics: it is a means to an end 
rather than an end in itself; and it is fungible—actually it is a means to various 
ends. But while the provision of credit is of primary importance, it is not 
a panacea.
Other complementarities exist: contextual or idiosyncratic household 
constraints affect the capacity of smallholders to take advantage of new 
opportunities, for example, labor constraints that inhibit physical expan-
sion of farms as well as the adoption of improved management practices. 
Investments involve strategic choices and often significant trade-offs between 
diverse livelihood activities, as well as risk of asset depletion and livelihood 
losses. For broader social objectives, interventions required will be more 
complex and involve a range of services that take into account asset trade-offs, 
particularly among the poorest. Heterogeneity and complexity thus make 
intervention targeting a serious ethical necessity.
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Second, because of complementarities and trade-offs, projects and inter-
ventions must not merely address the weakest links in the chain, through 
interventions directly targeting specific weaknesses such as the provision of 
finance or technical assistance. Programs and policies must reflect a more 
holistic approach to value-chain enhancement, specifically addressing the 
underlying constraints and capacities of smallholders: land tenure, credit 
collateral, small scale, labor constraints, technological change, principles and 
practice of cooperative action, and enhancement of business skills, all within a 
framework of environmental, social, and economic sustainability.
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CONTRACT FARMING IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: THEORY, PRACTICE, 
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Nicholas Minot and Bradley Sawyer
Introduction
Small farmers1 in developing regions face a number of constraints that limit 
their productivity. First, they lack information about production methods and 
market opportunities, particularly for new crops and varieties. Often farm-
ers are familiar with subsistence crops and perhaps a few widely-grown cash 
crops, but they have less experience with high-value commodities for which 
market demand is growing rapidly. Second, even with sufficient information 
about profitable investments, small farmers often lack the necessary financial 
reserves to invest in new crops, and their lack of collateral limits their access 
to credit. This constrains their ability to make profitable investments in tree 
crops or other crops that have expensive input requirements. Third, farmers 
operating near subsistence are understandably risk averse. They often prefer to 
assure themselves of a minimum supply of food before expanding production 
of cash crops for an uncertain market.
Contract farming has attracted the interest of researchers and policymakers 
because it has the potential to solve several of these constraints simultaneously. 
Contract farming may be defined as agricultural production carried out 
according to a pre-planting agreement in which the farmer commits to 
producing a given product in a given manner and the buyer commits to 
purchasing it. Often, the buyer provides the farmer with technical assistance, 
seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs on credit, and offers a guaranteed price for 
the output (Eaton and Shepherd 2001). This definition excludes post-planting 
agreements in which traders merely agree to purchase the harvest. Although 
more common than pre-planting agreements, this type of arrangement 
does not involve the provision of inputs, credit, or technical assistance, 
 1 A small farmer is defined as one who relies primarily on family labor with modest or only occa-
sional use of hired labor. In most countries, this definition corresponds to farms of 3–5 hectares 
or less.
This chapter is a condensed version of Minot and Sawyer (2014).
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nor can it influence production decisions, so it is less interesting from a 
development perspective.
Large farmers have better access to credit, better information about pro-
duction and marketing methods, and greater tolerance of risk. However, these 
advantages are offset by the higher costs and lower motivation of hired labor-
ers compared to family members. Thus, contract farming can be seen as a way 
to combine the advantages of large-scale production (improved access to credit, 
better production methods, and tolerance of risk) with the strengths of small-
scale production (lower implicit labor costs and improved incentives).
Although reliable estimates are not available, international trends in agri-
culture suggest that the prevalence of contract farming may well be increasing 
in developing countries. The growth of high-value agriculture, the expansion 
of agricultural processing, the consolidation in the retail food sector, and the 
increased demand for quality and food safety are all driving the need for ver-
tical coordination in agricultural supply chains (Jaffee 2003; da Silva 2005; 
Gulati et al. 2006).
However, the impact of contract farming is a subject of debate. Among 
proponents, contract farming is seen as a solution to the problems of informa-
tion, credit, and market risk that small farmers face in commercial produc-
tion. They see contract farming as facilitating the integration of small farmers 
into commercial agriculture, leading to income growth and poverty reduction. 
Critics, on the other hand, see contract farming as a way for large firms to take 
advantage of the land and poverty of small farmers, paying them less than the 
minimum wage and effectively taking control of their farms. The integra-
tion of small farmers into commercial agriculture is seen as a negative trend, 
leading to higher risk, indebtedness, and income inequality (Little and Watts 
1994; Singh 2002).
In light of this controversy, it is worth reviewing the experience of con-
tract farming in developing countries. More specifically, this chapter has 
four objectives:
• to describe the economic rationale for contract farming as a way to orga-
nize agricultural production,
• to examine the conditions under which contract farming is likely to make 
economic sense and to emerge as a marketing institution,
• to review the empirical experience with contract farming in developing 
countries, emphasizing its impact on small farmers in African countries 
south of the Sahara, and
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• to identify ways to promote contract farming when they contribute to an 
efficient and equitable system of agricultural market institutions.
We examine the economics of contract farming, showing that it is one 
form of vertical coordination that solves the problem of matching sup-
ply and demand under certain circumstances. We then describe the condi-
tions under which contract farming is likely to emerge, based on the type of 
buyer, the type of commodity, and the policy environment. We then review 
the empirical evidence regarding the impact of contract farming on farm-
ers in developing countries, including both the effect on participating farm-
ers and the likelihood that small farmers will be incorporated into contract 
farming schemes. Finally, we summarize the findings and identify some pol-
icy implications.
Economic Rationale for Contract Farming
All markets require some form of vertical coordination—that is, matching 
of supply and demand between different participants in the marketing chan-
nel, such as farmers, processors, wholesalers, and retailers. If a farmer intends 
to sell some of their maize harvest, he or she needs to know what kind of 
maize is in demand, where and when to sell it, and what price it is likely to 
sell for. Similarly, a large-scale maize miller in the capital city needs to know 
what kind of maize will be available for purchase, where to buy it, time of har-
vest, and how much it will cost. This type of vertical coordination problem 
exists throughout the marketing channel, for example between processors and 
wholesalers and between wholesalers and retailers, but the focus here is on the 
relationship between farmers and the buyer of the agricultural output.
Economics of Vertical Coordination
Transaction cost economics explains relations between buyers and sellers 
in terms of the costs of carrying out transactions, including finding a buyer, 
negotiating a price, delivering the commodity, and obtaining payment, as well 
as the risks associated with the transaction, including the risk of being cheated 
(Grosh 1994. Williamson 2000). Four problems exacerbate the cost of com-
pleting a transaction:
• Imperfect information: Because of imperfect information, sellers must 
spend time finding potential buyers and negotiating the price. Often the 
seller has more information about the quality of the product, but the buyer 
has better information about the market demand.
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• Limited ability to process information: Even if the buyer and seller had all 
the relevant information, they would not have the time or capacity to ana-
lyze it thoroughly.
• Dishonesty: The buyer and seller can never fully trust each other since 
each has some short-run incentive to misrepresent the truth and violate the 
terms of their agreement.
• Asset specificity: The risks of opportunistic behavior are even greater when 
the buyer or seller must invest in assets that are only useful for carrying out 
a transaction with the other party (Williamson 1983). After farmers invest 
in a crop (particularly a tree crop), their negotiating position is weakened if 
there is only one buyer (or just a few) in the area.
Delgado (1999) shows that contracted commodities often have high trans-
action costs in production and/or marketing. More specifically, these com-
modities tend to be characterized by labor-intensive production, complex 
input requirements, perishability, high value–weight ratio, and economies of 
scale in marketing but not production.
Although transaction costs are often seen as problems for the farmer, they 
affect traders and processors as well. Buyers cannot trust sellers to describe 
the quality and quantity of their product and are often forced to physically 
inspect it before purchase. If a processing plant is designed to handle just one 
commodity, the processor is locked into the sector by asset specificity and is 
dependent on a steady supply of the raw material. This problem is probably 
less severe for buyers than for farmers, however, because there are often many 
suppliers, making collusion difficult.
Formal and informal economic institutions are designed to address these 
problems by facilitating communications, disseminating information, devel-
oping trust, and punishing dishonest behavior. Examples include repeated 
transactions with trusted partners, informal codes of conduct, grades and 
standards, trade associations, credit bureaus, and (when the stakes are high 
enough) the legal system.
These institutions, however, cannot eliminate all costs and risks associated 
with carrying out a transaction, particularly in developing countries where the 
legal system and other institutions are less well developed. As discussed in the 
next section, transaction costs also help to explain the types of vertical coordi-
nation in the markets of different agricultural commodities.
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Types of Vertical Coordination in the Agricultural Sector
Often farmers sell in spot markets, in which transactions between buyers and 
sellers do not involve any commitments outside the transaction itself. In this 
case, coordination of supply and demand with respect to quantity, quality, and 
timing occurs only through the price. If the commodity is nonperishable, there 
is less need to coordinate the timing of sales; if the commodity is widely grown, 
there is no need to coordinate the location of delivery; if the production meth-
ods are well known and use few inputs, there is no need for the buyer to provide 
credit or technical assistance; and if the commodity has only small variations in 
quality, there is no need to coordinate the supply and demand of quality attri-
butes. Thus, spot markets work well enough (and are the norm) for staple cere-
als and pulses, as well as fruits, vegetables, and livestock products destined for 
traditional domestic channels, where consumers are less quality sensitive.
Sometimes, spot markets are not able to achieve the necessary degree of ver-
tical coordination, and an agreement (formal or informal) is needed. Contract 
farming allows a higher level of coordination between farmers and buyers 
regarding the methods by which the commodity is produced, the timing and 
location of delivery, and the characteristics of the commodity, such as vari-
ety, color, size, moisture content, and so on. Of course, contracts involve costs 
for both farmers and buyers. The buyer must draft a contract, educate poten-
tial farmers about the terms of the contract, sign up participants, monitor com-
pliance with the contract, and develop a strategy for enforcing the contract. 
The farmer makes a commitment to sell to a buyer at a given price and gives 
up some autonomy in production decisions. The Section “Conditions under 
which Contract Farming Makes Sense” (below) discusses the conditions under 
which the benefits of contracting are likely to exceed the costs.
The tightest form of vertical coordination is vertical integration, in which 
agricultural production and processing are carried out within the same com-
pany. Instead of buying raw materials on the open market (spot markets) or 
negotiating agreements with a group of farmers (contract farming), the com-
pany purchases or leases farmland and hires farmworkers to produce the crop. 
Clearly, the company has more control over how the product is grown and 
harvested when it owns the land and hires the labor, but farmworkers are paid 
by the day, so they are less motivated than independent farmers and require 
closer supervision. In addition, it is more costly to adjust the level of output 
when the firm produces on its own land (Eaton and Shepherd 2001).
In practice, there are many forms of vertical coordination that do not fit 
neatly into this three-part classification system. Cooperatives and producer 
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organizations may play a role in helping to match supply and demand, either 
as part of a contract-farming scheme or in the context of spot markets 
(Coulter et al. 1999). Nongovernmental organizations, local government offi-
cials, or donor-funded projects sometimes act as intermediaries, trying to link 
farmers with agricultural processors or exporters by providing technical assis-
tance, establishing standards, and/or providing credit to farmers (Bolwig, 
Gibbon, and Jones 2009; Delgado et al. 1999). Some processors grow the crop 
on their own land and purchase from contract growers.
Types of Contract Farming
There are several ways to classify contract-farming schemes. First, there is the 
degree of formality in the contract itself. In some cases, the contract is lit-
tle more than an oral agreement between a farmer and a buyer. At the other 
extreme, the contract is a formal written document that specifies input use, 
production methods, minimum quality standards, and purchase price. Formal 
contracts are more commonly offered by large processing or exporting firms, 
particularly when purchasing from medium- to large-scale farmers.
Second, contract farming schemes can be classified by the types of com-
mitments made between buyer and seller. In a seminar article on contract 
farming, Mighell and Jones (1963) classify contract farming schemes into 
three categories:
• A market-specifying contract describes the terms of the sales transaction 
with regard to price, quantity, timing, and product attributes.
• In a resource-providing contract, the buyer also provides agricultural inputs 
and technical assistance on credit.
• The third type is the production-management contract, which specifies the 
manner in which the commodity is to be grown, such as the planting den-
sity, use of pesticides, and timing of harvest.
In practice, however, many contracts combine elements of all three types. 
For example, the contract may specify the production methods and the terms 
of sale, as well as providing inputs to farmers on credit (Martinez 2002).
A third dimension in contract farming is the way the price is determined 
and paid. In some cases, the price is fixed at planting time by the buyer. If the 
market price is higher, side-selling may occur (a farmer violates the terms of 
the contract by selling some or all of their harvest on the market). Conversely, 
if the market price is lower, the buyer may be tempted to purchase its supplies 
from the market rather than the contracted farmers. To avoid problems of 
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side-selling and side-buying, contract-farming schemes sometimes rely on for-
mula pricing, in which the buyer agrees to pay a price based on a market price, 
usually the market price plus a percentage premium. Some contracts have split 
payments, in which the buyer makes two or more payments to the farmer.
Conditions under which Contract Farming Makes 
Sense
Under what conditions will contract farming be profitable for both growers 
and buyers? Here, we discuss the role of three factors: the type of buyer, the 
type of commodity, and the type of destination market.
Type of Buyer
Setting up a contract-farming scheme involves large fixed costs: the buyer 
needs a team of field agents who negotiate terms with farmers, distribute 
inputs, provide technical assistance, and collect the product. As a result, con-
tracting is generally not worthwhile for traditional wholesalers or other small- 
and medium-scale buyers. Rather, the buyers in a contract-farming scheme are 
more likely to be large-scale processors, exporters, or supermarket chains.
Another advantage of larger-scale buyers is that they have access to capital, 
knowledge about production methods, and market information that farmers 
may not have. This provides an incentive for them to contract with farmers as 
a way of providing credit, technical assistance, and market guarantees.
In addition, buyers with large capital-intensive processing plants have more 
incentive to contract with farmers because they need a steady and reliable flow 
of raw materials to maintain a high capacity-utilization rate. This is particu-
larly true if the plant purchases a large share of the locally available product, 
since there is more risk of supply shortfalls owing to weather or changes in 
the market.
Type of Agricultural Commodity
As discussed above, if a product is homogeneous and nonperishable, if qual-
ity is easily observed, and if farmers are familiar with the production methods 
and market requirements, then transaction costs are low. In this case, there is 
no need to incur the costs associated with contracts so that spot markets will 
be more efficient. These factors explain why spot markets are the standard 
form of vertical coordination between farmers and buyers in the markets for 
staple grains, starchy root crops such as cassava, and pulses. Even perishable 
fruits and vegetables, when widely grown and intended for rural consumption, 
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are usually sold on the spot market, although there are often informal rela-
tionships between farmers and buyers which may serve some of the functions 
of formal contracts.
More vertical coordination is required, however, for commodities with the 
following characteristics:
• Economically important quality variation. Vertical coordination is more 
likely if consumers are willing to pay a premium for a variety or attribute 
that will cover the additional cost of producing it and the cost of vertical 
coordination. Farm-level investments in human capital (skills), physical 
capital (assets), or specialized inputs are required to raise quality. In this 
case, vertical coordination is needed to provide producers with the incen-
tives and the means to make those investments.
• High value-bulk ratio. If the per-kilogram value of the crop is high, then 
a given percentage premium for higher quality is more likely to cover the 
incremental cost of contracting.
• Perishability. Not all perishable goods are produced under contract, but 
perishability means that farmers and buyers need to coordinate the tim-
ing of harvest and delivery, thus increasing the incentive for some form of 
vertical coordination. In addition, a farmer’s bargaining power is seriously 
weakened once the product is harvested unless there is a contract (or a per-
sonal relationship) that ensures a fair price.
• Technically difficult production. If buyers can reduce the cost of production 
with technical expertise, specialized inputs, or credit, then vertical coordi-
nation is useful in transferring these resources to farmers. The buyer may 
also provide inputs on credit to farmers who may not have the liquidity to 
purchase inputs at planting time.
In the choice between contracting and vertical integration, an important 
factor is scale complementarity, which is the degree of similarity of the econ-
omies of scale in production and processing. If both production and process-
ing have significant economies of scale (and large plots of land are available for 
purchase or lease), then processors and exporters are more likely to vertically 
integrate into direct agricultural production (Minot 1986).
Similarly, if both production and processing can be done on a relatively 
small scale, then vertical integration is again feasible. However, if there are 
large economies of scale in processing but no economies of scale in production, 
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it is more likely that the processor will source their raw materials from inde-
pendent farmers.
Type of Destination Market
The third factor is the destination market. The more quality-sensitive the 
final market and the more demand there is for food safety, the greater the 
incentive for vertical coordination to increase control over the production pro-
cess. The same commodity may be sold on the spot market for local, rural con-
sumers and grown under contract farming schemes for urban supermarkets 
and exporters. Some researchers argue that tighter food safety standards in the 
United Kingdom are creating incentives for horticultural exporters in Kenya 
to switch from small-scale contract farmers to large-scale contractors and ver-
tically integrated operations because it is difficult for the exporter to monitor 
and document the production practices of many small-scale farmers (Dolan 
and Humphrey 2000). In Shandong Province, China, apples for export to 
Japan are grown by vertically integrated orchards–packing houses, apples for 
sale to urban supermarkets are often grown under contract, and farmers sell 
apples for local consumption to wholesalers in spot markets (Hu 2005).
Another example in which the same commodity is grown with and with-
out vertical coordination depending on the destination market is organic 
food production. For example, although rice is rarely grown under contract, 
organic rice production is often organized under a contract-farming scheme 
(Setboonsarng, Leung, and Cai 2006).
A third example is seed production. Seeds must be grown under carefully 
monitored conditions to minimize the risk of seed-borne diseases and avoid 
mixture with other seed. Seed companies typically use contract farmers, par-
ticularly for the later generations of seed multiplication, to reduce the costs of 
production and achieve larger volumes. Farmers would be reluctant to take 
these additional measures unless they were assured of a price premium above 
the price of the food crop (Simmons, Winters, and Patrick 2005).
Experience with Contract Farming
In this section, we look at the experience of contract farming. First, we discuss 
the patterns of contract farming in developing countries. Second, we review 
studies that attempt to assess the impact of contract-farming schemes on farm-
ers who participate. Finally, we summarize studies that provide information 
on the types of farmers who participate in contract-farming schemes, particu-
larly on whether poor farmers can benefit from contract farming.
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Prevalence of contract farming in developing countries
How common is contract farming in developing countries? In the cotton- 
growing countries of western Africa, the proportion of farmers involved in 
some form of contract farming (including government-managed schemes) is 
relatively high. In Benin, one of the countries most dependent on cotton pro-
duction, about one-third of the farmers grow cotton and are, thus, involved in 
contract production (Minot and Daniels 2005). In Kenya, the proportion may 
be more than 25 percent because of the large number of contract producers of 
tea and vegetables (Jaffee 1994). However, most inventories of contract-farm-
ing schemes in individual countries identify only four to eight schemes, each 
of which has between several hundred and several thousand contract farmers 
(see Dannson et al. 2004). Given that most developing countries have more 
than one million farm households, this suggests that in many countries, the 
proportion of farm households involved in contract farming is probably in the 
range of 1–5 percent. Table 4.1 summarizes the results of several studies that 
estimate the share of rural households involved in contract farming (using var-
ious definitions).
Patterns of Contract Farming by Commodity
As discussed above, the prevalence of contract farming tends to vary signifi-
cantly across commodities as a result of differences in perishability, quality 
sensitivity, economies of scale in production and processing, and other factors. 
However, as will be evident, there is a fair amount of diversity in the forms 
of vertical integration within each commodity because of differences in the 
buyer, the destination market, and the policy environment.
• Horticulture. Fruits and vegetables that are destined for local consump-
tion in unprocessed form are generally sold through traditional market 
channels (assembler–wholesaler–retailer) without contractual agreements. 
However, horticultural production for export often commands specific 
requirements regarding quality, quantity, timing, or production meth-
ods which can only be met through a contractual relationship. Similarly, 
processors who produce (for example) tomato paste and fruit juice often 
contract the production of their raw materials to ensure that quality stan-
dards are met and to stagger production. Examples include contract farm-
ing of vegetables for export in Kenya (Jaffee 2003), Madagascar (Minten, 
Randrianarison, and Swinnen 2009), Senegal (Swinnen and Maertens, 
2007), China (Miyata, Minot, and Hu 2009), and Latin America 
(Swinnen and Maertens 2007). In most of these cases, the horticultural 
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products were being produced for export and contracted by a processor 
or exporter.
• Tobacco. This crop is suitable for small-scale production because it is 
labor-intensive and requires careful attention to maintain quality. At the 
same time, tobacco production requires good seed, lime, fertilizer, and dry-
ing facilities, which are beyond the means of many small farmers. Virginia 
tobacco has greater economies of scale because of the need for flue-curing 
facilities. Small-scale production of tobacco under contract is practiced in 
Malawi (Agar and Chiligo 2008), Madagascar (Barrett et al. 2012), India 
(Singh 2002), Thailand (Singh 2005a), Indonesia (Simmons, Winters, and 
Patrick 2005), and Chile and Guatemala (Swinnen and Maertens 2007).
• Sugarcane. The economies of scale in sugar processing mean that sugar 
mills are typically fairly large. Sugarcane is highly perishable and must be 
delivered to the mill within 1–2 days of harvesting. Given the very low 
 value–bulk ratio, sugarcane must be grown relatively close to the sugar mill 
TABLE 4.1 Estimates of the prevalence of contract farming in developing countries
Country Source Estimated prevalence of contract 
farming
Kenya Jaffee (1994), based on inventory of 
contract-farming schemes
about 25 percent
Benin Minot and Daniels (2005), based on a 
stratified random sample of 899 farm 
households
34 percent (includes only contract 
cotton growers)
Uganda Stratified random sample survey of 
1,440 rural households carried out in 
2012–2013
5 percent had a contract with a buyer 
(either pre-planting or pre-harvest)
ethiopia Stratified random sample survey of 
3,000 rural households carried out 
in 2012
0.2 percent had pre-planting con-
tracts, 2.0 percent had pre-harvest 
contracts, and 2.2 percent had any 
contract
Ghana (northern) Stratified random sample survey of 
1,290 rural households in northern 
Ghana carried out in 2010
3 percent had a contract with a buyer 
(either pre-planting or pre-harvest)
Vietnam (four provinces) Stratified random sample survey in 
four provinces of Vietnam in 2011
5 percent had pre-planting contracts 
with buyer of main crop, 13 percent 
received an advance payment from 
buyer
Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, and Senegal 
Losch, Fréguin-Gresh, and White 
(2011), based on nonrandom surveys 
in seven countries with a total sample 
of 7,200 households
7.4 percent of households had any 
type of contract, including post- 
planting informal agreement with 
buyer
Source: authors.
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to reduce transport costs. The two dominant forms of vertical coordina-
tion in sugar production are large-scale plantations owned by the refin-
ery and contract farming. In developing countries, these two forms are 
often combined in the form of a nucleus estate with outgrowers. Examples 
of contract farming of sugarcane can be found in Malawi (Agar and 
Chiligo 2008), Thailand (Eaton and Shepherd 2001), Indonesia (Simmons, 
Winters, and Patrick 2005), India (Singh 2005b), and Guatemala and 
Nicaragua (Swinnen and Maertens 2007).
• Cotton. In many developing countries, state-owned enterprises managed 
cotton marketing and exports that provided cotton seed, fertilizer, and 
extension services to farmers on credit. In Cameroon, Chad, Mali, and 
Senegal, a state enterprise with a legal monopoly on cotton marketing and 
exports remains. However, in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and 
Mozambique, the cotton sector has been liberalized, but regulations give 
local monopolies to the private cotton gins. The local monopoly (or con-
cession) makes it easier to ensure repayment, thus facilitating contract 
farming and the provision of inputs on credit (Tschirley, Poulton, and 
Labaste 2009). There are also examples from outside Africa, including 
India (Singh 2005b; Barrett et al. 2012) and Thailand (Singh 2005b).
• Tea. This crop is produced both on large-scale plantations and by small 
farmers. Grosh (1994) argues that contract farming is almost essential for 
small-scale tea production because of the perishability of the leaves and the 
reluctance of farmers to invest in perennial crops without some assurance 
of a market. The Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA) is a former 
state enterprise which was privatized in 2000. By 2009, the KTDA had 
54 tea factories and 562,000 contract tea growers (Mbadi 2010). Contract 
production of tea can also be found in India (Singh 2005b), South Africa 
(Kirsten and Sartorius 2002), Zimbabwe (Eaton and Shepherd 2001), and 
Vietnam (Saigenji and Zeller, 2009).
• Coffee. This crop is sometimes produced on large-scale plantations, nota-
bly in Brazil, but often by smallholders, particularly in Africa south of 
the Sahara and in Vietnam. There are few documented cases of contract 
farming in coffee. Coffee cooperatives have played a major role in orga-
nizing production in several countries such as Cameroon, Ethiopia, and 
Uganda, although market liberalization has reduced their role (Tilahun 
2007; Dannson et al. 2004). A review of contract farming in Malawi could 
not find any cases of coffee being contracted (Agar and Chiligo 2008). 
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Similarly, an inventory of Latin American contract-farming schemes did 
not include any examples of coffee (Swinnen and Maertens 2007). One 
case of contract farming in coffee involves an exporter of organic coffee in 
Uganda (Bowlig, Gibbon, and Jones 2009). The fact that tea is often con-
tracted while coffee is not may be related to the larger economies of scale 
in tea processing. Coffee processing is generally carried out by small trad-
ers and cooperatives with fewer means and less ability to organize con-
tract production.
• Seed. Early generations of new varieties are multiplied on farms owned by 
seed companies or agricultural research institutes, but the later generations 
in the process are often grown by contract farmers. The contracts are used 
to ensure that farmers use appropriate practices to maintain seed quality 
and purity (Simmons, Winters, and Patrick 2005; Kumar et al. 2010).
• Grains for breweries. Large-scale brewers need a steady supply of sorghum, 
maize, and/or barley. In addition, they may require a variety that is differ-
ent from what farmers would grow for the local market or for home con-
sumption. In this case, contracting helps coordinate farmer supply to meet 
processor demand (Swinnen and Maertens 2007).
• Poultry. Although not widely documented in Africa south of the Sahara, 
commercial poultry production in Asia is often carried out on a con-
tract basis. Large poultry or feed companies contract medium-scale farm-
ers, providing them with chicks, feed, and technical assistance, and 
buying the broilers when they reach maturity (Birthal, Gulati, and Joshi 
2005; Simmons, Winters, and Patrick 2005; Ramaswami, Birthal, and 
Joshi 2006).
• Dairy. Commercial smallholder dairy production is often organized either 
by cooperatives or by private processors using contract producers. Vertical 
coordination is needed because of the perishability of milk, the economies 
of scale in processing, and the need for processors to ensure a steady flow of 
raw material. In India, milk marketing has traditionally been organized by 
state-supported cooperatives. Recent economic reforms have allowed the 
emergence of private processors, both local and international, who contract 
with small producers (Birthal et al. 2008). The melamine food safety scan-
dal in China resulted in policy changes to encourage dairy farmers to bring 
their cattle to centralized production facilities where quality could be bet-
ter monitored, a system which could be considered contract production 
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(Mo et al. 2012). Contract dairy production has also been studied in 
Vietnam and Tanzania (Chapter 11; Hill, Temu, and Torero 2012).
• Rubber. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are the largest rubber produc-
ers in the world (FAO 2011b). Contract production of rubber in Malaysia 
represents one of the largest schemes in the world, with more than 100,000 
farm households. On a smaller scale, contract farming is also used to 
 produce rubber in western and central Africa. Rubber is grown by out-
growers, usually linked to a nucleus estate. The contract provides credit for 
the high cost of raising the trees to maturity, which may take seven years. 
Outgrowers have lower yields than the estates, but they can more easily 
adjust during periods of low prices because they grow other crops and do 
not depend exclusively on rubber income (Baumann 2000; Brüntrup and 
Peltzer 2006).
• Oil palm. Similar to rubber production, the largest oil palm producers 
are Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, though it is also grown widely in 
Colombia and West Africa (FAO 2011b). It is often grown on nucleus 
estates with outgrowers. Newer high-yielding varieties respond well to 
weed control and regular maintenance, shifting the advantage from small-
holders to estate production (Baumann 2000). Cahyadi and Waibel (2013) 
report that 40 percent of Indonesian oil palm is grown by smallholders, 
many of whom produce under contract.
This section confirms that contract farming schemes have been organized 
to grow a wide range of commodities, particularly high-value commercial 
crops to be purchased by large-scale processors or exporters and destined for 
a quality-sensitive market. It is worth noting that, apart from seed produc-
tion, there are few cases of contract production of staple grains. For example, 
Reardon et al. (2014) carried out farm surveys in Bangladesh, China, India, 
and Vietnam and found “nearly zero contracting by mills of farmers.”
Impact of Contract Farming on Participating Farmers
Economic logic would suggest that well-informed farmers will not volun-
tarily enter into contracts with buyers unless they believe there will be bene-
fits. However, the actual impact may be negative because of misperceptions 
or lack of information. If the contract-farming scheme involves tree crops or 
other transaction-specific investments, farmers may be locked into an arrange-
ment that is not beneficial. Finally, contract farming may bring benefits to the 
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farmers who make the decision, but have negative effects on other members of 
the household or the community.
Early reviews of the literature concluded that most studies suggest that 
farmers benefit from contract farming because it provides them with inputs 
on credit, technical assistance, and often a guaranteed price, allowing them to 
produce a higher-value commodity than would otherwise be possible (Glover 
1984; Minot 1986). Little and Watts (1994) provide a more skeptical view of 
the benefits of contract farming based on a set of seven case studies of con-
tract farming in Africa south of the Sahara. These studies focus on conflicts 
between farmers and the contracting firms, the imbalance of power between 
the two parties, intrahousehold tensions over the division of labor and new 
revenue, and increasing rural inequality. Similarly, Porter and Phillips-
Howard (1997) conclude that contract farming generally raises farmer 
incomes, but may also cause social problems.
More recent studies use farm surveys to compare income and other out-
come variables for contract farmers and other similar farmers. Most of these 
studies use econometric analysis to control for differences in farm size, edu-
cation, and other observable characteristics that might explain income dif-
ferences. Some of them use instrumental variables approaches to control for 
selection bias, since contract farmers may be different from other farmers in 
ways that are not easily observable, such as industriousness or management 
skill. Table 4.2 summarizes the results of studies of the impact of contract 
farming on crop revenue or farm income.
The weight of evidence suggests that successful contract-farming schemes 
generally raise the incomes of farmers who join them. The range of income gains 
associated with contract farming is from –49 percent to +700 percent, but most 
of the cases fall between 25 percent and 75 percent. The cases where contract 
farming does not generate benefits for farmers, in terms of either higher income 
or more stable income, are often short-lived as the scheme collapses.
Participation of Small Farmers in Contract Farming
Even if farmers benefit from their contractual relations with processors and 
exporters, there is the issue of whether small farmers can participate in con-
tract-farming schemes. Some critics of contract farming argue that firms tend 
to work with medium- and large-scale farmers (Little and Watts 1994; Singh 
2002). If so, contract farming may be an interesting institutional mechanism 
for vertical coordination, but it would have less relevance for poverty reduc-
tion strategies. In fact, by contributing to income inequality, it may exacerbate 
tensions between the social groups in rural areas.
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TABLE 4.2 Studies examining the impact of contract farming on income or revenue 
Study Location Commodities Results
Little and 
Watts (1994)
africa Various Case-study analysis of several schemes. Concludes that 
incomes increased for a moderate to high proportion 
of farmers, but highlights range of problems including 
conflicts between farmers and the contracting firms, the 
imbalance of power, intrahousehold tensions, and rural 
inequality
porter and 
phillips-
howard 
(1997)
africa Various review of contract farming. Finds that farmer incomes 
were raised from contracting but that there are possible 
problems caused by lack of control over production, 
intrahousehold conflict, income inequality, and power
Singh (2002) India Vegetables review of various schemes. Focuses on problems of 
power imbalance between farmers and firms, violation 
of terms, and social differentiation, but also finds higher 
incomes and satisfaction with participation in contract-
farming schemes
Warning and 
Key (2002)
Senegal Groundnut Treatment-effects model used to estimate impact on 
income. participation increases gross agricultural revenues 
56 percent over the average for noncontacting farmer
Simmons, 
Winter, and 
patrick (2005)
Indonesia poultry, 
maize, and 
rice
Contracting was associated with improved returns to 
capital for poultry and maize seed, but not for rice seed. 
Contract farmers had a 71 percent increase in gross 
margin for seed maize and 160 percent increase in gross 
margin for broilers over sample average
Birthal, Gulati, 
and Joshi 
(2005)
India Dairy, vege-
tables, and 
poultry
Most dairy and vegetable farmers would prefer to grow 
under contract, but most poultry farmers would not. 
Contract poultry growers tend to be less experienced and 
leave scheme when they become more experienced
ramaswami, 
Birthal, and 
Joshi (2006)
India poultry Based on an instrumental variables (IV) regression 
analysis, contract poultry growers earn 36 percent more 
per kilogram per production cycle than independent 
growers. also, contract growers had lower variability in 
gross margins across production cycles
Birthal et al. 
(2008)
India Dairy Contract dairy production is more profitable than 
independent contract production, mainly because of 
the lower transaction costs associated with contract 
production. a treatment-effects model suggests that 
participation in contract production increases net revenue 
more than 80 percent compared to the average
Bolwig, 
Gibbon, and 
Jones (2009)
Uganda Coffee positive revenue effect for contract farmers compared 
to a control group of noncontracting farmers. With 
full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation, 
the average effect is a revenue increase of 75 percent 
in net coffee revenue relative to the counterfactual of 
nonparticipation
Miyata, Minot, 
and hu (2009)
China apples and 
green onions
Treatment-effects model finds a 38 percent increase in 
income associated with contract farming. In the case 
of apple production, the additional income is largely 
attributed to higher yields, while in the case of green 
onions, the prices received by contract farmers were 
higher than those received by noncontract growers
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Study Location Commodities Results
Saigenji and 
Zeller (2009)
Vietnam Tea propensity score-matching approach used to control 
for effect of observable characteristics. Study finds that 
participation in contract tea production raises household 
income by 40 percent above that of similar noncontract 
farmers
Jones and 
Gibbon (2011)
Uganda Cocoa Contract participation increased real net cocoa revenue 
by 58–168 percent, depending on the econometric model 
used
Bellemare 
(2012)
Madagascar Vegetables, 
fruit, and 
grain
results indicate that a 1 percent increase in the likelihood 
of participating in contract farming is associated with a 
0.5 percent increase in household income. This implies 
that the average effect has an upper limit of 50 percent of 
income. The study also found that participation increases 
income from noncontract crops and from livestock 
production
Freguin-Gresh, 
anseeuw, 
and D’haese 
(2012)
South africa Fruit, vege-
tables, and 
poultry
Contract farmers benefit from higher incomes, better 
access to services and resources, and opportunities 
to participate in new markets. Study finds a sevenfold 
increase in income, significant at 5 percent level. however, 
contract farming is not widespread and mostly involves 
the better-off farmers
Cahyadi and 
Waibel (2013)
Indonesia palm oil results show that while contract farming has a 
significant positive effect on smallholder income overall, it 
discriminates against poorer smallholders. estimates that 
contract participation increased net household income by 
60 percent (significant at the 10 percent level)
Dedehouanou, 
Swinnen, and 
Maertens 
(2013)
Senegal horticulture results of a survey indicate that horticultural farmers 
producing under contract report higher levels of happiness 
than those not under contract
Narayanan 
(2014)
India Gherkins, 
papaya, 
marigold, and 
poultry
participation in contract farming estimated to have 
increased profits of gherkin farmers by 21 percent, papaya 
farmers by 32 percent, poultry farmers by 150 percent. 
Contract farmers in marigold earned 49 percent lower 
profits than they would have outside the scheme
Source: authors.
Other things being equal, firms would generally rather work with a small 
number of larger farmers than a large number of small farmers. The transac-
tion costs associated with negotiation, technical assistance, the monitoring 
of quality, and collection of harvest would certainly be less if the firm works 
with a smaller number of larger farmers.
However, all other factors are not equal. Family labor used by small farm-
ers has a lower implicit wage rate than the wage laborers hired by medium- 
and large-scale farmers. Also, family labor is better motivated than hired 
laborers to respond to problems such as disease or pest attack as they occur 
during the crop cycle. According to Birthal, Gulati, and Joshi (2005), firms 
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in India often found it more convenient to contract with smallholders (1) to 
reduce the risk of crop failure by spreading production, (2) to achieve higher 
quality when intensive management is required, and (3) to reduce labor costs 
because of the lower implicit wages of family labor. Cooperatives and other 
types of farmer organizations can serve as intermediaries, reducing the cost to 
the buyer of dealing with a large number of small farmers.
A number of studies compare the characteristics of contract and non-
contract farmers in terms of farm size, assets, and experience, as an indicator 
of the pro-poor impact of contracting (Table 4.3). Several studies find that 
contract farming favors larger farmers (see Wang, Zhang, and Wu 2011; Guo, 
Jolly, and Zhu 2005).
Other studies find little or no difference between contract and non-
contract growers (Warning and Key 2002; Birthal, Gulati, and Joshi 2005; 
Miyata, Minot, and Hu 2009). Indeed, there are cases where contract farmers 
tend to be smaller or less experienced. Presumably, they use contracting as a 
way to learn the business. Eventually, having acquired some experience, they 
leave the scheme to become independent growers. This was the case in studies 
of contract farmers in Costa Rica (Saenz and Ruben 2004), poultry growers 
in India (Ramaswami, Birthal, and Joshi 2006), and poultry growers in 
Indonesia (Simmons, Winters, and Patrick 2005).
A few studies give examples of buyers shifting from small- to large-scale 
farmers or the reverse. Minot and Ngigi (2010) describe the evolution of 
 several contract-farming schemes in Kenya, including one (Del Monte pine-
apple) that gave up on contract production and shifted to vertically integrated 
plantation production. As discussed earlier, green bean exporters in Senegal 
switched from small-scale contract production to large-scale contract pro-
duction (Maertens and Swinnen 2009). International tomato processors in 
Mexico first contracted with large growers but then involved small growers—
partly because, as a lucrative market for fresh tomatoes developed, firms found 
it increasingly difficult to enforce contracts they had with larger growers (Key 
and Runsten 1999).
These findings confirm that the comparative advantage of small farmers is 
not a static concept, but it can change as farmers and buyers experiment and 
learn from experience.
Challenges Facing Contract Farming
Although numerous studies confirm that contract farmers gain from par-
ticipation, the studies also reveal frequent problems in these schemes. In 
fact, there is a relatively high rate of failure for contract-farming schemes in 
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TABLE 4.3 Studies examining small farmer participation in contract farming 
Study Location Commodities Results
Key and 
runsten 
(1999)
Mexico Tomato Large tomato processors from the United States first 
contracted with large growers in Mexico, but later 
shifted toward small growers
Warning and 
Key (2002)
Senegal Groundnut asset ownership is not a significant predictor of con-
tract participation
Minot and 
Ngigi (2010)
Côte d’Ivoire, 
Kenya
horticulture Describe the evolution of several contract-farming 
schemes in Kenya, including one (Del Monte pineapple) 
that gave up on contract production and shifted to 
vertically integrated plantation production
Maertens 
and Swinnen 
(2009)
Senegal Green bean Green bean exporters in Senegal switched from 
small-scale contract production to large-scale contract 
production
Saenz and 
ruben (2004)
Costa rica Chayote 
squash
Study of contract farming in Costa rica found that 
younger, less-experienced growers were more likely to 
grow under contract
Simmons, 
Winters, and 
patrick (2005)
Indonesia poultry, 
maize, rice
Irrigation, age of head of household, and education 
were all found to be positive indicators of participation 
in contract farming across three sites in the country
Guo, Jolly, 
and Zhu 
(2005)
China Fruits, veg-
etables, tea, 
livestock
Specialization and commercialization along with 
distance from market and government support are 
shown to predict the likelihood that farmers engage in 
contract farming
World Bank 
(2006)
China Fruits, vege-
tables
a fruit and vegetable exporter in China that started pro-
ducing its own horticultural products on company land 
and later shifted to smallholder contract production
Birthal, Gulati, 
and Joshi 
(2005)
India Dairy, poultry, 
vegetables
experience and non-farm income are found to be 
significant indicators of contract farming for the dairy, 
vegetable, and broiler industries
Miyata, Minot, 
and hu (2009)
China apples and 
green onions
a probit model for the participation in contract farming 
shows no preference for larger farmers
Wang, Zhang, 
and Wu 
(2011)
China Vegetables risk attitudes are found to be a significant determinant 
of contract farming, with more risk-tolerant farmers 
preferring contracts
Narayanan 
(2012)
India Vegetables 
and poultry
Surveys of contract and noncontract farmers for vari-
ous commodities find that participation is determined 
as much by location as household characteristics
Cahyadi and 
Waibel (2013)
Indonesia palm oil Migrant status, household head age, plot size, and time 
since farm establishment are all significant predictors 
of participating in contract farming
Narayanan 
(2013)
India Vegetables 
and poultry
Survey of 822 farmers reveals significant attrition in 
contract-farming schemes over time. poor farmers 
from marginalized social groups are more likely to exit 
than other farmers, although some depart voluntarily
Source: authors.
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developing countries. This is particularly evident in Kenya, which has a his-
tory of contract farming going back to the colonial period. Reviews of the evo-
lution of contract-farming schemes in Kenya reveal a high rate of turnover as 
schemes collapse and new ones are launched (Jaffee 1994; Minot and Ngigi 
2010). Similarly, Sartorius, Kirsten, and Masuku (2004, 89) note “the high 
level of failure of small-scale farmer contract farming projects in developing 
countries.” Singh (2002) provides a list of numerous contract-farming schemes 
in India that failed for one reason or another.
One policy constraint on contract farming is legal restrictions on direct 
contact between farmers and agribusiness firms, such as processors and 
exporters. These regulations are intended to protect farmers from being 
exploited by large companies. The effect, however, is to force processors to 
vertically integrate and produce their own raw materials, to purchase from 
large-scale commercial farms, or to purchase from cooperatives. Birthal, 
Gulati, and Joshi (2005) list a number of regulatory constraints that impeded 
the establishment and growth of contract-farming schemes in India.
Another perennial problem with contract-farming schemes is the high cost 
of dealing with large numbers of dispersed contract farmers. This is partic-
ularly true when the company distributes inputs, provides credit, and orga-
nizes the collection of the crop. Sartorius, Kirsten, and Masuku (2004) argue 
that this is one of the main reasons why companies often prefer to work with 
 larger-scale farmers. One solution is to have another organization to act as 
intermediary between the company and the farmers. An NGO, a donor-
funded project, or a cooperative may help organize farmers (Narrod et al. 
2009; Coulter et al. 1999). In China, village leaders sometimes serve as inter-
mediaries between the company and contract farmers. They recruit contract 
farmers, explain the terms, and help enforce loan repayment and product 
delivery (Miyata, Minot, and Hu 2009).
One of the most common problems in ongoing contract-farming schemes 
is side-selling, the sale of contracted output to other buyers. Farmers try to 
sell to other buyers to take advantage of a better price or to avoid repayment 
of inputs they received on credit. Since the contracts are generally not legally 
enforceable,2 the only leverage the firm has is to refuse to work with the 
farmer in the future. Coulter et al. (1999) list a number of approaches that 
have been taken to reduce default: group lending, information sharing among 
buyers, incentives for repayment, good communication, and close monitoring.
 2 Although the contract may be legally binding in theory, it is often not worthwhile to either 
party to bring a case to court given the high costs relative to the value in dispute.
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As an example of the second point, when cotton markets were liberalized 
in Benin, the government established a clearinghouse for information on 
farmers who are producing cotton and receiving inputs on credit. This infor-
mation makes it easier to punish both the farmer who violates the terms of 
their contract and the buyer who knowingly purchases cotton from growers 
who have contracts with other companies. By tightening up on farmer default, 
the system of input credit has been preserved (Goreux 2003).
A related problem is that when market prices fall below the contracted 
price, the processor may be tempted to import or purchase from the open mar-
ket instead of from contract growers. Although the company may be under 
pressure to respect the terms of the contract, it can impose strict quality stan-
dards on the contractors to avoid purchasing from them at the agreed price. 
The main leverage that farmers have is to withdraw from the scheme or to 
bring the case to local officials for intervention. Several studies have shown 
that third-party certification can address this problem (Chapter 11; Hill, 
Temu, and Torero 2012).
Conclusion
Contract farming is defined as agricultural production that takes place under 
a pre-planting agreement between the farmer and the eventual buyer. It is 
mostly likely to be economically justified when the buyer is a large processor, 
exporter, or retail chain; when the commodity has a high value–bulk ratio, is 
perishable, and/or is not widely grown; and where the destination market is 
willing to pay a premium for attributes that are not easy to obtain through 
spot markets. In practice, this means that contract farming will be most suit-
able for fruits and vegetables for quality-sensitive markets; commercial dairy 
and poultry production; and cash crops such as tea, tobacco, sugarcane, and 
cotton. Contract farming is generally not suitable for grain production, except 
in the case of seed, organic grains, barley for large-scale breweries, or niche 
grain products for export.
Econometric analysis can be used to evaluate the impact of contract farm-
ing on household income, but it is important to take into account the fact 
that contract farmers may differ in other respects (such as education, farm 
size, or industriousness) from other farmers. Across the 20 econometric stud-
ies of the impact of contract farming, the estimated increase in income ranged 
from –49 percent to 600 percent, but most of the studies found an increase 
in income of between 25 percent and 75 percent. This is not surprising given 
that contract-farming schemes which do not provide higher incomes (or some 
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other benefit such as more stable income) to participating farmers are likely to 
lose farmers and eventually fail.
The evidence suggests that in many cases companies are willing to work with 
small farmers, but some crops have economies of scale that favor medium- and 
large-scale farmers. Numerous studies have found that farm size was not a sig-
nificant determinant of participation in a contract-farming scheme, and several 
more found that contractors preferred smaller farmers. On the other hand, some 
studies have found that contract farmers were larger than average. Commodity 
and policy differences may partially explain the contrasting results. Finally, con-
tractors may shift their strategy over time as they gain experience or as market 
conditions change, and these shifts can go in either direction.
One of the most common problems in contract farming is side-selling, 
when farmers sell to other buyers to avoid repaying loans or simply to obtain 
a better price. In addition, there are numerous cases of companies who are 
unable or unwilling to pay the negotiated price and use quality standards to 
evade their commitments. Third-party certification is one promising way to 
address this problem. A third problem is the high cost of working with large 
numbers of small farmers, though this problem can be ameliorated with the 
use of farmer organizations or other intermediaries. Because of these problems, 
there is a relatively high rate of failure in contract-farming schemes.
A major limitation of contract farming is that it is only appropriate for 
high-value commodities being sold to large-scale buyers for quality-sensitive 
markets. For most developing countries, the proportion of farmers involved 
in contract farming is probably in the range of 1–5 percent. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that contract farming can be scaled up to reach the majority of small 
farmers who produce grains and other staple foods.
The fact that most contract farming schemes raise the income of partici-
pating farmers and that small farmers are often (but not always) able to par-
ticipate suggests that governments should create a policy environment that 
facilitates the formation of contract-farming schemes, particularly when they 
incorporate small farmers. In particular, the following policy goals should 
be considered.
Improve the investment climate: Contract-farming schemes are usually 
organized by large-scale processors, exporters, or supermarket chains. Thus, 
an investment climate that facilitates private investment in agribusiness 
 sectors is a necessary precondition for the development of private contract- 
farming schemes.
Legalize direct firm–farm contracts: The government can facilitate 
 contract farming and other forms of vertical coordination by removing legal 
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restrictions that prevent firms from buying directly from farmers in some 
countries. The government’s role should be to ensure that both parties in an 
agreement understand and accept the terms.
Develop effective grades and standards: The establishment of grades and 
standards that are easy to implement and that reflect attributes demanded by 
consumers will facilitate communication and negotiation between buyers and 
farmers, and among traders. It will also make it easier for buyers to establish 
contracts with farmers, given that quality control is often a contentious issue.
Facilitate farmer organizations and other intermediaries: Local officials and 
extension agents can play a role in allowing and even promoting the develop-
ment of intermediary organizations that reduce the transaction cost associated 
with dealing with a large number of small farmers.
Promote public–private partnerships in extension: If extension services have 
the flexibility to provide services on behalf of the contracting firm and the 
incentives to serve small farmers, it reduces the cost to the firm of working 
with small farmers.
Promote competition: One of the best approaches for limiting the power 
of contracting companies is to allow or promote competition among firms. 
Policymakers should be cautious about responding to requests from agribusi-
ness firms for a regional monopsony. At the same time, it is important to rec-
ognize that competition makes it easier for farmers to avoiding repayment of 
input credit. It may be possible to enforce repayment without stifling competi-
tion, such as by creating credit clearing houses and forming professional bod-
ies with codes of conduct.
Provide mediation services: One of the most common problems in con-
tract farming is violation of the contract. If the market price rises during the 
agricultural season, farmers are tempted to sell to other buyers, particularly 
since doing so means they can avoid repaying the input credit. On the other 
hand, if the market price falls, the buyer is tempted to procure raw materials 
on the open market and/or apply quality standards more strictly. Government 
officials, particularly extension officers, sometimes play a role in mediat-
ing between contract growers and the buyer. Alternatively, they could help 
organize a nongovernmental mediation board with members acceptable to 
both sides.
Enforce contracts: The government should explore alternative approaches 
to enforcing contracts, particularly between buyers and farmers. This could 
take the form of establishing small-claims courts or collecting and dissemi-
nating information on noncompliance on the part of both farmers and buy-
ers. Providing better information about noncompliance will increase the 
CONTraCT FarMING IN DeVeLOpING COUNTrIeS 149
incentives for farmers and firms to comply and help each party avoid high-risk 
business partners.
It is likely that contract farming will expand in developing countries as 
local diets shift away from cereals and staple root crops, as markets link small 
farmers with quality-sensitive markets in the major cities and abroad, and as 
the share of agricultural output that is processed increases. The policy mea-
sures discussed above can help facilitate this shift toward more structured 
market channels that give farmers the opportunity to benefit from changing 
demand. However, contract farming is only one component in an agricultural 
strategy to raise incomes and reduce rural poverty. Efforts to promote contract 
farming should not distract from investments in rural infrastructure, agricul-
tural research and extension, market information systems, and social safety 
nets, all of which have broad-based impact on rural livelihoods.
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Summary
Six chapters examine efforts to promote innovation in value chains for beef 
cattle, dairy, potatoes, and other commodities in Africa south of the Sahara, 
the Andean region of South America, the Middle East, and South-East Asia. 
Virtually all began as research to boost farm-level productivity. However, as 
the importance of marketing issues became apparent, the approaches evolved 
to embrace inclusive value-chain development (VCD). Three of the chap-
ters deal with general issues of linking agricultural innovation with VCD 
and emphasize the importance of integrating the two approaches. The other 
three chapters focus on the use of multistakeholder platforms to foster innova-
tion, value-chain coordination, and governance, highlighting the crucial roles 
played by facilitators in platform formation, operation, and evaluation; the 
tensions that need to be managed; and the dynamic nature of platforms, inno-
vation, and VCD processes. The latter highlight the need for adaptive man-
agement and learning-oriented evaluation that supports decisionmaking.
Introduction
Agricultural development is taking place in the context of rapid urbaniza-
tion and increasing market integration, as supermarkets and food processors 
transform agrifood value chains throughout the developing world. The term 
value chain is shorthand for the sequence of interlinked agents and markets 
that transforms inputs and services into products with attributes for which 
consumers are willing to pay. While the growth of agricultural markets and 
the development of value chains create opportunities for many producers, 
1 The guide reviewed here, UNIDO (2011), is part of a toolkit of value-chain development for 
understanding and diagnosing value chains. See www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/
MDGs/IVC_Diagnostic_Tool.pdf
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smallholders face numerous challenges. They may have a comparative advan-
tage in producing labor-intensive crops for high-value markets, but they fre-
quently have limited access to the technical information, training, new inputs, 
and new technologies that could improve their efficiency and add value to 
their production. Additionally, smallholders frequently have limited access to 
land and capital, which limits their ability to invest in productive assets and 
expand their supplies. They often have weak relationships with market agents, 
service providers, and policymakers; limited basic knowledge of the market 
system; and limited information on market conditions and prices, market 
entry requirements, and consumer preferences. Because each smallholder sells 
only a small amount of produce, the costs of assembling, handling, and trans-
porting their produce is high relative to that of larger-scale operators. In some 
cases, such as for specialty coffee farmers, the additional transaction costs to 
enter specialty markets are not compensated by the premium price paid.
Recognizing the challenges that smallholders face in high-value markets 
for agricultural products, many donor agencies and nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), and some governmental agencies, have begun to promote 
inclusive value-chain development (VCD)—seeking to make positive changes 
in value chains to extend or improve productive operations and generate envi-
ronmental and social benefits, such as poverty reduction, income and employ-
ment growth, and gender equity (UNIDO 2011, 1).
Research is often confused with innovation, but there are important differ-
ences between them. Whereas research focuses on generating new knowledge, 
and technology development aims to create a supply of new production meth-
ods, innovation is concerned with the practical use of new knowledge. As 
Barnett (2004, 1) states, innovation involves ‘‘the use of new ideas, new tech-
nologies or new ways of doing things in a place or by people where they have 
not been used before.”
Interactive social-learning processes involving researchers and economic 
actors are crucial for ensuring that applied research generates useful new 
knowledge that is put into practical use. Since research organizations have tra-
ditionally worked in isolation from the end users of their technologies, institu-
tional innovations that strengthen patterns of interaction between researchers 
and economic actors are crucially important for strengthening innova-
tion systems.
An innovation system can be defined as ‘‘a network of organizations, enter-
prises, and individuals focused on bringing new products, new processes, and 
new forms of organization into social and economic use, together with the 
institutions and policies that affect their behavior and performance” (World 
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Bank 2007, xiv). The ability to interact constructively and work in new ways 
is crucial for the innovation performance of groups. Recent studies of agri-
cultural innovation highlight the utility of the value-chain concept as unit of 
analysis and focus of interventions aimed at stimulating innovation and devel-
oping innovation capacity (World Bank 2007, 24). Thus, attention should not 
be directed at individual value-chain participants such as producers, but at the 
overall supply-chain capacity and the degree to which the chain in its entirety 
can compete.
One approach for promoting innovation is to enable other actors to inno-
vate and to strengthen their interactions, through innovation brokering or 
facilitation (Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009). This is often accomplished 
by working with multistakeholder platforms, which Chapter 8 (Thiele et al.) 
defines as “a space of interaction among different [types of] stakeholders who 
share a common resource and interact to improve mutual understanding, cre-
ate trust, define roles, and engage in joint action.” The same authors distin-
guish between innovation platforms, which bring processors, traders, farmers, 
and other market-chain actors together with R&D organizations to foster 
commercial, institutional, and technological innovation; and market chain 
governance platforms, which bring farmers and service providers together 
to address governance issues related to the value-chain coordination and 
farmer empowerment.
Whereas networks of innovators are commonly found wherever innova-
tion takes place, multistakeholder platforms are usually established by exter-
nal interventions that seek to stimulate innovation or improve value-chain 
coordination. These interventions, such as the Participatory Market Chain 
Approach (Chapter 7), commonly seek to promote collective action—volun-
tary action taken by a group to pursue common interests or achieve common 
objectives—and to pass platform leadership to local groups.
Another way of promoting inclusive innovation within individual trading 
relationships between (formal or informal) producer groups and private-sector 
firms as buyers has been promoted through the LINK methodology (Lundy et 
al. 2014).
Despite the increased interest in inclusive VCD, most agricultural research 
and development (R&D) projects still promote technological innovation at 
the farm level, and pay scant attention to marketing and other important con-
straints related to postharvest practices, processing, and value addition at farm 
or local level. Different teams, with the common goal of improving smallhold-
ers’ welfare, often design and implement different types of intervention—some 
focused on promoting innovation in smallholder production practices and 
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others focused on VCD. However, significantly, few interventions seek to inte-
grate work on both innovation systems and value chains. The chapters in Part 
3 of this book show how more holistic approaches, embracing both agricultural 
innovation and inclusive VCD, can generate greater benefits for smallholders, 
and illustrate how such approaches can be implemented in practice.
The six chapters in Part 3 present cases from Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, where agricultural innovation systems and value-chain approaches 
have been integrated, and they identify remaining challenges and unresolved 
issues. All of these chapters deal with issues of combining innovation sys-
tems and value-chain approaches. The first three chapters focus on the inter-
face between technical R&D work and VCD, and highlight the importance 
of a systems view of innovation that accords importance to both supply and 
demand factors. The remaining three chapters focus more specifically on the 
role of multistakeholder platforms in fostering innovation and inclusive VCD.
All the chapters present examples from either the potato or livestock sec-
tor, but this does not mean that these sectors are more conducive to work with 
platforms or other approaches for stimulating innovation and improving mar-
ket coordination than other sectors. Similar work has been carried out with 
coffee, peppers, dairy, and other market chains (Mayanga et al. 2012; Lundy 
et al. 2014; Devaux et al. 2013). However, at the time of producing the pres-
ent book, these cases had not yet been analyzed in peer-reviewed publications. 
Work on value chains, in collaboration with private actors and NGOs, has not 
been a priority for use of core funds in CGIAR. The work reported on here, 
with livestock and potatoes, benefitted from long-term support from donors 
that pressed the centers for concrete results from applied R&D efforts.
Complementarity of Innovation Systems and 
Value-Chain Approaches
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 explore the complementarity of innovation systems and 
value-chain approaches. Chapter 5 (Ayele et al.) analyzes the strategies and 
results of programs hosted by the International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI) to improve farmers’ welfare in Ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam by inte-
grating fodder production into their livestock systems. While fodder was 
an entry point for the innovation process, major improvements required 
that broader value-chain issues be addressed in a more holistic manner. The 
authors highlight the value of a national innovation policy and of government 
support for improving livestock farmers’ access to agricultural services, includ-
ing credit and technological support.
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Chapter 6 (Stür, Troung Tan Khanh, and Duncan) analyzes how small-
holders in Vietnam were able to transform an extensive traditional livestock 
production system into a more intensive one, taking advantage of the growing 
urban demand for high-quality meat. They highlight several factors that con-
tributed to this transition, including a convincing technological innovation, a 
 system-oriented approach with emphasis on capacity strengthening, develop-
ment of a coalition of local actors supporting the transformation process, and 
having external and local support over a sufficiently long period of time (a 
decade in this case).
Chapter 7 (Devaux et al.) analyzes the work of the International Potato 
Center’s (CIP) Papa Andina regional network in Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Peru. This work sought to capitalize on the genetic diversity of native pota-
toes grown in remote mountainous areas, as well as on the social capital and 
local knowledge of the smallholders who have cultivated them for centuries—
assets that are often undervalued. An action–research approach, known as 
the Participatory Market Chain Approach (PMCA), was developed, which 
engages smallholders, market agents, researchers, and agricultural service pro-
viders to jointly identify market opportunities and to foster the commercial, 
technological, and institutional innovation needed to exploit these opportuni-
ties. This approach, developed and first applied in potato value chains in the 
Andes, has now been shared, tested, and applied successfully in other value 
chains and other regions (Mayanja et al. 2012; Horton et al. 2013).
In these three chapters, interventions evolved from an early focus on 
improving production technology to broader systems approaches aimed at 
improving both production and marketing. CIP’s work in the Andes origi-
nally centered on developing a regional research agenda and the transfer of 
production-related technology. ILRI’s work in Ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam 
originally centered on improving livestock productivity on small farms. As 
efforts evolved from research and technology transfer to facilitation of inno-
vation processes, program implementers broadened their engagement with a 
range of stakeholders involved in production, marketing, and service provision. 
Over time, participatory approaches for agricultural technology development 
were complemented with innovation systems and VCD approaches for iden-
tifying and exploiting potential marketing opportunities. Growing markets 
and commercial innovations stimulated technological and institutional inno-
vation. The cases often involved formation or strengthening of farmer groups. 
In Vietnam, farmer groups were established for joint learning and skill devel-
opment, as well as to strengthen farmer engagement in the value chain. Farmer 
groups facilitated the work of extension agents and, in time, helped reduce 
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transaction costs and improve profitability. The extension service played a key 
role in facilitating learning and innovation processes, which linked researchers, 
farmer groups, input suppliers, traders, credit agents, and a social bank.
In the Andes, where extension services and other local government agen-
cies are weaker, NGOs have often filled the gaps by facilitating interac-
tions among farmers, market agents, service providers, and input suppliers. 
However, the unstable funding of NGOs can jeopardize the reliability and 
sustainability of their support.
The experiences analyzed in these three chapters highlight the importance 
of having competent facilitation to engage diverse stakeholders in group pro-
cesses, keep the group focused on joint learning for market innovation, and 
develop cohesion within the group. There is a delicate balance between push-
ing ahead to achieve quick results and taking the time to develop local capac-
ity and leadership. In Vietnam, local leadership and ownership were crucial for 
achieving significant and durable results. The Vietnamese case also illustrates 
how informal local coalitions can be effective in stimulating innovation—per-
haps more effective than more formalized and centralized organizations.
The cases show that for R&D organizations to contribute to inclusive 
VCD, they need to develop their own capacity to facilitate collective action 
involving stakeholders with different, often conflicting, interests. R&D orga-
nizations also need resources to work off the experimental station and the 
flexibility to respond quickly to opportunities and challenges that arise unex-
pectedly. Funding for off-station activities from bilateral donors has often 
proven critical for the success of VCD initiatives.
The chapters illustrate the emergent nature of innovation and VCD pro-
cesses, and the time needed to strengthen and then utilize the capacities 
needed to foster changes in production and marketing practices, and to fos-
ter collective action for innovation among the diversity of actors involved 
in the value chain. The cases reviewed in this section all relate to work that 
took place over 5–10 year periods, and these are all still considered “work in 
progress.” Papa Andina invested in new institutional arrangements to build 
bridges between poor farmers and market intermediaries, and build trust 
through regular interaction. Although this type of institutional investment is 
time-consuming and the results are often intangible, it can make the differ-
ence between inclusive and exclusive development (Meinzen-Dick, Devaux, 
and Antezana 2009).
The work carried out triggered innovation processes that continued after 
the original projects finished. Large-scale impact has required that local 
actors continue to innovate long after the projects finished. Creative imitation 
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processes—in which early innovations are copied and improved upon in 
minor ways—are pathways to impact that merit more careful study in future 
(Horton and Samanamud 2013).
Role of Multistakeholder Platforms in 
Promoting Innovation and Inclusive Value-Chain 
Development
Chapters 8, 9, and 10 focus on the role of multistakeholder platforms in pro-
moting innovation and inclusive VCD.
Differences in the attributes of value chains, participating actors, and insti-
tutional arrangements have led to the emergence of two types of platform—
one focused on innovation and the other on value-chain governance and 
coordination. Analyses of work in the Andes (Chapter 8; Cavatassi et al. 2011) 
indicate that platforms that bring stakeholders together around value chains 
can result in new products, processes, norms, and behaviors that benefit poor 
farmers in ways that would not have been achieved otherwise.
A number of studies have addressed issues of platform organization, but 
few have studied how platforms shape innovation processes. Chapter 9 (Kilelu, 
Klerkx, and Leeuwis) attempts to unravel the role of platforms in supporting 
innovation, through an in-depth study of a smallholder dairy-development 
program in Kenya. The findings indicate that innovation processes produce 
numerous tensions and unexpected effects, and that intermediation and facili-
tation are crucial for resolving tensions. Innovation platforms require adaptive 
management that is supported by monitoring for continuous learning.
Dynamic innovation processes and differences in interests, capacities, and 
power present challenges for platform facilitators. Based on group reflec-
tion on their own personal experiences facilitating innovation platforms, 
Chapter 10 (Swaans et al.) discusses key issues that are critical for effective 
platform facilitation.
These chapters suggest five sets of general issues related to the types and 
roles of platforms, platform facilitation, platform sustainability, platform 
dynamics, and gender issues.
Types and Functions of Platforms
Chapter 8 (Thiele et al.) identifies two types of platforms, which play differ-
ent roles in innovation and VCD. Innovation platforms bring traders, pro-
cessors, supermarkets, researchers, and others together with farmers and 
their associations to foster the creation of new market opportunities through 
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commercial, institutional, and technological innovation. Dror et al. (2016) 
analyze experiences with innovation platforms for agricultural development 
in Central Africa, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, and Uganda. Value-chain gover-
nance platforms are structured around a geographically delimited supply area, 
meshing small farmers and service providers, and primarily addressing mar-
ket-governance problems in assuring volumes, meeting quality and timeliness 
constraints, as well as empowering farmers.
A single platform may facilitate both innovation and chain governance, 
and many of the cases analyzed in this book involve platforms that have 
played both roles. The roles and functions of innovation platforms have been 
more thoroughly studied than those of value-chain governance platforms.
Chapter 9 (Kilelu, Klerkx, and Leeuwis) notes that platforms may serve as 
“innovation intermediaries,” with the following functions:
• Demand articulation: Identifying innovation challenges and opportunities 
as perceived by the various stakeholders.
• Institutional support: Facilitating and advocating institutional change.
• Network brokering: Identifying and linking different actors.
• Capacity building: Strengthening and incubating new organiza-
tional forms.
• Innovation-process management: Coordinating interactions and facilitating 
negotiation and learning among different actors.
• Knowledge brokering: Identifying needs and mobilizing knowledge from 
different sources.
Chapter 8 (Thiele et al.) identifies additional roles for multistakeholder 
platforms in VCD that create space for social learning and joint innovation. 
They can also perform governance functions within the value chain, improv-
ing coordination of business activities and reducing transaction costs. Finally, 
a platform can perform advocacy functions and promote policy changes that 
can advance VCD.
In the cases analyzed in the three chapters, platforms triggered processes 
that produced new products, production processes, norms, and behaviors that 
could not have been achieved otherwise and that benefitted poor farmers. The 
clearest evidence of impact comes from the platforms in Ecuador (Cavatassi 
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et al. 2011). By 2007, some 1,483 tons2 of potato from 260 ha were marketed 
through the platforms by smallholder farmers (average landholding 2.6 ha). 
Platform farmers obtained an average yield 33 percent higher than nonpartic-
ipants. Although their input costs were also higher, their profit was approxi-
mately four times greater, thanks to the higher yield and a 30 percent higher 
selling price. Secondary indicators suggest that the linking to the platforms 
also contributed to better management of pesticides and promoted social cap-
ital, from the Farmer Field School training that accompanied implementation 
of the platforms.
The scale, sequence, and timing of impacts on farmer livelihood differed 
among the cases. In Ecuador, platforms concerned with value-chain coordi-
nation and governance generated quicker benefits than innovation platforms 
because they were oriented toward existing market opportunities that could 
be exploited quickly. In the longer run, innovation platforms produced greater 
benefits because private market-chain actors drove innovation processes that 
produced more pervasive and sustainable impacts.
Platform Facilitation
Effective facilitation is frequently identified as critical for the success of inno-
vation platforms. Based on reflection on experiences in Africa south of the 
Sahara, Swaans et al. identify the following issues for facilitation:
• The dynamic and evolving nature of platforms
• Power dynamics
• Gender equity
• External versus internal facilitation
• Sustainability of the process
• Issues of scale
• Monitoring and evaluation.
The other authors identified similar challenges for facilitators in Asia and 
South America.
Who is best placed to play the role of innovation facilitator? In the cases 
examined, professionals based in international organizations generally initi-
ated innovation processes and initially played the role of innovation facilitator 
2 Tons always refers to metric tons.
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or broker. However, as innovation platforms generally aim to build sustain-
able innovation capacity and support local actors in working as a self-orga-
nized and self-managed innovation system, handing over the task to local 
innovation brokers must be a central part of the process. It is essential to build 
up a cadre of local facilitators who can continue and expand the efforts. This 
aspect remains a challenge, which some capacity-building initiatives are tack-
ling. In Africa south of the Sahara, the Forum for Agricultural Research 
in Africa (FARA) has started undertaking such capacity-building activi-
ties. In addition, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and the 
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) have 
recently developed an initiative to train people from national research orga-
nizations across Africa in the facilitation of innovation platforms. These 
examples should be analyzed for possible adaptation and application in 
other contexts.
Platform Sustainability
Questions related to funding and sustainability of innovation platforms are 
discussed in the three chapters. An economic analysis of multistakeholder 
platforms in Ecuador reported significant benefits for smallholders and 
high rates of return on the resources used (Cavatassi et al. 2011). But assur-
ing long-term funding for platforms continues to be a challenge, in part due 
to the intangible nature of benefits. In the cases analyzed, support from local 
or national government helped ensure platform sustainability. In some cases, 
the platforms evolved into other forms of organization, such as farmer asso-
ciations, where participating farmers contribute to the association manage-
ment costs paying a tax based on the incomes generated through the sales of 
products. Chapter 10 (Swaans et al.) mentions the case of the Sub-Saharan 
Africa Challenge Programme, through which 36 platforms have been set up 
throughout Africa, and many have become established within the local or dis-
trict government administrations. Support to farmers from local policymakers 
has strengthened the platforms.
Platform Dynamics
In the analysis of the role of innovation platforms, Chapter 9 (Kilelu, Klerkx, 
and Leeuwis) identifies several tensions in relation to using platforms as a tool 
to stimulate innovation. The authors raise the question of whether all innova-
tion platforms should have a similar composition in terms of diversity of par-
ticipants and governance structure, or should also differ according to different 
types of outcomes (such as strengthening value-chain interaction, raising 
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farm-level productivity, and livelihood improvement) and the different lev-
els of operation (such as platforms aiming to develop innovative solutions to 
problems, and platforms aiming to scale up such solutions).
Platforms should not be seen as a development tool for executing a precon-
ceived plan, but rather they should be arenas for strengthening capacities and 
sharing knowledge to provide critical information to help deal with the com-
plex and dynamic nature of agricultural innovation. Chapter 10 (Swaans et al.) 
highlights how the agenda of innovation platforms, and in turn the composi-
tion of relevant actors, evolved over time. Flexibility in facilitation of the inno-
vation process and the management of platform dynamics was vital to ensure 
that the platform focused on appropriate and evolving issues for achieving 
impact. While innovation brokers can be provided with how-to guidelines for 
facilitating the innovation process, it is much more complicated to equip them 
with the skills to manage change. It is important that facilitators have a clear 
understanding of the need for flexibility and have the skills to work in an iter-
ative way with relevant actors to achieve desired outcomes.
This flexibility and need to adjust to changes can be in conflict with the 
relatively rigid R&D agenda of R&D organizations. For R&D organizations 
to contribute effectively to innovation processes, they need new skills and 
resources. Retooling themselves to play these new roles is likely to pose major 
challenges for many of them.
Facilitators of innovation platforms often struggle to develop appropriate 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) formats. Traditional R&D approaches have 
a tendency to use a linear M&E model based on an assumption that change 
can be planned, easily identified, and controlled (Prasad Pant 2010). In the con-
text of research for development, M&E has two broad objectives: (1) to generate 
evidence on the effectiveness of innovation platforms; and (2) to promote joint 
learning and guide course corrections. But, in practice, innovation brokers often 
do not consider M&E as part of their role.
Gender Issues
A review of research-for-development projects in Africa south of the Sahara 
(Chapter 10) found that women were frequently underrepresented in innova-
tion-platform processes. Few women participate in platform meetings, which 
in certain locations may reflect the wider cultural context. Platform facili-
tators and members may fail to take into consideration the constraints that 
women face in attending and being able to actively participate in platforms 
because of their family responsibilities. Women’s abilities to participate may 
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depend on the timing and location of meetings, the multiple demands on their 
time, and social expectations.
Even if women are present in platform meetings, they may not be able 
to voice their views. The same situation is observed in the Andes. This can 
result in platforms prioritizing issues that either do not reflect women’s con-
cerns, or could have a negative impact on them. For example, the Nile Basin 
Development Challenge innovation platform working on fodder development 
did not consider the extra demands on female labor and time that new inter-
ventions required. In the Andes, it was also observed that women’s opportu-
nities for participation in collective-action processes like the PMCA and the 
potential benefits needed to be addressed more systematically.
Policy Implications
Most agricultural R&D efforts still emphasize the supply side—providing 
smallholders with improved inputs (seeds, fertilizer, and pest-management 
practices) and production-oriented services (agricultural extension, informa-
tion, training, and credit). However, to achieve significant and lasting impacts, 
these production-oriented efforts need to be complemented with demand-side 
efforts that improve links between smallholders, market agents, and consum-
ers (Chapters 6 and 7).
For R&D organizations to contribute more effectively to inclusive VCD, 
they need to develop their own capacity. In particular, they need new skills 
and resources to facilitate collective action involving stakeholders with differ-
ent, often conflicting, interests (Chapters 1, 7, and 9). The work of FARA and 
KARI in Africa south of the Sahara to build brokering skills should be ana-
lyzed for potential application in other contexts (Chapter 10).
Innovation platforms that bring together diverse value-chain stakehold-
ers can contribute to the development of new products, processes, norms, and 
behaviors that may not otherwise have been achieved (Cavatassi et al. 2011; 
Chapter 8).
Initiatives that promote agricultural innovation and inclusive VCD need 
two distinct types of M&E:
• reflexive monitoring that provides rapid feedback on early results and 
changes in the operating environment, to support adaptive management 
(Chapters 1 and 9), and
• comprehensive impact assessment that provides credible evidence of costs 
and benefits of the intervention (Chapters 7, 11, and 12).
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Women’s interests, requirements, and constraints need to be carefully con-
sidered when platforms are designed, managed, and evaluated. Tools to inte-
grate gender perspectives into agricultural value-chain interventions need 
to be tested and validated (Chapter 14). This is one objective of the CGIAR 
Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets’ value chain research 
team. It is also important to keep in mind that since gender relations are 
deeply entrenched in local cultural norms, transforming them may be beyond 
the scope of collective-action processes for VCD, especially if they are operat-
ing for only a short time.
Knowledge Gaps and Priorities for Future R&D
From the chapters in Part 3 of this book, the following knowledge gaps and 
priorities for future research emerge:
• Monitoring and evaluation. M&E has generally been weak in platforms 
and other initiatives that promote innovation and inclusive VCD, and 
many authors identify M&E as a priority area for future applied research 
(see, for example, Chapters 2, 8, 9, 12, and 13). Research is needed both to 
draw lessons from experiences in this field and to identify good practices 
in other sectors that have potential for improving monitoring that sup-
ports adaptive management and systematic assessment of the impacts of 
inclusive VCD interventions. These issues are dealt with in greater detail 
in Part 4.
• Theories of action and change. The theories and assumptions that guide 
interventions to promote innovation and inclusive VCD are seldom well 
articulated or tested. Applied research on the action and change models 
that guide interventions—be they explicit or implicit—is essential to pro-
vide better guidance for the design, implementation, and evaluation of 
future interventions (Horton et al. 2013).
• Scaling up and institutional sustainability. Research is needed to explore: 
the effectiveness of different arrangements for facilitating innovation 
and inclusive VCD in different contexts; how to scale up successful pilot 
efforts; and how to sustain them in local institutional structures after 
international projects are phased out (Chapters 7 and 8; Cavatassi et 
al. 2011).
• Gender. Applied research would be useful to systematize and draw lessons 
from experiences with using a gender lens in designing, operating, and 
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evaluating the outcomes of interventions for promoting inclusive VCD 
(Chapter 14). Future research should respond to the question: What does 
improved gender equity or participation in the value chain mean in terms 
of economic and social benefits and environmental performance at house-
hold, enterprise, community, and the overall value-chain levels?
• Engaging large private firms. Large private firms are increasingly import-
ant in agricultural value chains and they could play useful roles in inter-
ventions to promote inclusive VCD. However, it has often been difficult 
to convince them to engage in the early stages of VCD. Applied research 
could usefully address such questions as—
 – When and how to most effectively involve large firms in inclusive 
VCD processes?
 – What roles could large firms most usefully play in different contexts?
Chapter 4 (Minot and Sawyer) usefully summarizes the state of knowledge 
on some of the issues related to contract farming. The LINK methodology 
can be used to measure and improve the degree of inclusivity in existing 
trading relationships between large buyers and producer groups (Lundy et 
al. 2014).
• Capacity development for facilitation. Facilitation is a critically important 
area for capacity strengthening. More research is needed to explore the 
effectiveness of different types of innovation brokers operating in different 
contexts, how their roles change over time, and how different brokering 
arrangements can be institutionalized so that innovation processes can be 
sustained after projects are phased out (Chapter 10).
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ENHANCING INNOVATION IN LIVESTOCK VALUE 
CHAINS THROUGH NETWORKS: LESSONS 
FROM FODDER INNOVATION CASE STUDIES IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Seife Ayele, Alan Duncan, Asamoah Larbi, and Truong Tan Khanh
Introduction
In developing countries, livestock can be an important pathway out of pov-
erty (FAO 2009; McDermott et al. 2010a; Rich et al. 2011). Over one billion 
people depend on livestock, which provide power and manure for crop pro-
duction, contribute to food and nutritional security, and are a form of sav-
ings for many poor people. Livestock also make major contributions to the 
agricultural GDP, export earnings, and employment. According to the “live-
stock revolution” thesis (Delgado et al. 1999; McDermott et al. 2010a), the 
sector is driven primarily by rising incomes and urbanization in developing 
countries like China and India, where demand for products such as meat and 
milk has been soaring. However, livestock are also responsible for adverse 
impacts on land, water, biodiversity, and climate change (Steinfeld et al. 2006; 
FAO 2009). Despite the conflicting paradigms, many, including McDermott 
et al. (2006), argue that, given appropriate policies to address social and envi-
ronmental effects, livestock provide opportunities for millions dependent 
on them.
There are, however, challenges to enhancing market success for livestock- 
dependent people, including fodder1 scarcity and weak farm-to-market links 
(McDermott et al. 2010b; IFAD 2006). The micro evidence we generated 
from Ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam shows that fodder scarcity is severe. For 
example, in Syria during the dry season (December to February) many farm-
ers face 50–60 percent fodder shortfalls (Larbi, Hassan, and Abdullah 2010). 
Fodder shortages reduce productivity and production and, as we noted in 
Ethiopia, may also damage community relations by provoking conflict over 
 1 Fodder refers to plants grown for feeding animals. It includes food–feed crops, grown for human 
consumption but whose residues and by-products are fed to livestock; grass, legumes, and tree 
species (see Hall, Sulaiman, and Bezkorowajnyj 2007).
This chapter was originally published as an article in Science & Public Policy 39 (3): 333–346 (2012).
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grazing lands. We found complex causes of scarcity, including limited and 
erratic rainfall, shrinking grazing lands due to competition for land for crops, 
and changing land-use patterns favoring urbanization and settlement.
Over the past four decades, research and development programs have 
looked into the fodder-scarcity challenge, with some success in developing and 
promoting food and feed crops like cowpea; and improved grasses, legumes, 
and fodder trees (Lenné and Wood 2004; Kristjanson et al. 2005; Franzel and 
Wambugu 2007; Horne et al. 2005). Despite these efforts, many researchers 
found “limited” evidence of adoption of fodder technologies (IFAD 2006; de 
Haan et al. 2006; Hall, Sulaiman, and Bezhorowajnyj 2007). Limited adop-
tion was attributed, among other factors, to farmers’ limited knowledge of 
technologies and low technical support provided to them, low government pri-
ority given to fodder compared to staple crop technologies, and limited avail-
ability of fodder seeds (IFAD 2006). For Hall, Sulaiman, and Bezhorowajnyj 
(2007), fodder scarcity has less to do with a shortage of information or tech-
nology per se than with “capacity scarcity” to innovate. Addressing scarcity 
entails the development of an “innovation capacity,” which consists of “the 
context specific range of skills, actors, practices, routines, institutions and poli-
cies needed to put knowledge into productive use” (Hall 2005, 625). Innovation-
capacity development comes under the rubric of an innovation system 
approach which stipulates innovation as an outcome of interactive learning in 
networks (World Bank 2007; Rajalahti, Janssen, and Pehu 2008).
This chapter is based on case studies drawn from the Fodder Adoption 
Project (FAP) (http://fodder-adoption-project.wikispaces.com/; Duncan et 
al. 2011) implemented in Ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam from 2007 to 2010.2 
The FAP was motivated by the innovation-systems approach, and aimed at a 
better understanding of the factors and processes influencing fodder innova-
tion (the successful introduction and integration of fodder technologies and 
related knowledge in livestock-production systems).3 A small team consisting 
of a research scientist and support staff coordinated networks in each coun-
try to initiate and diffuse fodder innovation in nine learning sites (villages and 
districts): four in Ethiopia, three in Syria, and two in Vietnam. The chapter 
 2 The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) acted as the implementing agency, on 
behalf of the CGIAR Systemwide Livestock Programme. It was administered by a consortium of 
centers: ILRI, International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) and International Centre 
for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA). FAP in Syria concluded in 2011.
 3 Besides fodder technological innovation, in some sites FAP also promoted organizational 
innovations such as formation of farmer groups and coordination of value-chain actors 
and activities.
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synthesizes the lessons learned. It pays particular attention to documenting 
and analyzing innovation processes in different local and national contexts. 
This analysis highlights the importance of learning on farms and in networks, 
and that sustained improvement to fodder availability occurs when broader 
livestock value-chain issues are addressed.
The next section discusses innovation-system and value-chain approaches 
as tools of understanding, organizing, and implementing agricultural devel-
opment initiatives. It also outlines the methodology of the study. The third 
section describes and characterizes the national and local innovation environ-
ments. The fourth section discusses the innovation processes and outcomes 
thereof. Focusing on a meat value chain, it also discusses the factors that 
enhance fodder innovation in a sustained manner. The fifth section draws les-
sons and provides the conclusions.
Contemporary Approaches to Agricultural 
Development and Study Methodology
Innovation System and Value-Chain Approaches to Agricultural 
Development
Along with Spielman, Ekboir, and Davis (2009), the World Bank (2007), 
and others, we understand (agricultural) innovation as a successful introduc-
tion and exploitation of knowledge and technologies for social and economic 
benefits. The use of such knowledge and technologies brings about positive 
changes in how people make or do things, and ultimately improves their liveli-
hoods. The linear research–development–extension approach has been much 
criticized for being hierarchical, top-down, and supply-driven, and for its lim-
ited impacts on the generation and diffusion of relevant knowledge and tech-
nologies. The thinking behind the approach has been that scientific research 
is the driver of innovation, but often disregards different sources of knowledge 
and demand (see Lundvall et al. 2002; World Bank 2007; Rajalahti, Janssen, 
and Pehu 2008). The more recent paradigm for knowledge generation and use 
is the innovation-system approach (Lundvall et al. 2002; Clark et al. 2003; 
World Bank 2007; Rajalahti, Janssen, and Pehu 2008; Spielman, Ekboir, and 
Davis 2009), described as a network of private- and public-sector organiza-
tions whose interactions produce, diffuse, and utilize economically useful 
knowledge. For innovation-systems thinkers, innovation of different kinds 
(technical, institutional, etc.) follows a nonlinear process and uses multiple 
sources of knowledge. Networks coordinate and facilitate interorganizational 
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interactions and knowledge, and information flows; allow the exploitation of 
complementary capabilities; and open up opportunities for exploiting syner-
gies within networks (Pyka and Kuppers 2002; Howells and Edler 2011).
The “system” capacity depends on the “density and quality of relation-
ships” between the innovation-producing and -using agents, and the support 
institutions (Altenburg, Schitz, and Stamm 2008). The more diverse the 
actors the better the opportunity to combine complementary capabilities. 
Interaction and learning also depend on actors’ “proximity”—including 
the physical distance, the institutional environment that shapes trust-based 
relationships, and actors’ capacity to absorb new ideas. The stronger the 
proximity, the better the flow of (particularly tacit) knowledge that cannot be 
coded and “transferred” (Boschma 2005; Clifton et al. 2010). However “more  
links” and “denser network ties” could also produce “lock-in failure,” where 
inward-looking tendencies block diverse and open relationships and stifle 
innovation (Boschma 2005; Clifton et al. 2010; Howells and Edler 2011). 
Facilitation by “intermediary” organizations also enhances networking 
and interaction, as such organizations, acting as brokers, help find advice 
and funds to support innovation (Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008). In the cases 
discussed here, the institutional environments provided a limited number and 
diversity of actors, and barely any network facilitators, making the demand for 
innovation-capacity development more challenging.
The innovation-systems approach assumes that learning in networks 
leads to learning by individual market-chain actors and farmers, producing 
innovation. Evidence from the case studies reported in this chapter shows 
that, before acceptance, farmers learn on-farm a great deal about the 
performance and suitability of fodder technologies to farming systems; and 
the sustainability of input and product markets. Johnson (1992) noted that 
of all types of learning (like imprinting or searching) the most economically 
worthwhile and useful in increasing the stock of knowledge is “learning 
by producing” or “learning by doing,” which we interpret to mean learning 
on-farm. Further relevant innovation capacities reside in networks and 
partnerships, in organizations, and in individuals (Ayele and Wield 2005). 
The chapter, therefore, links network- and farm-level learning arenas (with 
institutional support) as central to innovation.
The literature on value chains and innovation systems shows many com-
mon and complementary features (for example, Anandajayasekeram and 
Gebremedhin 2009). A value chain is understood to include all the actors 
and activities from production to consumption, and the dynamic relation-
ships between actors involved in a chain (Rich et al. 2011; McDermott et al. 
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2010b). Key to both approaches is the mapping and characterization of actors 
and their interactions. As discussed above, an innovation-systems approach 
focuses on knowledge generation and use at a particular stage of a value 
chain, while the value-chain approach is more about value creation and mar-
ket opportunities and linkages across a chain. With few exceptions (such as 
Anandajayasekeram and Gebremedhin 2009; McDermott et al. 2010b), an 
integrated innovation-system and value-chain approach to developing, imple-
menting, and evaluating agricultural-development initiatives has received 
limited attention among researchers and practitioners, arguably resulting in 
suboptimal outcomes. Fodder is important, but only as a single input in live-
stock production, hence sustainable return to improved fodder depends on 
the efficiency of a whole value chain. We argue that an integrated approach 
provides, first, a better framework to address market failures such as high 
transaction cost, insufficient market information, and the exercise of market 
power that are inherent in the smallholder livestock system (Rich et al. 2011). 
Second, it allows for the optimization of gains from innovations in interre-
lated inputs and services. In relation to the latter, for example, McDermott 
et al. (2010b: 156) cite 300 percent gains to smallholders due to combined 
use of breed and feed improvements (which otherwise would not have 
been achieved).
Study Methodology
The case studies reported in this chapter are described and analyzed against 
the backdrop of the above conceptual literature and an integrated innovation- 
systems and value-chain approach. The innovation-systems framework empha-
sizes, among other things, the totality of actors and factors required to bring 
about innovation and growth (World Bank 2007). Following this frame-
work, the study identifies and characterizes the main actors in the study sites, 
such as knowledge and technology providers and users; their roles; interac-
tion among actors; and their habits and practices that influence joint learning 
and innovation. It also evaluates the enabling environment for fodder inno-
vation and livestock development. It describes and analyzes FAP’s fodder-in-
novation  processes, and the capacities developed and technological options 
introduced and adopted. Using the value-chain tool (Kaplinsky and Morris 
2001; McDermott et al. 2010b), the study identifies and assesses site-specific 
livestock- production value-chain activities and actors and their roles, produc-
tion quality standards, and opportunities for improving the chain. The tool 
is employed to  evaluate the integration of fodder innovation into smallholder 
livestock production, and the linking of the latter with markets. The chapter 
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uses empirical data collected from six of the nine learning sites over 2009–10 
from multiple sources, including extensive semi- structured interviews with 
FAP county-team members, partners, and participating farmers; and FAP 
internal reports (three learning sites, one from each country, were not covered 
in the analysis as insufficient data emerged at the time of fieldwork). It also 
draws on close observation of actors’ interactions and learning.
Background to Fodder Innovation Case Studies
FAP Origin and Approach
The idea for the FAP originates from debates in 2001–2002 among multi-
disciplinary researchers on ways of addressing fodder scarcity (Lenné, 
Fenandez-Rivera, and Blümmel 2003; de Haan et al. 2006). At about the 
same time, the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and 
partners began developing project ideas for implementation in countries 
where a large number of people depend on livestock. This led to the design 
and implementation of the Fodder Innovation Project in two phases over 
2002–2009 in India and Nigeria (www.ilri.org/ilrinews/index.php/archives/
tag/fodder-innovation-project). FAP followed in 2007. As an approach, FAP 
country teams focused on three levels of interaction and learning, innovation, 
and diffusion: farm, district, and region/national levels. First, farmer and 
farm-level learning were considered central for improvement of livestock 
production, which generally happens at farm level, with farmers learning by 
themselves and from each other, testing and integrating new ideas within 
existing practices. Second, where a network of actors was weak or nonexistent, 
strengthened actor networks at district level were thought to enhance the 
innovation processes and outcomes. Finally, engaging higher-level (regional 
or above) policymakers in dialogs over fodder and livestock matters was 
also thought to improve the enabling environment for innovation, such as 
improved policy on fodder-seed production and distribution.
Innovation Environments in Different National Contexts
Table 5.1 provides selected country indicator data for Ethiopia, Syria, and 
Vietnam. In Syria, livestock (predominantly sheep) contribute 34 percent 
to the agricultural GDP (Shomo et al. 2010). Some 85 percent of the coun-
try receives less than 350 mm rain per year. The humid areas, account-
ing for 15 percent of the country, receive more than 350 mm rain per year. 
Across Syria, grazing provides the most important source of fodder for 
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ruminants, but the supply of fodder is insufficient and seasonal (Shomo et 
al. 2010). In contrast to Syria, Ethiopia is largely high tableland, highlands 
above 1,500 meters comprise 43 percent of the country, while the rest of the 
country consists of lowlands where pastoral and agropastoral systems dom-
inate. The maximum mean annual rainfall reaches 2,000 mm in the south-
western parts of the country, while the lowest mean annual rainfall is below 
250 mm in the northeastern and southeastern lowlands. Agriculture is the 
mainstay of Ethiopia. It accounts for 43 percent of the country’s GDP and 
employs 85 percent of the labor force. Its livestock population consists of over 
50 million cattle and over 45 million sheep and goats. Livestock also provide 
power and manure in crop production.
Vietnam’s agriculture and forestry sectors are main sources of livelihood 
for the rural poor who accounted for 74 percent of an estimated 86 million 
people in 2008. The country has two fairly equal dry and wet seasons, and the 
central highlands (including FAP learning-site area, Ea Kar district in Daklak 
province) altitude ranges from 300 m to 2,000 m above sea level; rainfall is in 
the range 1,500–2,000 mm per year. While keeping pigs is important nation-
ally, many Vietnamese farmers also keep cattle (Khanh et al. 2009). The FAP 
Vietnam team estimates 40 percent fodder shortage during February and 
March; and 20 percent during November and December.
The structure and authority of different levels of governments in the three 
countries vary, with implications for the emerging innovation architectures. 
For example, unlike in Syria or Vietnam, Ethiopia has autonomous regional 
states that have the power to determine their social, economic, and cultural 
affairs. Likewise, NGOs have more visibility, particularly in the implementa-
tion of development projects, in Ethiopia than in Syria and Vietnam. While 
livestock development is largely a private activity, governments in all three 
countries play a role in providing animal health and extension services. In all 
three countries, the role of the private sector in generating and diffusing agri-
cultural technologies is limited. Fueled by growing urbanization and incomes, 
all three countries have been enjoying a growing domestic and foreign mar-
ket for livestock products. In Vietnam and Syria, livestock development has 
been supported by a relatively developed infrastructure including roads (see 
Table 5.1). The national environment (agricultural, ecological, and institu-
tional factors) guided the FAP teams to select partners and learning sites.
Partner and Learning Site Selections
In selecting learning sites, FAP in Ethiopia focused on market opportuni-
ties for livestock products and agroecological and socioeconomic challenges 
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to improve food security. First, the team identified a key collaborating part-
ner running the Improving Productivity and Market Success (IPMS)—a proj-
ect located within ILRI operating in ten pilot learning woredas (districts) 
across Ethiopia. It selected four IPMS learning sites (two highland woredas, 
Ada’a and Atsbi Woberta, and two from the lowlands, Alamata and Mieso). 
Alamata and Atsbi Woberta woredas are in Tigrai Regional State, in northern 
Ethiopia, where livestock productivity is severely affected by fodder shortages 
caused by frequent droughts. Mieso and Ada’a are located in Oromia Regional 
State. In Mieso, livestock are major contributors to livelihood. The area is 
semiarid, and frequently affected by water shortages and drought. Ada’a is 
close to the capital Addis Ababa and has fairly developed industry and infra-
structure; it has access to relatively large market opportunities for its produce, 
notably the cereal crop teff. It has a growing smallholder dairy-production sys-
tem with strong milk-marketing and farmers’ service cooperatives, but limited 
and erratic rainfall and expanding urbanization have been reducing tradi-
tional sources of fodder such as open grazing lands. The woredas thus pro-
vided the setting for the emerging innovation networks. Within each woreda, 
TAbLE 5.1 Basic indicators of Fodder Adoption Project (FAP) countries
Indicator Ethiopia Syria Vietnam
Total land area (km2)a 1,104,300 185,180 329,310
• arable land (percentage of land area) (2007)a 13.0 26.5 21.3
human population (total, millions) (2008)b 81 21 86
• rural population (%) (2005)a 84.0 49.4 73.6
Gross domestic product (GDp) (US$ million) (2008)b 26,487 55,204 90,705
Value added as percentage of GDp (2008) 
• agriculture 43 20 20
• Industry 13 35 42
• Services 45 45 38
Gross national income per capita (US$) (2008)b 280 2,090 890
GDp average annual growth rate (2000–2008)b 8.2 4.4 7.7
road density (km of road per 100 km2) (2000–2006)a 3.6 51.6 71.7
Livestock population (total in millions) (2009)c
• Cattle 50.88 1.08 6.10
• Goats 21.96 1.51 1.48
• Sheep 25.98 12.38 –
• pigs 27.63
Sources: a World Bank (2009); b World Bank (2010); and c FaO (2011).
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learning sites were narrowed down to one or more kebeles—farmers’ neigh-
borhood associations—where 50 or more willing participant farmers (who 
owned livestock and land, and who tend to be model farmers and opinion 
leaders) were experimenting with new fodder options. At the national level, 
a fodder platform was set up, consisting of stakeholders from Oromia and 
Tigrai regional states, federal government units, NGOs, and donor organiza-
tions, to deliberate on relevant policy matters and ways of up-scaling success-
ful practices.
The FAP team in Syria started with a consultation process at the national 
level for identifying potential partners. The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Reform (MAAR) became its core partner. With MAAR support, a 
national project-inception workshop was held to engage a wider set of stake-
holders in FAP implementation. The inception workshop also constituted 
a Steering Committee led by the head of the MAAR Extension Directorate. 
Province- and site-selection criteria were: high livestock population density 
(notably sheep); rainfed and mixed crop–livestock systems that allow the 
application of different fodder technologies of tree crops and food–feed crops; 
and experiences of relevant departments in livestock production and exten-
sion. As in Ethiopia, farmer selection focused on their willingness, and own-
ership of livestock and land. The innovation architecture consisted of (1) a 
national steering committee—to provide leadership and a mechanism for scal-
ing up and replicating lessons in other sites; (2) three innovation networks—
El-Bab (Aleppo province), Salameih (Hama province), and Tel Amri (Homs 
province)—to engage farmers, develop and implement options, and monitor 
and evaluate outcomes; and (3) on-farm experimentation and learning. At 
all levels, consideration was given to ensure the participation of women and 
of policymakers.
Unlike in Syria and Ethiopia, the Ea Kar site in Vietnam was a continua-
tion of previous research for development projects: Forages for Smallholders 
Project (2000–2002), and Livelihood and Livestock Systems Project (2003–
2005). Key players in both projects were the International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT), Tay Nguyen University (TNU), and the National 
Institute of Animal Husbandry (NIAH). In partnership with the district 
extension and agriculture and rural development workers, the projects devel-
oped forage technologies with smallholder farmers in Daklak province, and 
succeeded in introducing and evaluating a variety of fodder options such as 
napier grass (Khanh et al. 2009). Building on experiences from these proj-
ects, in 2007 FAP inherited the existing network of actors, and focused on 
the strengthening of value-chain actors, including extension, research, traders, 
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and government. The country team also established a new site, Ky Anh in 
Ha Tinh province. As an approach, the FAP team started with key volunteer 
farmers who had land and animals, and were able to organize hired or house-
hold labor to work on their farm. Around each key farmer, a fodder group, 
composed of at least ten farmers, was set up to identify and introduce fodder 
options and jointly evaluate performance.
The preceding description of learning sites and partner selection, and the 
innovation architectures that emerged showed no regularity and varied from 
top-down to bottom-up approaches. It showed the various ways of organiz-
ing innovation networks in different socioeconomic, institutional, and agro-
ecological contexts. Selected sites also showed varied conditions: in Syria they 
started anew, in Ethiopia they piggy-backed on an ongoing project, and Ea 
Kar in Vietnam they built on previous projects that ran for over five years. 
Appreciating these differences, our next aim is to understand whether net-
working enhanced learning and innovation (the following analysis and discus-
sion does not include Atsbi Woberta, Ethiopia; Tal Amri, Syria; and Ky Anh, 
Vietnam learning sites, as insufficient data emerged at the time of fieldwork).
Results: Developing Innovation Capacity and 
Fodder Options
Developing Innovation Capacity
As the innovation systems approach would suggest, FAP teams and partners 
diagnosed relevant policies, institutions, and infrastructure; and actors and 
their roles, attitudes, and practices. Participatory assessment of farmers’ needs, 
causes, and extent of fodder scarcity were also conducted; and with FAP 
facilitation a set of actors were engaged to “respond to the fodder challenge.” 
Table 5.2 shows that, besides farmers, seven or more actors were involved in 
networks in Ethiopia, but the number and diversity of actors were fewer in 
Syria and Vietnam. Despite encouraging policies, there was an element of 
mistrust among some government officials in all three countries of 
organizations operating for “private gain.” As they often “come and go,” the 
continuous participation of nonlocal NGOs in networks was also seen as 
uncertain. Government departments for agriculture and rural development 
feature in all networks, providing infrastructure for disseminating knowledge 
and information, and supporting learning on farms. They are, however, 
insufficiently resourced and have a “limited culture of collaboration.” Any 
engagements in collaborations were guided by official directives and plans, 
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TAbLE 5.2 Summary of actors’ networks, actors’ roles, and interactions by sites
Actor name and type, scope of operation, and degree 
of interaction in network in 2010
Core activities
Ada’a, Ethiopia
ada’a Dairy Coop (private) a Milk collection, processing, and marketing
Cooperative promotion Office (govt.—regional) b Information dissemination
Crop Grow (private) b production and marketing of feed- and foodcrops
Debre Zeit agricultural research Centre 
(government—federal) a
research, evaluation, and training 
eden Field agri Seeds enterprise (private) a producer and supplier of forage/fodder seeds
ethiopian Meat & Dairy Technology Institute 
(government—federal) a
Training, source of improved breeds
Fap–ILrI: Fodder adoption project—International 
Livestock research Institute (international research) a
Network facilitation, providing access to planting 
materials, and joint learning; research
IpMS—Improving productivity and Market Success 
project (ILrI—Government of ethiopia—international 
research) a
research for development (r4D); facilitate 
access to information and knowledge 
Land O’Lakes (NGO) b Training, technology transfer 
Office of agricultural & rural Development 
(government—woreda) a
Seed multiplication and distribution; extension 
and training
Farmers a Testing and joint evaluation of fodder 
technologies 
Alamata, Ethiopia
abergelle Livestock Int. Trading plc (private) a Cattle fattening, supply of farm inputs; training
ethiopian Sheep and Goats project (NGO) a research and extension 
Fap–ILrI (international research) a Network facilitation, providing access to planting 
materials, and joint learning; research
IpMS (ILrI–Government of ethiopia) a r4D; facilitate access to information and 
knowledge
Office of agricultural and rural Development 
(government—woreda) a
Training and technical support, seed 
multiplication 
alamata agricultural research Institute (government—
woreda) a
research, technical backstopping
World Vision ethiopia (NGO) a provision of bull service and fodder seeds
Farmers a Testing and joint evaluation of fodder 
technologies
Mieso, Ethiopia
adami Tulu agricultural research Centre 
(government—regional) b
research; supply of forage seeds; training 
Fap–ILrI (international research) a Network facilitation, provide access to planting 
materials, and joint learning; research
Food Security Office (government—regional state) b Support seed multiplication (including paying for 
laborers)
IpMS (ILrI–Government of ethiopia) a r4D; facilitate access to information and 
knowledge
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Actor name and type, scope of operation, and degree 
of interaction in network in 2010
Core activities
Melakassa agricultural research Centre 
(government—federal) b
research; supply fodder seeds; technical 
backstopping 
Office of pastoral and rural Development 
(government– regional state) a
Fodder-seed multiplication and distribution; 
extension; training; coordination, monitoring, and 
evaluation 
Woreda administration Council (government) a Follow-up and guidance; link to higher offices
Farmers a Testing and joint evaluation of fodder 
technologies
Salameih, Syria
aga Khan Foundation (international NGO) a rural development, extension, technology 
transfer
Fap–ICarDa (International Centre for agricultural 
research in the Dry areas) (international research) a
r4D; facilitation of joint learning, providing 
access to planting materials; training
Office for agricultural research (government—
provisional) a
research and evaluation
Office for extension and animal resources 
administration (government—provisional) a
extension 
Farmers a Testing, joint evaluation of technologies and 
practices
El Bab, Syria
Fap–ICarDa (international research) a r4D; facilitation of joint learning, providing 
access to planting materials; training
Office for agricultural research (government—
provisional) a
research and evaluation
Office for extension and animal resources 
administration (government—provisional) b
extension
Farmers a Testing, joint evaluation of technologies and 
practices
Ea Kar, Vietnam
Fap–International Center for Tropical agriculture 
(international research) a
With TNU, coordinated Fap Vietnam activities, 
provide technical support 
Tay Nguyen University (TNU, national university) a research, capacity development, technical 
support, facilitate stakeholder interaction
National Institute of animal husbandry (government—
national) b
Link to national policymaking
District extension (government—district) a Facilitation and evaluation of on-farm testing and 
dissemination of technologies and information 
District agriculture and rural Development 
(government—district) a
Dissemination of technologies, liaise with 
policymakers 
Farmers and farmer fodder groups a Testing, joint evaluation of technologies and 
practices; participate in meat value chain
Small and large cattle traders (various contributions) Buy cattle, provide market information, etc. 
Source: authors.
Notes: a an “active” actor that participates in more than 50 percent of all meetings, and provides input such as technological 
knowledge on fodder innovation and livestock development to a network; b a “moderately active” actor that is a member of a 
network, but not a regular and active participant.
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hence slow to respond to other actors’ needs. National and international 
research organizations were also drawn into the networks as knowledge and 
technology providers or capacity developers, but some were wary of getting 
bogged down in “development work” that might adversely impact on their 
capacity to produce “public goods” (publications) and maintain their 
reputation in research. While the vision to improve the livelihoods of 
smallholder farmers united the different actors, collaboration was also 
hampered by a lack of network facilitators. The FAP teams took the 
facilitation role and embarked on various types of innovation capacity  
development.
STRENGTHENING WEAK INTERACTOR TIES
Before networking began, there were either “no” or “weak” actor interactions 
because of a limited culture of collaboration and trust, or lack of facilitators. 
However, networking allowed regular meetings (on average four times a year 
in networks) where actors discussed fodder scarcity, policy and market issues, 
as well as their potential contributions. Less formal and more frequent one-
to-one and small-group meetings were also reported across the sites. Actors 
made cross-site and within-site visits, and participated in fodder field days, 
etc., which facilitated information and knowledge exchanges. These efforts 
paid off, and by 2009 and 2010 actor interactions significantly improved 
from largely “no” or “weak” to “strong” and “moderately strong” interactions 
(Table 5.2).
FILLING ORGANIZATIONAL GAPS
Where the local institutional landscape did not provide actors with necessary 
capabilities, actors were nonetheless brought into networks from further afield 
(for example, Eden Field in Ada’a, and Adami Tulu and Melkassa research 
centers in Mieso).
STRENGTHENING FODDER-SEED SUPPLY SYSTEM
Where capacity to produce fodder seeds was weak or nonexistent, farmers 
and development agents were trained. A series of one- to three-day training 
sessions was given on fodder-seed multiplication, evaluation, etc. for 562 
participants in Ethiopia (Duncan et al. 2010); 50 in Syria (Larbi, Hassan, and 
Abdullah 2010); and 115 in Ea Kar and Ky Anh sites in Vietnam (Anh et 
al. 2010).
eNhaNCING INNOVaTION IN LIVeSTOCK VaLUe ChaINS ThrOUGh NeTWOrKS 187
INTERACTING WITH POLICYMAKERS TO IMPROVE POLICIES
Besides regular interactions with policymakers, FAP teams produced train-
ing and communication materials like guide booklets, videos, and posters to 
inform actors of their activities and document lessons for replication in other 
areas of the respective countries. In summary, networking helped relevant 
knowledge and information flows, strengthening and coordinating comple-
mentary capabilities for joint learning and innovation.
On-Farm Learning and Implementing Fodder Options
The purpose of the networking described above was to foster learning and 
produce innovation. Table 5.3 shows that, supported by the respective 
networks, farmers in all the learning sites selected and implemented novel 
technological solutions. Before acceptance, farmers experimented and 
learned about the performance and suitability of improved fodder options 
for farming conditions; the need for (re)allocation of resources like land and 
water; and sustainability of seed supply. Fodder innovation was thus found 
TAbLE 5.3 Fodder options implemented by learning sites
Learning 
site 
Key technological 
interventions
Participating farmers Area planted (ha, estimated)
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
ada’a 
(ethiopia)
Oats–vetch, maize–lablab, 
napier, alfalfa; pigeon pea, 
sesbania, and fodder beets
44 84 204 11 21 51
Mieso 
(ethiopia) 
Cowpea, lablab, pigeon pea, 
napier, and alfalfa
40 80 160 10 20 40
alamata 
(ethiopia)
Cowpea, lablab, alfalfa, napier, 
pigeon pea, sesbania, rhodes, 
buffel grass, and panicum
20 20 35 5 5 9
Salameih 
(Syria)
Barley, common vetch, narbon 
vetch, and grass pea for grain, 
straw, or hay production; inte-
grating forages into olive-tree 
systems to improve feed and 
soil productivity; vetch grain-
based mixed rations for dairy 
production and lamb fattening
67 187 188 28 109 384
el-Bab 
(Syria)
Various combinations of 
barley, common vetch, narbon 
vetch, and grass pea (as in 
Salameih above)
5 67 107 15 92 191
ea Kar 
(Vietnam)
Various types of green fodder, 
mainly napier, pennisetum 
hybrid/Va06 and guinea grass
n/a n/a > 3,100 n/a n/a n/a
Source: authors.
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through interactive learning in networks and on farm. The new technologies 
fitted farmers’ food–feed requirements (for example, by combining food and 
feed crops in areas of food scarcity: maize–lablab, cowpea), or rainfed versus 
irrigation options, seasonal availability, performance, or ease of intercropping 
requirements. The number of adopting farmers and area planted grew fast, 
particularly in Ada’a, Salameih, and Ea Kar, where actors’ interaction was 
much more consistent and on-farm technical support was provided by FAP. 
Following experimentation with a basket of options, farmers adopted fewer 
but more suitable and high-performing fodder options (typically oats–vetch in 
Ada’a, and cowpea in Mieso and Alamata).
Fodder availability improved for innovating farmers. Some farmers 
were storing enough fodder to sustain the shortage season. Farmers also 
consistently stated that improved availability of fodder increased productivity 
and production: quantity and quality of milk increased; and small and large 
ruminants were fattened in shorter time. In Ethiopia, animals are sources 
of draught power, hence improved fodder also positively impacted crop 
production. Farmers also noted that the increase in production was consumed 
on farm, improving the food and nutritional requirements of households, 
and/or sold on the market, improving their income. However, it was clear to 
the stakeholders that the sustainability of fodder availability and the derived 
benefits depend on factors such as the dynamics of networking and joint 
learning, availability of complementary innovations that optimize returns, 
and access to market opportunities and linkages.
Several key developments promised sustainability to the emerging 
networking and joint learning culture. For example, coached by FAP teams, 
extension workers, who gained network-facilitation skills, showed an 
interest in incorporating the innovation-systems approach in their routines 
to facilitate the networks as FAP exited. To this end, Ea Kar’s experience in 
farmer organization and fodder management was used in the new Ky Anh 
site with considerable progress made in fodder adoption in a shorter period 
(Anh et al. 2010). Moreover, improved fodder technologies were increasingly 
reaching nonparticipating farmers around the sites; for example, a Syrian 
farmer was noted to have been copied by seven farms in his neighborhood. 
Interviewees were confident that the political support for fodder innovation 
would continue. For example, a senior Syrian government official showed 
interest in “building on [FAP’s] successful experiences in upcoming 
projects.” The Eden Field Agri Seed Enterprise has been expanding across 
Ethiopia, becoming a viable fodder-seeds supplier. That said, uncertainties 
remain—due to high turnover of staff in the Ethiopian public sector, it was 
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unsure whether “key individuals capable of network facilitation will remain 
in their positions.”
In Mieso and Alamata in particular, farmers operate in weak livestock 
value chains, which, according to the partners, could undermine the 
sustainability of fodder availability: “some farmers may have been growing 
fodder but progress so far has not been life changing to them nor can be 
guaranteed to sustain.” These farmers were “feeding improved fodder to low 
milk or meat producing animals” as improved breeds were hardly available. 
Consequently, the productivity gain was significant but limited (farmers 
reported increase in milk production from around 1.5 to 2 liters per cow per 
day). The “surplus milk” from these sites did not get to the market for lack of 
milk-collection points and access to market. However, farmers sold animals to 
local consumers and traders but at a “low price,” as they lacked information on 
market price or they faced high transaction costs or limited marketing skills 
to sell animals in distant cities.
In response to these and similar challenges, FAP teams identified the 
respective livestock value chains for potential interventions, but progress was 
mainly seen in the more established Ea Kar site (see below). In Syria, taking 
advantage of the growing market opportunity, many FAP-participating 
farmers were fattening and selling sheep on an existing local market. A 
formal coordination of value-chain actors such as traders, transporters, and 
slaughterhouses was not pursued due to limited project time and inadequate 
expertise in value-chain organization. Faced with similar limitations, in 
Ethiopia chain-linkage developments showed modest progress only in 
the market-opportune Ada’a site. The Ada’a Dairy Cooperative has been 
experiencing falling milk supplies largely due to shortages of fodder. The 
Cooperative’s interest in the fodder network was derived from the prospect 
of increasing milk supply from farmers participating in FAP. Many farmers 
claimed that improved availability of fodder boosted milk production 
and sale, some farmers earning as much as 1,000 birr (around US$60) per 
month. However, as many of the farmers keep local breeds, yield was lower. 
The FAP network responded to this issue by catalyzing the procurement of 
small numbers of crossbred cows by farmers with the support of the District 
Department for Agriculture and Rural Development over 2009–2010. Below, 
the Ea Kar case is discussed separately for the exemplary approach taken to 
address the above challenges and develop a thriving meat sector.
190 ChapTer 5
Integrating Fodder Innovation in a Meat Value Chain: Experience 
from Ea Kar, Vietnam
According to Stür and Khanh (2010), Ea Kar’s conventional value chain 
was characterized as farmers growing and selling all types and sizes of 
animals at local markets without being able to meet the growing demand 
for  quantity and quality of meat. Through FAP-participating farmers, two 
production lines emerged: farmers with less potential to keep animals for 
fattening (labeled F1 in Figure 5.1) started a “cow–calf ” production system 
to raise crossbred calves for sale. The second system was beef production 
where farmers (F2 in Figure 5.1) fatten and sell animals. The FAP Vietnam 
team worked by steps to strengthen the meat value chain (Stür and Khanh 
2010): first, fodder was planted to stimulate farmers’ interest in increasing 
productivity. Realizing that they were occasionally paid twice as much for 
their fatter  cattle on the local market (compared to conventionally raised 
animals),  farmers adopted a “buy thin—sell fat” strategy. Second, new 
FIGURE 5.1 Simplified meat value chain, Ea Kar, Vietnam
 
 
Cow–calf production
(Farmers – F1)
Beef value chain
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semen import, 
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certification, etc. 
(relevant government
 departments)
Input and 
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Technologies 
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(research, extension, 
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Transport
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Information/ITC
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Source: authors.
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markets were identified and developed for fat cattle in provincial urban 
centers such as Buon Ma Thuot. This led to producing and marketing 
meat for city markets and restaurants. Third, chain actors negotiated and 
introduced standards to ensure that fattened animals would be less than three 
years old, more than 300 kg at slaughter weight, and generally healthy. To 
meet the standards, farmers improved their animals’ feed and fodder intake, 
shelter, and health services. They kept information on each animal’s weight, 
breed type, and health conditions. These measures helped farmers receive 
better and relatively stable prices. Handlers were able to make direct and 
regular contacts with farmers and were able to purchase animals on farm; they 
in turn sold the animals to large  traders and slaughterhouses. The government 
provided support in areas such as breed improvement and regulation of 
meat slaughterhouses.
By the end of 2010, the Ea Kar meat value chain was growing (Stür and 
Khanh 2010):
• 44 farmer clubs were established in the district with a focus on cattle pro-
duction, and 3,100 households (30 percent of cattle producers in the dis-
trict) planted forages;
• 532 households were fattening cattle for urban markets, and 800 house-
holds produced crossbred calves;
• 3 farmer clubs had contracts with city traders, and cattle and beef were sold 
to local, provincial, and several other city markets across the country.
FAP’s approach started impacting on the livelihoods of many participat-
ing farmers in Ea Kar. One of the fodder groups in the district is in Ea Kmut 
commune, located in the neighborhood of Ea Kar town. The fodder group 
had 13 household members in 2009, and each household was fattening, on 
average, 32 animals per year (eight animals per three-month cycle). After cov-
ering their costs, farmers on average made a net US$69 per month or US$828 
per year (according to the farmers, income from sale of fattened animals made 
up about 70 percent of their total income). The income was spent on farmers’ 
basic needs and children’s education, and the head of the farmer group noted 
a “bright future for beef production” in his commune. Farmers in Ea Pal com-
mune were also able to benefit from the applied approach. However, they were 
facing some challenges like poor access roads and inadequate water to grow 
forage all year round. Ea Pal commune farmers noted that it was difficult 
to sell the animals on time for lack of easy reach to markets, and small trad-
ers were colluding with large traders to cut prices. Like farmers in Ea Kmut 
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commune, they noted that raising capital to buy and fatten animals was also a 
major problem:
yes we earn more money now from fattening than two years ago … 
but our capacity is still limited to raise capital as high as 10 million 
Vietnamese dong [about $520] to buy an animal. We don’t get bank 
credit because of tight collateral conditions (head of farmer fod-
der group).
At the time of data collection (2009–2010), FAP partners were looking 
into these challenges. Despite the challenges, FAP Vietnam team and part-
ners stressed that the approach helped produce rewarding and sustainable 
outcomes; and that the technological options and institutional arrangements 
introduced fit the local context and met local needs, and were supported by 
the local and national governments. As summed up by Stür and Khan (2010), 
in 2010 the Ea Kar learning site was changing from “traditional” cattle man-
agement to a “refined” cattle-production system, where farmers moved from 
feeding animals on naturally available resources to planted forage, from free 
grazing to confined animal keeping, from extensive production to defined 
production like fattening, and from production not linked to markets to mar-
ket orientation.
Discussion
More, and increasingly diverse, actors would provide the ideal complementary 
capabilities for innovation, but the real world of the case studies presented 
networks with a limited number and heterogeneity of actors, and the 
networks had to be triggered and facilitated through an external research-
for-development project. Actors outside the “current systems” were drawn in 
and different types of capacity were developed. Sustained interactive learning 
in networks, and on farm, brought about fodder innovation in all sites. 
The integration of improved fodder in production processes also resulted 
in promising productivity gains, with improvements in farmers’ food and 
nutrition, as well as income.
The study reported in this chapter shows that fodder technological inno-
vation is sustainably enhanced when linked with other innovations and 
 market-oriented activities that optimize productivity. Testimony to this was 
the Ea Kar learning site, where a thriving meat value chain emerged. Key fea-
tures of the success are worth stating here. First, once fodder innovation was 
found, dynamics were built into networking for continuous learning and 
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innovation. To make fodder innovation more rewarding, it was integrated 
into interrelated innovations (notably breed and animal management) and 
 value-chain activities. Benchmarks were developed for keeping and fatten-
ing animals so that quality was consistent, and this helped farmers earn better 
value for their produce. Second, a new organizational innovation—a farmer 
group—was created to learn and innovate, and to support farmers’ engage-
ment in markets. Small and isolated farmers often suffer, therefore farmer 
groups became key instruments to improve marketing efficiency and prof-
itability by reducing transaction costs. The need and organization of such 
groups, however, cannot be legislated as it depends on the value chains that 
innovating farmers are in (meat, dairy, or the species they keep), farm sizes, 
availability of infrastructure, etc. In summary, the Ea Kar site demonstrated 
that fodder innovation triggered technological and socioeconomic changes 
where actors’ behavior were changing from an isolated to a more collaborative 
and interactive learning and innovation, where interrelated innovations were 
incorporated in production processes, and where smallholder farming was 
changing from extensive and subsistence-based farming toward an intensive 
and market-oriented business.
Some of the factors that influenced innovation outcomes relate to time 
and contexts—notably whether learning sites were started anew or built 
on previous projects. Sites with more favorable conditions (such as those 
where the facilitators or partner organizations have worked before, and 
where there are good prospects for market development) produced more suc-
cessful results than those with less favorable conditions. In Ea Kar, it took 
more than five years for farmers to learn about potential benefits and risks 
of fodder technologies, and effectively engage in markets. This suggests 
that, as underlined in studies involving science and technology partnerships 
(Chataway et al. 2006), time and patience, and the necessary support are 
required to take success from simply producing inputs to the level of meet-
ing long-term objectives like improving livelihoods. Another key lesson was 
that farmers select and deselect fodder options appropriate to them based 
on technical, socioeconomic, and agroecological criteria. Fodder options 
attuned to farmers’ local contexts led to successful adoption. Hence it is crit-
ical to understand farmers’ needs and constraints, and support them to have 
a range of technological options to deal with the challenges they face. As 
FAP concludes, the innovation capacity developed in the networks and on 
farm is likely to support farmers to select and adopt fodder and related live-
stock technologies. Transferring lessons beyond learning sites and countries, 
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however, entails making necessary adjustments to fit into farmer circum-
stances and local and national contexts.
The present study highlights the importance of policy for innovation in 
value chains. For example, meat production was expensive for some farmers 
in Vietnam and might require credit. The supply of improved breeds of cat-
tle and milk-collection points were inadequate in Ethiopia. Where such con-
straints prevail, governments need to support innovations and livestock-based 
businesses by facilitating the provision of credit, improved breeds, etc. Second, 
due to market manipulation by some cattle traders, some farmers were selling 
animals for less than market prices, therefore governments and other stake-
holders need to step in and prevent such destructive behavior. Third, network-
ing is best facilitated by local and dedicated “intermediary” organizations 
(Klerkx, Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010), but this seems a long way off in the sites 
studied—hence public investment is required to support local NGOs and 
public organizations to develop facilitation capacity. Finally, the weak and 
often missing actor in local networks was the private sector, hence govern-
ments should nurture the sector so that it plays its due roles, particularly in 
disseminating agricultural knowledge and technologies.
Conclusion
The study shows that fodder innovation is successfully triggered and inte-
grated in livestock production by actors interacting and learning in networks, 
and on farm. However, fodder is one among many inputs in livestock pro-
duction. The success of fodder innovation, and for that matter innovation in 
other livestock technologies, depends on other inputs, institutions, and mar-
kets. The key lesson is that fodder can be an entry point, but real improvement 
occurs when broader value-chain issues are addressed in a holistic manner.
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TRANSFORMATION OF SMALLHOLDER 
BEEF-CATTLE PRODUCTION IN VIETNAM1
Werner Stür, Truong Tan Khanh, and Alan Duncan
Introduction
This chapter addresses the question “Can smallholder livestock production 
systems in developing countries be transformed to take advantage of the 
increasing demand for meat?”, a question that has been posed by many authors 
(for example, Tarawali et al. 2011). On the basis of a case study that followed 
smallholder cattle development in Ea Kar, a district in the central highlands 
of Vietnam, over a ten-year period, it analyzes the contributions to sustainable 
intensification of smallholder livestock production made by technology 
interventions, market linkages, private-sector development, participatory 
research and farmer group-based approaches, capacity strengthening, local 
coalitions, and innovation platforms.
Livestock production is considered to be an important pathway out of 
poverty for the rural poor in developing countries (for example, Kristjanson 
et al. 2010) and worldwide 1 billion poor people depend on livestock for their 
livelihoods (McDermott et al. 2010). Livestock are living assets contributing 
to nutrition, food security, and building wealth. The increasing consumption 
of meat in some developing countries, related to rising household income 
and rapid urbanization, has been well documented (for example, Delgado 
2003). In Vietnam, per capita meat consumption rose at an average annual 
growth rate of 4.1 percent from 11 kg in 1980–1982 to 28 kg in 2001–2003, 
confirming Vietnam as one of the developing countries where the predicted 
“livestock revolution” is taking place (Pica-Ciamarra and Otte 2011). While 
much of this increase can be attributed to increased consumption of pork, 
1 The authors thank all the stakeholders and project partners involved in this study for sharing 
their experiences and enthusiasm for smallholder cattle development. They also acknowledge 
the donors who supported research into cattle development in Ea Kar: the Asian Development 
Bank for funding from 2000 to 2005, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
from 2007 to 2010.
This chapter was originally published as an article in the International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability  
11 (4): 363–381 (2013).
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consumption of beef has been predicted to almost double between 2001 and 
2020 (Quirke et al. 2003).
This rising demand for beef presents poor livestock producers with signif-
icant opportunities to increase the benefits gained from their livestock and 
raise income through increasing livestock sales. However, at the time of this 
publication, there have been few documented examples of smallholder farm-
ers being able to take advantage of these opportunities. This chapter describes 
one such example in which smallholder families in Vietnam, whose livelihood 
was based on small, diversified crop–livestock farms, were able to change from 
being traditional “cattle keepers” to becoming market-oriented “cattle produc-
ers” within a relatively short time span. A series of small research-for-develop-
ment projects provided interventions that both catalyzed and supported this 
development (Table 6.1).
The case-study location was Ea Kar district, Daklak Province, Vietnam 
and the study covers the period from 2000 to 2010. Data and information 
presented are based on information extracted from project reports and pre-
sentations, interviews with key informants, and primary data collected 
during the Fodder Adoption Project; these include adoption surveys in 2007 
and 2010, and market studies in 2004 and 2008. The chapter describes the 
changes in production, marketing, and innovation capacity, analyzes the key 
factors that were instrumental in enabling this transition, and draws lessons 
on the changing needs for intervention strategies at different stages of the 
intensification process.
Site Description, Research Process, and Methods
Description of Ea Kar
Ea Kar is one of the 13 districts of Daklak Province in the Central Highlands 
of Vietnam. It is well connected by sealed road to Buon Ma Thuot (1.5 hours 
by car), the provincial capital of Daklak, and to Nha Trang (2.5 hours by car) 
on the main coastal north–south route. The landscape is undulating and par-
tially mountainous. At the time of the study, 40 percent of the total land area 
of 104,000 ha was used for agriculture and 52 percent was declared forest 
(Daklak Statistics Office 2008). Agriculture accounted for 65 percent of the 
district’s GDP, and more than 80 percent of Ea Kar’s population depended 
on agriculture for their livelihood. Smallholder families subsisted by growing 
a diverse range of foodcrops, livestock, and fish for home consumption and 
sale to generate family income. Farm sizes were small for upland agriculture 
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with an average land area of 1.3 ha. The main crops grown were hybrid maize 
and cassava; coffee and fruit trees were cultivated on the most fertile soils 
(16 percent); paddy rice was grown in valleys and other flat areas (12 percent); 
and a range of other annual upland crops were also cultivated. Crop yields 
TABLE 6.1 Research projects implemented in Ea Kar, Daklak, Vietnam, 2000–2010
Project title Forages for Smallholders 
Project-2 (FSP-2)
Livelihood and Livestock 
Systems Project (LLSP)
Enhancing livelihoods of poor 
livestock keepers through 
increasing use of fodder 
(Fodder Adoption Project, FAP)
period 2000–2002 2003–2005 2007–2010
Countries 
included
Southeast asia regional 
project including Vietnam
Southeast asia regional 
project including Vietnam
ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam
Donor asian Development Bank 
(aDB)
asian Development Bank 
(aDB)
International Fund for 
agricultural Development (IFaD)
Implementing 
agency
• International Center 
for Tropical agriculture 
(CIaT) in collaboration 
with national partners. 
• In ea Kar: Tay Nguyen 
University (TNU), the 
National Institute of 
animal Science (NIaS), 
and the ea Kar extension 
office (DeO)
• CIaT in collaboration 
with national partners. 
In ea Kar: TNU, NIaS, 
DeO, and commune 
extension workers
• International coordination by 
the International Livestock 
research Institute (ILrI) on 
behalf of the System-wide 
Livestock programme of the 
CGIar. 
• In ea Kar: implemented by 
CIaT, TNU, NIaS, DeO, district 
government, and commune 
extension workers
Objective in 
ea Kar
Developing and integrating 
forage technologies for 
smallholder farmers
Improving livestock 
production through 
forage-based feeding 
systems
Building innovation capacity for 
fodder and cattle development
activities • participatory evaluation 
of forage varieties with 
individual farmers in 
several villages
• Developing improved 
feeding systems with 
farmer groups
• Up-scaling of forage-
based feeding systems 
to more villages in 
ea Kar
• Facilitating the involvement of 
a broad range of stakeholders 
in cattle development
• Improving market linkages
• Building stakeholders’ 
capacity for cattle production 
and marketing
Outputs and 
outcomes
• Farm-grown forages, 
grown on farmers’ 
own land and used 
to supplement cattle, 
adopted by participating 
smallholder farmers
• adoption of forage 
technologies by more 
than 2,000 farmers in 
ea Kar, and move toward 
stall-fed cattle fattening 
(buy thin, sell fat)
• Improved cattle 
productivity and 
increased income from 
forage-based cattle 
production
• Changed cattle-production 
system from traditional 
“cattle keepers” to market-
oriented “cattle producers”
• adoption of forage 
technologies by more than 
3,000 farmers and adoption 
of market-oriented cattle 
fattening and breeding by 
more than 1,300 farmers in 
ea Kar
Source: authors.
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were constrained by low soil fertility (with the exception of small pockets of 
fertile red basaltic soils, 16 percent of agricultural land) and a cool dry season 
from January to April (Figure 6.1). From 2003 to 2009, the mean annual rain-
fall was 1,605 mm, varying from 950 mm in 2004 to 2,230 mm in 2005.
Most rural households raised several livestock species, including pigs, 
poultry, and cattle, and some households had small fish ponds. Traditionally, 
cattle had been used for draught power and asset accumulation, and many 
smallholders now raised one to three cattle as part of a diversified small-
holder livelihood. Cattle were raised to preserve cash: farmers bought cat-
tle whenever cash was available and sold animals when funds for major 
expenses were needed. Thus, cattle were a cash reserve rather than a way 
of generating regular income for the family. Farmers grazed cattle on grass, 
herbs, and shrubs growing along roadsides, fields, and waterways, and in 
nearby forests. In intensively cropped lowland areas, farmers supplemented 
grazing with freshly cut native grasses and crop residues such as rice straw. 
There were two main problems with this type of production system: (1) feed 
supply was insufficient for good animal growth, as animals were unable to 
find enough fodder on heavily grazed or utilized land; and (2) cattle man-
agement was labor-intensive, as grazing needed to be supervised in cropping 
areas and hand cutting of short, native grasses was time consuming. This 
situation has resulted in thin animals with poor reproductive performance 
and a low meat yield at slaughter. Animals, therefore, were sold at local mar-
kets for local consumption only. For traders to access urban markets, cattle 
FIgURE 6.1 Mean monthly rainfall and air temperature in Ea Kar, 2003–2009
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needed to be in a much better condition and this could only be achieved if 
farmers changed the way they raised, produced, and marketed cattle.
Research Process
Three research projects contributed directly to cattle development in Ea Kar 
(Table 6.1). The nature and focus of these projects gradually changed over the 
ten years and this evolution provided insights into the types and sequencing of 
interventions required at different stages of the innovation process.
Based on earlier research by CIAT that had identified forage varieties suit-
able for different agroecosystems in Southeast Asia (Stür et al. 2002), the 
Forages for Smallholders Project (FSP, 2000–2002) introduced a range of 
promising forage varieties and evaluated these with individual smallholder 
farmers in three villages in Ea Kar, using a farmer-participatory approach. The 
Livelihood and Livestock Systems Project (LLSP, 2003–2005) continued 
working with these farmers to develop new, improved feeding systems that 
combined and integrated the new fodder resource—the farm-grown forages—
with the existing feed resources. A key intervention was the fattening of thin 
cattle before sale to achieve a higher sale price. Farmers provided ad libitum 
fodder to stall-fed cattle for 1–2 months, adding 25–50 kg of liveweight to 
animals before sale. Later, supplemental feeding using cassava meal, rice bran, 
and other farm-grown crops and crop by-products was also introduced to fur-
ther improve the growth rate of cattle, and feeding systems were then tailored 
to different production systems such as cattle fattening and cow–calf produc-
tion. As the project progressed, activities expanded to more villages and com-
munes, and scaling up became a focus of the project. Increasingly, the project 
worked with farmer groups rather than individual farmers and engaged with 
local organizations such as farmers’ and women’s unions. Extension tools, 
such as cross-visits, field days, and farmer training, were facilitated and imple-
mented by extension workers who had received training by project scientists. 
In 2004, the LLSP conducted a rapid cattle-market appraisal that brought 
farmers and traders together to discuss constraints and opportunities for 
improving marketing of cattle from Ea Kar. Commencing in 2007, the Fodder 
Adoption Project (FAP, 2007–2010) drew on innovation-systems thinking 
(World Bank 2006) and engaged with a wide range of stakeholders, strength-
ening capacity of local stakeholders to improve smallholder cattle production 
and marketing in Ea Kar. The project combined participatory approaches to 
developing and extending agricultural technologies (for example, Horne and 
Stür 2003) with an innovation-systems approach (for example, World Bank 
2006; Hall et al. 2007). The focus of activities was on stimulating farmer 
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links to urban markets, improving the efficiency and quality of cattle produc-
tion to enable farmers to access these markets, and building capacity of local 
stakeholders for sustainable cattle development.
Methods
The results presented are based on information gathered from reports, pre-
sentations, and publications of the FSP, LLSP, and FAP projects, and primary 
data collected during the LLSP and FAP projects. These include the results of 
adoption surveys in 2007 and 2010, and market studies in 2004 and 2008.
The first adoption survey was conducted in September 2007 and aimed to 
interview all farmers who were growing forages in Ea Kar. District and commune 
extension workers visited all communes and villages in Ea Kar and interviewed 
commune officials, village heads, and other key informants on forage develop-
ment in their village, and assembled a list of households that had adopted forages 
(adopters). The extension workers arranged visits to all adopters and one adult 
household member was interviewed using a simple one-page structured ques-
tionnaire. The questionnaire included questions on basic household information, 
crops and livestock resources, and planting of managed forages. In 2010, a sec-
ond adoption survey was carried out in two stages: first, the survey team inter-
viewed commune officials, village heads, and other key informants in each of the 
15 communes (and 259 villages) where forage and cattle development was known 
to have taken place, to determine the number of households with cattle and the 
type of production systems used (that is, traditional grazing, use of farm-grown 
forages, fattening of cattle, cow–calf production, or mixed production systems). 
The team then randomly selected a subset of 54 households for a more detailed 
survey, which elicited detailed information on adoption, management, and pro-
ductivity of forage and cattle production. The selection process was in two stages: 
first, the team randomly selected 5 of the 15 communes; second, they randomly 
selected 54 households from the list of households engaging in cattle production 
in these communes. Data were summarized and analyzed using a spreadsheet.
The first cattle-market study was carried out in 2004 (Khanh et al. 2004). 
During the study, key informants were interviewed. Separate group discussions 
with local government representatives, cattle producers, and traders were facili-
tated during which each group discussed the history of cattle development and 
marketing, identified current stakeholders in the market chain, mapped market 
chains, and discussed constraints and opportunities for improving cattle mar-
keting. The outcomes of the discussions were reported at feedback workshops 
with all stakeholders. A second market study was carried out in 2008. This study 
used the Rapid Market Appraisal (RMA) method developed for agricultural 
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commodities (Wandschneider et al. 2007). The main components of the 
RMA were:
• interviews with key informants;
• collection of secondary data;
• group discussions with three farmer groups representing different cattle- 
production systems (traditional extensive grazing, stall-fed cow–calf 
production, and cattle fattening);
• group discussions and individual interviews with eight small and four large 
traders in Ea Kar;
• interviews with relevant district authorities;
• interviews with individual traders and other stakeholders involved in the 
market chain at the three main destination markets of Buon Ma Thuot, Da 
Lat City, and Ho Chi Minh City where most of the cattle from Ea Kar were 
sold; and
• a feedback meeting with all stakeholders in Ea Kar to discuss the results of 
the market study and explore opportunities for improving cattle production 
and marketing.
The field surveys (data collection, interviews, and group discussions) were 
conducted between 15 June and 15 September 2008. Destination market sur-
veys were carried out in December 2008. The LLSP and FAP projects facili-
tated participatory market studies taking farmer-club leaders, local traders, and 
local government representatives to possible destination markets to observe 
operations and discuss market opportunities with traders, slaughterhouse oper-
ators, and meat-market stakeholders, and develop linkages with urban markets. 
Details of this study have been published separately (Khanh and Stür 2012). 
Building capacity of researchers and extension workers in participatory research, 
forage, animal nutrition and feeding systems, market studies, and innovation 
systems approaches was an integral part of the research projects.
Results
The system changes relating to cattle development in Ea Kar will be presented 
in three parts: (1) intensification of cattle production, (2) accessing new mar-
kets, and (3) institutional and stakeholder dynamics.
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FIgURE 6.2 Farmers growing fodder in Ea Kar, 2000–2010, for the FSP (Forages for 
Smallholders Project, 2000–2002), LLSP (Livelihood and Livestock Systems Project, 2003–
2005), and FAP (Fodder Adoption Project, 2007–2010) projects
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Source: Fap adoption surveys in 2007 and 2010; District extension Office (pers. comm.) for other years.
Intensification of Cattle Production
FODDER PRODUCTION AND USE
In 2000, the FSP introduced the concept of farm-grown fodder production 
to smallholder farmers in Ea Kar by introducing a range of forage grasses and 
legumes that were likely to be well adapted to local conditions. The notion 
of growing fodder for their cattle on their own land was a novel idea for 
farmers used to exploiting common-property resources to feed their animals. 
Despite this, farm-grown fodder was rapidly adopted by farmers, with the 
highest adoption rates occurring from 2003 to 2005 (Figure 6.2). By 2010, 
more than 3,100 farm households, or 31 percent of all households with cattle, 
had adopted fodder production (Figure 6.2, Table 6.2). When interviewing 
farmers who had recently started growing forages about the reasons for 
adopting forage production, they invariably listed labor savings and improved 
body condition of their animals as the main reasons for growing forages. They 
commented that they now had a ready fodder resource next to their house and 
it took only a few minutes to cut feed for their cattle; they no longer needed 
to send family members to herd cattle for long periods, contradicting the 
often-held view that zero grazing is more labor demanding; and they could 
also keep their cattle close to their house. In 2005, a small study comparing 
 cattle-production labor use of 27 fodder-crop adopters and 20 nonadopters 
in Ea Kar showed that, on average, adopters spent 3 hours per day while 
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nonadopters spent 6.8 hours per day looking after their cattle. The return to 
labor was US$0.73 per hour for adopters and $0.16 per hour for nonadopters. 
While this was only a snapshot, it confirmed the assertion by farmers that 
labor savings were a major factor driving fodder adoption.
The main fodder crops selected and grown by farmers in Ea Kar were 
the grasses Panicum maximum “Simuang,” Pennisetum purpureum “Napier,” 
and a Pennisetum hybrid “VA06,” with smaller areas of the grasses Paspalum 
 atratum “Terenos” and Brachiaria hybrid “Mulato 2,” and the legume 
Stylosanthes guianensis “CIAT184.” Grasses rather than legumes were adopted 
more frequently by farmers as grasses produced higher fodder yields than 
legumes, and quantity of fodder (rather than quality) was the first concern 
of farmers. During the first few years, most farmers grew only small areas, 
100–200 m2, as they evaluated the potential of forages. Later adopters imme-
diately grew larger areas, 500–1,000 m2, which were sufficiently large to 
impact  animal growth positively. By 2007, the average fodder area per farm 
was 887 m2 and by 2010 it had increased to 1,309 m2 (Table 6.2). Farmers 
grew fodder crops on land that had previously been planted with other crops 
such as coffee, maize, or cassava, often on land marginal for crop production. 
The preference for grasses also had the advantage that these could be propa-
gated vegetatively from cuttings and rootstocks, which eliminated the need 
for developing a seed-supply system. The researchers promoted sale of (rather 
than provision of free) planting material, which enabled early adopters to sell 
small amounts of planting material to other farmers who also wanted to eval-
uate farm-grown fodders, and this provided an extra incentive for early adopt-
ers. For new farmers, the cash investment needed was small as they could start 
with only a few plants for multiplication and then produce their own plant-
ing material.
TABLE 6.2 Fodder adoption in Ea Kar, 2007 and 2010
Characteristic 2007 2010
Total number of smallholders in ea Kar (hh) 31,690 31,800
hh with cattle (percent) 34.0 31.6
mean number of cattle per hh growing forages (cattle/hh) 3.2 4.3
hh with fodder production (hh) 2,407 3,101
Fodder adoption rate of hh with cattle (percent) 22.3 30.9
average size of fodder area per hh (m2) 887 1,309
Source: Fodder adoption project (Fap) surveys, 2007 and 2010.
Note: hh = households.
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Forage productivity was high, as almost all farmers applied manure recy-
cled from cattle pens and small amounts of inorganic fertilizer, usually nitro-
gen fertilizer, to their forage crops. Also, farmers managed forages in the same 
way as they did foodcrops: they grew forages in rows and cut and carried the 
fodder to animals to maximize forage productivity. Most farmers irrigated at 
least part of their fodder area during dry periods, mainly using existing irriga-
tion equipment purchased for coffee production. The average size of 1,309 m2 
of forage-production area was sufficient to produce fodder for fattening of two 
cattle at any one time.
The intensive fodder production had few negative impacts. At the end of 
the study in 2010, households had committed only 10 percent of their farm 
area to fodder production, which allowed them to continue to use most of 
their agricultural land for crop production and other livestock activities, and 
so maintain diversified agricultural production. Fodder crops were cut fre-
quently and so produced little or no seed that could potentially grow as a weed 
in unwanted situations. There was no evidence of invasive tendencies of the 
forages grown as fodders. The application of manure ensured that nutrients 
contained in cut fodder were replaced and productivity of fodders and soil fer-
tility were maintained.
Adoption of forage production among different communes in Ea Kar var-
ied considerably, ranging from 1 to 95 percent of farms with cattle (Table 6.3). 
Uptake was less common for farmers living in remote communes such as Cu 
Lang and Cu Bong, and more common for those living in communes with 
easy access to main roads and the district center, such as Ea Dar, Ea Mut, and 
Ea Pal. In community consultations, local stakeholders identified several fac-
tors that contributed to this differential adoption, including level of access to 
grazing lands, tradition of cattle grazing, poverty, and access to extension ser-
vices. People in more remote communes tended to have easier access to graz-
ing lands, so there was less pressure to find new feed resources; they tended to 
belong to ethnic-minority groups with a long history of cattle grazing; they 
were poor and had little access to credit to engage in cattle fattening; and they 
had limited interaction with the government extension services.
INCREASE IN CATTLE POPULATION, AND CHANGE OF BREEDS AND MANAGEMENT
Between 2003 and 2005, cattle population in Ea Kar almost tripled from 
approximately 10,000 to 29,000 animals and then remained at 25,000–
28,000 animals from 2006 onwards (Daklak Statistics Office 2009). The two 
main cattle breeds raised by smallholders in Vietnam were native Yellow cat-
tle with a mature bull weight of 200–250 kg and “Laisind,” a stabilized cross 
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of native Yellow cattle × Red Sindhi cattle, with a higher mature bull weight 
of 300–450 kg (NIAH 2007). The main cattle breed raised traditionally by 
farmers in Ea Kar was Yellow cattle. The Ea Kar district extension office esti-
mated that, in 2000, the breed composition consisted of 80 percent native 
Yellow and 20 percent Laisind cattle. By 2007, the percentage of native Yellow 
cattle was 74 percent with the remainder made up mostly of Laisind cattle 
and a small percentage of crossbred cattle. Crossbred cattle (Laisind × exotic 
breeds such as Brahman or Droughtmaster) were the result of an artificial 
insemination (AI) program offered by the government. Breed composition 
changed dramatically from 2007 to 2010. By 2010, the percentage of native 
Yellow cattle had declined to 40 percent, while the percentage of Laisind and 
crossbred cattle had increased to 37 percent and 23 percent, respectively.
Growing their own fodder enabled farmers to raise cattle in pens for calf 
production. Farmers could control and manage breeding, which had previ-
ously been almost impossible when cattle were grazed on communal land. 
TABLE 6.3 Fodder adoption by commune, 2010
Commune Distance from 
district town 
(km)
Distance from 
main road 
(km)
Farms with 
cattle
Farms with 
forages
Forage 
adoption (%)
Thi Tran (district 
township)
 0  0 279  82 29
ea mut  5  0 538 262 49
Cu Ni  5  2 864 222 26
Cu hue  8  3 587 175 30
ea Dar 10  0 769 373 48
ea Knop (secondary 
township
10  0 389 177 46
Xuan phu 10  5 539 102 19
ea pal 15  3 782 740 95
ea O 15  5 793 232 29
Cu prong 18  5 422  74 18
ea Tyl 25  0 995 211 21
Cu Yang 25  3 548 201 37
ea So (including 
ea Sa)
25  5 994 159 16
Cu Lang 30 15 643   5  1
Cu Bong 35 10 900  86 10
All communes 10,044   3,101 31
Source: Fodder adoption project (Fap) surveys, 2007 and 2010.
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When keeping cattle in pens, farmers could observe their animals more closely 
and could arrange AI and animal-health services more easily. AI, using exotic 
semen, had been offered by the district extension office from 1996, but was 
only taken up widely from 2003 onwards (Figure 6.3). The uptake of AI was 
relatively unrelated to the cost. AI was offered free of charge to all farmers 
until 2000. From 2001 to 2007, semen was still supplied free of charge, but 
farmers had to pay a small service fee for insemination. Since 2008, farm-
ers have had to pay for both semen and insemination service themselves with 
charges ranging from US$13 to $18 for each successful insemination. While 
the jump in the cost of AI reduced demand in 2009, there were many farmers 
who were willing to pay for successful AI.
MOVING TOWARD SPECIALIZED CATTLE PRODUCTION
Farmers started to specialize in stall-fed cattle fattening and/or stall-fed cow–
calf production using AI or Laisind bulls for breeding. Fattening cattle and 
cow–calf production in pens using farm-grown fodder was a relatively new 
concept for smallholder farmers. In 2003, only three farms experimented 
with cattle fattening. By 2010, some 525 farms were fattening cattle and all 
used farm-grown fodder (Table 6.4). In comparison to cattle fattening, the 
adoption of farm-grown fodder for cow–calf production was much lower and 
many farmers continued to use traditional grazing systems (Table 6.4). Of 
the farmers who adopted forages, many used farm-grown fodder as a supple-
ment to grazing, though some moved to stall-fed cow–calf production with 
FIgURE 6.3 Semen doses used in the Ea Kar artificial insemination (AI) program, 1996–2010
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farm-grown fodders used as the main feed. The Ea Kar extension office esti-
mated that, by 2010, more than 800 farms were practicing stall-fed cow–calf 
production using AI or Laisind bulls for breeding.
While the total number of farmers fattening cattle changed little between 
2007 and 2010 (Table 6.4), there were other major changes in the production 
system (Table 6.5). By 2010, farmers had increased the number of animals fat-
tened at any one time from averages of 1.5 to 3.9 animals per cycle; they fat-
tened more Laisind and crossbred cattle; they fattened younger animals that 
required a longer fattening period; and achieved a higher slaughter weight and 
a higher weight gain. To achieve these weight gains, farmers fed cattle with 
fresh fodder ad libitum (approximately 32 kg of fresh grass per animal per day), 
and supplemented this with an average of 2.9 kg of farm-mixed concentrates 
consisting of maize, rice bran, cassava meal, and fish meal. Ingredients for con-
centrates were largely locally grown, often on farm or easily available from 
local sources. As farmers gained experience, they were able to modify supple-
ment ingredients to match animal needs during different stages of fattening. 
TABLE 6.4 Cattle production systems and fodder adoption, 2007 and 2010
Production system 2007 2010
Households with 
cattle
Forage adoption 
(percent)
Households with 
cattle
Forage adoption 
(percent)
Cattle fattening 501 96 525 100
Cow–calf system 10,134 19 9,770  28
all farms with cattlea 10,614 23 10,044 31
Source: Fodder adoption project (Fap) surveys, 2007 and 2010. 
Note: a Some farms operated both cow–calf systems and fattened cattle at the time of the survey, thus the total is smaller 
than the sum of the two production systems.
TABLE 6.5 Cattle fattening characteristics, 2007 and 2010
Characteristic 2007 2010
Forage area (m2) 890 2,860
Number of cattle per fattening cycle 1.5 3.9
percentage of native cattle breeds 74 8
age of animal at start of fattening (months) 33 14
Length of fattening cycle (months) 2.5 4.5
Starting weight (kg) 229 252
Finishing weight (kg) 295 355
Daily weight gain (g/day) 670 770
Source: Based on cattle fattening survey, 2007 and Fodder adoption project (Fap) survey, 2010.
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The research projects provided training in animal nutrition and feed formu-
lation, and facilitated farmer-group experiments on low-cost feeding systems 
with locally available concentrate ingredients.
The production focus was also reflected in herd structure. In 2010 
cows, heifers, and calves/young growing cattle accounted for approximately 
80 percent of the cattle population. Most of the remaining cattle were being 
fattened for slaughter at the time of the survey. Many of the native cattle were 
sold as “calf beef ” aged 12–18 months. A comparison with the 2007 adop-
tion survey is not available as herd structure was not elicited in the 2007 sur-
vey; however, the 2010 data clearly indicate a herd structure consistent with 
a production rather than the traditional “savings” focus. It was observed that 
the use of cattle for draught purposes declined, while mechanized land prepa-
ration increased during the study period. Households that traditionally used 
cattle as a way of preserving capital found it harder to do so as access to graz-
ing lands diminished, but alternative investments such as cattle fattening 
emerged at the same time.
ACCESSING NEW MARKETS
In the four years between 2004 and 2008, substantial changes occurred in the 
quantity and quality of cattle supplied to destination markets, and the way cat-
tle were marketed from Ea Kar. In 2004, the vast majority of cattle produced 
in Ea Kar were sold for use in Ea Kar and nearby districts. Farmers sold cattle 
to small, local traders or, less frequently, directly to other farmers. Of the cattle 
they bought, traders sold 70 percent of the animals to other farmers for breeding 
or growing, and 30 percent for slaughter. By 2008, this situation had changed 
and 85 percent of cattle were sold for consumption in the urban markets of Ho 
Chi Minh, Da Lat, Nha Trang, and Buon Ma Thuot, and only 15 percent were 
consumed in Ea Kar (Table 6.6). Sourcing and marketing of cattle varied con-
siderably among the different production systems (Table 6.6). Farmers who had 
specialized in cattle fattening bought young male crossbred or Laisind cattle and 
sold fat cattle directly to large traders. Farmers who specialized in stall-fed cow–
calf production sold crossbred or Laisind calves and/or fattened these them-
selves for sale to large traders. Farmers using the traditional cow–calf production 
continued to sell mostly to small traders or directly to other farmers.
During the 2008 market study (Khanh and Stür 2012), large and small 
traders were asked to estimate the number of cattle sold for slaughter (off-
take) from Ea Kar from 2004 to 2008. The traders estimated that off-take 
increased from 6,000 animals in 2004 to 17,000 animals in 2008. During 
the same period the cattle population increased only slightly, from 23,000 to 
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28,000 animals. This increased off-take indicated (1) a transition to regular 
sale of animals, (2) more efficient production systems, and (3) import of ani-
mals from other districts for fattening in Ea Kar.
Different destination markets had different criteria for accepting cattle 
for slaughter with stricter quality criteria in urban markets (Table 6.7). The 
two most important factors deciding acceptance and price were the live body 
weight and the body-condition score of cattle (score of 1–5; with 1 very thin 
TABLE 6.6 Marketing chain of cattle produced in Ea Kar, 2008
Production system Stall-fed cattle fattening Stall-fed cow–calf 
production
Traditional cow–calf 
production
Farmers • Bought crossbred 
and Laisind cattle for 
fattening
• Sold cattle to large 
traders (100%)
• Occasionally bought 
cows for breeding and 
used aI
• Sold Laisind and cross-
bred calves and some 
farmers also sold fat 
cattle to large traders 
(50%), other farmers 
(40%), and small 
traders (10%)
• Seldom bought animals
• Sold mainly native 
Yellow and some 
Laisind calves and 
mature cattle to small 
traders (75%) and other 
farmers (25%)
Small traders • Bought cattle from traditional cow–calf producers (60%) and from stall-fed  
cow–calf producers (40%)
• Sold fat cattle to large traders (70%) and calves and thin cattle to farmers (30%)
Large traders • Bought fat cattle from farmers (50%) and small traders (50%)
• Sold fat cattle for slaughter to urban markets (75%), for slaughter in ea Kar 
and sale as chilled meat to urban markets (10%), and for slaughter and local 
consumption in ea Kar (15%)
Source: modified from Khanh and Stür (2012), based on the cattle marketing study, 2008.
TABLE 6.7 Cattle quality criteria of different markets, 2008
Quality criteria of cattle 
sold for slaughter in 
different markets
Ea Kar Buon Ma 
Thuot
Nha Trang Da Lat Ho Chi Minh
Distance from ea Kar (km) 0 67 125 222 407
Destination markets for 
cattle from ea Kar (%)
15 35 10 20 20
Body condition score  
(1 = very thin; 5 = very fat)
any any First-grade 
chilled beef a
≥4 ≥4
Live body weight (kg) any any First-grade 
chilled beef a
≥300 ≥300
age (years) any any First-grade 
chilled beef a
≤3 ≤4
Source: modified from Khanh and Stür (2012).
Note: a First-grade chilled beef = slaughter of cattle with good body condition (≥4) and young age (≤4 years) but using only 
prime cuts of the animals with the remaining meat being sold on local markets. 
TraNSFOrmaTION OF SmaLLhOLDer BeeF-CaTTLe prODUCTION IN VIeTNam  215
and 5 very fat). The third most important criterion was the age of animals. 
The markets in Da Lat and Ho Chi Minh City were looking for relatively 
young, heavy animals with a body condition score of 4–4.5. Animals that 
were too fat (body condition score of 5) were not encouraged, whereas in the 
local Ea Kar market all animals regardless of body condition were accepted.
Traders in Da Lat did not accept cattle that did not meet the quality 
requirements. In Ho Chi Minh City, traders accepted them but paid a lower 
price. In Vietnam, the farm price for cattle is based on the amount of lean 
meat on the carcass, as estimated visually by the traders and farmers. The trad-
ers and farmers agree upon the amount of lean meat on the carcass and mul-
tiply this amount by the price of beef sold at the market at that time. Traders 
in Ea Kar were willing to pay an extra VND200,000 to 500,0002 per head 
(US$10–30 per animal) for cattle meeting all quality criteria of the destina-
tion market. Competition among traders for buying good-quality animals was 
high. Farmers consistently reported that there were many traders who were 
willing to buy their fattened animals and they generally asked at least three 
traders to make offers for the animals they wanted to sell.
The price of beef sold in urban markets had increased steadily, despite the 
recent economic crisis, by an average of 9 percent per year from $2.30/kg in 
2000 to $5.60/kg in 2010. Farmgate prices rose correspondingly and these rel-
atively consistent price increases have been a major factor attracting farmers to 
engage in cattle production.
In 2009, for the first time, a farmer group entered into a group contract 
with a large trader to regularly supply high-quality cattle at agreed quantities 
and prices. Other farmer groups also entered into contracts with traders in 
2010. Feedback from traders was that there was strong demand for high-qual-
ity beef in urban markets. Conversely, the market for smaller, native animals 
was less promising and prices paid for such animals were low. Currently, Ea 
Kar farmers supply only a fraction of the demand for quality meat in urban 
centers and there is ample opportunity for increasing supply.
INSTITUTIONAL AND STAKEHOLDER DYNAMICS
As the focus moved from forage research (2000–2002) to developing feed-
ing systems and extending forages to more farmers (2003–2005) and then to 
strengthening the capacity of stakeholders to improve cattle production and 
marketing (2007–2010), the number of stakeholders involved and their roles, 
interactions, and practices evolved (Figure 6.4).
2 VND is Vietnamese Dong. 
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FIgURE 6.4 Stakeholder linkages in 2000, 2005, and 2010 (the thickness of lines indicates 
the strength of interaction between stakeholders)
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Farmers’ and women’s union
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Various local government 
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Commune extension workers Commune officials
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Source: modified from Khanh et al. (2009).
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In 2000, the process started with on-farm research involving a small num-
ber of farmers in three villages (Table 6.8). Researchers from Tay Nguyen 
University worked directly with farmers with the participation of district 
extension workers. As forage and livestock development expanded to more 
farmers and new communes, the number of stakeholders involved increased.
By 2005, the district extension office had become the communication 
and facilitation hub for forage and livestock development. The district gov-
ernment had recognized the importance of forage production as a means of 
enabling intensification of smallholder cattle production and provided politi-
cal and financial support for cattle development. They also facilitated linkages 
with commune officials and farmers’ and women’s unions. By now, commune 
extension workers were actively involved as the main facilitators of inter-
actions with farmers. Fodder and cattle development had spread to 51  villages 
in 10 communes (Table 6.8). Extension workers no longer worked with indi-
vidual farmers, but had facilitated the formation of self-managed farmer 
clubs (that is, groups of 10–15 farmers interested in cattle development, usu-
ally located in a commune or a cluster of villages to enable easy participation) 
to facilitate extension activities, farmer training, and learning. Farmer clubs 
were regulated and managed by their members and included a broad cross- 
section of farmers including poor households. They were the central element 
in experimenting with new cattle-production systems and providing feedback 
to researchers, extension workers, and local government. Extension workers 
facilitated cross-visits between farmer clubs and asked experienced farmers 
to share their experiences with farmers from other, less-experienced clubs. 
Researchers continued to develop interventions for improving production 
TABLE 6.8 Geographic spread, extension workers, and farmer clubs involved in fodder and 
cattle development
Characteristic 2000 2005 2010
Number of communes with fodder and cattle 
development
3 10  15
Number of villages with fodder and cattle 
development
3 51 259
extensionists involved in cattle development
• at district level
• at commune level
1
3
 3
10
  3
 30
Number of farmer clubs with a fodder and cattle 
development focus
0 25  43
Source: authors.
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systems, and provided training to extension workers and methodological sup-
port to the district extension office. Traders, who had participated in the 
2004 market study, investigated access to larger provincial and urban markets, 
and developed linkages with large traders and slaughterhouse operators in des-
tination markets.
By 2010, fodder and cattle production knowledge and practice had spread 
to many more villages and communes, and the number of extension work-
ers and farmer clubs involved in these processes had increased considerably 
(Table 6.8). The number of stakeholders and the complexity of interactions 
had increased further (Figure 6.4). Traders, input suppliers (for example, 
AI), and credit institutions had become important stakeholders, interacting 
directly with farmers and farmer clubs, although the central role of the district 
extension office in facilitating interactions had continued. The district exten-
sion office ensured that traders, together with other key stakeholders, were 
consulted and invited to all meetings on how to improve cattle development. 
The role of researchers had continued to evolve into a more supportive rather 
than driving role for cattle development.
Researchers continued on-farm research on issues arising from the 
rapidly changing production systems, provided training, monitored and 
evaluated adoption patterns, and conducted market studies to provide local 
government and other stakeholders with data and information as a basis for 
decisionmaking. Farmer clubs had grown in size to an average of 20 (range 
15–40) members. The district government had facilitated access to credit 
for cattle production through local credit institutions, and had investigated 
the establishment of more efficient market mechanisms in Ea Kar. Credit 
for cattle fattening was available through local banks for the more affluent 
farmers. Other farmers had limited access to credit provided they belonged 
to a farmer club that supported their application and provided training and 
support to the applicant. In collaboration with the Social Bank, the project 
successfully facilitated a “credit through traders” scheme that enabled poor 
farmers from ethnic-minority groups to engage in cattle fattening. For more 
details on this scheme see Khanh et al. (2011a).
Discussion
The question “Can developing-country crop–livestock systems be trans-
formed to address the increasing demand for meat or will integrated small-
holder systems be replaced by intensive industrial production systems?” has 
been posed by many authors (for example, Tarawali et al. 2011; Udo et al. 
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2011). This case study shows that smallholder farmers in Ea Kar were able to 
convert from traditional cattle production to efficient market-oriented pro-
duction and compete successfully in city markets with other suppliers. While 
this is only one example, the study contributes to a greater scientific under-
standing of development processes and provides an opportunity to draw gen-
eral lessons.
The research projects that supported forage and cattle development 
in Ea Kar evolved from a purely technical focus on farm-grown forages 
to a broader systems perspective. Throughout the ten-year period, the 
research approach had a strong emphasis on participatory research that 
responded to farmers’ needs and identified opportunities for research and 
development (described in greater detail in Horne and Stür 2005), nurtured 
partnerships and local decisionmaking, provided training and, apart from 
the initial period when forages were first introduced, considered both the 
supply and demand sides of cattle development. Many of these elements 
are encompassed in an innovation-systems perspective, which considers 
innovation as a complex interactive learning process involving multiple 
actors, institutions, and organizations with different roles, agendas, and 
practices (for example, Hall et al. 2003, 2007; World Bank 2006; Spielman 
et al. 2008). This also fits with Edquist and Hommen’s (1999) point of view 
that a “systems-oriented view of innovation accords great importance to the 
demand side, rather than concentrating primarily, if not exclusively, on the 
supply side,” this latter having been the hallmark of the linear innovation or 
technology supply push approach (Hounkonnou et al. 2012). In Ea Kar, the 
nature of interventions changed as the production system intensified from 
purely production interventions in the early years to mostly market-level 
interventions toward the latter part of the case-study period.
Many factors contributed to the transition to more market-oriented 
cattle production in Ea Kar. Strong market demand in urban centers as a 
driving force for livestock development has been well recognized (for example, 
McDermott et al. 2010; Tarawali et al. 2011) and clearly played a key role 
in this case study. Other contextual factors included the strong desire of Ea 
Kar farmers to improve their livelihood, the cohesive nature of the district 
extension service, the supportive district government, and the availability of 
technical expertise from Tay Nguyen University. However, prior to the start 
of the R&D effort, farmers and local traders had not been able to access these 
markets because the type of animal produced in the traditional production 
system was acceptable only in local markets with limited demand. The lack 
of fodder had been identified as a major constraint to cattle production in 
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participatory research with smallholder farmers, and the introduction of 
farm-grown forages enabled farmers to produce fatter animals and reduce 
labor inputs in cattle production by moving from grazing to stall-fed animals. 
Traders were only able to develop access to provincial urban markets once 
farmers were able to produce fatter animals following the introduction of 
fodder interventions, that is, farm-grown forages. The attribute of farm-
grown forages to substantially reduce labor requirements for cattle production 
and improve educational outcomes of children previously employed in 
supervising grazing of cattle has also been documented by Maxwell et al. 
(2012).
The early impact of this innovation provided a vision for farmers, trad-
ers, and local government that catalyzed stakeholder interest and involvement 
in cattle development. Starting with a simple relationship involving research-
ers, farmers, and extension workers, with time, the stakeholder configuration 
expanded to include other actors such as local government planners, traders, and 
credit institutions. Biggs and Smith (1998) used the term “development coali-
tion” to describe such loosely structured, opportunistic groups of actors and, in 
their analysis of two case studies, concluded that coalition-building was a key 
ingredient for successful technology development and dissemination. This con-
clusion was supported by Cramb (1999), who used an “actor-oriented perspec-
tive” to analyze adoption of soil-conservation methods by smallholders in the 
Philippines. He also emphasized that the interests of key actors had to converge 
sufficiently for them to allocate resources and efforts on working toward change. 
In the Ea Kar case study, this impetus was created by the success of farm-grown 
fodder emerging from participatory forage development. For farmers, cattle pro-
duction became more profitable, local traders could see opportunities of access-
ing new markets, extension workers were successful in disseminating forages to 
more farmers, and local government realized that cattle development provided 
an avenue for raising incomes of smallholders. Interests converged, and forage 
and cattle development became a focus for the district.
The district extension workers stepped into the role of facilitator or broker 
of the loosely structured development coalition. Through this networking 
role they were able to connect farmers with information and the knowledge 
of other stakeholders such as traders, researchers, and credit institutions, thus 
becoming “innovation intermediaries” (Spielman et al. 2008; Poncet, Kuper, 
and Chiche 2010). An important aspect of the development coalition was 
its local facilitation that ensured local ownership of and responsibility for 
the process. External facilitation may not have resulted in the strong level of 
ownership and commitment that was apparent in this case. A feature of the 
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coalition was the strong mutual respect and friendship that developed among 
stakeholders and adherence to good partnership principles. Brinkerhoff (2002, 
21) defined these as follows:
Partnership is a dynamic relationship among diverse actors, based on 
mutually agreed objectives, pursued through a shared understanding of 
the most rational division of labour based on the respective comparative 
advantages of each partner. Partnership encompasses mutual influence, 
with a careful balance between synergy and respective autonomy, which 
incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in decision making, 
mutual accountability and transparency.
There is currently a lot of interest in the use of so-called innovation plat-
forms as catalysts for innovation in rural research-for-development circles. 
See, for example, a recent book bringing together a series of case studies from 
Africa south of the Sahara to draw out some lessons on their utility (Nederlof, 
Wongtschowski, and van der Lee 2011). The term “innovation platform” 
means different things to different people, but most would agree that such 
platforms represent a physical or virtual forum that brings together different 
stakeholders for joint learning and action. Innovation networks are also in 
vogue, and represent looser associations of stakeholders but still with the goal 
of catalyzing innovation. In the case study presented here, neither the stake-
holders nor the facilitators consciously defined their activities as being part of 
a formal innovation platform. Yet, innovation capacity was certainly built and 
sustained through interactions among key stakeholders. Establishment of for-
mal innovation platforms can raise expectations which are hard to meet and, 
in our experience, can soak up stakeholders’ time in diffuse meetings with-
out concrete actions emerging. The current case suggests that an alternative 
approach to catalyzing innovation through ad hoc interactions among essen-
tial actors for specific purposes may be an alternative and less cumbersome 
means of stimulating innovation and may yield changes on the ground before 
expectations have been raised through convening of a formal platform with all 
the fanfare that involves. Further work to compare the utility of formalized 
platforms and looser networks would be useful (for some preliminary discus-
sion on this see Ayele et al. 2012).
The district extension office actively promoted the formation of farmer 
clubs for forage and cattle production (that is, farmer interest groups) to facil-
itate interactions with farmers, maximizing learning among farmers and 
farmer clubs through cross-visits, field days, and training. Each club had only a 
small number of members (rarely more than 20–30 members within a village 
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or cluster of neighboring villages) and was self-regulated and managed—attri-
butes that have been recognized as being important for farmer organizations 
(Markelova et al. 2009). Researchers supported cattle development through 
participatory research with selected farmer clubs, provision of information, 
and training, but their overall input into the innovation process reduced over 
time. Although farmer clubs were self-regulated and managed, they were for-
mally recognized by the government and provided an opportunity for collec-
tive action and representation on local government forums. Initially, farmer 
clubs concentrated on production issues but, toward the end of the ten-year 
period of this case study, several farmer clubs had signed contracts with large 
traders from urban markets to supply groups of cattle on a regular basis. 
While collective action was not essential for accessing urban markets, as is 
the case for high-value products (for example, Kaganzi et al. 2009), it offered 
farmers certainty of demand and prices, and provided an additional linkage to 
urban markets and traders.
Once traders were linked to urban markets, feedback on the growing 
urban market demand for larger, heavier animals of a younger age catalyzed 
considerable changes to the production systems that required changes in 
breeds, AI, animal health, and other input services. Government provided 
transitional support for some of these services such as AI and animal 
health, but within a short period most of the services were provided by new, 
previously nonexistent, private-sector suppliers. The rapid change to crossbred 
animals has, to some extent, led to an ad hoc use of semen of different exotic 
breeds and there is an urgent need for a more sustainable breeding strategy, 
which requires capacity development and engagement of local government 
and private service providers (Rege et al. 2011). This example illustrates that 
the change process is not and may never be completed, requiring continued 
investment by and capacity strengthening of local stakeholders. The well-
established linkage between local stakeholders in Ea Kar and researchers at 
Tay Nguyen University will be a sound basis for continued scientific support 
to the innovation process.
The rapid changes observed in Ea Kar had not taken place elsewhere 
despite interest by traders and local government to “export” Ea Kar’s live-
stock development to neighboring districts (Khanh et al. 2011b). While some 
farmers in nearby areas had started to grow forages on their own farms based 
on what they had seen in Ea Kar, this had not resulted in widespread cattle 
development. Up-scaling needed to be supported through similar processes to 
those in Ea Kar, such as coalition-building and strengthening the capacity of 
local stakeholders, but made simpler and more rapid by having a convincing 
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example in Ea Kar that showed that it was possible for comparable small-
holder farm families to produce high-quality cattle competitively.
Conclusion
The key to successful smallholder cattle intensification in Ea Kar was the 
combination of (1) a convincing innovation—farm-grown fodder—that pro-
vided early benefits and a vision for farmers, traders, and local government; 
with (2) a participatory, systems-oriented innovation process, which took into 
account both production and marketing constraints and opportunities; (3) an 
emphasis on strengthening capacity of key stakeholders; and importantly 
(4) was locally owned and managed by a loosely structured coalition for cat-
tle development. This example also illustrates the need for a sufficiently long 
time period to ensure that innovation processes are able to continue without 
external support. The development processes described in this study demon-
strated the importance of coalition-building, but also the need for a stimu-
lus for coalition formation, which, in this case, was provided by a promising 
intervention. The study also showed the need for a systems-oriented view that 
addressed important issues in the beef value chain as they emerged and for 
linking farmers to market actors to facilitate information flows and feedback 
mechanisms. Finally, the study showed the importance of building capacity 
of local stakeholders to facilitate and manage the innovation processes and so 
sustain the development effort.
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COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR MARKET-CHAIN 
INNOVATION IN THE ANDES1
André Devaux, Douglas Horton, Claudio Velasco, Graham Thiele, 
Gastón López, Thomas Bernet, Iván Reinoso, and Miguel Ordinola
Introduction
The Andean region of South America is characterized by extreme social and 
economic inequalities. It is estimated that more than 60 percent of Ecuador’s 
rural population and nearly 80 percent of Bolivia’s and Peru’s are poor 
(CEPAL 2004). Poverty is especially prevalent in highland areas, where the 
potato is the main staple food and an important source of cash income. In 
areas over 3,500 meters above sea level, subject to frequent frost and drought, 
potatoes are among the few crops that can be grown. Over centuries, Andean 
farmers have developed more than 4,000 native varieties of potato. In Peru 
and Bolivia, most native potatoes are cultivated by semicommercial farmers 
for home consumption, barter, and sale in local markets. At lower altitudes, 
more commercially oriented farmers grow modern varieties employing pesti-
cides, herbicides, and chemical fertilizers. In Ecuador, where growing condi-
tions are generally milder, native varieties have almost entirely been replaced 
by new varieties introduced by national breeding and seed programs.
Agricultural development is taking place in the context of rapid urbaniza-
tion and increasing market integration. Farmers are confronted with many 
new market challenges as well as opportunities. Urbanization and increasing 
participation of women in the labor force are leading to a dietary transition 
toward convenience foods, animal protein, fresh dairy products, and higher 
1 The authors thank the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) for supporting 
the International Potato Center’s (CIP’s) regional Papa Andina Partnership Program and the 
work reported on here. Additionally, the Department for International Development of the 
United Kingdom supported work in Bolivia, and the New Zealand Aid Programme supported 
Papa Andina’s regional program beginning in 2007. We are grateful to Helen Markelova and 
Ruth Meinzen-Dick from the CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property 
Rights and two anonymous reviewers for their perceptive comments, and to Sophie Higman 
for skilful editing. This work would not have been possible without the collaboration of many 
individuals and partner organizations in the three countries that have contributed to the 
development of Papa Andina’s approaches.
This chapter was originally published as an article in Food Policy 34: 31–38 (2009).
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consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables. Packaged food sales and super-
market retail outlets are now found in most developing countries. Demand is 
also increasing for higher quality foods that meet ever-increasing standards 
of safety. Supermarkets are becoming major players in vertically integrated 
food-marketing systems. Consequently, the production practices and liveli-
hoods of small Andean farmers are increasingly influenced by the demands of 
urban consumers, market intermediaries, and food industries (Reardon and 
Berdegué 2002; Wilkinson and Rocha 2006).
In contemporary agricultural markets, small farmers are often at a 
disadvantage in relation to larger commercial farmers who can supply larger 
volumes of quality-assured products, possess superior bargaining power, and 
have better access to information, services, technology, and capital. Small 
farmers’ limited access to physical and financial resources restricts their 
ability to expand and invest in technologies that increase efficiency and add 
value to primary production. Small farmers also frequently have limited 
technical skills and poor access to information and training for improving 
their production practices. The limited market surplus of individual small 
farmers inflates marketing costs, increasing transaction costs and the per-
unit costs of assembly, handling, and transportation. Small farmers also lack 
basic knowledge of the marketing system, current information on prices and 
market conditions, and bargaining power (Kruijssen, Keizer, and Giuliani 
2009; Berdegué 2001).
Various approaches have been proposed to improve the prospects of 
small farmers in agricultural markets, including collective action via farmer 
organizations and cooperatives (Shepherd 2007). In the present chapter, 
we discuss two novel uses of collective action that involve not only small 
farmers but also market agents and agricultural-service providers. The 
Participatory Market Chain Approach (PMCA) and Stakeholder Platforms 
foster market-chain innovation in ways that benefit small farmers as 
well as other market-chain actors. The main intended outcomes of these 
types of collective action are commercial, technological, and institutional 
innovations. This differs from most cases of collective action described in 
the literature, which report on farmer organization for achieving economies 
of scale, enhancing small farmers’ bargaining power, or improving the 
management of common pool resources. The new forms of collective action 
reported on here, involving diverse market-chain actors, researchers, and 
other agricultural service providers, have been developed by the regional 
research and development (R&D) network, Papa Andina, which operates in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.
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Perspectives on Collective Action and Innovation
This chapter is concerned with the use of collective action to foster pro-poor 
innovation in market chains. Much has been written on farmer organizations 
for managing common pool resources, and for marketing and service provision. 
There is also a rapidly growing literature on innovation processes. However, the 
role of collective action in innovation processes has received little attention to 
date. In this section we review relevant literature on collective action and on 
innovation, and identify key factors that will later be combined in a framework 
for analyzing collective action in market-chain innovation processes.
Perspectives on Collective Action
Collective action refers to voluntary action taken by a group to pursue com-
mon interests or achieve common objectives. In collective action, members 
may act on their own, but more commonly they act through a group or an 
organization; they may act independently or with the encouragement or sup-
port of external agents from governmental bodies, NGOs, or development 
projects (Meinzen-Dick and Di Gregorio 2004).
There is an extensive body of literature on the role of collective action in 
managing common pool resources such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands, and 
irrigation water. Agrawal (2001) presents an exhaustive literature review that 
identifies 33 “critical enabling conditions” that contribute to the sustainability 
of common property institutions. These fall into four main categories:
1. Resource-system characteristics (for example, small size, well-defined 
boundaries, predictability, low levels of mobility, and feasibility of stor-
ing benefits from the resource);
2. Group characteristics (for example, small size, shared norms, past suc-
cessful experience with collective action [social capital], homogeneity 
of identities and interests, capable leadership, interdependence among 
group members, and low levels of poverty);
3. Institutional arrangements (for example, rules are simple and easy 
to understand, locally devised access and management rules, ease in 
enforcement of rules, and graduated sanctions for breaking rules); and
4. External environment (for example, external support for organization, 
low levels of articulation with external markets, governmental bodies 
that do not undermine local authority, and supportive external sanc-
tioning institutions).
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Ostrom (1999) identifies other factors that are important for institutional 
development, such as the feasibility of improving the resource and a low dis-
count rate. Many authors emphasize the importance of social capital for the 
emergence and development of local organizations for collective action.
Based on a study of “associative peasant business firms” in Chile, Berdegué 
(2001) identified several factors that facilitate the emergence and development 
of collective action for marketing and value addition. These factors include: 
high transaction costs; policy incentives; presence of community groups and 
organizations, providing an important initial forum where alternatives can 
be discussed; support from external agents, such as NGOs or private exten-
sion firms; linkage to actors outside the rural community, providing access to 
external sources of information, expertise, and financial resources; embedded-
ness in the rural community, facilitating more effective and less-costly internal 
rules, decisionmaking processes, and procedures for monitoring and evalua-
tion; establishment of rules that are consistent with market signals; and poten-
tial to differentiate members’ products through value addition.
Kruijssen, Keizer, and Giuliani (2009) discuss the importance of social 
learning for collective action in the context of smallholder market participa-
tion. Social learning is defined as the process through which groups of people 
learn, by jointly defining problems, searching for and implementing solutions, 
and assessing the value of solutions for specific problems (Koelen and Das 2002). 
Social learning brings about a shift from “multiple cognition” to “collective cog-
nition.” Individuals involved in social-learning processes begin with quite differ-
ent perceptions of their current situation and the potential for change; as they 
interact, they develop common, shared perspectives, insights, and values. Dialog 
and social learning foster collective cognition and social-capital formation, both 
of which are necessary for effective joint action. Social learning and social capi-
tal formation are also key features of innovation processes.
Perspectives on Innovation
Whereas research focuses on generating new knowledge, and technology 
development aims to create a supply of new production methods, inno-
vation is concerned with the practical use of new knowledge. As Barnett 
(2004, 1) states, innovation involves “the use of new ideas, new technologies 
or new ways of doing things in a place or by people where they have not been 
used before.”
The relationship between research and economic activity is not simple and 
linear but complex and interactive (Hall et al. 2001; Engel and Salomon 2003; 
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World Bank 2007). Interactive social-learning processes involving researchers 
and economic actors are crucial for ensuring that applied research generates 
useful new knowledge that is put into practical use. Since research organiza-
tions have traditionally worked in isolation from the end users of their tech-
nologies, institutional innovations that strengthen patterns of interaction 
between researchers and economic actors are crucially important for strength-
ening innovation systems.
An innovation system can be defined as “a network of organizations, enter-
prises, and individuals focused on bringing new products, new processes, and 
new forms of organization into social and economic use, together with the 
institutions and policies that affect their behavior and performance” (World 
Bank 2007, xiv). Four key sets of factors influence the performance of inno-
vation systems: the external environment, the diversity of actors involved, the 
values and attitudes of the key actors, and the institutional arrangements and 
patterns of interaction.
Different factors can trigger innovation, including changes in policies, 
markets, and technology. Attitudes and institutions determine how indi-
viduals and organizations respond to such triggers. Behaviors that make 
 organizations and policies responsive to stakeholders’ needs and interests 
can encourage innovation. Innovation is also stimulated by the interaction 
of individuals and groups with different backgrounds, interests, and perspec-
tives. Hence, groups that are more diverse generally have a greater potential for 
innovation. Even though participants with different economic interests may 
initially be skeptical about the benefits of interacting, the values, attitudes, 
and patterns of interaction can change over time as a result of social learning, 
development of personal relationships, trust, and other forms of social capital. 
The ability to interact constructively and work in new ways is crucial for the 
innovation performance of groups.
Recent studies of agricultural innovation highlight the utility of the 
 value-chain concept—a set of interconnected, value-creating activities under-
taken by individuals and enterprises to develop, produce, and deliver a 
product or service to consumers—as a unit of analysis and focus of interven-
tions aimed at stimulating innovations and developing innovation capacity 
(World Bank 2007, 24). Thus, attention should not be directed at individual 
 supply-chain participants such as producers, but at the overall supply-chain 
capacity and the degree to which the chain in its entirety is able to compete.
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Framework for Analyzing Collective Action in 
Market-Chain Innovation
Ostrom (2005) has developed a general framework for understanding 
 institutions known as the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
Framework. It has three main components:
• the “action arena” in which participants interact,
• three groups of “exogenous variables” that influence the action arena (bio-
physical/material conditions, attributes of the community and rules), and
• the “outcomes” produced (Ostrom 2005, 15).
In developing a framework for analyzing collective action in market-chain 
innovation, we have built on the IAD framework and added the external envi-
ronment component from Agrawal (2001) and World Bank (2007). To focus 
attention on important innovation processes, we have also added the com-
ponents of social learning, social capital formation, and joint activities from 
Kruijssen, Keizer, and Giuliani (2009). The resulting Framework for Analyzing 
Collective Action in Market Chain Innovation is illustrated in Figure 7.1.
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The central focus of attention in this framework is the innovation arena 
where social learning, formation of social capital, and joint innovative activi-
ties lead to the development of innovations. The innovation arena is influenced 
by four sets of exogenous variables: the external environment, biophysical and 
material characteristics of the market chain, characteristics of market-chain 
actors, and institutional arrangements. Based on the literature review reported 
in the previous section, particularly the works of Agrawal and Berdegué, we 
have identified a number of factors in each of these four areas that are likely 
to influence collective-action processes and outcomes in the context of mar-
ket-chain innovation (Table 7.1).
TAbLE 7.1 Exogenous variables that influence the emergence and outcomes of collective 
action in market chain innovation
External environment
• “Trigger” for initiation of collective action
• support from external agents (such as research organizations, nGos or governmental bodies) to 
stimulate innovation and facilitate group activities, and provide technical and institutional backstopping
• policy incentives for pro-poor market-chain innovation
• presence of community groups or organizations
• Collective-action institutions at complementary levels (higher or lower).
Biophysical/material characteristics of the market chain
• Characteristics of the commodity (for example, perishability and production zones)
• Current uses and consumer perceptions of intrinsic value
• potential to reduce transaction costs through market-chain innovation
• potential for product differentiation and value addition.
Characteristics of participating market-chain actors
• participation of diverse market-chain actors and service providers
• high levels of dependence on the market chain
• presence of social capital (norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs that predispose people toward collective 
action, as well as rules, procedures, precedents, and social networks)
• Capable leadership within the market chain and in the farming community.
Institutional arrangements (rules)
• effective social-learning processes, leading to development of collective cognition, social capital, and 
leadership capacity
• locally devised rules that are simple, easy to understand, easy to enforce, and consistent with market 
signals
• fair allocation of costs and benefits of collective action
• Graduated sanctions for noncompliance with rules
• accountability/responsiveness of external agents to group members.
Source: Based on agrawal (2001, Table 2) and Berdegué (2001).
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In the resulting framework, the two major outcomes of collective action 
are strengthened capacity for innovation and commercial, technological, and 
institutional innovations. As indicated by the broken lines in Figure 7.1, these 
outcomes may influence the processes that take place within the innova-
tion arena. For example, successful innovation may stimulate participants to 
invest more time and resources in joint activities. Over time, outcomes may 
also influence the four groups of exogenous variables. For example, successful 
innovation may predispose policymakers to support future programs involv-
ing collective action.
Papa Andina’s Use of Collective Action to Foster 
Pro-poor Market-Chain Innovation
Papa Andina was established in 1998 to promote pro-poor innovation 
in the Andean potato-based food systems. Financed mainly by the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation and other donors, and hosted 
by the International Potato Center, the network includes about 30 partners 
in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. In each country, Papa Andina coordinates 
its activities with a “strategic partner” that plays a leadership and coordi-
nating role in market-chain innovation: the Promotion and Research for 
Andean Products (PROINPA) Foundation in Bolivia, the Innovation and 
Competitiveness of the Peruvian Potato (INCOPA) project in Peru, and the 
National Potato Program of Instituto Nacional Autónomo de Investigaciones 
Agropecuarias (INIAP) in Ecuador. This network of partners reaches a grow-
ing number of poor rural households, currently estimated to be around 4,000. 
The PMCA is used to bring researchers together with other agricultural-ser-
vice providers and market-chain actors, including small farmers, to promote 
pro-poor innovations.
Interaction among the market-chain actors is crucial for market 
chain innovation. In 2000, we began experimenting with a participatory 
approach to stimulate agricultural innovation known as “Rapid Appraisal of 
Agricultural Knowledge Systems” (RAAKS). This approach, developed by 
Engel and Salomon (2003), brings diverse stakeholders together in a flexible, 
participatory process. Papa Andina began using RAAKS to foster pro-poor 
market-chain innovation for native potatoes. Based on RAAKS, through 
action research we developed two complementary approaches to enhance 
innovation: the PMCA and Stakeholder Platforms.
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The Participatory Market Chain Approach
In 2000, the INCOPA project began working with RAAKS to stimulate 
social learning, build trust, and foster joint actions among potato market 
chain actors. They added tools for product and market development, and 
renamed the approach as the “PMCA” (Bernet, Thiele, and Zschocke 2006). 
The PMCA has three phases, usually implemented over several months. An 
R&D organization initially leads planning, coordination, and facilitation. As 
the process advances, market-chain actors take on more responsibility, and the 
R&D organization shifts to a supporting role (Figure 7.2).
Phase 1 of the PMCA begins with a rapid market survey and ends with a 
workshop where market-chain actors meet supporting R&D organizations to 
discuss possible innovations. Phase 2 involves a series of group meetings and 
applied research to analyze market opportunities. A key goal of this phase is 
to build trust among participants. Phase 3 involves joint activities that seek 
to develop concrete innovations, which might be technical (for example, new 
products, production practices, or packaging) or institutional (for example, 
farmer associations, stakeholder platforms, or business arrangements such as 
contract farming agreements). The PMCA formally ends with a large public 
event where market-chain actors and service providers present their innova-
tions and meet national policymakers, donor representatives, the media, and 
FIguRE 7.2 Three phases of the participatory market chain approach
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other “VIPs.” After the formal closure, the R&D organization may be called 
on by specific actors or asked to backstop new institutions.
Stakeholder Platforms
In the Andes, interactions among market-chain actors and service providers 
are frequently characterized by lack of trust, and successful public–private 
partnerships and alliances are rare (Hartwich and Tola 2007). Agricultural 
research organizations usually keep their distance from NGOs, farmer groups, 
and traders. The quest for market-led innovation made it necessary to look 
beyond the research community and build relationships with a broader range 
of public and private actors. Papa Andina employs stakeholder platforms to 
promote interaction, social learning, social capital formation, and collective 
activities involving diverse actors in innovation processes.
Stakeholder platforms have been established at different levels. Local plat-
forms facilitate interactions between potato producers, local authorities, and 
 service providers to empower small farmers, reduce marketing costs, and 
increase efficiency in service delivery. Market-chain platforms bring farmers’ 
associations together with traders, processors, supermarkets, researchers, exten-
sion agents, chefs, and others to foster pro-poor innovation. In some cases, plat-
forms also serve as representative bodies for interaction with policymakers.
Illustrative Examples
The following examples present cases from Peru and Bolivia, where the 
PMCA has been developed and refined, and from Ecuador, where attention 
has focused on stakeholder platforms for strengthening farmer organizations.
PERUVIAN EXAMPLES
In 2002, INCOPA initiated the PMCA in Peru with a market-chain  survey. 
Results were discussed in a meeting of nearly 100 stakeholders, including 
potato producers, wholesalers, processors, supermarket managers, research-
ers, and professionals from NGOs and international agencies. Based on this 
 survey, two cycles of PMCA were implemented, one for potatoes in general 
and one specifically for native potatoes.
Innovations resulting from the first cycle included: “Mi Papa” (a new 
brand of high-quality, fresh potatoes for the wholesale market), “Papy Bum” 
(a new native potato-chip product), and a series of online bulletins with 
daily information on wholesale prices and supplies for more than 20 types of 
 potatoes. A national organization, Cadenas Agrícolas Productivas de Calidad 
(CAPAC-Peru), was established to promote marketing of high-quality 
238 ChapTer 7
potato products, reduce transaction costs, and add value through innovation. 
Founding members included farmer organizations, NGOs, traders, and pro-
cessors. Today [2009], CAPAC represents 22 core members including five 
farmer organizations with 600 members.
In the second PMCA application, several new actors joined the  process 
to develop new native-potato products. CAPAC-Peru played a key role 
(Ordinola et al. 2007), and results included two new products: T’ikapapa and 
Tunta Los Aymaras.
T’ikapapa is the first brand of high-quality, fresh native potatoes sold in 
Peru’s leading supermarkets. First marketed in 2004, sales grew from 14 tons2 
to over 70 tons in 2006. This has allowed more than 300 families in 10 high-
land communities to obtain 10–30 percent above the going market price for 
native potatoes. An agroprocessing company, a member of CAPAC, owns the 
brand and contracts farmers to supply potatoes to the supermarket. CAPAC 
helps to organize small farmer groups to supply potatoes that meet market 
requirements. In 2007, INCOPA and its partners received a United Nations 
award for “Supporting Entrepreneurs for Environment and Development.”
Tunta Los Aymaras is a brand of high-quality, freeze-dried native pota-
toes developed through a coalition of farmers’ groups, local government agen-
cies, NGOs, and a private service provider. Tunta is produced traditionally from 
native “bitter potatoes” by small farmers in the high Andes and has generally 
been restricted to traditional Andean markets. Through collective action, farm-
ers’ marketing and processing capacities were strengthened, quality norms devel-
oped, and market studies undertaken. A farmers’ association, Consortium Los 
Aymaras, was created to market this new product, and it also owns the brand.
BOLIVIAN EXAMPLES
The PMCA was applied in two regions of Bolivia. In Cochabamba, the 
PMCA was introduced from Peru in 2003, validated, and adapted. PROINPA 
led the exercise with a local farmers’ association, a food-processing firm, and a 
supermarket in Santa Cruz. Based on the common interest identified by the 
participants, two new products were developed for sale in supermarkets: col-
ored chips made from native potatoes and high-quality, prepackaged, fresh 
native potatoes. PROINPA gained a new approach for linking small farmers 
to markets; it helped the farmers’ association to get better organized, build 
links with market agents, and upgrade the quality of its members’ native 
 2 Tons refers to metric tons in this chapter.
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potatoes. It also helped them to improve working relations and negotiation 
capacity with market-chain actors.
From 2003, the PMCA was applied twice in the Department of La Paz in 
market chains for tunta and chuño, traditional freeze-dried products. These 
applications involved farmers, traders, food-processing firms, exporters, cook-
ing schools, and R&D organizations. In the first cycle, participants prepared 
a set of Bolivian quality standards for chuño and tunta in coordination with 
national authorities. In 2004, the PMCA was used to identify new uses for 
chuño and tunta, and ways to improve the products’ image. This exercise 
involved some participants from the first cycle plus chefs and a food-process-
ing firm manager. It resulted in a new product: clean, selected, and bagged 
chuño, marketed under the brand “Chuñosa.”
In 2005, participants established the Bolivian chuño and tunta platform, 
formalized as the Bolivian Andean Platform, to sustain and consolidate their 
collective action. Among other activities, the platform has established links 
with market agents to develop better-quality chuño-based products with a 
higher price and to explore the export potential of chuño and tunta. The plat-
form today [2009] represents 13 core members, including four farmers’ asso-
ciations with around 200 members, processing firms, development projects, 
an NGO, and a research organization, PROINPA. It has helped to build trust 
and social networks among its members and has improved links between 
small farmers and market agents on one hand, and R&D organizations and 
other service providers on the other.
ECUADORIAN EXAMPLES
INIAP’s potato program initially attempted to create a national-level con-
sortium of market-chain actors and development organizations to address 
macro-level problems. When this effort failed, attention shifted to local stake-
holder platforms to develop better collaboration among local institutional 
actors and farmer organizations. With financial support from the SDC, it has 
provided small grants for collaborative projects that link small-scale potato 
farmers with specific markets.
Platforms and collaborative projects were set up in the provinces of 
Tungurahua and Chimborazo in 2003, and in Cotopaxi and Bolivar in 2006. 
With initial leadership from INIAP, these involved 24 farmer groups that were 
created through previous Farmer Field School experiences (they include around 
200 members), universities, local governments, and NGOs representing 32 
core members in total including the farmer groups’ representatives. Platforms 
were organized around existing farmer groups. Their activities have included 
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marketing selected fresh potatoes to 29 restaurants, fast-food outlets, and 
processors in Ambato and Riobamba. Platform members grow the new 
Fripapa potato variety, which is in high demand for processing and fast-
food outlets. Through the platforms, researchers have interacted with small 
farmers as well as local authorities, development projects, and NGOs. This has 
facilitated knowledge sharing, social learning, and capacity building, leading to 
improvements in small farmer productivity and the quality of potatoes supplied 
to market. As a result of this process, a national organization, the Consortium 
of Small Potato Producers (CONPAPA), was established to support joint 
marketing activities.
Discussion
In this section, we summarize patterns that emerge from our examples of 
collective action in relation to the main components of the framework for 
analyzing collective action in market chain innovation (Figure 7.1).
Role of External Factors
In each of the cases described, the collective action was triggered by a research 
organization associated with Papa Andina, external to the market chain. 
Once local groups had been established with external facilitators, they took on 
lives of their own and often evolved in unexpected ways. All the groups were 
supported by such external agents as NGOs, local or national governments, 
and R&D organizations. The Bolivian and Peruvian groups benefitted from 
policy support for market-chain development. In contrast, in Ecuador policies 
emphasized farmer organization and empowerment rather than market-
chain development per se. In several cases, collective action for market-chain 
innovation built on earlier groups, such as Farmer Field Schools, NGOs, 
and farmer associations, confirming the importance of prior experience 
with collective action. In some cases, when collective action got under 
way, complementary groups were established at other levels (for example, 
CONPAPA, CAPAC-Peru, and the Bolivian Andean Platform).
Importance of Market-Chain Characteristics
As shown in the cases, joint marketing can reduce transaction costs. However, 
commercial innovation and development of high-value niches for potato prod-
ucts have generated more significant benefits for small farmers as well as other 
market-chain actors. In Peru and Bolivia, use of the PMCA led to the develop-
ment of new products based on native potatoes. In contrast, in Ecuador, where 
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attention focused on organizing farmer groups to respond to existing market 
opportunities for modern varieties, fewer commercial innovations and benefits, 
have resulted.
Importance of Participant Diversity
In the Bolivian and Peruvian cases, small farmers, market agents, researchers, 
and service providers have participated in groups working with the PMCA. In 
contrast, in Ecuador market agents have not been involved in the platforms. 
An important factor for innovation has been the trigger effect of researchers 
who brought new information and ideas. For example, in Peru and Bolivia, 
researchers suggested that it might be possible to market a colorful native-potato 
product, and they assisted with laboratory testing of processing techniques. 
With these inputs, other participants took the lead in product development, 
testing, and refinement. The Ecuadorian approach focusing on farmer 
organization has strengthened farmer organizations but has led to less market-
chain innovation.
Women were involved in all cases, more actively in marketing and processing 
than in production. In most of the cases, men assumed leadership at the 
community level, while women assumed leadership in R&D organizations in 
Bolivia and Peru. Small farmers are generally more dependent on the potato 
market chain than large retailers; this may be one reason why it is easier to 
engage small farmers in the PMCA than to engage market agents. Small 
Andean farmers have traditions of collective action at the community level, 
but not along market chains. Relations in market chains are traditionally 
characterized by lack of trust and cooperation. Hence, getting diverse  market-
chain actors (including small farmers) to work together in innovation processes 
is itself a significant institutional innovation.
Institutional Arrangements
One of the key challenges has been to provide adequate facilitation for social-
learning processes, which promote the development of collective  cognition, 
social capital, and leadership capacity. In most cases, a research organization 
took responsibility for facilitation. There has been a tendency for facilitators 
to introduce rules to speed up the process, rather than facilitate the local 
development of rules. Where multistakeholder platforms have emerged from 
PMCA exercises, they have developed their own rules, often with little support 
from Papa Andina.
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The Innovation Arena
The three phases of the PMCA correspond to the three social processes that 
take place in the innovation arena. Therefore, where the PMCA has been 
implemented, in Peru and Bolivia, the groups involved have advanced through 
the phases of social learning and social-capital formation, and have engaged in 
joint activities focused on the development of specific commercial, technical, 
and institutional innovations. In all the cases, participants report that the group 
meetings and social interactions with other market-chain actors and service 
providers were useful to them, even before they began the process of developing 
specific innovations. Participants learned new things about the market chain 
or about technical and market potentials that they could put into practical 
use in their businesses. They also established personal relationships with other 
market-chain actors or service providers that have proved  useful to them in their 
businesses. This is one reason why stakeholder platforms have been established 
in some cases: to allow the diverse stakeholders to continue to interact and work 
together over time.
Outcomes
An important result of the collective-action processes promoted by the PMCA 
and stakeholder platforms has been the buildup of participants’ capacity for 
teamwork and innovation. Leadership capacity has also been developed at the 
level of farm communities to enable communication and interaction with 
market-chain actors and service providers as well as institutional leadership 
for facilitating collective action and distributing roles among the market-
chain participants.
The groups identified new market opportunities and developed new 
production processes, new ways of working together, and, finally, new 
commercial products to exploit these opportunities. This is illustrated by the 
case of T’ikapapa in Peru, where this commercial innovation stimulated other 
innovation in the areas of technology development to respond to the quality 
criteria required by the market and institutional innovation required in the 
CAPAC association, to provide the necessary services to these market-chain 
actors. The results of these outcomes can be summarized as higher prices for 
native potatoes, increased farmers’ revenues, more stable markets for native-
potato producers, improved image of native potatoes, and increased farmers’ 
self-esteem.
An example of indirect outcomes is the creative imitation process by which 
other market-chain actors develop similar products based on the original 
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creative idea that stimulated further innovation and involved new participants 
in the process and eventually new members to the CAPAC association. 
The promotion of successful innovation has also attracted the attention of 
policymakers and donors to the process, increasing their support for future 
collective action for market-chain innovation.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Implications for general understanding of Collective Action
Papa Andina’s work illustrates how collective action involving small farmers, 
market agents, researchers, and other agricultural service providers can generate 
pro-poor market-chain innovations. The collective-action literature emphasizes 
its role among individuals with common interests in managing common pool 
resources, reducing transaction costs, gaining scale economies, and improving 
the bargaining power of small farmers. The innovation literature, in contrast, 
highlights the importance of interactive, social learning among individuals with 
different perspectives and interests. Neither discusses the use of collective action 
in fostering innovation. Papa Andina provides some concrete examples of how 
these two fields can be bridged—how collective action involving diverse stake-
holders can contribute to innovation processes that benefit small farmers. In 
the examples presented, participants strengthened business contacts and social 
networks, shared knowledge, and built up trust. As the capacity for teamwork 
developed, participants identified market opportunities and developed new 
products and marketing methods, creating innovation processes that improved 
the market participation of smallholders on more favorable terms.
Papa Andina’s work shows that diversity of participants’ roles and interests 
is not always bad for collective action. In fact, diversity is valuable for innova-
tion. The collective-action literature commonly observes that diversity within 
a group impairs collective action. Papa Andina’s experience confirms that 
diverse groups may be more difficult to establish and maintain over time, and 
that good facilitation is essential. But, in line with the innovation literature, 
diverse groups are potentially more productive in terms of social learning and 
innovative behavior. Papa Andina’s experience shows that a well-facilitated 
group, with diverse backgrounds, values, and economic interests, can coalesce 
into a high-performance team that actively, creatively, and successfully pursues 
the common objective of market-chain innovation.
Papa Andina’s work illustrates the synergies of different forms of collective 
action at different levels: stakeholder platforms and the PMCA have proven to 
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be highly complementary. At the market-chain level, groups have found that 
exploitation of new market opportunities often requires collective action at 
the local level, and vice versa.
In many cases, collective action has been short lived, linked to accomplish-
ment of the initial goal. In others, it has evolved into more formal and stable 
multistakeholder associations. Much of the collective-action literature seeks 
to identify factors that contribute to sustainable institutions. While clearly 
important for natural-resources management, institutional sustainability is 
perhaps less relevant for innovation processes. Our experience highlights the 
dynamics of collective action—the different ways in which it has emerged 
and the different courses it has taken over time as social capital and leadership 
capacities have been built up and institutions have emerged.
Papa Andina’s work highlights the initial importance of competent 
external facilitation and support. The collective-action literature notes that 
many local organizations are established as a result of external interventions. 
However, the roles of external agents and the capacities they need are seldom 
carefully assessed. In collective action for market-chain innovation, facilita-
tors need to motivate business development, and at the same time foster devel-
opment of social capital and leadership within the group. This often involves 
a delicate balance between achievement of short-term results (for example, 
new products) and the development of sustainable institutions that can foster 
innovation processes.
Policy Implications
Three broad policy implications come out of Papa Andina’s experiences with 
collective action. First, institutional innovations in R&D (such as use of the 
PMCA and stakeholder platforms) can lead to technical and institutional 
innovations that enhance small-farmer market participation. For example, as 
a result of the PMCA, new native-potato products were launched. This stim-
ulated the formation and strengthening of farmer organizations, which facil-
itated marketing and improvements in production and postharvest practices. 
At the market-chain level, formal associations were established, such as the 
Bolivian Andean Platform in La Paz and CAPAC-Peru.
Second, market-chain innovation for indigenous agricultural products can 
aid in-situ conservation of biodiversity. In Bolivia and Peru, commercial inno-
vation with native potatoes has been a key element in linking small farmers 
to markets. Until recently, urban consumers did not appreciate the cultural 
value and nutritional characteristics of native potatoes. However, recent con-
cerns for food quality and safety have stimulated demand for locally grown, 
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organically produced foods, reflected in the number of gourmet restaurants 
serving dishes based on indigenous products. These trends have created new 
market opportunities for indigenous foods, including native potatoes. The 
resulting products also have export potential, because they are seen as exotic 
and nutritious. As Smale (2006) and others have shown, increasing farmer 
returns to crops with a high public value, such as native potatoes, will enhance 
the incentive for farmers to maintain agrobiodiversity. Applications of collec-
tive-action approaches such as the PMCA may also prove useful for the con-
servation of other indigenous agricultural products in other settings.
Last, for R&D organizations to contribute to market-chain innovation, 
they must develop their capacity to facilitate and participate constructively in 
collective action. Pro-poor innovation goes far beyond the traditional R&D. 
Implementing the PMCA requires R&D organizations to have the capac-
ity to diagnose innovation systems and facilitate group processes involving 
people with diverse stakes in a commodity’s production, marketing, and use. 
Women’s opportunities for participation in collective-action processes like the 
PMCA and the potential benefits need to be addressed more systematically. 
To effectively facilitate such processes, R&D organizations need new skills 
and resources. Retooling themselves to play these new roles is likely to pose 
major challenges for many R&D organizations.
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Introduction
Developing countries have seen the reconfiguration of value chains presenting 
new opportunities for adding value and raising rural incomes (Gibbon 2001). 
Supermarkets and large-scale food manufacturers have transformed agrifood 
markets in much of the developing world (Reardon and Berdegué 2002). There 
is an extensive literature about the effects of this new economy on the potential 
exclusion of small farmers, who produce small volumes on dispersed fields and 
struggle to meet demands for quantity, quality, and timeliness of delivery. The 
difficulty is compounded by a lack of trust among farmers and other value-chain 
actors, which generates high transaction costs and short-circuits innovation. A 
recent review by Reardon et al. (2009) confirmed a mixed picture with some 
exclusion of small farmers in contexts where small and large farmers coexist, 
but also evidence of positive effects on income and assets of small farmers 
where inclusion occurs. Reardon et al. (2009) pointed out the critical nature of 
nonland assets such as inputs, credit, association, and extension, and the role of 
government to help small farmers “make the grade.” Many ongoing initiatives 
seek to improve value chains and favor poorer farmers (Harper 2010).
1 The authors thank Valerie Gwinner, Laurens Klerkx, Sietze Vellema, and three anonymous 
reviewers for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper, and Roger 
Cortbaoui for encouraging us to develop platform concepts. We appreciate the support of 
farmers and staff, Ecuador’s National Institute for Agricultural and Livestock Research 
(INIAP), Bolivia’s Promotion and Research for Andean Products (PROINPA) Foundation, and 
numerous other partners and projects acknowledged in the original article, who contributed to 
developing and testing ideas about platforms. We are especially grateful to SDC and the New 
Zealand Aid Programme, which provided funding and vision for the work of the Papa Andina 
program, which inspired this chapter.
This chapter was originally published as an article in International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability  
9 (3): 423–433 (2011).
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This chapter explores the role of multistakeholder platforms in promoting 
inclusion of small farmers. It considers three different platforms with potato 
value chains in the Andes (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru). It presents a frame-
work for characterizing and understanding platforms, with an action arena 
comprised of innovation and market governance. It then assesses evidence of 
the platforms’ effectiveness and flags areas for future work.
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
The term platform is in vogue. Sometimes it refers to a methodology, such as 
Farmer Field Schools (FFS), or to any group that comes together for joint action. 
Building on Röling, Leeuwis, and Pyburn (2002) and Thiele et al. (2005), we 
define a multistakeholder platform as a space of interaction among different stake-
holders who share a common resource and interact to improve mutual understand-
ing, create trust, define roles, and engage in joint action. Henceforth we refer to 
this as a “platform.” It is related to the concept of learning alliances which pro-
motes multistakeholder learning processes for stimulating innovation and busi-
ness development, but differs in that it has a clearly bounded membership linked 
to a shared resource (Lundy, Gottret, and Ashby 2005).
Platforms involve stakeholders of diverse types, with different interests, 
ways of making a living, and assets. A producer cooperative is not a platform, 
because it includes only one type of actor. A platform has value for stakeholders, 
because they are, or may become, interdependent. Interdependence can create 
tension, conflict, maneuvering to seek advantage, and even group displacement. 
But it also opens opportunities for mutual understanding, building confidence, 
social learning, and joint action (Röling, Leeuwis, and Pyburn 2002). The 
platform makes possible actions that none of the members could have achieved 
on their own. Because of its complex membership and potential for conflict, a 
platform is likely to require facilitation and may have a lengthy initial phase of 
mutual learning and role definition, before it can get down to business (Thiele 
et al. 2005).
Stakeholders can have different roles in a platform. We distinguish plat-
form members who are the core actors who make up the platform; partners 
who interact with the platform, contribute to defining its objectives, and share 
information and other resources; and clients and providers who may receive 
goods or services from the platform or provide them on a commercial basis. In 
practice, these categories may be somewhat blurred and some members may be 
more passive than partners.
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Multistakeholder platforms were first proposed in the context of natural-
resource management, where stakeholders share a common-pool resource, 
such as access to water in a river basin, and the platform contributes to the 
collective management of the resource (Röling, Leeuwis, and Pyburn 2002). 
The use of platforms in the context of value chains is less frequent. A recent 
overview of collective action for small-farmer market access considered 
small-farmer organizations, but did not mention platforms (Markelova et 
al. 2009). One exception is Vellema et al. (2009), who analyze an oilseed-
subsectoral platform in Uganda.
In a value chain, a platform can perform three different but interlinked func-
tions. First, it can create a space for learning and joint innovation, as innovation 
intermediary or broker. Second, it can perform a governance function within 
the value chain to improve coordination of business activities by actors and 
reduce transaction costs. Finally, a platform can perform advocacy functions to 
secure policy change or influence. We concentrate on the first two functions.
Learning and Innovation
Increasing attention is being given to intermediaries or brokers to promote 
innovation (Howells 2006). Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis (2009) recognize 
that new types of systemic intermediary are needed to broker innovation in 
a complex innovation system. Klerkx and Leeuwis (2009) describe the key 
innovation brokerage functions as: (1) demand articulation, which articulates 
innovation needs and corresponding demands; (2) network formation, which 
facilitates linkages between relevant actors (scanning, scoping, filtering, 
and matchmaking of possible cooperation partners); and (3) innovation- 
process management.
Platforms have been also used as a type of innovation intermediary in the 
experiences described here in the Andes. In this sense, they complement, and 
(in two of the cases, Bolivia and Peru) build on, the Participatory Market 
Chain Approach (PMCA): a three-stage facilitated process that  promotes 
innovation by strengthening trust and constructive interactions among chain 
actors (Bernet, Thiele, and Zschocke 2006). In a similar vein, Critchley, 
Verburg, and van Veldhuizen (2006) have emphasized the role of platforms as 
a space or theater for innovation involving different stakeholders.
Value-Chain Governance
Value-chain governance may be provided by: (1) market mechanisms, 
(2)  hierarchical nonmarket mechanisms, and (3) nonmarket-based volun-
tary coordination between actors of a collective action type (Markelova et 
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al. 2009). Dorward et al. (2009), writing from a new institutional  economics 
perspective, note that coordination provided through different  nonmarket 
mechanisms can help market actors reduce transaction costs and escape the 
low-level equilibrium trap associated with underdeveloped economies as 
a weak institutional environment and high transaction risks limit invest-
ment opportunities.
Developed countries have seen the emergence of supply-chain manage-
ment, defined as the “integration of key business processes from end-user 
through original suppliers that provide products, services and information 
that add value for customers and other stakeholders” (Lambert 2008). Given 
the increasingly “disintegrated” nature of supply chains made up of dif-
ferent enterprises in automotive, textile, and electronic industries, Bitran, 
Gurumurthio, and Lin Sam (2006) postulate the need for a neutral third 
player or maestro to coordinate the network of suppliers.
The need for increased integration in developing countries and the disinte-
gration of more hierarchically organized supply chains in developed countries 
has created a curious convergence with the need for new types of institutions 
to facilitate value-chain governance. As we shall see below, platforms have pro-
vided one such institutional mechanism for this market-governance function.
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework was devel-
oped to explain the functioning of common-pool resource systems and has 
been applied in many empirical contexts (Ostrom 2005, 2010). The focus is 
on understanding the formal and informal rules that affect behavior in an 
action arena, where actors interact, make decisions, take actions, and experi-
ence the consequences of these actions. Behavior in the action arena is con-
ditioned by: (1) biophysical conditions, (2) the attributes of community, and 
(3) the set of rules in use. Behavior in the action arena determines outcomes, 
and these outcomes and the valuation that actors make of them reshape the 
external variables and the action arena.
The present chapter further develops the IAD framework to understand 
the role of platforms in a value chain (Figure 8.1). It specifies as external vari-
ables the biophysical and material characteristics of the value chain, char-
acteristics of the chain actors, and institutional arrangements which can be 
described as a set of rules. The rules are of quite diverse types, some have to 
do with who can be a member of the platform and what roles they may per-
form, and others to with the types of benefit they receive through member-
ship. Some of the rules are implicit, while others, as we shall see, are explicit 
and written. These external variables jointly determine and shape possibilities 
in the action arena made up of innovation and governance sub-arenas. These 
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sub-arenas interact as innovation can generate new governance opportunities, 
and improved governance interacts with innovation processes. Finally, actions 
in each sub-arena lead to a range of linked outcomes and benefits for actors. 
Next, we apply the IAD framework to analyze the three platforms and their 
contribution to stimulating innovation and improving governance.
Platforms Compared
The three platforms we compare are: Andino Boliviana (ANDIBOL) in 
Bolivia; Cadenas Agrícolas Productivas de Calidad (CAPAC) in Peru; and 
the Chimborazo platform in Ecuador.2 We begin by examining the three 
sets of external variables that condition the action arena of the platforms. We 
describe the platforms in the present tense, and the description relates to their 
status when this study was initiated. The Chimborazo platform was substan-
tially restructured in 2006.
2 These platforms were brought together by the Papa Andina Partnership Program of the 
International Potato Center (CIP). Papa Andina encouraged the development of the platform 
concepts and cross-learning between partners (Thiele 2007; Devaux et al. 2009).
FIGURE 8.1 Framework for analyzing collective action in value-chain innovation and 
governance
 
 
 
Biophysical/material 
characteristics of 
the value chain
Characteristics of 
participating value-
chain actors
Institutional
arrangements
(rules) 
Innovation
Governance
Outcomes 
-  Reduced transaction costs
-  Improved income for 
 small farmers
Value chain
Action arenaExternal variables
-  Capacity to innovate
-  Commercial, technical and 
 institutional innovations  
Source: adapted from Devaux et al. (2009).
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Biophysical and Material Characteristics of the Market Chain
Potato production in the Andes involves a mix of small, medium, and (in Peru 
and Ecuador) large farmers. Small farmers typically occupy land at higher 
altitudes, with poorer access, less input use, and often grow a relatively larger 
area under native varieties (landraces). Medium and larger farmers occupy 
higher-quality valley-bottom land, with better access and more input use, and 
typically have a much larger share of marketed production.
Most potatoes in value chains in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador still go 
through traditional market channels, with a large number of rural assemblers, 
supplying wholesale urban markets and a network of urban retail markets 
with graded potatoes of a considerable range of varieties sold loose to 
the consumer. In general, this market appears to be fairly efficient, with 
no clear evidence of excessive levels of intermediation (Scott 1985). The 
market is dominated by spot prices with high price volatility. Transaction 
characteristics with small volumes managed by each market intermediary 
make it difficult to plan for investments in improving product quality, and 
hinder innovation.
The three platforms described link farmers with high-value chains rather 
than with traditional market chains. These offer more scope for value-added, 
with potentially higher and more stable farmgate prices (in some cases with 
forward contracts), but may require considerable innovation for the entry of 
small farmers if they are to meet stricter quality and quantity criteria. In Peru 
and Bolivia, the focus is on native potatoes, one of the assets of poorer farm-
ers, grown primarily for home consumption or local markets (Meinzen-Dick, 
Devaux, and Antezana 2009). Native potatoes were selected as having the 
greatest probability of generating benefits to poorer farmers as value-chain 
upgrading takes place. In Peru, the target market for native potatoes centers 
on high-income consumers in Lima, a large city with a growing middle class 
and a rapidly expanding agroindustrial sector. The challenge is to create a 
niche market for native potatoes as part of a more general interest in Andean 
cuisine. In Bolivia, while the market also centers on native potatoes and deriv-
ative products, the middle class is much smaller and there are no large agro-
processors, so nontraditional retail outlets are the primary market. In Ecuador, 
native potatoes are much less widely grown and the market opportunity is a 
large agroindustrial chip producer, and fast-food outlets and restaurants which 
need potatoes for French fries. Medium and large farmers predominantly 
access this value chain, so the challenge is not to stimulate the creation of a 
new market, but to create a space for small farmers within an existing one.
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Characteristics of Participants
In each case, an agricultural research organization assumed the role 
of platform facilitator: the PROINPA (Promoción e Investigación de 
Productos Andinos) Foundation in Bolivia; Instituto Nacional Autónomo 
de Investigaciones Agropecuarias (INIAP) in Ecuador; and the International 
Potato Center (CIP), through the Innovación y Competitividad de la 
Papa (INCOPA) project, in Peru. All these partners had experience with 
participatory approaches for on-farm research, but had not engaged multiple 
stakeholders to work with markets. The research organization learned 
how to assume a new role in facilitation of the process of platform creation 
and to “step back” and play a subsidiary role in research to address specific 
market constraints.
The CAPAC (Peru) and ANDIBOL (Bolivia) platforms were estab-
lished by INCOPA and PROINPA, respectively, resulting from applications 
of the PMCA with native potatoes, as more permanent forums to support 
the innovation process (Devaux et al. 2009). In the PMCA, the participa-
tion of private market-chain actors as members and partners to develop new 
business opportunities underpins the innovation process (Bernet, Thiele, 
and Zschocke 2006). ANDIBOL includes food-processing companies, 
such as Ricafrut, Ascex, and Bolivia Natural; farmer organizations, such as 
Asociación de Productores Ecológicos de la Provincial Aroma (APEPA); non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Kurmi Foundation; and others 
(Table 8.1). CAPAC interacts with some private-sector actors as members (for-
mal membership), including Mi Chacra, a supplier of marketing information; 
the Gastrotur cooking school; potato processors, including Frito-Lay, a mul-
tinational chip producer; and the Wong supermarket group. Researchers and 
other agricultural service providers, including the NGOs Asociación Fomento 
de la Vida (FOVIDA) and Asociación para el Desarrollo Sostenible (ADERS), 
promote and support these market-driven platforms.
In Ecuador, the INIAP team, which facilitated the creation of the 
Chimborazo platform, was critical of the PMCA; they felt it paid insufficient 
attention to farmer empowerment and perceived a risk of capture of the bene-
fits of innovation by the private sector. However, they recognized that broader 
impact for agricultural research means engaging a broad range of stakeholders 
with a clearer market orientation. The Chimborazo platform brings together 
28 farmer organizations and a group of service providers comprised of three 
NGOs, two universities, and INIAP itself. Frito-Lay and restaurants serving 
French fries in Riobamba and Ambato are involved, but as clients rather than 
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full partners. Here the meshing of farmers and service providers in the plat-
form is the driver of the innovation process.
Institutional Arrangements (Rules)
Engaging such diverse sets of stakeholders for collective action in value chains 
requires a broad set of rules to guide and shape their interaction. Some rules 
are explicitly formulated—all platforms have written statutes that define their 
mandate or mission, and describe leadership positions (Table 8.1). Other rules 
are implicit or informal.
In CAPAC and ANDIBOL, rules about platform membership embod-
ied in formal statutes give private market-chain actors a privileged position, as 
their decisions about new market opportunities underpin innovation options. 
Researchers and other service providers play a supporting role in sustain-
ing innovation.
In the Chimborazo platform, INIAP seeks to build on the existing man-
dates and interests of a group of research and development (R&D) actors or 
service providers in the potato sector, recognizing that each has a particular 
competence, but guided by a new set of institutional rules called the “New 
Institutionality,” whereby each can best capture their comparative advantage 
(Crespo et al. 2005). Farmers organize the production process and demand 
an array of services provided by R&D organizations; NGOs provide techni-
cal assistance; and research organizations develop new technology to facili-
tate small-farmer entry into markets. Value-chain actors such as restaurants 
and supermarkets are treated as clients. These rules are most clearly articu-
lated around multistakeholder platforms conceived as local alliances between 
farmers and R&D organizations. INIAP helped set up four platforms (among 
them the Chimborazo platform) differentiated by market catchment area. 
The rules for identifying and engaging actors are specified through a method-
ology that stipulates a series of steps in setting up the platform around a mar-
ket opportunity (Reinoso et al. 2007). The steps include stakeholder mapping 
to identify and engage relevant platform members, and designation of one of 
the service providers to host the platform and assume more specific facilita-
tion responsibilities.
Each of the platforms has different rules regarding the outcomes which 
they can affect. CAPAC and ANDIBOL have mandates to promote and 
develop value chains for potato and other Andean tubers and Andean 
 products (Table 8.1). As discussed above, in these platforms it is the participa-
tion of private market-chain actors that drives innovation. In order to ensure 
that benefits flow to small farmers, both platforms have complementary 
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rules, embodied in the formal objectives of the platforms, concerned with 
the  inclusion of small producers and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(Thomann et al. 2011).
The Chimborazo platform focuses explicitly on strengthening small-scale 
potato producers and positioning them in the market for processed potato. 
Here it is the meshing of small farmers and service providers that drives the 
innovation process. Many farmers attend platform meetings and are active 
participants. The Chimborazo platform treats private-sector actors as clients 
rather than as members or partners, and they do not attend ordinary platform 
meetings. Initially, the primary client was seen as Frito-Lay, but in practice it 
was difficult to meet the more demanding quality (levels of reducing sugars), 
quantity, and continuity requirements imposed by this large agroindustrial 
client. As a result, the most important group of clients are restaurants serving 
French fries in the cities of Ambato and Riobamba.
We turn now to discuss the action arenas of the platforms.
Action Arena
CAPAC as a platform has only one annual general assembly; other 
stakeholder interaction is project- and activity-specific. In practice, involve-
ment of some private-sector partners is more active than that of some formal 
members. CAPAC was created as a result of the application of PMCA with 
the intention to support and consolidate the innovations that had been 
generated earlier and to promote additional innovation. It has some action in 
the innovation arena, for example in technical normative commissions that 
can change product-quality parameters and in promoting the use of CSR 
among private-sector actors. However, it has become increasingly active in 
the governance arena, providing business services on a not-for-profit basis 
for linking farmers to the supply chain of processors like Frito-Lay (for 
example, contract management, quality control). CAPAC also plays a role 
in advocacy and promotional activities (for example, as National Potato Day 
co-organizer).
ANDIBOL has regular monthly meetings with a principal focus on 
stimulating new product development by its members, and supporting 
innovation to address market constraints. Although set up with facilitation 
from PROINPA, the interest in developing new businesses has meant 
that private-sector actors have taken a more proactive role and are seeking 
additional funding. At the time of writing in 2009, ANDIBOL members 
are reframing and redefining the set of internal rules and statutes governing 
the operation of the platform and members’ behavior to promote trust and 
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improve decisionmaking. Specifically, they are working on the definition of 
rules related to the entry of new members and those associated with the use 
of the “Chef Andino” trademark and “ANDIBOL” certification hallmark, 
both created by the platform. The first will be used as a commercial image to 
introduce new products to urban markets, and the second as a certification 
label to show that products have been developed with CSR (and generating 
benefits flowing back to small producers).
The Chimborazo platform has monthly meetings which focus on planning 
production, meeting quotas for delivery to clients, and overcoming technical 
constraints to improve the quantity and quality of potatoes produced. These 
platform meetings build on and complement planning by the NGOs and the 
farmer organizations they work with to meet their shares of the quota. One 
of the first activities of the Chimborazo platform was to coordinate farmer 
training through the implementation of FFS. INIAP and other NGO part-
ners had organized FFS previously (Pumisacho and Reinoso 2003), but this 
was the first time that they were articulated around a specific market opportu-
nity. The FFS covered traditional topics in integrated pest and crop manage-
ment linked to the introduction of a new processing variety, Fripapa,3 and also 
included new sessions on marketing, leadership, production costs, and pesti-
cide management. INIAP trained NGO staff and farmer promoters as FFS 
facilitators, and provided backstopping to FFS implementation. The farmer 
training linked to the platform was substantial, and played a key role in facil-
itating technological innovation linked to the new variety to enable small 
farmers to meet quality and quantity parameters set by the market (Cavatassi 
et al. 2009).
The Chimborazo platform also planned interactions with clients and 
partners to capture demands and build networks to link producers with sup-
pliers. In 2004, for example, a business roundtable was held with potential 
clients, primarily restaurants, for the Fripapa variety (suitable for frying) and 
other improved varieties. This had stands with information about research 
and training activities of the platform, production plans to assure regular sup-
ply, and bags of Fripapa with the CONPAPA label. The Cooking School from 
the local university Escuela Superior Politécnica del Chimborazo (ESPOCH) 
 prepared French fries and other processed potato products, and restaurants 
were asked to estimate purchasing needs by variety (Reinoso et al. 2007).
 3 Processed variety released by INIAP from clones provided by CIP.
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Innovation Outcomes
CAPAC played a critical role in the creation of trademarks for native potatoes, 
a type of commercial innovation. First, CAPAC’s collective trademark “Mi 
Papa” recognizes quality across a diverse range of potato-based products. 
Second, the “Andean Potatoes Label” is a certification trademark for 
native-potato trade with CSR. CAPAC participated in the public–private 
workgroup to define quality parameters tor selling under the label and was 
chosen by the group to be the legal owner of the brand (Thomann et al. 2011). 
CAPAC also provides expertise to private partners for the creation of new 
products. It helped establish “Ayllin Papa,” a product owned by a provider 
of the Wong supermarket, with clean, graded, bagged, and labeled native 
potatoes, which targets the gourmet high-value market.
With regard to technological innovation, production of native potatoes 
in Peru is highly seasonal, and sprouting and dehydration lead to progressive 
loss of market quality after the peak period of harvest. CAPAC linked with 
researchers at CIP to extend the period of supply through modifications to 
storage methods and the use of sprout inhibitors in stored potatoes (Manrique 
and Egusquiza 2009).
ANDIBOL has also acted as broker for technological innovation. “Chuñosa” 
is a packaged and graded product made from chuño, an artisanally freeze-dried 
potato that can be stored for long periods of time and is a key ingredient in 
some local dishes. Chuño is normally produced using very basic technology, 
under unhygienic conditions, and sold ungraded with impurities. The Ricafrut 
processing company, which owns the Chuñosa label, wanted to improve the 
product. They requested help to improve the quality and grading of the chuño 
raw material. The platform brokered this demand to improve cleanliness, 
grading, and presentation with PROINPA and Kurmi Foundation, which 
subsequently carried out participatory research to develop a potato peeler 
and grader. The manager of Ricafrut visited the production area to see 
how the machines performed and verify if the chuño obtained met market 
quality standards.
The Chimborazo platform only played a limited role in commercial 
innovation. This was related to the material characteristics of the market 
chain. The platform did not develop any new products, but instead sought 
to exploit existing market opportunities for French fries with restaurants in 
Ambato and Riobamba. It played a central role in articulating the demand 
for a potato suitable for frying from the platform’s clients, refining the tech-
nology for the supply of quality potatoes of the Fripapa processing variety 
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from small farmers through the FFS, and establishing local farmer capacity 
for multiplying high-quality seed. This was a complex technological inno-
vation. Because processing characteristics are variety-specific, the exploita-
tion of a new market for potatoes for French fries, which involved a specific 
technological innovation (the new variety), triggered a series of other inno-
vations. For example, restaurants prefer larger tubers for French fries. But 
Fripapa, initially selected by breeders for chipping, produces predominantly 
medium-sized tubers. This demand for larger tubers was brokered through 
the platform and led to the implementation by INIAP of research on plant-
ing densities and fertilization to increase the percentage of larger tubers and 
acceptability by the restaurants.
All three platforms stimulated market-linked innovation functioning to 
differing degrees as innovation facilitators or brokers performing brokering 
functions described by Klerkx et al. (2009). The type of innovation which 
occurred was shaped by the material characteristics of the value chains and 
the characteristics of the participating actors. For CAPAC and ANDIBOL, 
where a new market opportunity was created, commercial innovation was 
especially important and specific innovations, such as trademarks, were devel-
oped to ensure that benefits from value-chain upgrading flow back to small 
farmers. For the Chimborazo platform, where an existing market opportunity 
was exploited and innovation was driven by linking small farmers and service 
providers, technological innovation around the Fripapa processing variety pre-
dominated. The innovation outcomes in all cases were complex and would 
have been hard to achieve by a single R&D actor on its own. They involved an 
interaction between commercial and technological innovation, involving both 
private value-chain actors and service providers in the platforms in Peru and 
Bolivia, and a complex technological innovation combining varietal change, 
improvements in quality, and adjustments in cultural practices coordinated 
between service providers and farmer organizations in Ecuador.
Market Governance Outcomes
In Peru, CAPAC has been instrumental in providing transparent information 
on price and volumes. It has assumed an important role in market governance 
by linking farmers’ native potato production to Frito-Lay and Ayllin Papa 
through intermediary NGOs. Indeed, in the areas where no local partner 
(NGO) is available, CAPAC carries out more specific and local market-
governance tasks (contract management, quality control, and delivery at the 
plant) that cannot yet be handled by farmer organizations, and provides 
them with orientation and capacity building for planning, production, and 
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postharvest management. In these areas, planning meetings among CAPAC 
and farmer representatives are held at the beginning of every planting season 
to establish quotas by area and planting times to organize production supply. 
This direct role as marketing agent may conflict with that of a national 
stakeholder platform, providing transparent information on native-potato 
supply and a higher-level integration function with the intermediary NGOs.
In Bolivia, ANDIBOL played an important facilitating and coordinating 
role, linking farmer organizations with exporting companies, and contribut-
ing to the supply of quality chuño for the export market. Without ANDIBOL 
it would have been impossible for chuño to enter export markets (Enrique 
Rivas, pers. comm.).
The Chimborazo platform played the most extensive role in market 
governance. The platform developed and monitored production plans with 
farmer quotas by market catchment areas to smooth the supply of potatoes 
to clients. This supply-chain management function was time-consuming and 
involved most of the time of the coordinator of the Chimborazo platform 
working with the intermediary NGOs. In addition, the platform empowered 
farmer organizations and associations to assume a greater leadership role. This 
began with FFS, which helped build social capital by creating trained and 
organized groups and included specific training in leadership with a particular 
emphasis on women. This process of empowerment led to the creation of 
Consorcio de Pequeños Productores de Papa (CONPAPA, Consortium 
of Small Potato Producers), which from late 2006 took over the technical 
assistance, production planning, bulking up, and marketing functions that 
the Chimborazo platform had previously performed.
Impacts
The scale, sequence, and timing of the impacts of the platforms—understood 
as livelihood improvements for small farmers—differed. Platforms in Peru 
and Bolivia primarily involve the creation of new market opportunities for 
native potatoes with innovation brokering along a value chain, and benefits 
flowing back from the value chain to the small farmers. The immediate ben-
efits of innovation brokers are often intangible and the time frame for change 
to work its way through the innovation system may be quite long (Klerkx et 
al. 2009). But because private market-chain actors are driving the innova-
tion process, this change may be more pervasive and sustainable. In contrast, 
in Ecuador the platform was oriented toward existing market opportunities 
structured around geographically delimited supply areas composed of small 
farmers, and has primarily addressed market-governance problems in assuring 
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volumes, meeting quality and timeliness constraints, as well as empowering 
farmers. This generates a more immediate and higher impact but, because 
engagement of the private sector is weaker, the eventual scale of the impact 
could be less than in the first case.
In 2009 the companies linked to ANDIBOL sold over 9,000 half-
kilogram bags of Chuñosa and nearly 3,300 boxes of Chef Andino. Exports 
have begun to Spain, so far benefiting 70 families directly, who receive 
US$1.10/kg. These products are still in a pilot stage of development and the 
final market size and potential for increased farmer income is not yet clear.
In Peru, there has been a rapid growth of native potato marketed through 
CAPAC and its members to Frito-Lay, the fresh market, and as seeds, dou-
bling from 2008 to 2009 and reaching over 400 tons.4 Farmers selling 
through these channels received around double the price in traditional 
markets, with a profit margin over 20 percent, and reported significantly 
higher yields.
The clearest and largest evidence of impact comes, as expected, from the 
platforms in Ecuador (Cavatassi et al., 2009). By 2007, some 1,483 tons of 
potato from 260 ha were marketed through the platforms by smallholder 
farmers (average landholding 2.6 ha). Platform farmers obtained an aver-
age yield 33 percent higher than nonparticipants. Their input costs were also 
higher, but despite this their profit (gross margins) was approximately four 
times greater thanks to the higher yield and a 30 percent higher selling price. 
Secondary indicators suggest that the linking to the platforms did not lead to 
negative consequences for farmers from the intensification of agricultural pro-
duction (careful attention was given to risks and precautions regarding pesti-
cide use and to integrated pest management in FFS training).
Outstanding Questions and Issues
Limited Underlying Conceptual Base and Methodology
Despite developing a general definition of platforms and exchanges of ideas 
among partners, there has been little explicit theory behind the creation of 
the platforms. One attempt to provide a more general explicit theory was pub-
lished but not widely applied among Papa Andina and its partners (Thiele 
et al. 2005). Theory behind platforms has been mostly implicit and the plat-
form facilitators involved followed their noses in pragmatically developing the 
 4 Ton means metric ton throughout.
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platforms. Only one platform (Ecuador) had a specific procedure for imple-
mentation (Reinoso et al. 2007). This lack of conceptual base, combined with 
the complexity of the challenges faced in increasing competitiveness of inclu-
sive value chains, may explain why the platforms have sometimes taken on 
potentially conflicting functions (for example, legal owner of collective or cer-
tification brands, and market-chain facilitator for a specific geographic area 
and/or specific private-sector partners).
Funding Mechanisms and Sustainability
All three platforms have had subsidies provided through project funding. This 
was probably a reasonable investment which generated acceptable returns to 
the use of public funding, as shown by the impact study of the Plataforma pro-
gram in Ecuador (Cavatassi et al. 2009). But in the longer run, and for scaling 
up, other funding and management mechanisms should be explored. One such 
mechanism could follow the lines of US levy boards, which are funded through 
levies on both potato producers and purchasers (www.idahopotato.com/), or 
models mixing levies and income from services (www.swisspatat.ch). These are 
backed by government legislation and function in a very different institutional 
environment. Securing funding for the function of innovation broker where 
the services provided are less tangible is a challenge even in the Netherlands 
(Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009).
Conclusion
This chapter uses the IAD framework to understand the dynamics of three 
platforms linked to value chains. While all three platforms share some fea-
tures, the material characteristics of the market chains they support, the char-
acteristics of participating actors, their different underlying development 
paradigms, and institutional arrangements, mean that two different types of 
platform can be distinguished. In the first, the platform brings traders, pro-
cessors, supermarkets, researchers, chefs, and others together with farmers 
and their associations to foster the creation of new market opportunities and 
commercial, institutional, and technological innovation with greater possi-
bility of added-value for small farmers. In the second, the platform is struc-
tured around a geographically delimited supply area, meshing small farmers 
and service providers, and primarily addressing market-governance problems 
in assuring volumes, meeting quality and timeliness constraints, as well as 
empowering farmers, with a focus on technological innovation. Both types 
show indications of success, although the timescales to generate impacts 
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are rather different, and more time is needed to judge which would be most 
appropriate under what circumstances.
The platform in Peru began as the first type, but subsequently shifted 
toward the second, perhaps because as commercial innovations were consol-
idated governance became a more pressing concern. This raises a more gen-
eral concern that, because of the more tangible nature of the services delivered, 
governance functions in platforms may tend to displace those of innovation 
brokers. Once this risk is appreciated, careful attention to the institutional 
rules which guide the functioning of the platforms could help maintain the 
broker function.
The evidence from these cases suggests that platforms can bring together 
diverse stakeholders and contribute to new products, processes, norms, and 
behaviors oriented toward value chains, which could not have been achieved 
otherwise. In addition, platforms can achieve significant outcomes, increase 
farmer income, and help lift small farmers out of the low-level equilibrium 
trap (Cavatassi et al. 2009). More systematic evaluation is still needed to assess 
the impacts of platforms and their cost-effectiveness relative to other types of 
innovation broker and mechanisms for improving market governance. Up to 
now, platforms have lacked a coherent theoretical framework, making their 
assessment more difficult. We hope that this chapter will encourage more 
rigorous comparative analysis and wider use of multistakeholder platforms in 
value-chain innovation and governance.
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UNRAVELING THE ROLE OF INNOVATION 
PLATFORMS IN SUPPORTING COEVOLUTION OF 
INNOVATION: CONTRIBUTIONS AND TENSIONS IN A 
SMALLHOLDER DAIRY-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM1
Catherine W. Kilelu, Laurens Klerkx, and Cees Leeuwis
Introduction
Smallholder agricultural development in developing countries faces challenges 
and constraints related to persistent food insecurity, food price volatility, food 
safety, and sustainability concerns, but also is experiencing increased opportu-
nities arising from growing domestic and global agricultural market demand 
(McCullough, Pingali, and Stamoulis 2008; World Bank 2006, 2007). Such a 
dynamic context requires the sector to continually innovate if it is to contrib-
ute to sustainable socioeconomic development. In this regard, the agricultural 
innovation-systems (AIS) approach has gained currency as a framework for 
understanding bottlenecks and identifying opportunities for enhancing the 
innovation capacity of agricultural systems, particularly in Africa south of the 
Sahara (SSA) (Hounkonnou et al. 2012; Spielman, Ekboir, and Davis 2009; 
Sumberg 2005; World Bank 2006).
AIS thinking recognizes that innovation occurs through the collective 
interplay among many actors—including farmers, researchers, extension offi-
cers, traders, service providers, processors, development organizations—and 
is influenced by factors such as technology, infrastructure, markets, policies, 
rules and regulations, and cultural practices (actors’ values and norms). Thus, 
innovations are not just about technology, but also include social and insti-
tutional change, and have a systemic and coevolutionary nature (Biggs 1990; 
1 The authors extend their appreciation to various individuals within the East Africa Dairy 
Development-Kenya team, including the many farmers and other collaborating actors for their 
time and cooperation during the research. We also acknowledge the International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI) for hosting the ﬁrst author as a graduate fellow, and speciﬁcally thank 
Isabelle Baltenweck for the invaluable support during the ﬁeldwork period. The constructive 
comments of anonymous reviewers were very helpful in improving the article. We gratefully 
acknowledge the support of Wageningen Graduate School of Social Sciences, which enabled 
this study.
This chapter was originally published as an article in Agricultural Systems 118: 65–77 (2013).
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Leeuwis and van den Ban 2004). Coevolution entails mutual interaction and 
adaptation over time among the technological, social, and institutional com-
ponents of an innovation, and therefore innovation cannot be understood 
and managed by separating these different components (Edquist and Johnson 
1997; Ekboir 2003; Hall and Clark 2010; Nelson and Nelson 2002). However, 
coevolution does not mean seamless and smooth evolution, but is accompa-
nied by tensions and sometimes incongruent actions that affect the outcomes 
of complex innovation processes (Leeuwis and Aarts 2011; Smits 2002).
Following the AIS perspective, the importance of recognizing and 
stimulating coevolution has been noted as key to promoting smallholder 
agricultural development in Africa south of the Sahara, and interventions 
increasingly focus on supporting interaction among multiple actors at 
different levels in agricultural production systems and value chains to enable 
innovation and enhance livelihoods (Ayele et al. 2012; Dormon et al. 2007; 
Hounkonnou et al. 2012). Such multiactor arrangements have been captured 
using different concepts and terminology, such as coalitions (Biggs 1990), 
innovation configurations (Engel 1995), innovation networks (Leeuwis 
and van den Ban 2004); public–private partnerships (PPPs) (Hall et al. 
2001; Spielman, Hartwich, and Grebmer 2010), and innovation platforms 
(Adekunle and Fatunbi 2012; Nederlof, Wongtschowski, and van der Lee 
2011). While these concepts are similar in their emphasis on understanding 
innovation as an interactive and collective process, they are mostly used as 
analytical concepts rather than intervention approaches, with the exception 
of innovation platforms and PPPs, although the latter has mainly been 
described in the context of research collaboration (see, for example, Hall et 
al. 2001; Spielman, Hartwich, and Grebmer 2010). In this chapter, we use 
the concept of innovation platforms, which generally has wider application 
in the agricultural field. We define an innovation platform as a multiactor 
configuration deliberately set up to facilitate and undertake various activities 
around identified agricultural innovation challenges and opportunities, at 
different levels in agricultural systems (for example, village, country, sector, or 
value chain).
Recent studies from Africa south of the Sahara have shown that 
multistakeholder platforms are contributing to agricultural innovation, 
citing enhanced interdependence among actors and enhanced social capital 
as some contributory factors (Nederlof, Wongtschowski, and van der Lee 
2011; Tenywa et al. 2011; van Rijn, Bulte, and Adekunle 2012). Although 
these studies often point to issues such as platform composition, governance, 
and facilitation, they do not provide a clear understanding of how and why 
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these platforms shape the innovation process and contribute to the outcomes. 
Thus, innovation platforms largely remain “black boxes.” To understand 
innovation processes and how to support them through platforms, there is 
a need for more robust analysis of the dynamics of coevolution and the role 
of change agents in the process (Hounkonnou et al. 2012; Waters-Bayer et 
al. 2009). This chapter aims to fill this gap by unraveling how platforms 
shape and contribute to innovation processes, through a case study of the 
East Africa Dairy Development (EADD) program in Kenya. The EADD 
program provides a platform for stimulating multistakeholder collaboration 
aimed at improving productivity and incomes of smallholder dairy-
producer households.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section draws a conceptual 
framework that links the concepts of coevolution and innovation platform to 
provide an analytical framework to unravel innovation platforms. This is fol-
lowed by a presentation of the research design. Then we present the findings, 
followed by a discussion of the merits and limitations of innovation platforms 
in supporting coevolution of innovation. We end with conclusions, which 
highlight some theoretical and practical implications of the findings.
Conceptual Framework
This section first discusses the concept of coevolution and innovation plat-
forms as innovation intermediaries. We then combine these concepts to build 
an analytical framework to elucidate the dynamics of coevolution of the inno-
vation process.
Operationalizing Innovation as Coevolution
AIS scholars point to coevolution as a useful concept for understanding the 
complexity of the innovation process, which entails continuous interaction 
of technical, social, and institutional elements. However, to enable a simul-
taneous analysis of these elements, the coevolution concept needs to be oper-
ationalized. Leeuwis and van den Ban’s (2004) adaptation of Smits’ (2002) 
definition of innovation as alignment of hardware (technology in the form 
of new technical devices), software (new modes of thinking and correspond-
ing practices and learning processes), and orgware (new institutions and 
socio-organizational arrangements) aptly captures this view on coevolution of 
innovation and provides a heuristic for analytical purposes. The hardware ele-
ments refer to a tangible product or a well-defined set of practices that define 
a technology. The software dimension captures the essence of AIS thinking, 
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which emphasizes innovation as the outcome of interactive learning among 
multiple actors involving both explicit and tacit knowledge from different 
sources, such as scientific, experiential, and indigenous knowledge (Leeuwis 
and van den Ban, 2004; Oreszczyn, Lane, and Carr 2010). The characteri-
zation of the orgware dimension follows North’s (1990) definition of insti-
tutions as the “rules of the game” or as human-devised rules that structure 
interaction, in which a distinction can be made between formal (for exam-
ple, laws, regulations, standards) and informal (norms, attitudes, values) insti-
tutions. Institutions can be considered to have a twofold role, in that they 
provide the environment or conditions for collaboration necessary for inno-
vation, but are also part of the innovation process and so they also need to be 
changed (Hung and Whittington 2011; Klerkx, Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010). 
Conducive institutional conditions enhancing collaboration for institutional 
change, or conversely a lack of them, have been underlined as key elements 
that enable or constrain innovation (Hounkonnou et al. 2012; Klerkx, Aarts, 
and Leeuwis 2010; Leeuwis and van den Ban, 2004; Roep, Van der Ploeg, and 
Wiskerke 2003).
Coevolution points to deliberate efforts to align the technological and 
socio-institutional arrangements not only in the sense of trying to fit into 
pre-existing conditions (Leeuwis and Aarts 2011; Smits and Kuhlmann, 
2004), but also in actively trying to change the socio-institutional environ-
ment, which has been referred to as effective reformism (Klerkx, Aarts, and 
Leeuwis 2010; Roep, Van der Ploeg, and Wiskerke 2003). Thus, innova-
tion processes are marked by dynamics of alignment and conflict, with often 
unpredictable outcomes.
Agricultural Innovation Platforms and Their Role as 
Intermediaries in Innovation Coevolution
Multiactor platforms have been noted as important interventions for creating 
spaces to orient interaction to enable innovation, as they stimulate changes 
among platform actors that eventually have greater effects in the broader envi-
ronments in which these actors operate (Dormon et al. 2007; Klerkx, Aarts, 
and Leeuwis 2010). The platform concept has already been applied in the 
agricultural-innovation context to explore different modalities for collective 
action among multiple stakeholders around natural-resource management, for 
example, farmer field schools (FFS), local research committees (CIALs), nat-
ural-resource management platforms (Braun, Thiele, and Fernández 2000; 
Röling and Jiggins 1998). More recently, various forms of agricultural inno-
vation platforms have been promoted as arenas for action in operationalizing 
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AIS interventions (Adekunle and Fatunbi 2012; Devaux et al. 2009; Nederlof, 
Wongtschowski, and van der Lee 2011). Platforms can have different goals 
and can also be structured and conceptualized in diverse forms: the focus of 
platforms can be research oriented, development oriented, or both, and some 
platforms take on more centralized forms with central coordinating struc-
tures, whereas others consist of distributed networks of interaction (Nederlof, 
Wongtschowski, and van der Lee 2011; Steins and Edwards 1999).
Innovation platforms generally do not emerge autonomously, but con-
nections among platform members need to be forged and their interaction 
needs to be coordinated (Leeuwis and van den Ban 2004; Röling and Jiggins 
1998). Building on the theoretical and empirical insights from the broader 
innovation-studies literature (Howells 2006; van Lente et al. 2003; Winch 
and Courtney 2007), AIS scholars have argued that there is thus an import-
ant role for so-called innovation intermediaries, who engage in coordinating 
and brokering relations at several interfaces in complex multiactor configura-
tions in the AIS (Devaux et al. 2009; Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008a; Morriss et 
al. 2006). Kilelu et al. (2011) provide a collated range of functions that inno-
vation intermediaries in agricultural innovation can fulfill; we apply these to 
understand the role of innovation platforms (for details see Kilelu et al. 2011). 
These functions include
• Demand articulation: Facilitating the process of identifying innovation 
challenges and opportunities as perceived by the various stakeholders 
through diagnostic exercises, visioning, and needs assessment. The needs 
could include access to information, technologies, finance, or institu-
tional gaps.
• Institutional support: Facilitating and advocating institutional change 
(for example, policy change, new business models, and stimulating new 
actor relationships).
• Network brokering: Identifying and linking different actors.
• Capacity building: Strengthening and incubating new organiza-
tional forms.
• Innovation process management: Coordinating interactions and facilitating 
negotiation and learning among different actors.
• Knowledge brokering: Identifying knowledge/technology needs and 
mobilizing and disseminating the technology and knowledge from 
 different sources.
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Whereas literature which takes a more structural perspective on catego-
rizing such innovation intermediaries in AIS suggests that a single innova-
tion intermediary orchestrates innovation platforms (Batterink et al. 2010; 
Kilelu et al. 2011; Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009), innovation process-ori-
ented studies show that several intermediaries are active and that they make 
different connections between actors and components in innovation pro-
cesses and act as change agents (Eastwood, Chapman, and Paine 2012; Klerkx, 
Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010; Stewart and Hyysalo 2008). This derives from the 
fact that innovation processes are of a highly distributed nature in terms of 
space and time. To resolve different problems and uncertainties (technolog-
ical, social, market-related, institutional) in relation to realizing an innova-
tive vision or problem, work is needed simultaneously at several interfaces in 
the innovation system (Klerkx, Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010). This suggests that 
the role of intermediaries in platforms can be conceptualized as ecologies or 
nested systems of intermediaries connecting different components of AIS and 
fulfilling complementary functions to guide coevolution.
Integrating these insights distilled from the literature on coevolution of 
innovation, innovation platforms, and innovation intermediaries, we con-
struct an analytical framework (presented in Figure 9.1) to unravel the role of 
innovation intermediaries in supporting coevolution of innovation processes 
on the EADD multiactor platform. The model places the platform at the cen-
ter and is the arena in which intermediation of innovation processes takes 
place, by undertaking the various intermediation functions described above. 
Outlining these functions provides a frame for understanding the nature of 
intermediation and how this contributes to innovation outcomes on the plat-
form. The innovation processes are characterized as change, loosely from one 
system (A) to another (B). The change can happen through either radical 
(fundamental change to the system) or incremental (stepwise improvement of 
a system) innovation. The platform is situated in a broader sociotechnical con-
text that influences how the change process evolves.
We now apply the analytical framework to answer the main question of 
this chapter as set out in the introduction: how do innovation platforms shape 
and contribute to the dynamics of coevolution?
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Case Description and Research Methods
Background of the EADD Program
The smallholder-dominated dairy sector in Kenya is considered to be relatively 
successful in the context of Africa south of the Sahara, but the sector still 
contends with many challenges that have limited its potential in terms of 
productivity, competitiveness, and improving livelihoods (Moll, Staal, and 
Ibrahim 2007; Muriuki et al. 2003; Technoserve 2008). To tackle these 
challenges, the EADD multiactor program was initiated in 2008. The EADD 
is being implemented in three countries in East Africa—Kenya, Uganda, 
and Rwanda—but this research focuses on Kenya only. The modality of the 
program as a multiactor platform (see Figure 9.2) in the dairy sector was 
noted as interesting for an in-depth study of innovation processes. EADD 
Kenya works at 19 sites in the Rift Valley and central Kenya regions where 
dairy production is concentrated. Such sites are defined in relation to one of 
the program’s innovations—a dairy farmers’ limited company (referred to as 
Dairy Farmer Business Association, DFBA) with an operational chilling plant 
FIGURE 9.1 Analytical framework: innovation platforms supporting coevolution of innovation
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that evolves into a local business hub. The DFBA has a catchment area that 
covers a radius of approximately 10 kilometers in which it aims to attract dairy 
farmers to deliver milk for bulking and collective marketing (EADD 2011b).
The EADD program is implemented by a consortium of five organiza-
tions: Heifer International, International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), 
Technoserve (TNS), African Breeders Services Total Cattle Management 
Limited (ABS-TCM), and World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF). The con-
sortium brings in different expertise, including agricultural research, business 
development, and dairy production, in coordinating the program; this enables 
them to shape innovation in different ways.
The EADD staff, although coming from separate organizations, are all 
housed together in one office to enable them to work together collaboratively. 
As Figure 9.2 illustrates, the EADD as a multiactor platform consists of com-
plex and layered linkages. The EADD consortium acts as a central coordinating 
FIGURE 9.2 A schematic presentation of EADD Kenya as an innovation platform
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unit that facilitates linkages among different configuration of actors, including 
farmers, government agencies, and the private sector, which interact through the 
different DFBAs (inner layer). Thus, each DFBA can be seen as a distributed 
platform for localized interactions among the various actors in an effort to meet 
the program goal. The EADD platforms operate in the broader context (outer 
layer) of a liberalized dairy market and increasingly dynamic agribusiness envi-
ronment (in terms of a growing number of input suppliers, for example, feeds, 
supplements, and dairy processors and traders) in an evolving policy environ-
ment (in terms of a new dairy development policy, agricultural extension policy 
promoting pluralistic demand-driven service provision, policies to improve flow 
of credit to farmers, and so forth) (see Muriuki et al. 2003 for an overview).
Case Study Methods
In line with other studies on agricultural-innovation processes (Eastwood, 
Chapman, and Paine 2012; Klerkx, Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010), a single case-
study research design was selected as appropriate for providing in-depth 
insights into the dynamism of innovation processes (following Flyvbjerg 
2006; Hoholm and Araujo 2011; Yin 2003). The EADD program in Kenya 
was selected for this study following initial exploratory research (see Kilelu 
et al. 2011 for details) that identified several ongoing initiatives supporting 
smallholder agricultural innovation in Kenya. From the exploration, the case 
provided indications of an innovation platform achieving tangible outcomes 
that made it interesting for a more in-depth study to elucidate the role of inno-
vation platforms in supporting innovation processes. Further, as an ongo-
ing project, it provided the opportunity to both reconstruct the innovation 
dynamics (Van de Ven, Polley, and Venkataraman 2008) and follow the pro-
cess in real-time (Hoholm and Araujo 2011).
Because of the breadth of the program areas of focus, the research was con-
ducted at two sites purposively selected with guidance from EADD staff—
Tanykina (Kipkaren) Dairy Company Limited and Metkei Multipurpose 
Dairy Company Limited. Although we only studied two sites, the risk of bias 
in such a sampling strategy was minimized by selecting sites that were suffi-
ciently advanced in the process of hub establishment but had followed dif-
ferent innovation trajectories and thus provided adequate depth of diverse 
experiences to elucidate the innovation process. The sites are located in sepa-
rate districts in the Rift Valley region with different agroecosystems but simi-
lar mixed farming systems. Because the two sites have different histories with 
dairy farming, it was possible to glean a variety of insights on the dynamics 
of the innovation process. Tanykina was considered a pre-established site as 
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it had recently been established as a cooperative that had already been operat-
ing a chilling tank for cooling and bulking milk. Metkei was considered a new 
site where four small dairy societies worked separately and had no chilling 
tank. The aim of the case study was not to develop generalized, prescriptive 
accounts, but rather to look for patterns that could provide explanatory anal-
ysis (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 2003). Various data-collection methods were used 
to understand the processes, but also to ensure reliability and validity through 
triangulation. The data were collected from August 2010 to December 2011. 
Table 9.1 presents a summary of the data collected at each site.
Other data sources included direct observations and informal discussions 
from participation in various meetings and discussions during site and EADD 
office visits. We also conducted a semistructured group interview with six 
EADD team members. All focus-group discussions and interviews were taped 
and fully transcribed for systematic analysis. Various project reports (includ-
ing annual project reports and mid-term evaluation) provided additional 
information. Following the analytical framework, we coded and characterized 
the data to identify different elements of the coevolution process in relation to 
the three intervention (innovation) areas and to unravel the role of the inter-
mediaries on the platform.
Findings
In this section, we describe the process of how EADD established and exe-
cuted the program, distilling from this description the components of the 
coevolution of the innovation processes on the platform, and we highlight 
some of the issues and tensions that emerged as the process unfolded. We also 
examine the role of intermediaries in the processes, using the six intermedia-
tion functions described in the conceptual framework above. Quotes derived 
from the interviews are used to illustrate key points.
The Entry Point—Setting the Agenda, Mobilizing the Platform, 
and the Role of EADD
The EADD program was established with the goal of improving the incomes 
of smallholder dairy households by implementing interventions that enhance 
both dairy production and market access. To guide these interventions, 
EADD first conducted diagnostic studies to understand the bottlenecks 
in smallholder dairy farming. These studies focused on three main areas: 
(1) improving breeding and animal health; (2) improving feed management 
and enhancing access to quality and affordable feeds; and (3) strengthening 
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market access for smallholders (EADD 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d). The 
studies pointed to areas of intervention; subsequently, how these were 
addressed evolved through testing and implementing various sociotechnical 
and institutional innovations. Furthermore, the EADD team also conducted 
feasibility studies to guide site selection.
TABLE 9.1 Overview of data collection
Methods Study site Information gathered
Tanykina Metkei
Focus-group discussion 
with farmers working in 
DMGs (approximately 
15 farmers in each focus 
group)
8 9 history of dairy in the area; 
dairy production and marketing 
issues, linkage to DFBa access 
to services, marketing issues, 
perception of role of eaDD and 
other actors
Focus-group discussion 
with non-DMG farmers 
(approximately 15 farm-
ers in each focus group)
1 1 history of dairy in the area; 
production and marketing 
issues, linkage to DFBa access 
to services, marketing issues, 
perception of role of eaDD and 
other actors, reasons for not 
working in groups
Semistructured inter-
views with Ministry of 
Livestock district officers
1 (5 participants) 1 (4 participants) Views on the new DFBa business 
model; their collaboration with 
eaDD, production and marketing 
issues
Semistructured 
interviews with service 
providers 
4 (2 extension 
providers, aI, 
animal-health 
assistant) 
2 (aISp/extension 
provider and 
animal-health 
assistant)
Views on the new DFBa model; 
links with eaDD, views on pro-
duction issues, their collaboration 
with eaDD as business-service 
providers
Interviews with DFBa 
management team
3 4 DFBa history and governance; 
views on production and mar-
keting issues, assessment of the 
challenges facing DFBa
participation in meetings 
and discussions with 
DFBa Board of Directors 
2 2 DFBa history and governance; 
views on production and 
marketing issues, assessment of 
the challenges facing DFBa, and 
collaboration with eaDD
Unstructured interviews 
with other actors 
1 (bank manager) 1 (manager of 
packing firm) 
Involvement with eaDD, views on 
production and market issues, 
the role of eaDD 
Source: authors.
Note: aI = artificial insemination; aISp = artificial-insemination service provider; DFBa = Dairy Farmer Business association; 
DMGs = dairy management groups; eaDD = east africa Dairy Development project.
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As an entry point to the communities, the EADD consortium started by 
advancing a vision for the establishment of farmer-owned DFBAs as an alter-
native to dairy cooperatives, which are the dominant institutional model of 
dairy-farming enterprises in Kenya (Technoserve 2008). Dairy cooperatives 
had faced several challenges over the years, with many of them disbanding 
for reasons such as mismanagement coupled with the collapse of the gov-
ernment-owned Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC), the main market-
ing channel before liberalization of the market in 1992. This had resulted in 
huge losses for farmers who hence became wary of cooperatives. This context 
informed EADD’s drive for an alternative dairy business model, as illustrated 
by the following quote:
EADD was clear that we were only dealing with a limited liability 
company. Limited companies were considered less prone to challenges 
of accountability, governance, sound business management  
(EADD team interview, September 2010).
With this vision, the EADD started mobilizing dairy-farming communi-
ties. A key mobilizing strategy used by the EADD team was the involvement 
of the local administration and relevant government ministries at different 
administrative levels (for example, division and district) and local politicians. 
It was thought that getting these actors on board would ease entry into com-
munities and ensure their long-term cooperation beyond the lifespan of the 
program. Involving the local administration was also useful in supporting the 
process of selecting the interim leaders for the DFBAs. As one EADD team 
member noted on this point:
In sites where we worked with government from the word go and we 
had their buy in, and they contributed in selecting representatives from 
the community that served on the steering committee—When there 
was this interaction, it [mobilization] worked well  
(EADD team interview, September 2010).
EADD organized various public meetings to present the ideas of the pro-
gram. After these first meetings, communities were invited to nominate an 
interim board of directors. The board members were to represent different 
administrative divisions where they were expected to mobilize farmers to reg-
ister and purchase shares in the new company. These meetings spurred the ini-
tial platforms for interaction among multiple actors leading to the setting up 
of the DFBAs. To demonstrate their commitment to the vision, farmers were 
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expected to raise an initial portion of the equity (10 percent) for the start-up 
that would go toward purchasing the cooling tanks and cover initial opera-
tional costs. To match farmers’ 10 percent contribution, the EADD provided 
an interest-free loan of 30 percent from program funding, with the remain-
ing 60 percent to be financed through commercial loans. Thus, an important 
intermediation role of EADD at the early stages was to mobilize farmers; sup-
port the interim leadership of the DFBAs to draw up business plans; facili-
tate the setting up of governance structures; and bring on board other relevant 
actors as collaborators, broker their interactions, and support the interim lead-
ership to raise capital.
In Tanykina, the farmer-mobilization process progressed fast because there 
was a pre-existing cooperative with a cooling tank (albeit running unprofit-
ably), installed with support from Heifer International. EADD was to assist 
in remodeling the Tanykina cooperative into a limited company and sup-
port its further development into a business hub. In contrast, the Metkei 
Multipurpose DFBA was a conglomerate of four cooperative societies that 
were still operational but struggling: Tulwobei, Metkei, Kapkitony, and 
Kipsaos. This made mobilizing farmers a challenge. Although the cooper-
atives agreed to form the company, they retained their own members and 
respective organizational structure, making it difficult to mobilize farm-
ers for the new Metkei Multipurpose Company, which was to encompass all 
four societies. There were underlying suspicions and competition among the 
respective cooperatives, as one EADD staff member noted:
There is a superficial barrier where you are working through the 
 cooperative as a proxy. This is why in Metkei we are stuck with member-
ship of 2,440 though there is potential to mobilize 5,000 farmers  
(EADD staff, interview, September 2010).
In Metkei, it took longer to raise the equity; this delayed the setting up of 
the chilling plant, which began full operations in February 2010, a year after 
EADD started its engagement with the community. Discussions with farmers 
indicated that there was confusion about the new entity, and this affected ser-
vice delivery at later stages, as discussed below. One farmer noted the follow-
ing on this confusion:
All of us have some Metkei shares, but are registered with the cooper-
atives. There are four cooperatives and, according to the constitution, 
the members have to go through the cooperatives  
(Farmer focus-group discussion, Metkei, November 2011).
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The establishment of the DFBA therefore provided the entry point and 
a local-level platform for interventions and multiactor interactions as dis-
cussed below.
The Dynamics of Coevolution of Innovation on the EADD 
Platform
In this section, we unravel this coevolution of innovation and the role of inter-
mediaries on the platform in relation to the three main areas of intervention—
milk marketing, breeding, and feeding. The findings also include some of the 
tensions that emerged in the process and affected the innovation processes in 
unexpected ways, revealing the complexity of such processes. Figure 9.3 pres-
ents a broad overview of events in the innovation process at the two sites, illus-
trating the interweaving of technical, social, and institutional dimensions of 
innovation that involved mobilizing different actors and resources at various 
points in time.
FIGURE 9.3 Timeline of important events in the innovation process in the two study sites
2009
Tanykina DFBA 
as pre-existing 
CP partners 
with EADD
2009
Metkei multipurpose 
DFBA – a conglomerate 
of four cooperatives,
partners with EADD
2009
Farmer mobilization
(slow due to complexity
of working with 
four cooperatives)
2009
Financing 
attained 
for purchase 
of chilling tank
2009
Extension services
using trainer of 
trainers and AI animal 
health supported 
through EADD
2009
CP management
staff hired
2009
Farmer 
mobilization and
increased milk 
volumes (was 
rapidly achieved)
2009 2010 2011 2012
2010
CP management
staff hired
2010
CP inaugurated
boosting milk 
volumes
2010
Extension services
using trainer of trainers
and AI animal health
supported through
EADD
2011
CP hub with 
check-off
operational 
(partially)
2011
Restructured 
extension
services 
entrenched
in DFBA
2011
New CP 
building
inaugurated
2011
Restructured 
extension services 
entrenched in DFBA
2011
Financing
attained
and satellite
CP installed
2010
Financial services
(“village bank”)
opened
2010
CP hub 
with check-off 
operational
2010
Agro-vet shop
operational
Source: authors. 
Note: Cp = chilling plant; DFBa = Dairy Farmer Business association; eaDD = east africa Dairy Development project;  
 = processes in Tanykina DFBa;  = processes in Metkei DFBa.
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ENHANCING INNOVATION FOR IMPROVED MILK MARKETING
As noted above, the starting point for EADD was the establishment of dairy 
limited companies as an alternative dairy business model to address con-
straints faced by smallholders in production and marketing (EADD 2009b; 
Technoserve 2008).
This model was in itself an institutional innovation which started by first 
setting up the chilling plant for bulking and cooling milk, and putting in 
place interim governance structures for the DFBA. This genesis provided 
the platform that triggered a series of other sociotechnical and institutional 
innovations that in combination enhanced marketing (see Table 9.2 for 
a summary).
With support from EADD consortium partners, the DFBAs were linked 
to different actors to support different dimensions that were vital to improve 
marketing. In Metkei, EADD brought in a food processing and packaging 
firm as a partner that offered to finance the purchasing of a cooling tank, 
some laboratory equipment, and the dairy management software for the 
DFBA. As the firm manager noted:
[their] interest in supporting the cooling tank in Metkei was because 
it was important being part of the dairy value chain to ensure an 
increase in the quantity and quality of milk processed  
(Interview, February 2011).
As noted above, there was already a pre-existing chilling plant in Tanykina, 
so the starting point was the establishment of the DFBA, but also the improve-
ment of the facilities where the chilling plant was located. Later on, Tanykina 
was linked to a commercial bank that financed a loan to purchase additional 
cooling tanks for satellite collection centers, thereby reducing the distance to 
be covered and time it took for milk to be delivered, and ensuring the quality of 
the milk.
Farmers commented that the installation of the cooling tanks and the estab-
lishment of the DFBA with new governance structures boosted their confidence 
about accessing markets for their milk. This was reflected in the increased num-
ber of farmers selling their milk through the two DFBAs. In 2009, about 2,757 
farmers sold an average of 15,000 liters per day in Tanykina; this rose to an 
average of 21,700 liters from 4,432 farmers. In Metkei, 1,188 farmers supplied 
on average 4,990 liters per day in 2009; this increased to about 17,000 liters a 
day from an average of 3,970 farmers. The EADD brokered negotiations for 
supply contracts between the DFBA and milk-processing companies as a way 
UNraVeLING The rOLe OF INNOVaTION pLaTFOrMS IN SUppOrTING COeVOLUTION OF INNOVaTION 283
TABLE 9.2 Summary of coevolution of innovation relating to milk marketing and the roles of 
intermediaries in supporting the process
Dimension of 
innovation
Activities Functions of intermediary actors
Orgware • establishment of Tanykina Dairy Ltd and 
Metkei Multipurpose Dairy Company Ltd 
as new dairy-business enterprises
• Signing supply contracts with milk-
processing companies
• Development of the chilling plants into 
business hubs that offer integrated 
services (for example, aI, animal health, 
extension, banking, milk transport, 
health insurance) and inputs (feeds, 
supplements, veterinary drugs, farming 
equipment) using a payment/credit 
system referred to as check-off
• F2 and F6—Guidance in the selection 
of DFBa board members and providing 
them with technical support—TNS and 
heifer
• F2—Development of strategic business 
plans in collaboration with the board 
members—and overall monitoring of 
performance—TNS
• F5, F4, and F6—providing board 
with technical support in negotiating 
contracts—TNS, heifer
• F2 and F6—Technical support to the 
board and management team, and 
monitoring in the stage-gate process of 
business-hub development—TNS and 
heifer 
hardware • Installation of chilling plants (Cps)—
equipped with laboratories for milk-
quality monitoring 
• Integrating the Cps with various ICT 
management and information systems 
(including electronic weighing scales, 
dairy information management software) 
to support overall business hub 
operations
• F4 and F5—Technical support in 
procurement of various equipment 
and set up of Cps, including identifying 
suppliers and vendors through a 
tendering process (for example, 
cooling tanks, construction of the plant, 
software)—heifer and TNS
• F5—providing technical support to the 
board and management team in various 
areas (for example, human resource and 
financial management, financial-service 
delivery)—all eaDD consortia
• F4 and F6—Mobilizing of funding by 
linking DFBa with various financiers 
(banks and microfinance institutions)—
TNS and heifer
Software • Facilitating new governance of the dairy 
enterprise by strengthening the functions 
and oversight structures of the board
• recruitment of skilled management 
team overseeing day-to-day business 
management
• Integrating improved procedures to 
ensure quality management of the Cp 
(including milk-quality testing)
• F1—Conducting diagnostic and 
feasibility studies—TNS and ILrI/ICraF
• F5—providing guidance on governance 
and management of hub in set up and 
operationalizing of hub—TNS
• F5—Mentoring and coaching board and 
management team
• F2 and F6—Overseeing transparent 
process of recruiting skilled staff to 
manage the DFBa—TNS and heifer
• F4, F5, and F6—providing technical 
support in managing the Cp—TNS, 
heifer.
Source: authors.
Note: DFBa = Dairy Farmer Business association; F1 = Demand articulation; F2 = Institutional support; F3 = Knowledge 
brokering; F4 = Network brokering; F5 = Capacity building; F6 = Innovation process management; ICraF = World 
agroforestry Centre; ICT = information and communications technology; ILrI = International Livestock research Institute; 
TNS = Technoserve.
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of stabilizing the markets. Milk prices also increased, as farmers in Tanykina 
received Kenya shillings (KES) 30 (US$0.35) per liter in 2011 compared to 
KES24 ($0.28) in 2009, and in Metkei the price rose from KES23 ($0.27) to 
KES31 ($0.36) per liter (EADD 2011a). Data from project reports indicated 
an increase in milk production at farmer level during the period 2009–2011: in 
Tanykina, farmers involved with EADD increased production from 4 liters to 
about 8.1 liters per cow on average, whereas in Metkei the estimated production 
increased from 4 liters to 6 liters (EADD 2011a; EADD Kenya 2011). Although 
this is a notable increase, these average volumes are considered below the min-
imal levels estimated as necessary for households to move beyond the poverty 
line (TANGO International 2010; Technoserve 2008).
The increased milk volumes marketed by the DFBAs and higher milk prices 
resulted in their profitability as enterprises and thus enabled them to expand 
services to farmers (EADD Kenya 2011; TANGO International 2010). The 
interviews revealed that EADD guided the DFBAs in establishing business 
hubs within the chilling plants to offer a bundle of goods and services (for exam-
ple, credit and financial services, artificial insemination, feeds, drugs, extension, 
and transportation) to farmers that supplied milk. The business hub inte-
grated a ‘‘check-off ’’ system where the farmers could access the goods and ser-
vices through a credit system, and the cost was deducted from the monthly final 
payment to farmers. Tanykina was offering more services to its members than 
Metkei at the time of the study, but there was an overall increase in service deliv-
ery to farmers at both sites. The hub was managed by a professional team guided 
by the board of directors. From observations, we noted that, in both DFBAs, 
older men continued to dominate the boards, reflecting the cultures of both 
communities. Hub development was accompanied by integration of other tech-
nological devices (weighing scales, dairy information-management software). To 
support delivery of some services such as extension, other new organizational 
structures such as formation of dairy-management groups (DMGs) were also 
put in place. From the focus-group discussion, farmers who had joined DMGs 
associated their increased production with the training and support introduced 
through these groups. At both sites, EADD facilitated financing arrangements 
with commercial banks to buy motorbikes for various service providers, includ-
ing transporters, artificial-insemination service providers (AISPs), and ani-
mal-health assistants linked to the DFBAs. Bringing together diverse actors 
with different stakes and interests required the platform intermediaries to bro-
ker continually and negotiate relationships.
Nonetheless, marketing remained precarious, as indicated by some of the 
issues and tensions that emerged from discussions and observations. The 
UNraVeLING The rOLe OF INNOVaTION pLaTFOrMS IN SUppOrTING COeVOLUTION OF INNOVaTION 285
bulking and cooling of milk as a way of collective marketing was expected to 
streamline supply to the DFBA. But there was no control over competition 
among the different buyers who formed part of the broader market environ-
ment in the sector. Many farmers at both sites indicated that they divided their 
milk and sold through different channels, including informal milk traders. The 
main reasons cited for selling to different buyers were price and transportation. 
We observed that some farmers from both sites were located far from the chill-
ing plants, and some areas were unreachable even by motorbike, particularly 
during the rainy season. This made transportation not only expensive but also 
unpredictable. Many of these farmers stated that they opted to sell their milk to 
whoever could collect it at the farmgate. Both Tanykina and Metkei set up a few 
satellite collection centers to try to address this challenge.
Farmers also pointed to seasonal fluctuations in prices and indicated that 
in some cases the processors reduced the volumes that they bought during glut 
periods in the rainy season when there was increased milk production. Thus, 
the processing companies had control of the market and signing contracts did 
not deter this uncertainty in the market. Consistency in milk quality was also 
an issue that affected marketing. In Tanykina, it was noted that farmers contin-
ued to use plastic containers to deliver milk even though these were not hygien-
ically ideal. The DFBA was trying to change this practice by making the more 
hygienic aluminum cans available through check-off, but not many farmers 
were using them. Further, in an effort to increase milk volumes in the DFBA, 
EADD was encouraging collection of evening milk. Metkei had started receiv-
ing evening milk toward the end of 2011. However, the discussions revealed 
that the evening milk was consumed mainly at home, and some was sold to 
neighbors mainly by women, to acquire ready cash for daily use. Whether this 
marketing emphasis has an effect on intrahousehold dynamics is an area for fur-
ther research.
As illustrated above, the different consortium actors fulfilled comple-
mentary intermediary functions in the innovation process. In supporting the 
coevolution process, the intermediaries also shaped how the network structure 
of the platform changed over time. However, from interviews we found that 
consortium partners had divergent views regarding the goal of enhanced 
market access. Some partners considered that the primary focus should be on 
strengthening the DFBAs as agro-enterprises and enhancing their profitability, 
which would then cascade down to improved productivity at farm level, whereas 
other partners thought that this emphasis on DFBA profitability deflected 
attention from the primary goal of improving productivity at farm level so 
that the farming households could benefit from marketing more milk. This 
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observation was also noted in the mid-term evaluation (TANGO International 
2010). This may suggest that intermediaries also brought in competing interests 
into such processes that needed to be negotiated.
DYNAMICS OF IMPROVING BREEDING PRACTICES
The improvement of breeding practices through artificial insemination (AI) 
was one of the key interventions to enhance milk productivity. A combina-
tion of technical and institutional interventions to improve breeding practices 
was guided by a diagnostic study conducted at the early stages of the program 
(EADD 2009a). AI was not a new technology in Metkei and Tanykina, as 
noted in discussions with farmers, but its uptake had declined over the years 
due to various factors, including a policy shift to privatization of AI services, 
as some farmers noted:
There was government AI but they since stopped around the 1980s. 
The government used to do it for 1 Kenya shillings but now it has 
hiked to 1,000 Kenya shillings so it is now only for the rich  
(Metkei farmer, focus-group discussion, November 2011).
The first issue tackled was ensuring availability of, and access to, quality 
semen. To enable this, one of the EADD partners—ABS-TCM—facilitated 
procurement of semen tanks and semen for the DFBAs. With semen available, 
the DFBA had then to ensure the service was delivered to farmers. At both 
sites, there was a shortage of well-trained AISPs, therefore EADD supported 
the training of more AISPs, four in Metkei and five in Tanykina. These AISPs 
were then linked to the DFBA, where arrangements were later made for them 
to provide AI services through the check-off system. The AISPs mainly used 
the semen that was available at the DFBA, but sometimes had to acquire other 
semen that was not stocked at the DFBA, but which farmers demanded. The 
check-off system ensured quality service delivery by the AISPs who were now 
directly linked to DFBAs. To further ensure service delivery, the platform 
also facilitated AISPs to acquire equipment (AI tanks and motorbikes). 
Table 9.3 summarizes and characterizes the coevolution process, showing 
the interdependence of the interventions and actors, and how the platform 
intermediaries supported the process.
Several respondents, including farmers and ministry of livestock officers, 
pointed at the increased uptake of AI at both sites, indicating that the inno-
vation platform contributed to innovation outcomes. Many DMG farmers 
indicated that the increased uptake was facilitated by the training on breed-
ing that improved their knowledge about AI, complemented by the check-off 
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system that allowed them readily to access AI services. Conversely, many 
farmers not in a group said that they did not use AI and linked this to lim-
ited access to knowledge on breeding, as groups were the platform for train-
ing and information dissemination. However, many farmers still perceived AI 
to be expensive, even with the check-off system and the subsidization of some 
semen through the program. The perceived high cost was linked to many 
instances of repeat inseminations because of missed conceptions, as illustrated 
by the following quote:
TABLE 9.3 Summary of coevolution of innovation related to breeding and the roles of 
intermediaries in supporting the process
Dimension of 
innovation
Activities Functions of intermediary actors
Orgware • Training of aISp to improve the aI-
delivery system
• providing aI with necessary equipment 
(for example, motor bikes, semen tanks) 
through loans and integrating aI-service 
delivery with check-off system
• Formation of DMGs as platforms for 
farmer training
• F4, F5, and F6—Forging partnership 
with various organizations for training aI 
service providers—heifer and aBS-TCM
• F2 and F5—Supporting entrepreneurial 
development of the aISp (as a business-
development service) by facilitating 
access to finance and business skills 
training through partnering with relevant 
actors—aBS, heifer, and TNS
• F4, F5, and F6—Facilitating the 
mobilization of farmers into groups—
heifer
hardware • acquisition of semen tanks by DFBas for 
semen storage and distribution to aISp
• acquisition of quality semen from various 
suppliers
• promoting “village bull” concept, that 
is, encouraging farmer groups (DMGs) 
to acquire semen tanks to store their 
preferred semen at village level
• F3 and F5—providing information 
on semen tanks and facilitating their 
procurement—aBS-TCM and heifer
• F1, F3, and F5—Guiding procurement 
and distribution of selected semen at a 
subsidized price due to bulk buying—
aBS-TCM
Software • Improving service-delivery contracts 
between DFBa and aI-service providers
• promoting informed farmer decision-
making and aI-service demand by 
farmers to improve breeding practices 
through training and information 
dissemination
• F5 and F6—Facilitating drafting and 
signing of contracts—heifer
• F1–Conducting baseline/diagnostic 
studies on breeding issues—ILrI
• F5—providing funding for extension 
services at the beginning, and later (from 
2011) cost sharing with the DFBa—
eaDD
Source: authors.
Note: aBS-TCM = african Breeders Services Total Cattle Management Limited; aI = artificial insemination; aISp = artificial-
insemination service provider; DFBa = Dairy Farmer Business association; eaDD = east africa Dairy Development project;  
F1 = Demand articulation; F2 = Institutional support; F3 = Knowledge brokering; F4 = Network brokering; F5 = Capacity 
building; F6 = Innovation-process management; ILrI = International Livestock research Institute; TNS = Technoserve.
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When you take the cow for insemination, there are times it will fail and 
people will decide that if the AI is failing yet it is very costly, it will be 
better to go back to the bull system  
(Tanykina farmer, focus-group discussion, August 2011).
On the one hand, many farmers linked repeats to delayed responses by ser-
vice providers, particularly because there was still a shortage of personnel and 
the few available had to cover long distances over very poor terrain. AISPs, on 
the other hand, stated that part of the challenge was that farmers were not 
detecting heat on time and that this resulted in delays in insemination. Thus, 
some farmers reverted to using bulls as a cheaper option, although the use of 
bulls also persisted because of other traditional practices, including uncon-
trolled open grazing.
At both sites, AISPs, DFBA managers, and even EADD partners were 
aware and agreed that missed conception was an issue, but from interviews, 
we noted that there was no systematic feedback process that could guide col-
lective learning in solving this problem. A few DMGs indicated that they had 
tried out the “village bull” idea that was being promoted as one way of giving 
farmers more control of AI services, but these groups ran into the challenge of 
lack of qualified service providers. The operation of a village bull depended on 
a group being able to hire their own service provider, but there was a shortage 
of locally available qualified AISPs. Some farmers expressed some reservations 
about the subsidized imported semen, pointing to issues of perceived poor 
quality (for example, weak calves from the semen) and also suitability of the 
semen (for example, adaptability). Further, the improvement of breeding prac-
tices depends also on farmers keeping proper records for all inseminations and 
on ear tagging; but discussions with farmers indicated that many of them did 
not consistently keep records on items such as AI servings, conception, calv-
ing, milking, and tracking of progeny, and there was no structured support 
through the platform to improve these.
This section indicates that the platform to a certain extent induced the 
uptake of improved AI practices by building adequate linkages with different 
actors at different times and also by integrating new organizational and insti-
tutional structures (such as the check-off system, or the village bull). However, 
the various gaps and tensions noted indicate that the interventions could not 
cater for all categories of farmers and also did not put in place all necessary 
conditions to address the bottlenecks to successful AI innovation.
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ENHANCING PRODUCTION THROUGH IMPROVED FEEDS AND FEEDING PRACTICES
In both Metkei and Tanykina, natural pastures for grazing comprised the 
largest portion of livestock feed. The predominant feeding system combined 
extensive open grazing, complemented by the use of planted fodder (mainly 
Napier grass and oats), and supplemented by purchased concentrate feeds. The 
reliance on pastures by a majority of the farmers resulted in a perennial prob-
lem of limited quality feeds, and this affected milk production. Many farmers 
indicated that growing fodder was a good alternative to expensive concentrate 
feeds. The platform supported various interventions that combined extension 
and training on new feed technologies (that is, forage and fodder production) 
and promotion of feed conservation methods so as to maximize milk produc-
tion while minimizing feed cost. First, a trainer-of-trainers (TOT) approach 
that combined model (demonstration) farmers and community-based trainers 
was used to disseminate information and technologies to farmers in DMGs. 
ICRAF and ILRI provided dissemination support and conducted partici-
patory research on some new fodder crops (for example, dual-purpose sweet 
potatoes) and on silage making. The district-level Ministry of Agriculture 
extension office also collaborated to support the trainers. However, the TOT 
approach faced challenges, as the trainers were not effectively reaching farm-
ers as a result of an oversight relating to their supervision, because it was not 
clear whether they reported to the DFBA management or the EADD facili-
tators. This challenge resulted in extension services being halted for a period. 
Consequently, a new extension approach had to be designed, whereby commu-
nity extension-service providers (CESPs) were to be hired directly through the 
DFBA; this meant that the DFBAs had to contribute financially for this ser-
vice from their revenues. Table 9.4 provides a summary of how the feed inno-
vation dynamics coevolved.
At both sites, most farmers belonging to DMGs indicated increased knowl-
edge about different types of feeds (for example, lucerne, Calliandra, sweet 
potato vines, Desmodium) and feed-conservation methods (for example, silage, 
hay) compared to those that were not in groups. Most of the DMG farmers 
indicated that they made better use of crop residue as feed, particularly maize 
stovers (leaves and stalks) which previously were not highly valued as feed, and 
some had also planted new fodder crops. However, we generally noted from 
the focus-group discussions with farmers that the adoption of the new feed-
ing technologies and practices was still a challenge. The most common prob-
lem cited by farmers was the lack of access to seeds. Most of the seeds for the 
newly introduced feeds were not easily available at the local agro-vet shops, so 
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farmers could not purchase them. Further, in some areas, farmers stated that 
the demonstration plots that were to serve as multiplying sites for seeds did 
not work as well as expected. In Metkei, farmers indicated that most demon-
stration plots had not yet been established and those that were set up did not 
receive adequate technical support from the program as planned. Various 
informants attributed some of the difficulties to how the extension approach 
was structured when the program began. However, although the extension 
approach was restructured and incorporated into the DFBAs, the changes still 
did not address many of the challenges noted.
From discussions with various informants, we found that feedback and 
learning from some of these challenges were not systematically captured. We 
TABLE 9.4 Summary of innovation activities for improved feeding and the roles of 
intermediaries in supporting the process
Dimension of 
innovation
Activities Functions of intermediary actors
Orgware • Training and dissemination of information 
on improved feeds and feed conservation 
management through DMGs
• establishment of demonstration plots in 
farmer-trainer fields for use in training on 
growing various types of feeds and for 
seed multiplication
• F2—Facilitating extension-service 
provision, including design of training 
modules and training of extension-
service providers in partnership with the 
Ministry of Livestock—heifer and ICraF
• F3 and F5—Technical backstopping of 
demonstration farmers, including set-up, 
supplying seeds, and follow up—ICraF/
ILrI
hardware • promoting the use of small-scale 
feed-processing technologies, that is, 
pulverizers and chuff cutters
• Dissemination of various types of fodder 
crops (seeds, vines)
• F4—Facilitating procurement of 
feed-processing equipment through 
partnership with local small and medium 
enterprises—heifer and TNS
• F3—Conducting research to understand 
uptake and use of feed-processing 
technologies—ILrI
Software • Conducting participatory research with 
farmers to test various newly introduced 
fodder crops (for example, dual-purpose 
sweet potatoes)
• promoting change in farmer feeding and 
feed-conservation practices 
• F1—Conducting baseline/diagnostic 
studies on feeding issues—ILrI
• F3—Identifying sites and setup of 
experiments in collaboration with other 
scientists and farmers—ICraF/ILrI
• Facilitating information dissemination 
and training through extension—heifer 
and ICraF/ILrI
• F3—Conducting research to draw 
lessons on improving feeding practices 
and feed markets—ILrI 
Source: authors.
Note: DMG = dairy-management group; F1 = Demand articulation; F2 = Institutional support; F3 = Knowledge brokering;  
F4 = Network brokering; F5 = Capacity building; F6 = Innovation-process management; ICraF = World agroforestry Centre;  
ILrI = International Livestock research Institute; TNS = Technoserve.
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found that, although learning on EADD’s function was embedded into the 
program plan and led by one of the consortium partners (ILRI), this learning 
was not transferred to different levels on the platform. A mid-term evaluation 
report highlighted this challenge, pointing to the constraint of a focus on ful-
filling program milestones as reflected in the monitoring and evaluation sys-
tem which did not necessarily link to a learning agenda at the different levels 
of operation of the platform (EADD 2011b; TANGO International 2010). 
Additionally, at both sites, many farmers indicated that shrinking plot size 
constrained the possibility of switching from foodcrops to fodder crops on 
part of their land. The issue of access to land was particularly challenging for 
the youth and women, who had less control over land because of cultural fac-
tors. Furthermore, it emerged from both sites that poor rainfall also affected 
their plans to plant fodder crops, and a general lack of access to adequate water 
was a critical challenge to improving dairy production. This not only affected 
the productivity of the cow, but was also very time-consuming, particularly for 
women who were responsible for tasks such as taking cattle to the river.
These findings point to the important role of platforms in intermediat-
ing linkages among actors by trying out various organizational arrangements. 
However, the gaps noted point to the importance of systematic feedback and 
learning in the process to attain the expected outcomes. Furthermore, we note 
how the broader context impeded the extent to which the platform could 
shape the innovation process. Consequently, platforms may run into major 
constraints which need structural change, but this is not easily achieved.
Analysis and Discussion
Innovation Platforms Synchronize Mutually Reinforcing 
Developments Through Distributed Intermediation
The findings indicate how the innovation platform shaped the innovation 
process in addressing the various system weaknesses that had been impeding 
the enhancement of smallholder dairy farming, and contributed to outcomes 
in relation to access to services and inputs, and improved productivity. The 
strength of EADD as an innovation platform was in sequentially (but with 
recurring and sometimes simultaneous attention to the same issues if needed) 
implementing combinations of technical and social institutional innovations; 
this also contributed to some reconfiguration of relations among different actors. 
As the results show, the new dairy business model as an institutional innova-
tion integrated technological elements that further catalyzed business-hub 
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development and accompanying institutional rearrangements in service delivery. 
Most of the innovations were institutional in nature, confirming earlier find-
ings on institutional change as a sine qua non (essential component) for inno-
vation (Cleaver 2002; Hounkonnou et al. 2012). However, the integration of 
technological elements (albeit incremental technological innovation) was also 
of key importance because technological innovation also triggers new practices. 
For example, the introduction of the dairy management software for records 
management introduced more transparency not only in the weighing of milk, 
but also in systematically tracking the various transactions relating to services 
used by each farmer, thus enhancing farmers’ trust in the dairy company. Also, 
the establishment of dairy companies with improved governance and manage-
ment structures, coupled with a credit guarantee provided through the EADD 
program, enabled companies to secure credit from commercial banks, which 
previously were wary of lending to farmers because of the perceived risk of agri-
cultural enterprises. Thus, it is in the coevolution process that the different 
elements mutually reinforce one another, almost in a virtuous cycle (compare 
Hekkert and Negro 2009), which is also linked to changing and emergent net-
work configurations (Ekboir 2003; Kash and Rycroft 2002; Klerkx, Aarts, and 
Leeuwis 2010). This is what contributes to overall system change—in our case 
moving from predominantly smallholder subsistence dairy farming (comparable 
to system A in Figure 9.1) to increasingly commercial dairy farming (system B in 
Figure 9.1).
As our findings demonstrate, the key role of platforms is in connecting the 
orgware component (institutional change) to the hardware and software com-
ponents of innovation by establishing effective patterns of interactions for 
negotiating institutional change; this confirms earlier findings (Dormon et al. 
2007). Here, it clearly emerges that the intermediation on the platform is crit-
ical in strengthening more system-level capacities relating to orchestrating and 
organizing networks, thus enabling the coevolution of innovation by facilitat-
ing linkages among different stakeholders who were previously not connected 
for various reasons (for example, cognitive distance, high transaction costs, and 
information asymmetry). But importantly, as others also have shown, it is the 
negotiated institutional changes as the outcomes of these linkages that can then 
provide opportunities for successful innovation for smallholders (see Dormon et 
al. 2007; Hall et al. 2001; Nederlof, Wongtschowski, and van der Lee 2011).
From these findings, we note that the important role of the EADD consor-
tium actors as innovation intermediaries could be seen from the beginning of 
the innovation process, facilitating the articulation of the innovation vision, and 
mobilizing funding and other resources necessary for the program. This was 
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followed by orchestrating networks of different actors who were brought in at 
different points in time, mainly around specific issues. This included selecting 
which actors were important for fulfilling particular objectives of the program 
at various points in the innovation process, which contributed to reconfigura-
tion among actors, including patterns of cooperation. This indicates that plat-
forms are highly dynamic and distributed in composition, as opposed to static 
structures, as Nederlof, Wongtschowski, and van der Lee (2011) have also found.
The results indicate that platforms are effective in coordinating innovation 
because of the complementary skills and competencies that the various interme-
diary actors bring to them. The organizations in EADD were able to connect 
different actors representing different ambits of the innovation process. These 
findings confirm the complexity of innovation intermediation, which entails 
fulfilling a myriad of functions distributed over time and fulfilled by different 
actors. Rather than one central innovation intermediary acting as a platform 
facilitator, there is a set of innovation intermediaries, as other studies (Klerkx, 
Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010; Stewart and Hyysalo 2008) have observed.
Tensions and Caveats of Innovation Platforms in Stimulating 
Coevolution
Despite innovation platforms acting as catalysts for innovation-systems inter-
action, the results also point to the limitations of platforms. As other scholars 
have also argued (Hall and Clark 2010; Hekkert and Negro 2009; Leeuwis 
and Aarts 2011), coevolutionary processes cannot be steered and controlled 
fully, so the platform is not a magic bullet for fully managing innovation 
processes. From our analysis, we can identify several tensions in relation to 
employing platforms as a tool to stimulate innovation.
A first tension relates to the structure of platforms in relation to purpose. 
As the results indicate, EADD appeared to be successful with regard to 
improving marketing at the DFBA level, but, despite some positive results, the 
platform appeared to be less successful with outcomes relating to farmer-level 
innovation and productivity linked to uptake of AI and improved feeding-
management strategies. Despite the fact that EADD enabled the formation 
of different lateral networks to address a variety of emerging issues relevant to 
the overall innovation process, the platform appeared not to have sufficient 
capacity to enact the effective reformism needed to change all structures; this 
impeded change at different levels. This raises the question of whether all 
innovation platforms should have a similar composition in terms of diversity 
of participants and governance structure, or should also differ according to 
different types of outcomes (such as strengthening value-chain interaction, 
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raising farm-level productivity, and livelihood improvement) and the different 
levels of operation (such as platforms aiming at developing innovative 
solutions to problems, and platforms aiming at up-scaling such solutions), as 
the recent findings by Hermans et al. (2012) suggest.
A second tension is that, despite the usefulness of the distributed nature of 
innovation intermediation, it could also be seen as a source of tension and com-
petition among the innovation intermediaries, which are essentially different 
organizations each with its own objectives. In this context, each organization 
focused on or pursued strategies that reflected its own imperatives and man-
dates, and in some cases this resulted in tensions that undermined the broader 
vision of the program. In relation to this finding, there is also a limitation in 
our analysis: by focusing only on the platform’s formal innovation intermedi-
aries (the EADD consortium), we did not necessarily capture the distributed 
agency of other actors involved in the network; but these could also be acting as 
innovation intermediaries in less formal ways and could even counteract overall 
platform objectives, as Klerkx and Aarts (2013) have observed elsewhere.
A third tension relates to the flexibility that platforms need to have vis-à-
vis program planning. As the EADD case shows, platforms are continuously 
facilitating interactions with different actors, dictated by circumstances and 
unanticipated effects of actions. These findings confirm earlier findings that 
the management of innovation processes needs to be adaptive and guided 
by iterative learning (Klerkx, Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010; Kouévi, Mierlo, and 
Leeuwis 2011). Although the EADD platform was designed with a learning 
component, it was not always sufficiently adaptive and responsive, at least in 
the short term, to the new problems and tensions that emerged. This implies 
that platforms should not be seen as a development tool for executing a pre-
conceived plan in a blueprint fashion, but rather they should be arenas for 
strengthening capacities to deal with the complex and dynamic nature of agri-
cultural innovation (following Ekboir 2003; Hall and Clark 2010; Leeuwis 
and van den Ban 2004). This connects to the issue of the need to balance and 
reconcile results-based, milestone-focused monitoring (for example, logical 
frameworks) with process-based monitoring, where the intermediaries system-
atically capture feedback and enhance reflectivity to adequately support adap-
tive capacity in the innovation process (Regeer 2009; van Mierlo et al. 2010b).
This is an important finding in light of the increasing application of plat-
forms in agricultural innovation and development programs. Such adaptive 
capacity can be a challenge in development program–driven innovation plat-
forms. One of the reasons is the scale of programs and the platforms connected 
to them (for example, the Sub-Saharan Africa Challenge Programme working 
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in nine countries—van Rijn, Bulte, and Adekunle 2012) and demands in terms 
of clear planning for budgeting, implementation, and accountability purposes. 
Another reason is that some issues that emerge are beyond the scope of the 
platform given the broader contextual factors that impinge on the process. For 
example, infrastructural problems linked to inadequate access to water or poor 
feeder roads could not be adequately addressed by EADD. This hints at the 
need to be aware that adaptive management of innovation through platforms 
also requires funding schemes that are responsive to emerging challenges or 
finding ways to leverage the required resources.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated how innovation platforms are important 
mechanisms for stimulating and coordinating coevolution of innovation. A 
main implication of our study for theory is that the coevolving nature of inno-
vation processes requires a conceptualization of platforms as dynamic and 
distributed networks instead of static and centralized networks. They have a 
nested structure comprising different intermediary actors who build bridges 
between different components in innovation systems, and it is the variety of 
intermediary actors that makes the platform effective. A key policy implica-
tion is that supporting innovation platforms as mechanisms for enhancing 
innovation requires platform funding, planning, and governance mechanisms 
that allow for continual adaptation to emerging issues. This also points to 
the need to integrate more reflexive forms of monitoring to optimally enable 
adaptive management of innovation through innovation platforms.
The study also highlights a number of areas for future research, connected 
to the tensions and caveats identified herein. A first area is about platform 
structure and governance in relation to the objective of the innovation plat-
form (such as strengthening value-chain interaction, raising farm-level produc-
tivity, livelihood improvement). A key question is how to determine a priori 
the optimal diversity of participants on innovation platforms, and the opti-
mal governance form for innovation platforms. This also relates to issues such 
as the costs of operating innovation platforms (efficiency), and sustaining 
action initiated by innovation platforms (effectiveness). It could be relevant to 
explore work from organization and management studies in order to inform 
studies on platform composition and governance (Klerkx and Aarts 2013; 
Provan and Kenis 2008).
A second area relates to the role of innovation intermediaries. Our study 
has shown that different innovation intermediaries are complementary, but 
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it also revealed diverging priorities among the different innovation interme-
diaries operating on the platform. For platform efficiency and effectiveness, a 
key issue is that overall facilitation should be in place to minimize such diver-
gence and maximize complementarities between different innovation inter-
mediaries. It is still an open question as to who is best placed to fulfill this 
role of overall platform facilitator. Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009) have sug-
gested that a specialized and independent organization has certain advan-
tages for overall platform facilitation vis-à-vis innovation intermediaries on 
the platform, who also have a substantive role (for example, in undertaking 
research or providing technical services) and a stronger normative orientation 
or political or commercial interest, but further research is needed to verify this. 
Furthermore, whereas this study focused on the formal intermediaries on the 
platform, future studies should analyze the many informal intermediaries that 
may be active on the platform or in its broader environment. Finally, a third 
area for future research relates to how to shape monitoring to enable adap-
tive management of innovation through innovation platforms. Future studies 
should investigate whether and how different ways of monitoring can be com-
bined to satisfy the needs of both innovation-platform participants and inno-
vation-platform funders.
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DEALING WITH CRITICAL CHALLENGES 
IN AFRICAN INNOVATION PLATFORMS: 
LESSONS FOR FACILITATION1
Kees Swaans, Beth Cullen, André van Rooyen, Adewale Adekunle, Hlami 
Ngwenya, Zelalem Lema, and Suzanne Nederlof
Introduction
There is growing scientific recognition of innovation platforms (IPs) and 
the role of facilitation in catalyzing agricultural innovation (see Klerkx and 
Gildemacher 2011; Hounkonnou et al. 2012; Klerkx, Mierlo, and Leeuwis 
2012), with increasing documentation of experiences from practitioners 
(see Hawkins et al. 2009; Nederlof, Wongtschowski, and Van der Lee 2011; 
Nederlof and Pyburn 2012; Mbabu and Hall 2012). IPs have become increas-
ingly popular, and run the risk of becoming a void concept or misunderstood—
for example, because they are taken as merely mechanisms to regulate value 
chains or to extend new technologies to large numbers of farmers (PAEPARD 
2013; Darbas and Sumberg 2013); still, the discussion whether or not IPs are 
useful and effective is a relevant one. In this chapter, we argue that the success 
of an IP depends on the attitude and skills of the facilitator. Indeed, one of the 
most frequent questions from practitioners is: How do we best facilitate IPs?
IPs are composed of a range of actors, often with very different back-
grounds, who discuss and address challenges and opportunities around a par-
ticular issue or area (Nederlof, Wongtschowski, and Van der Lee 2011). IPs 
may operate at local or national level; sometimes linking actors at differ-
ent scales. Often, the actors have divergent and sometimes competing and 
conflicting interests and values, and they do not naturally want to cooper-
ate or share information with each other. Experience has shown that skill-
ful facilitation is needed to enable the platform members to reach a shared 
1 The development of ideas presented in this chapter took place during a writeshop on innova-
tion platforms, which was held on May 27–29, 2013 in Nairobi, Kenya, and was funded by the 
CGIAR Research Program on Integrated Systems for the Humid Tropics. The authors would 
like to thank Alan Duncan from ILRI for his comments on an earlier draft.
This chapter is an expanded version (with extended methodology) of an article originally published in Knowledge 
Management for Development Journal 9 (3): 116–135 (2013).
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understanding of the issues at hand, agree on common goals, communicate, 
cooperate, coordinate activities to address their challenges, and take advan-
tage of opportunities.
In this chapter, we reflect on some of the key challenges emerging from our 
experiences of facilitating IPs in Africa. The challenges are derived from dis-
cussions among researchers and practitioners during a “writeshop” on IPs in 
Nairobi, May 2013, in which most of the authors participated (see Gonsalves 
and Armonia 2010 for further information about writeshops). The identified 
issues related to IP facilitation are recognized challenges within development 
practice; despite this, however, they often do not receive the attention they 
deserve among IP practitioners.
The Process of Identifying Key Issues and 
Challenges
The idea for this chapter was first born during a writeshop organized in 
May 2013 at the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) in 
Nairobi, Kenya. During the writeshop, 20 individuals worked together, 
with expert facilitation and artistic support, to produce “practice briefs.” 
The writeshop hosted two types of participants: (1) IP “practitioners” 
with significant experience of managing a diverse range of platforms; and 
(2) “researchers” studying innovation systems and IP processes, who could 
link practice with theory, and help refine and critique the products. Some 
of the participants bridged these two categories and could be described as 
“researcher–practitioners.” This group of experts, facilitators, and artists 
worked together intensively for three days. One of the key issues identified 
by the writeshop participants was “platform facilitation.” The participants 
observed the need for solid lessons on facilitation that could be utilized by 
brokers. To ensure that a wide range of experiences were included, addi-
tional authors were invited to participate. The current authors reflect a 
diversity of “IP initiatives” in Africa.
This chapter is based on qualitative research using a case-study approach. 
The cases were selected from agricultural-extension and research-for-devel-
opment (R4D) projects. These projects were all implemented in southern, 
East, and West Africa in the past decade, and focused on agricultural pro-
duction, value-chain development, and/or natural-resource management 
(see Box 10.1). Different IPs were taken as cases and systematically checked 
for consistency on the lessons derived. The authors used critical reflexivity 
to obtain the main lessons on facilitation (see Schön 1983).
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BOx 10.1 Selection of agricultural extension and research-for-development 
projects across Africa with authors’ involvement
Fodder Adoption Project (FAP): The project aimed to strengthen the 
capacity of poor livestock keepers to select and adopt fodder options and 
access market opportunities to enable them to improve their livelihoods; for 
this purpose the project engaged with a wide range of actors through IPs 
(Ethiopia, Syria, Vietnam) (2008–2010).
Nile Basin Development Challenge (NBDC): Program to improve the 
resilience of rural livelihoods in the Ethiopian highlands through a landscape 
approach to rainwater management; district-level IPs were established to 
address natural-resource management issues at the local level (Ethiopia) 
(2010–2013).
Volta Basin Development Challenge (VBDC): Program on integrated 
management of rainwater and small reservoirs for multiple uses; district-
level IPs were established to improve rainwater management and increase 
production and market access at the local level (Burkina Faso, Ghana) 
(2010–2013).
Small ruminant value chains as platforms for reducing poverty and 
increasing food security in dryland areas of India and Mozambique 
(imGoats): The project aimed to increase income and food security 
through a pro-poor value chain for goats using an IP approach (India and 
Mozambique) (2011–2013).
Livestock Livelihood and Markets Project (LILI Markets): The project 
aimed to improve market participation by small goat and cattle growers 
in semiarid regions of southern Africa using IPs (Mozambique, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe) (2007–2010).
Increasing food security and household income through small-stock 
market development in Zimbabwe (ZimGoats): Project to increase food 
security and income for small-scale goat keepers through increased 
production, market development, and through the testing and use of an IP 
approach (Zimbabwe) (2011–2013).
Sustainable management of globally significant endemic ruminant 
livestock of West Africa (PROGEBE): Program on conservation of indigenous 
cattle in West Africa; local IPs were formed for value-chain development 
on specific commodities to increase interest among farmers (The Gambia, 
Guinea, Mali, Senegal) (2003–2013; IPs since 2011).
Building livelihoods resilience to alleviate poverty in semiarid areas of 
West Africa (PLM): Program to build livelihood resilience of smallholder 
farmers through the establishment of community-level IPs for dairy and/or 
vegetable value chains (Mali, Niger, Togo) (2010–2013).
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To strengthen the quality of the analysis and synthesis, triangulation 
of several methods is applied. The first method is a literature review on 
facilitation of IPs. Emerging findings were cross-checked and verified through 
literature. The second method entailed informal conversations and group 
discussions with practitioners, researchers, and researcher–practitioners in 
the field of facilitating IPs. These took place during the writeshop consult-
a tion process to identify key issues and challenges. As the writeshop 
participants began evaluating their various experiences of IP facilitation, 
certain patterns began to emerge—often across different programs working 
in different regions. A third method used was that of self-reflection by the 
authors as “researcher–practitioners” of IP facilitation themselves. Key issues 
and challenges identified during the writeshop were further reflected upon, 
prioritized, and synthesized by the authors based on their personal experiences 
with IP facilitation across Africa (see Schön 1983 for an elaborative discussion 
on the “reflective practitioner”). When possible, this information was further 
substantiated by referring to secondary literature.
The approach we have taken to gathering and analyzing the information 
included in this chapter has both strengths and weaknesses. Most of the 
authors and writeshop participants are “researcher–practitioners” with first-
hand experience of IP facilitation. The experiences of such people, particularly 
those more involved in practice, often remain undocumented or are only 
Sub-Saharan Africa Challenge Programme (SSA CP): Response to 
the need to dramatically increase the development impact of agricultural 
research on livelihoods in Africa by developing, testing, and promoting an 
IP approach for conducting agricultural research for development (AR4D) in 
Africa (throughout East, West, southern Africa) (2005–2010).
Convergence of Sciences—Strengthening Agricultural Innovation 
Systems (COS-SIS): Program to carry out interdisciplinary policy and 
institutional experiments with a view to elaborate, apply, and assess a 
development approach to sustainable rural-poverty alleviation and food 
security, based on innovation-systems thinking (Benin, Ghana, and Mali) 
(first phase 2001–2006; second phase 2008–2013).
Broadening Agricultural Service and Extension Delivery (BASED): Bilateral 
program between Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(then Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) and the 
Limpopo Department of Agriculture aimed at transforming the extension 
service-delivery system (South Africa) (1998–2006).
Source: authors.
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partially captured in reports and unpublished documents. The writeshop 
approach and critical reflexivity were used because they are specifically 
designed to capture and document the experiential, tacit knowledge of the 
practitioner (Schön 1983). The writeshop approach is particularly valuable 
considering the pressure that researcher–practitioners increasingly face to 
generate “key lessons” and recommendations for “best practice” (Patton 2001).
The methodology used allowed for analysis of a broad range of cases in 
Africa, including many well-known examples. We did not, however, analyze 
cases from other parts of the world. Yet, many interesting experiences exist 
in other parts of the world, such as those described for Papua New Guinea 
by Mbabu and Hall (2012), and experiences of the International Center 
for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) with learning alliances in Latin America 
(see Lundy, Gottret, and Ashby 2005). In addition, most of the platforms 
referred to in this chapter have been established within AR4D projects 
and may not be representative of approaches being taken by organizations 
working in other sectors. We may also have missed examples of more locally 
emergent platforms.
Key Issues in Facilitating Innovation Platforms
To frame the discussion on key challenges in facilitating IPs, we briefly reflect 
on what IPs are, the implications for facilitation, and who is best suited to 
facilitate these platforms, drawing from practice and current theory.
Innovation Platforms—Forums for Learning and Action
In this chapter, we adopt Homann-Kee Tui et al. (2013)’s—practical—
definition of IPs:
A forum for learning and action involving a group of actors with dif-
ferent backgrounds and interests: farmers, agricultural input suppli-
ers, traders, food processors, researchers, government officials, etc. 
These actors come together to develop a common vision and find ways 
to achieve their goals. They may design and implement activities as a 
group or coordinate activities by individual actors (p. 1)
IPs are based on innovation-systems thinking: a holistic and comprehen-
sive framework for understanding innovation (new products, new  processes, 
and new forms of organization) as emerging from a broad network of 
 dynamically linked actors within a particular institutional and policy context 
(Hall et al. 2006).
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Within agriculture, IPs can be useful to explore strategies that can boost 
productivity, sustainably manage natural resources, improve value chains, or 
influence policies; these strategies often include biophysical, socioeconomic, 
and political elements, and concern various formal and informal institutions2 
(Homann-Kee Tui et al. 2013). By bringing together actors from various 
sectors and from different administrative levels, and by acknowledging and 
making use of their diverse capacity (knowledge, skills, capabilities, interests, 
resources), IPs may be able to identify and address existing barriers or 
challenges to innovation and/or take advantage of potential opportunities.
From Facilitation to Innovation Brokering
The task of a facilitator in the context of IPs goes beyond merely facilitating 
meetings and managing dynamics between a bounded group of actors. Rather, 
“innovation brokering” is required, which involves stimulating interactions 
with a wide range of actors, often operating at different levels, with diverse 
interests (see Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009; Kilelu, Klerkx, and Sitima 
2011). Innovation brokers are defined as the persons or organizations that 
catalyze innovation by bringing actors together and facilitating their 
interaction (Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009). To achieve this, brokers 
perform a variety of functions, ranging from facilitating interactions between 
actors, through linking and strategic networking, technical backstopping, 
mediation, advocacy, capacity building, and management, to documenting 
learning (see Box 10.2).
As we can see, the role of an innovation broker is diverse and challenging, 
and demands a particular set of skills. Effective innovation brokers are 
flexible and natural networkers, have a knack for developing cooperation 
and partnerships, a strong and wide personal network, a capacity to manage 
relations effectively over time, a good sense of power dynamics, the ability to 
manage conflict, a listening ear, group-facilitation skills, and the ability to 
consider broader system dynamics. They may also need to encourage actors 
within a given system to change entrenched practices and question the ways in 
which the system functions. This raises questions about who is best placed to 
fulfill this role.
 2 By institutions we mean the informal and formal rules and regulations that govern human action 
(Douglas 1986).
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Who Are the Brokers?
There are different ways of categorizing innovation brokers (for example, 
see Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009), but generally brokers can either be 
BOx 10.2 Brokering functions
Facilitation: The facilitator convenes and manages regular meetings to 
identify key constraints and strategies, and ensures that all members can 
express their views. He or she safeguards the overall process and nurtures 
relationships among the members, coordinates interactions, negotiates 
where required, and facilitates collective learning based on increased insight.
Linking and strategic networking: The facilitator builds relationships with 
other relevant actors and invites them to collaborate with the platform; this 
may include mobilizing support and resources for activities undertaken by 
the platform.
Technical backstopping: The facilitator may provide technical advice or 
link the platform to others who can provide that information; he or she may 
also solicit further studies or consultations to identify or confirm problems 
and information needs.
Mediation actors may perceive others as competitors, who want to 
monopolize the process and prevent others from receiving crucial informa-
tion. The facilitator prevents such power struggles and addresses them if 
they arise. He or she tries to help the platform members realize they all have 
an interest in finding solutions and creating opportunities.
Advocacy innovation requires an enabling environment. The facilitator 
may help the platform to advocate for policy changes, generate new busi-
ness models, or stimulate new relationships among the actors, and get the 
buy-in and support of those who matter to the platform.
Capacity building: Most platform members are not equipped with the 
technical, organizational, and management skills to play their role in the 
platform effectively. The facilitator may link the platform to training institutes 
and organize exchange and exposure visits; he or she may also help actors 
to organize themselves better.
Management refers to the financial management, reporting, and commu-
nication with the donor. Sometimes the facilitator combines the function of 
broker with that of manager.
Documenting learning: The facilitator ensures that the meetings and the 
process are well documented and reported to relevant actors and other par-
ties; it is used to stimulate reflection and learning based on actions initiated, 
as well as the overall innovation process.
Source: authors, based on heemskerk, Klerkx, and Sitima (2011).
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organizations or individuals who can be members of the platform or indepen-
dent from the platform (Tennyson 2005; see Table 10.1).
As Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis (2009) point out, the role of innovation 
broker in Western countries is often fulfilled by intermediary organizations 
that are independent from the platform and specialized in brokering (for 
example, innovation consultants). However, such specialist brokers are not 
common in developing-country contexts. As a result, the role of innovation 
broker is often fulfilled by those who instigate platform processes (for exam-
ple, research or development organizations). Representatives from these orga-
nizations may not only be responsible for establishing platforms, they may 
also be platform members. In some cases, “insiders” from a given system may 
be selected to play the role of broker (for example, extension agents or govern-
ment representatives).
Voices from the Field: Challenges Faced
Although much has been written from a theoretical perspective on innova-
tion systems and there are many guidelines for facilitating platforms, the chal-
lenges facing innovation brokers only become evident through practice. We 
highlight seven key issues here.
Dynamic and Evolving Platforms—A Need for Highly Skilled 
Innovation Brokers
Ideally, an agricultural IP addresses social, technical, and institutional issues 
affecting the farm level as well as the wider context. Therefore, the ability of the 
facilitator to enhance interaction across different levels, with a view to enabling 
the enhanced functioning of the whole system, is of critical importance. This 
includes changes in attitudes, skills, and practice of individual actors, as well as 
the relations between them, all of which need to be carefully facilitated.
TABLE 10.1 Different types of brokers
Individual Organization
In
te
rn
al an individual operating from within one of the 
partner organizations with a designated role to 
build and /or develop the partnership
a team or department located within a partner 
organization specifically tasked with building 
and/or developing partnership relations on its 
behalf
Ex
te
rn
al an individual working externally to the partner 
organizations, appointed by either one (or more, 
or all) of the partners to build or develop some 
aspects of the partnership
an independent organization or mechanism 
created specifically to promote partnerships and/
or to undertake a brokering function on behalf of 
different partnerships
Source: Tennyson (2005).
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For example, in a small-ruminant livestock project utilizing IPs in south-
western Zimbabwe (LILI Markets/ZimGoats), local actors initially identi-
fied production and marketing issues as key challenges. After verification, the 
platform members agreed that market access was the most limiting factor; the 
IP members then sought to involve actors associated with marketing, includ-
ing buyers, transporters, and auctioneers, as well as representatives from the 
local government responsible for regulating livestock marketing in the district. 
Once local markets were established and the sales modalities developed, the IP 
shifted to include processors, namely abattoirs, and focused on improving pro-
duction, by linking farmers to commercial feed suppliers. This illustrates how 
the agenda of the IP, and in turn the composition of relevant actors, evolved 
and changed over time. Flexibility in facilitation of the innovation process 
and in the management of platform dynamics was vital to ensure that the IP 
focused on appropriate issues for achieving impact.
This example does not stand alone, and is typical for many IPs (see Duncan 
et al. 2011 for an example of how planted forage was used as an entry point for 
catalyzing innovation on broader livestock value-chain issues in Ethiopia). Based 
on an analysis of various case studies, Nederlof and Pyburn (2012) argue that a 
flexible approach to platform structure and membership is useful in case new 
topics arise, priorities change, or unexpected problems emerge. Sometimes the 
real issues only emerge after the process has begun. It may also take some time 
to determine the best level for the platform to operate in support of institutional 
change. Navigating these dynamics requires tact and diplomacy, and the inno-
vation broker’s role in orchestrating this is critical. While innovation brokers 
can be provided with how-to guidelines for facilitating IPs, it is much more com-
plicated to equip them with the skills to manage change. As process-oriented 
approaches are by nature not a blueprint with fixed goals and time frames, it is 
important that facilitators have a clear understanding of the need for flexibil-
ity and have the skills to work in an iterative way with relevant actors to achieve 
desired outcomes (see Ngwenya and Hagmann 2009).
Power and Platforms—Risk of Reinforcing the Status Quo
Although issues surrounding power dynamics are widely recognized within 
the “participation” literature (see Chambers 1997; Cooke and Kothari 2001), 
they have received scant attention3 in research on IPs (Zannou et al. 2012; 
Cullen et al. 2014). It is tempting to think that bringing different actors 
 3 Dealing with power dynamics in multistakeholder settings receives further attention in a 
recently published paper of Brouwer et al. (2013).
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together may address key constraints for value chains, managing natural 
resources, and policy development, but bringing actors together may not 
address the underlying reasons for weak actor linkages. If these issues are not 
taken into account, IPs may be used to reinforce existing dynamics, or be 
misused by powerful actors to achieve their own goals.
Experiences with district-level platforms as part of a natural-resource 
management project in the Ethiopian highlands suggest that careful attention 
should be given to power asymmetries. During a series of exercises to identify 
natural-resource management entry points in one of the districts, termite 
infestation was identified as a priority issue by farmers, due to their impact 
on grazing lands, crops, and infrastructure. However, local government 
representatives insisted that soil erosion should be prioritized—in order 
to meet national government targets for soil and water conservation. 
Government actors were overrepresented within the platform, and facilitators 
realized that if the government agenda dominated the process it was 
likely to reinforce the status quo, in which farmers have limited voice in 
decisionmaking processes, and lead to lack of engagement and “buy-in” on 
the part of community members. Platform facilitators played a critical role in 
mediating between these different interests. Together with researchers, they 
identified an intervention that could serve as a compromise between farmers 
and government decisionmakers: a termite-resistant fodder species called 
Chomo grass. This would help to conserve soils, rehabilitate grazing areas 
destroyed by termites, and provide livestock feed.
However, achieving a compromise should not always be a priority for 
platforms. It is important to point out that the focus IPs place on identifying 
and solving common problems through a process of consensus building often 
ignores the fact that conflict can be an important catalyst for change. Pushing 
actors to achieve consensus may also lead to “solutions” that are not ideal for 
all of the actors involved, particularly those who have less of a voice. With 
this in mind, although platform-facilitation guidelines often state that the 
innovation broker should be relatively neutral and objective, there may be 
situations—particularly when there are power inequalities—when brokers 
may need to advocate on behalf of certain groups. There is growing evidence 
that suggests that such multiactor processes may not be advantageous for 
marginalized groups, who may be overruled or manipulated by more powerful 
actors (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2002). Those who take this view argue that 
measures should be taken to empower weaker groups before they engage in 
collective dialog within a platform space.
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Although care should be taken to ensure that those with more power do 
not dominate the platform space, there can be advantages to working with 
powerful actors. The COS-SIS program facilitated the creation of a cocoa 
IP which aimed to secure higher prices for cocoa farmers. The cocoa sector is 
composed of powerful actors, many of whom were represented in the IP. One 
of the IP members was formerly an adviser to the minister of finance and eco-
nomic planning, with responsibility for cocoa affairs. The IP members asked 
this influential member to represent their interests, and in doing so probably 
played a role in convincing the minister to raise the producer price of cocoa for 
all farmers (see also Nederlof and Pyburn 2012; Zannou et al. 2012).
Gender—Promoting Equitable Opportunities
Gender is a critical factor in achieving development objectives, and evidence 
suggests that disparities between the sexes limit the effectiveness of develop-
ment programs (Word Bank 2001, 2011). Evaluating IPs from a gendered per-
spective can serve to highlight imbalances between men and women in terms 
of power and representation. However, when we look at the recent literature 
on IPs, gender only seems to feature in the margins. Moreover, if we look at 
all the R4D projects we are and have been involved in, only a few have given 
attention to roles played by men and women, the relationships between them, 
and how this influences innovation.
When reviewing the R4D projects, we found that women are frequently 
underrepresented in IP processes, despite the fact that in many project loca-
tions women are often the primary producers and processors of agricultural 
products. There are often limited numbers of women included in platform 
meetings, which in certain locations may reflect the wider cultural context. 
Platform facilitators and members may fail to take into consideration the con-
straints that women face in attending and being able to actively participate in 
platforms. Women’s ability to participate may depend on the timing and loca-
tion of meetings, the multiple demands on women’s time, and social expecta-
tions. Even if women are present in the platform they may not be able to voice 
their views. In certain parts of Africa, women are constrained from express-
ing their opinions due to cultural attitudes toward women speaking in public. 
This can result in platforms prioritizing issues that either do not reflect wom-
en’s concerns, or could have a negative impact on them. For example, NBDC’s 
IPs working on fodder development did not consider the extra demands on 
female labor and time that the new interventions required. Having said this, 
merely focusing on assessing women’s participation in such public spaces may 
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ignore the influence that women have over decisionmaking processes “behind 
the scenes.”
Nonetheless, it should be recognized that the recent focus on the use of 
multiactor processes to link the poor, especially women, to economic and social 
benefits, does not always lead to desired effects. This is particularly evident 
in value-chain processes where increasing women’s participation in market-
oriented production can either increase or decrease their access to and control 
over income, depending upon the character of their involvement and the specific 
characteristics of the chain (Coles and Mitchell 2011; KIT, Agri-ProFocus, 
and IIRR 2012). For example, commercialization of small ruminants—which 
in many places are traditionally the responsibility of women—may lead to a 
loss of control over household resources for women unless provisions are put 
in place to protect female interests. This may be difficult to address because it 
entails interfering with power dynamics at a household level, which may have 
unpredictable and unintended consequences.
The use of a gender lens to critically look at the design, operating modali-
ties, focus of the platform, key constraints, strategies, and resulting outcomes 
may avoid some of the adverse effects mentioned above. However, gender rela-
tions are usually deeply entrenched, so transforming them may not be always be 
something that a platform is able to address, particularly if they are operating in 
a short time frame. In addition, concepts of gender equality are often imposed 
from a Western point of view, and may need to be reconfigured to take into 
account what men and women want in specific contexts.
Internal Versus External Facilitation—Pros and Cons
When reviewing the IPs described in Box 10.1, it was observed that almost all 
were facilitated by international and national research organizations; some were 
facilitated by NGOs, and occasionally extension officers were involved in bro-
kering innovation. According to the scheme of Tennyson (2005), most of these 
individuals and organizations would be classified as “internal” brokers, as they 
often have a direct stake in the process.4 This raises questions about their abil-
ity to facilitate platform processes as they may have a vested interest in platform 
activities. This issue is of fundamental importance to IP processes, as those who 
establish and facilitate the platform often set the broad objectives, and this may 
significantly influence the selection of platform members, identification of key 
 4 In the case of COS-SIS (see Box 10.1), the program paid the facilitators, who often came from 
universities or research organizations, to act as innovation brokers. But they did not have a stake 
in the objective of the IP.
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issues, and subsequent entry points (see Nederlof, Wongtschowski, and Van 
der Lee 2011). For example, organizations that instigate platforms may have 
their own institutional agendas, such as an emphasis on commercialization 
and value-chain development, which may not always reflect the interests of the 
main beneficiaries.
Although innovation processes are based on participatory principles which 
include ensuring equal representation, flexibility, and adaptive management, 
those who manage and facilitate the process may not always get the organiza-
tional support to undertake such an approach, and individual facilitators may 
have a narrow understanding of the function and purpose of the IPs. For exam-
ple, many IPs are currently driven by national research organizations in response 
to the low uptake of technologies developed by them, such as the Research 
Into Use (RIU) program funded by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) (see Mur and Nederlof 2012) and the Dissemination of 
New Agricultural Technologies in Africa (DONATA) program coordinated by 
the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA).5 Some merely use plat-
forms as a dissemination mechanism for existing technologies, instead of explor-
ing the underlying reasons for low adoption.
In the case where international research centers and NGOs facilitate the pro-
cess, there is a risk that members of the platform associate the platform with the 
funding organization. This may lead to members choosing issues that reflect 
the mandate of the funding organization, rather than expressing more genuine 
concerns. An alternative is to seek facilitators who are more closely aligned with 
the existing agricultural system, for example, agricultural extension workers. 
However, such actors often have a limited mandate, which restricts their ability 
to act effectively as innovation brokers (see Leeuwis 2004). Moreover, in utiliz-
ing such actors, government agendas may come to dominate the discussion, as 
we have seen in the case of natural-resource management in the Ethiopian high-
lands. For these reasons it is important that both brokers and platform members 
clearly state their position and areas of interest.
A solution may be to involve specialized brokers, who have innovation brok-
ering as their main task and are external to the membership of the platform. But 
this would require further experimentation to identify who could play this role, 
as well as willingness on the part of donor organizations to fund such arrange-
ments. It is also important to bear in mind that, although external brokers may 
 5 RIU is a DFID-funded program aimed at catalyzing agricultural innovation; DONATA is a six-
year program run by FARA to accelerate the dissemination of agricultural technologies across 
the region.
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have advantages in terms of perceived neutrality and objectivity, there may also 
be certain advantages to engaging internal brokers. Internal actors are often 
better positioned as they can use existing relationships, networks, and local 
knowledge, this is particularly important in contexts where there are poorly 
functioning institutional frameworks which external actors may find difficult 
to navigate (see Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009).
While the identification of actors as “internal” and “external” can be a useful 
way of identifying the pros and cons of different brokering arrangements, these 
categories may not be as fixed as they initially appear. So-called internal bro-
kers may initiate a platform process, but then gradually take more of an external 
role as the platform develops, and vice versa. There is also potential for design-
ing brokering arrangements that involve cooperation and collaboration between 
both internal and external actors. Ultimately, the type of brokering will depend 
on the specific context, the purpose of the platform, the availability of actors, 
and the skills required.
Issues of Sustainability: Toward Self-Organization
IPs exist only as long as they are useful: their composition is likely to change over 
time as different issues emerge, they may be reconfigured to address a new set 
of problems, and ultimately they may evolve into a more permanent entity, such 
as a producers’ association, cooperative, or even business. Platforms may serve 
to build the innovative capacity of actors within the system, but the platforms 
themselves may cease to function.
Although most IPs are facilitated by research organizations or NGOs, which 
themselves have a stake in the process, these organizations are often perceived as 
relative outsiders by the other actors in the platform; they often reside outside the 
project area and operate on behalf of a specific project and donor. In order to sus-
tain the innovation process, it would be important to make other actors in the 
platform capable of taking over some of the critical innovation brokering tasks 
after project funding comes to an end. However, handing over facilitation may 
be a complicated process. For example, relative outsiders may be more accepted 
as facilitators by other actors—especially where there are power inequalities or 
conflicting agendas between platform members—leading to potential resistance 
to internal actors taking over this role. In some cases it may be easier for exter-
nal actors to convene the process and to keep the overall objective of the platform 
in mind; insiders may need capacity building to take on this role. Facilitation by 
so-called insiders may encourage ownership of the process among local actors, 
making it easier for the implementing organization(s) to phase out, but there can 
be problems with lack of trust, particularly regarding finances.
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Experiences from projects that have instigated platforms and then tried  
to “hand over the stick” illustrate some of the challenges that may be encoun-
tered. As part of a two-year project on goat production and marketing in 
 dryland areas of Mozambique (imGoats), an international NGO was identified 
to take up the innovation-broker role. Although a project team from the NGO 
took the lead, they realized the need to identify local actors who could take 
over the role of innovation broker in order to sustain the process. The platform 
 members elected a committee of four members, representing different actor 
groups. Throughout the process, the project team provided on-the-spot support 
and backstopping. Although the committee gradually took over responsibili-
ties for facilitation and coordination, they faced two big challenges: linking with 
different actors outside the platform, and strategic networking with government 
agencies. One constraint was the low capacity among the committee members 
at the start of the project, but committee members’ competing commitments 
and the short time frame of the project played a role as well. However, there 
are also positive examples of platform sustainability, such as the case of the SSA 
CP—whereby 36 platforms were set up throughout Africa. Many have become 
established within the local or district government administrations. Support 
to farmers from local policymakers has strengthened the platforms. According 
to Mokwunye and Ellis-Jones (2010), the sustainability of the IPs has become 
apparent where farmer organizations, commercial people, and local govern-
ments have become drivers and champions.6
We find it difficult to draw conclusions regarding the most effective bro-
kerage arrangements for the sustainability of platforms. Generally speaking, as 
the main focus of any IP is to stimulate and support actors to start working as 
a self-organized and self-managed innovation system, handing over the task to 
local innovation brokers should be a central part of the process.
Issues of Scale: How to Ensure the Quality of the Process
Recently, FARA was approached by the Minister of Agriculture of Sierra 
Leone, who wanted to establish 230 IPs (Adekunle, pers. comm.). In addition 
to this, The Gambia, having been persuaded to try the approach, decided to 
commence by setting up 22 platforms.7 However, working at this kind of scale 
 6 Champions are highly motivated actors that can play a role to mobilize peers of their groups, 
promote contact between the platform members and their constituencies, and often set an 
example (see Heemskerk, Klerkx, and Sitima 2011).
 7 It is important to realize that IPs are not a blueprint solution; instead of starting with IPs, it is 
better to start with the identification of opportunities through a scoping exercise and then to 
take advantage of these opportunities, through establishment of actor linkages or an IP.
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demands that a new generation of innovation brokers is trained and armed 
with the basic tools for effective platform facilitation.
FARA has started undertaking such capacity-building activities through 
a range of programs, including the SSA CP and the Platform for African–
European Partnerships for Agricultural Research and Development 
(PAEPARD).8 The PAEPARD project in particular places an emphasis on 
training “Agricultural Innovation Facilitators.” FARA is also working with 
partners to enrich the curriculum of universities to include soft skills that are 
essential for the successful facilitation of innovation processes. In addition, 
the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and the Australian Centre 
for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) recently developed an ini-
tiative to train people from national research organizations across Africa in 
the facilitation of IPs (Makini et al. 2013).
Such endeavors are highly encouraging, but it is important that they are 
not one-off activities. Developing skills in innovation brokering requires an 
iterative learning process which cannot be dealt with through modular train-
ing, but requires learning by doing and reflection on the process (Ngwenya, 
Hagman, and Ramaru 2008; Ngwenya and Hagmann 2009, 2011). Moreover, 
institutional and policy support may be required over a sufficient time frame 
in order for such initiatives to have long-lasting impact. For example, those 
who are trained are likely to need support and possibly incentives from their 
organizations to address systemic and underlying constraints. Experience has 
shown that building facilitation capacity without investing in the institu-
tional reform necessary to support process-oriented approaches is unlikely to 
succeed. In South Africa, for example, a Participatory Extension Approach 
(PEA) with facilitation for change embedded in it was implemented through 
the BASED program (see Ngwenya, Hagman, and Ramaru 2008). The pro-
gram was successful in training quality facilitators among selected extension 
officers and managers. However, in order for these new emerging profession-
als to be successful, a radical transformation of government structures was 
required to provide an enabling institutional environment. At the beginning, 
some senior managers backed the approach and initiated the process of inte-
grating PEA into the mainstream system. However, the process collapsed due 
to a change of management. As a result, many of the trained facilitators left 
the government system to form an independent NGO.
 8 PAEPARD seeks to strengthen African agricultural research and development actors’ capacity 
to participate in European-led development initiatives for Africa and to create more responsive 
development programs for Africa.
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With these examples in mind, it is clear that developing facilitation capac-
ity requires a much more systematic approach that pays attention to the broader 
supporting structure. Scaling out of IPs to other areas and locations needs to be 
accompanied by institutional and political support for different ways of work-
ing and for the newly emerging professionals who help guide these processes.
Monitoring and Evaluation: A Role for Facilitators?
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is particularly important for IPs given 
the growing demand for evidence that innovation-system approaches lead to 
impact on the ground. However, facilitators of IPs often struggle to develop 
appropriate M&E formats. Traditional research and development approaches 
have a tendency to employ a linear M&E model based on an assumption that 
change can be planned, easily identified, and controlled (Prasad Pant 2010). 
However, such theoretical approaches and the associated tools are not nec-
essarily suitable for an innovation-system approach due to its complex, non-
linear, and participatory nature. Due to their nature, the impacts of IP 
processes are not always tangible and can be difficult to monitor. IPs therefore 
require an M&E framework and set of tools that take into consideration the 
complexities of innovation systems, and which can document and assess pro-
cess as well as outcomes (see Njuki 2010).
The objective of M&E in the context of R4D projects is twofold: first, it 
may serve as a tool to generate research-based evidence for the effectiveness 
of IPs across different contexts; second, it is meant for joint learning among 
project teams and the actors by assessing their performance and to gain 
a better insight into the underlying issues to adapt the course of action. 
Although researchers may play an important role in the first objective, 
innovation brokers play a critical role in the second one through facilitating 
and documenting a systematic process of action, monitoring, reflection, and 
adaptation. In our experience, however, innovation brokers often do not 
consider M&E as part of their role, which makes implementation difficult. 
Based on the SSA CP, a set of tools to document IP processes and outcomes 
was adapted for use by innovation brokers in several R4D programs in West 
Africa (see Pali and Swaans 2013; initially adapted for PROGEBE, some tools 
were used for the PLM project and VBDC). However, the tools were applied 
with mixed success. After further training, research-focused platforms—
which often assigned specific persons to document lessons—applied the tools 
successfully; however, facilitators of development-focused platforms either did 
not always understand what was expected in terms of M&E, or struggled to 
use the tools and found them cumbersome.
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In one of the other projects (imGoats), outcome mapping—an alternative 
approach to planning, monitoring, and evaluating development impact devel-
oped by Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) (Earl, 
Carden, and Smutylo 2001), was adopted for M&E.9 Project partners and 
innovation brokers used this approach to track changes in behavior (that is, 
actions, relations, activities) among actors in the platform and the wider envi-
ronment. Although their experience was generally positive, the documenta-
tion and analysis was perceived as highly resource intensive. Overall, whether 
outcome mapping or other approaches were used, innovation brokers and 
project partners found it easier to apply and use the tools than to design the 
overall framework. This suggests a need for process-light, simple, and accessi-
ble formats for M&E.
While more resource-intensive approaches may work in more research- and 
learning-focused platforms, in more development-focused projects, the use of 
relatively simple participatory tools may be more appropriate to monitor prog-
ress. This could be a task of the innovation broker, but it should be borne in 
mind that joint observation, documentation, and analysis may also stimulate 
ownership of the process and outcomes among platform members. There are 
examples, such as the SSA CP, where farmers and other players on the plat-
form helped in the monitoring process after having been trained. However, 
from our experience it seems that assistance and support from M&E special-
ists may be required for the development of an overall M&E framework and 
the tools themselves, particularly if the M&E goals are focused on collecting 
evidence for external donors or researchers rather than for platform mem-
bers themselves.
Conclusion
IPs are increasingly being used in research and development initiatives. 
However, the dynamic nature of innovation processes, and the differences 
in interest, capacity, and power among the actors involved, makes the role 
of facilitation or innovation brokering particularly challenging. We believe 
that the key to success of an IP is very much linked to the attitude, skills, and 
capacities of the innovation broker. This chapter has highlighted seven key 
issues which, in our view, are critical to effective platform facilitation and have 
 9 Outcome mapping is one of the more popular M&E approaches for the purpose of learning, 
but there are also other approaches and tools, for example Causal Process Tracing (Crane and 
Richards 2009), which was tested in the COS-SIS program.
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not received the attention they deserve. They range from the dynamic and 
evolving nature of IPs to issues of power and gender, the problematic role of 
innovation brokers, issues of sustainability and scaling, and monitoring and 
evaluation for learning.
For maximum benefit of IPs, facilitators with a flexible attitude and 
process skills are needed. Both internal and external actors can act as 
facilitators and there is potential for brokerage arrangements which draw 
on both actor groups. For example, we have seen from many cases that with 
external support, farmers or other local actors can grow slowly into facilitation 
roles. It is also important to realize that not all brokering functions need 
to be fulfilled by one person or organization; so-called champions, that is, 
highly motivated actors in the platform, can play a role to mobilize peers of 
their groups, and promote contact between the platform members and their 
constituencies (see Heemskerk, Klerkx, and Sitima 2011; Klerkx and Aarts 
2013). It is clear that capacity building for facilitators is of critical importance, 
and steps being taken by agencies including FARA and KARI are heading in 
the right direction for enhancing brokering skills at a larger scale.
Although IPs offer a potential way of achieving institutional change and 
a means for facilitating interaction and learning among different actors, this 
may be complicated in contexts where there are entrenched inequalities and 
political sensitivities and where informal (local) institutions play an important 
role (Cullen et al. 2014). A group-based approach provides an opportunity for 
different actors to interact, build trust, and engage in joint learning, and can 
potentially provide an opportunity to transform underlying values and pat-
terns of interaction that may hinder innovation. However, this may work bet-
ter in homogeneous settings where people are free to express themselves, than 
in heterogeneous settings such as IPs (Swaans et al. 2008). Under such circum-
stances, combining multiactor platforms with subgroups which can focus on 
the needs of specific actors should be considered.
The context and the aim of the platform may also determine who is best 
placed to take on the role of innovation broker. As IPs have evolving agen-
das, fluid brokerage arrangements may be required that also evolve over time 
to draw on the skills and resources of both “insider” and “outsider” brokers. 
This requires sufficient flexibility on behalf of the facilitating organization 
and an understanding that actor roles may need to shift depending on the tra-
jectory of the platform. More research is needed to explore the effectiveness 
of different types of innovation brokers across different contexts, how their 
roles change over time, and the implications for the innovation process, as 
well as how different brokering arrangements can be institutionalized so that 
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innovation processes can be sustained after projects, or organizations instigat-
ing the process, phase out.
Despite the positive developments that are already taking place, significant 
changes to institutional arrangements and incentive mechanisms are required 
if IPs are to be successfully scaled up. This implies an emphasis on developing 
facilitation and management competencies among a range of actors that are sys-
tems based and process oriented, as well as the political will to support such new 
ways of working. Achieving socioeconomic impact among small-scale farmers 
will be critical to justify such time- and resource-intensive processes. IPs will also 
require critical monitoring and assessment to ensure that they adequately target 
and address the problems of the poor.
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Part 4
Evaluating Inclusive  
Value-Chain Development

EVALUATING INCLUSIVE VALUE-CHAIN 
DEVELOPMENT1
Maximo Torero
Summary
This chapter introduces the various qualitative and quantitative methods used 
to conduct value-chain program impact evaluations that will be discussed in 
the following four chapters. We provide a brief overview of each method, as 
well as its benefits and limitations, and the scenarios in which it should and 
should not be used. While each of these methods has its uses, significant 
research remains to be done to ensure that impact evaluations of value-chain 
interventions truly capture program effects and take into account the chal-
lenges faced when trying to scale up successful programs in different locations 
and across different populations.
Competitive and efficient markets are key to successful economic growth, 
and well-functioning value chains are in turn key to successful markets. 
However, constraints such as limited market power, high transaction costs, 
poor incentives, variable risk, and a lack of access to credit can hinder the 
development of high-value agricultural markets, as well as markets for staple 
crops. This introduction discusses how interventions designed to establish 
more inclusive value chains for smallholders, and thus more successful mar-
kets, should be evaluated so that their impacts, costs, and benefits can be bet-
ter understood.
Traditional methodologies to assess the performance and impact of value 
chains have focused on techniques such as participatory data collection, case 
studies, or different mechanisms to collect data for point price estimates or 
identification of inefficiencies across the value chain. While these methods 
serve the needs of commercial actors, they do not identify an intervention’s 
welfare benefits, nor do they provide measures of the performance of the 
1 The authors thank PIM for supporting innovative work on impact evaluation for inclusive 
value-chain development and on the use of quantitative tools to measure gender differences 
within value chains, as part of their cross-cutting gender program.
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whole value chain. We provide concrete examples of different methods that 
can be used to fill these two gaps.
In essence, impact evaluation will accumulate credible knowledge of what 
works and what does not work. The overarching goal behind impact evalu-
ation is to maximize the impact of development projects in reducing global 
poverty by generating information which will help: (1) to improve the design 
of projects based on experience; (2) to improve accountability, by clearly iden-
tifying the causal links from intervention to impact; (3) to identify successful 
projects to be scaled up, and (4) to allocate resources across programs by better 
understanding what works well, and how and which interventions are more 
cost-effective than others.
Finally, it is not feasible to conduct impact evaluations for all interventions. 
We need to build a strong evidence base for all sectors in a variety of contexts 
to provide guidance for policymakers and practitioners. Some examples of the 
types of value-chain intervention for which impact evaluation would be use-
ful are (1) innovative schemes to upgrade value chains; (2) pilot programs that 
are due to be substantially scaled up; (3) interventions for which there is scant 
solid evidence of impact in the given context; and (4) when there is a clear 
need to prioritize projects based on cost-effectiveness.
What We Know about Impact Evaluation for Value-
Chain Interventions
Impact evaluations measure the change in a development outcome that is 
attributable to a defined intervention; they are based on models of cause and 
effect, and require a credible and rigorously defined counterfactual to control 
for factors other than the intervention that might account for the observed 
change. Impact evaluations are structured around one question: What is the 
impact (or causal effect) of a program on an outcome of interest? The same 
general principles apply to impact evaluations of value chains and innovation 
platforms. Evaluation assesses whether the program has affected the key indi-
cators of interest, such as poverty and nutrition, among a sample of project 
beneficiaries and across other dimensions of interest, such as gender.
There are different designs and methods of impact evaluation. Qualitative 
methods are normally used to understand the knowledge, attitudes, priori-
ties, preferences, and perceptions of target beneficiaries and other stakeholders. 
These methods include, among other things, the organization of focus groups, 
informal interviews, semistructured interviews, and structured interviews (for 
further details see Lawrence 1999; Garbarino et al. 2009; Chung 2000a,b). In 
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addition, these methods are also useful to understand the mechanisms behind 
impacts and the channels through which observed effects emerge. The idea is 
that important information about perceptions, attitudes toward the program, 
incentives to participate, and the program’s unexpected indirect effects on 
household or community dynamics may be missed by the use of purely quan-
titative methods. Qualitative methods are particularly useful for acquiring 
a more in-depth understanding of the factors influencing a program’s opera-
tions or impact. Several examples are presented in parts 2 and 3 of this book. 
For example, the 5Capitals method (Donovan and Stoian 2012) spells out 
why impact evaluation is different in the context of value-chain development 
(VCD) and provides an example of how it can respond to the needs of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and value-chain actors for learning what 
works and what does not work for achieving inclusive VCD. There is, however, 
a trade-off between depth and breadth, and smaller sample sizes in qualita-
tive studies mean that findings are rarely statistically representative of a broad 
population. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods compensate for 
each other’s weaknesses, and each approach provides more value when used in 
a mixed-method design, providing information and conclusions that are more 
coherent, reliable, and useful than those from single-method studies.
On the quantitative side, there are experimental and quasi-experimen-
tal methods (for a detailed review of all methods see Khandker et al. 2010; 
Gertler et al. 2011) A fully experimental approach takes a subsample of the 
population of interest and randomly assigns them as participants in the 
program (the so-called treatment group); a second subsample is randomly 
assigned to the so-called control group, which does not participate in the pro-
gram. The control group provides a proper counterfactual by showing the con-
ditions for the treatment group had they not participated in the program, thus 
allowing for a comparison that identifies the impact of the program. With a 
sufficiently large sample, this type of design relies on the correct implemen-
tation of the randomization and on the full exclusion of the control group 
from the program (when a control group is not properly excluded, this is 
called contamination).
A quasi-experimental approach may be used when it is not possible to con-
duct randomized evaluations. In such approaches, instead of creating treat-
ment and control groups by random assignment ex ante (that is, prior to the 
beginning of the program), these groups are created ex post (that is, once the 
program has begun or even after it has ended). This is done by using observed 
socio cultural, economic, ecological, and geographical characteristics to ensure 
that the comparison groups are sufficiently similar, at least in observable 
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characteristics. In this way, it can be argued that any observed impact is due to 
the program as opposed to other confounding factors. Ex-post design is typi-
cally used when ex-ante randomization is not possible—for example, if the pro-
gram has already begun or if ethical or targeting considerations rule out such 
randomization. A nonexperimental method may be used to generate a con-
trol group; this would involve the comparison of program beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries who had similar observable characteristics before the project 
was implemented.
Finally, in a nonexperimental evaluation, a program is nonrandomly estab-
lished across units (individuals, households, villages, and so on) to identify 
an appropriate counterfactual. The various nonexperimental methods can 
be classified into two groups. The first group assumes that the unobservable 
characteristics of the program’s beneficiaries and control group participants 
have nothing to do with the individuals’ decisions to participate in the pro-
gram. This is also known as conditional exogeneity of program placement—a 
strong assumption. Such methods include single-difference methods and dou-
ble-difference methods. The second group is comprised of matching (includ-
ing propensity-score matching, PSM) methods, discontinuity design methods, 
and instrumental variables; these methods do not make the exogeneity 
assumption, but rather address the possibility that, even after controlling for 
observable characteristics, unobservable characteristics may still make partici-
pation nonrandom. As a result, these methods evaluate the impact of interven-
tions by comparing the outcomes among participants to the outcomes among 
comparable nonparticipants, but without randomization of participation. If 
both groups are exposed to similar other external events, then they allow the 
analyst to disentangle the effect of the intervention from the effect of all other 
confounding factors. A second class of difficulties arises when the project is 
purposively targeted at particular classes of beneficiaries, leading to an exter-
nal selection bias. Assume for instance that an intervention in the value chain 
is targeted at the neediest households. In this case, comparing the poverty rate 
between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries after the project may wrongly con-
clude that the overall impact is zero or negative. In such cases, a more valid 
control group would be households that were similar to the beneficiaries at 
the start of the intervention. One strategy may be to compare the changes—
instead of the level—of a given indicator (what we refer to as double- 
difference methods) between the group of beneficiaries and the control group. 
Assuming that the change in the indicator in the control group is a good rep-
resentation of what the change in the indicator would have been among the 
beneficiaries, this “difference in differences” estimate may provide a valid way 
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to neutralize the external selection bias among observables and unobservable 
characteristics that are fixed over time, and hence provide an unbiased assess-
ment of the program’s effect.
In other cases, however, the confounding factor will affect the benefi-
ciaries and the control group differently—for instance, if one would like to 
assess the effect of microcredit targeted at the poorest households in an area. 
Assume that the program occurs at a time of relatively high economic growth 
or weather conditions from which all households in the targeted area (rich 
and poor) benefit. It is likely that the economic growth will also contribute to 
the improvement of the income among the poor program beneficiaries, while 
the effect will be limited on the richer households. In such a case, a “differ-
ence in differences” measure between the richer (control) and the poorer (ben-
eficiaries) groups will tend to overstate the effect of the program on income 
generation for the poor. A valid control group is one that provides a valid rep-
resentation of what the average poverty level among program participants 
would have been without the program. Several methods may be used to gen-
erate such control groups. For instance, if the program selection criteria are 
known, information may be collected on nonbeneficiaries who also satisfied 
the selection criteria but were not included in the program for reasons inde-
pendent of the outcome of interest.
A third type of bias may, however, occur when the selection process is not 
fully observable. Such is the case, for instance, when not all targeted house-
holds decide to benefit from the program, leading to self-selection bias. The 
problem of biases linked to unobservable characteristics may be resolved by 
“natural experiments.” Such methods rely on the availability of some variable(s) 
that help predict participation in the program but are not related to the out-
come variable (for example, income). Such methods include instrumental vari-
ables approaches, regression discontinuity designs, pipeline comparisons, and 
others as previously mentioned.
The following four chapters detail several distinct approaches to conduct-
ing value chain-intervention impact evaluations. The authors of Chapter 11 
(Saenger et al.) implemented a randomized controlled trial and field experi-
ment in Vietnam to improve dairy farmers’ quality measurements. Chapter 12 
(Cavatassi et al.) examines the Plataformas program in Ecuador using 
 quasi-experimental methods. Chapter 13 (Horton et al.) analyzes the expe-
rience of Participatory Market Chain Analysis (PMCA) using qualitative 
methods in several case studies. Finally, Chapter 14 (Madrigal and Torero) 
provides several quantitative tools and metrics from the labor economics and 
discrimination literature, and gives examples of how these could be applied 
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in a value-chain context. All of these methods seek to connect smallholders 
and other marginalized groups to high-value markets. The approaches provide 
complementary views of the value chain and of methods to improve both the 
rigor and the nuance of impact evaluations for value-chain interventions.
Chapter 11 (Saenger et al.) provides a perfect example of a randomized 
controlled impact evaluation. The authors conducted a randomized 
controlled trial and field experiment with dairy farmers and a milk-processing 
company in Vietnam. Their approach, designed ex ante, is a theoretically 
ideal approach to constructing a valid counterfactual and to ensuring that 
there is no selection bias, given that the farmers are randomly assigned to 
treatment (beneficiaries) and control groups. This randomization ensures 
that all farmers have the same chance of participating in the program and 
that the distribution of the two groups’ characteristics (both observed and 
unobserved) are statistically indistinguishable. The authors tested whether 
the quality-control procedures used by the processing company were 
leading farmers to underinvest. The risk on the farmers’ part came from the 
possibility that the company would manipulate the process and say that the 
milk delivered was of low quality and therefore deserved a lower price. By 
introducing vouchers for third-party quality measurement, the program 
improved the company’s credibility with the farmers. With this increased 
trust, the farmers then had more incentive to invest in techniques to improve 
milk quality and increase revenue. This chapter is unique in that it focuses 
on the mechanisms and incentives for different value-chain actors to contract 
with one another. The authors’ proposed contract-farming designs make both 
parties better off, rather than trying to cut out the intermediary or encourage 
smallholders to take over other capacities in the value chain.
Although the intervention reported in Chapter 11 (Saenger et al.) affected 
the whole milk-production value chain, there were some specific characteristics 
of the intervention that enabled the use of the randomization procedure. First, 
the intervention was directly targeted to milk producers, which made it sim-
pler to randomize; second, it was one single intervention rather than a package 
of interventions, which is normally the case with innovation platforms, as in 
Chapter 12 (Cavatassi et al.), or with participatory approaches, as in Chapter 13 
(Horton et al.). Therefore, it is important to stress this given there are in  general 
few value-chain impact studies that use experimental and randomized con-
trolled trial (RCT) methods because value-chain development usually involves 
many different partners (public and private-sector institutions) and often com-
plex interventions, which might make RCT and experimental approaches par-
ticularly difficult and in many cases not feasible to implement.
334 PART 4
The authors of Chapter 12 (Cavatassi et al.) performed an ex-post eval-
uation using econometric techniques common in impact evaluations. They 
assessed whether participation in Ecuador’s Plataformas program, which 
establishes alliances between small-scale farmers and a range of agricul-
tural support-service providers, had any effect on income. The chapter finds 
that the program had a positive impact on yields, prices, and gross margins. 
The authors conducted baseline household and community surveys in two 
Ecuadorean provinces and then identified treatment communities. Using 
data from the most recent census, they constructed a counterfactual control 
group with similar geographical, agroecological, and sociodemographic char-
acteristics to the treatment communities. They then used PSM to identify 
which control communities were most similar to each treatment community. 
In addition to creating control communities, they also factored in house-
holds in treatment communities that did not participate in the program. The 
PSM procedure allowed the authors to select a control community that was 
very similar to each treatment community in all observable aspects except for 
the treatment status, thus providing a proper counterfactual for each treat-
ment community.
One of the major concerns regarding the PSM approach is that there might 
be other observable and unobservable differences that could explain a com-
munity’s selection into the treatment group. To minimize this problem, the 
research (Chapter 12) implemented an instrumental variable (IV) approach to 
control for observable and unobservable differences in the control and treat-
ment groups. The IV technique identifies a factor that predicts participation 
in a program but that does not influence the program’s outcomes of interest. 
This factor is then used to simulate which participants would have been in 
the treatment group and which would have been in the control group had the 
project been based on that factor. The difference in outcomes between these 
simulated treatment and control groups constitutes the project’s impact.
For an IV estimation approach to be viable, as it is in Chapter 12, the 
instrumental variables used must be strong predictors of whether or not a par-
ticipant will receive the treatment; however, we must also be sure that the 
variables themselves will not determine the program’s outcome. It will likely 
be difficult to identify variables that meet both these criteria since the fac-
tors determining whether a potential beneficiary wants to participate in the 
program are likely to also be factors that will affect the outcome of interest. 
IV methods estimate a program’s impact on people who participate in the 
program because of the program’s instruments. It is thus important to know 
which precise groups will be affected by those instruments, and whether these 
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groups are of interest for the program. IV estimation does not easily allow for 
generalizing to other groups.
The IV technique is useful in determining local average treatment effects 
(LATE) rather than average treatment effects (ATE), which are usually the 
effects examined in impact evaluations. The IV estimator is a weighted aver-
age of the LATE of different subpopulations; the subpopulations that are 
more responsive to the program’s instruments carry a higher weight in the 
final IV estimate. These issues could severely bias the results or the conclu-
sions that can be drawn from them if the subpopulation is not correctly iden-
tified; thus great caution is required when interpreting the results of the 
IV technique.
Finally, one important thing that the authors of Chapter 12 (Cavatassi 
et al.) did that can help strengthen the interpretation of a program’s results 
is an assessment of the program’s impact pathways. The authors analyzed 
the ways in which farmers might benefit from the program and found that 
the program significantly increased yields and gross margins for the treat-
ment communities.
Chapter 13 (Horton et al.) tries to assess the impact of a PMCA. The 
chapter provides a clear example in which neither experimental nor quasi-
experimental approaches could be implemented. In PMCA, practitioners 
gather various market-chain actors together to brainstorm ideas for new 
agricultural products and better ways to market existing crops. PMCA was 
created both to link smallholders to markets through innovation, and to 
evaluate participatory interventions. Chapter 13 (Horton et al.) evaluates 
eight PMCA interventions, four of which they exclude from in-depth analysis 
because of significant departures from the PMCA protocol. Attempts were 
made to conduct an impact evaluation using quasi-experimental methods; 
however, delays in conducting the baseline surveys prevented the data from 
being useful for evaluation purposes. Instead, the authors implemented a  
case-study evaluation following the methodology of Yin (2009). Drawing on 
the definitions of Chen (2005), they stressed the importance of the action 
model, “a systematic plan for organizing resources, staff, and relationships in 
order to deliver the intervention faithfully.” They also identified the program’s 
change model, which is the “broader conceptual framework that links the 
intervention’s activities and outputs to the expected outcomes and impacts 
and explains how and why the intervention is expected to lead to the desired 
changes.” Their evaluation is based on the “fidelity of implementation,”  
which “refers to the extent to which a program’s implementation is consistent 
with its action model.” They discovered that PMCA needs to be adapted 
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to local country and market contexts, while still remaining consistent. The 
economic benefits of the four PMCA interventions were small, but by 
identifying both the action and the change models, the authors were able to 
distinguish creative adaptations to the program from lapses in implementation.
The approach followed by Chapter 13 (Horton et al.) is extremely useful 
in understanding the potential effects of PMCA, but it doesn’t allow us to iso-
late whether the observed changes can be truly attributed to the intervention. 
Clearly, it would have been better to combine this method with an experimen-
tal or quasi-experimental approach.
Finally, Chapter 14 (Madrigal and Torero) sheds light on an important 
issue that is not captured by any of the previous approaches: Most value-chain 
impact evaluations fail to look at effects disaggregated by gender. This is an 
important oversight, because in most value chains men and women play dif-
ferent roles, and failure to account for gender in a randomized controlled trial, 
quasi-experimental, or participatory intervention may significantly alter the 
results of these studies. To resolve this gap in the literature, the authors focus 
on several tools and metrics to incorporate gender in value-chain impact eval-
uations. The Oaxaca Blinder decomposition analysis allows for proper mea-
surement of wage gaps between men and women by controlling for other 
observable variables; the Duncan Index and Access to Work Equality Index 
measure occupational segregation and differential access to employment. 
Finally, time-use analysis can provide insights into how to improve labor 
opportunities for both men and women. Provided that gender-disaggregated 
survey data are collected, these tools can all be applied to value-chain inter-
ventions and analyses at low cost.
Gaps that Need to be Addressed
Although the four chapters in this section provide clear examples of ways in 
which value-chain improvements can be evaluated, there are still some import-
ant issues and gaps that need to be addressed in future research. First, even 
where RCTs are used, as in Chapter 11, there are still concerns on RCTs that 
need to be looked at, and specific implications as mentioned by Barret and 
Carter (2010). Second, most of the value-chain improvements being devel-
oped include interventions that affect different nodes of the value chain. This 
creates enormous complexity when trying to assess the impact of a program 
experimentally or quasi-experimentally. For example, if the unit of treatment 
is a whole value chain, there will need to be sufficient treatment and control 
value chains of the same commodity to have enough statistical power to assess 
EvAluATing inclusivE vAluE-chAin DEvEloPmEnT 337
the true impacts of the intervention. This would require an appropriate sam-
pling strategy representative of each node: input suppliers, producers, traders, 
wholesalers, and retailers. However, it will sometimes not be feasible to find 
the number of value chains needed in the same geographical area. Similarly, 
the potential for spillovers of the effects in one node of the value chain to oth-
ers is important, and methods need to identify ways to control for this.
An alternate method which could contribute to partially addressing this 
problem is a nonexperimental approach known as regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) (for further details, see Jacob et al. 2012; Bloom 2012; Imbens 
and Lemieux 2008). If small variations in a specific variable produce a discon-
tinuous change in a person’s (or value chain’s) eligibility for the treatment or 
participation in the program, this can be used to identify the program’s impact 
using IV estimation, even if the variable is also a direct determinant of the 
program’s outcome. For example, there may be levels of poverty or of access 
to roads or technology that determine a farmer’s eligibility; these may in turn 
produce regression discontinuities. As presented in Figure P4.1, by using such 
discontinuities the impact of an intervention or program can be estimated by 
comparing outcomes for beneficiaries who just qualify for the project on this 
index/score2 with outcomes for individuals who just fail to qualify for the pro-
gram given their score (the so-called control group), as determined by these 
characteristics. The logic behind this is that since observations around the cut-
off have treatment status, that is as good as randomly assigned.
One caveat to this approach is that if the discontinuity (or cut-off range) is 
too big, those who did not qualify for the program may be sufficiently differ-
ent from those who did in terms of their observable characteristics. As a result, 
the impact of the program may be estimated incorrectly.
A variation on this type of evaluation method is called “fuzzy” regression 
discontinuity (see Jacob and Zhu 2012). In this case, some beneficiaries have 
scores that place them on the nonbeneficiary side of the discontinuity. This 
RDD method is termed fuzzy because the cut-off is not clear or strict. When 
the eligibility criteria for participation are public information, the variable 
used to establish the treatment group could be manipulated so that a person 
appears eligible; clearly, this can create difficulties when estimating the effect 
of the program. Such manipulation would introduce nonrandom selection 
2 Note that this score does not necessarily relate to the PSM procedure. The score for the RDD is 
a variable, either existing or constructed, that establishes a threshold above which individuals 
are allocated to the program and below which they are not part of the program. The propensity 
score is one such variable that can be used in this estimation if it is discontinued at some spe-
cific point.
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around the cut-off, which would need to be addressed by randomizing the 
subpopulation around the fuzzy cut-off; if this is not possible, nonrandom 
assignment can be permitted to adjust for selection into the fuzzy interval in 
the final estimation. However, as long as this manipulation is not precise, the 
RDD remains valid.
RDDs require a large sample (and a considerable amount around the cut-
off) and the fuzzy interval must be moderate to be able to provide valid and 
precise impact estimates.
The second issue that calls for significant innovation and research is that 
in all the impact-evaluation approaches, even RCTs, there needs to be a mech-
anism to capture heterogeneity and external validity—that is, to understand 
how much the results identified can be extrapolated to other areas or even 
other value chains of similar commodities (heterogeneous populations). In a 
majority of impact evaluations, it is commonly assumed that the estimated 
treatment effects can be generalized to the whole population or to a new loca-
tion in which no experiment was conducted. However, since individuals in 
a new location can have different observable and unobservable characteris-
tics, the ATE can be significantly different from the one obtained from exper-
iments conducted in other locations. Several authors have protested against 
policy recommendations that they believe are based on implicit extrapolation 
from a small number of experiments to a wide variety of dissimilar contexts 
FIGUrE P4.1 Regression discontinuity design
 Outcome (Y)
selection criteria
based on 
access to 
markets and/or 
poverty scores    
Participants Nonparticipants 
Impact 
Criteria:
access to market/
poverty score 
selected households
in the sample  
Source: Authors.
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(Deaton 2010; Pritchett and Sandefur 2013). Empirically, a growing body of 
work shows that identical policies have different effects among individuals 
with the same observed characteristics living in different contexts (for exam-
ple, Allcott 2012; Attanasio, Meghir, and Szekely 2003), because unobserved 
differences between populations remain. Hence, we need a method that 
accounts for heterogeneity across locations, or we need to design an evaluation 
that takes this issue into account from the beginning.
For methods that account for heterogeneity, there has been some progress. 
Athey and Imbens (2006) generalize the standard difference-in-differences 
estimator and derive an estimator that can be used to extrapolate results under 
perfect dependence between the treated and untreated outcomes. Gechter 
(2014) improves on this work by developing a method for predicting the 
ATE in a new location under a mild restriction on the joint distribution of 
potential outcomes. Specifically, he derives bounds on the predicted ATEs 
by imposing a lower bound on the rank correlation of the potential outcomes. 
We can then take the case of minimal treatment effect heterogeneity (perfect 
rank correlation) as a benchmark to further investigate how the predicted 
bounds on the ATE change by allowing different levels of heterogeneity.
Finally, an alternative way to ensure a certain level of external validity 
is through the ex-ante design of a scaling-up mechanism that will allow 
a program to be replicated on the basis of results from rigorous impact 
evaluations. An example of this potential approach is given by Torero (2014), 
who essentially develops a typology of rural areas that identifies needs, 
opportunities, and bottlenecks at the regional level based on modeling of 
agricultural performance and potential using the economic concept of the 
production possibilities frontier, drawing on highly detailed household-level 
survey data and geospatial tools. Such a typology allows program targeting 
based not only on needs, as is the case when using poverty maps, but also on 
economic potential against current performance (or efficiency relative to the 
economic potential) and the associated needed investment gaps to improve 
the respective performance so that it can reach its economic potential. As a 
result, projects designed to resolve those gaps can be replicated in similar types 
within the typology. In addition, combined with appropriate project designs 
and impact-evaluation tools, this typology can help systematize targeting 
of development projects in a range of technical domains across the value 
chains, including financial services. However, because this approach involves 
an ex-ante identification of similar locations where an intervention can be 
successfully tested, it will require significant work before implementation.
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IMPACT OF THIRD-PARTY ENFORCEMENT OF 
CONTRACTS IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS— 
A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN VIETNAM
Christoph Saenger, Maximo Torero, and Matin Qaim
Introduction
Over the past two decades, many smallholder farmers in developing coun-
tries have benefitted from closer integration into global value chains, but 
constraints in accessing high-value markets remain (Reardon et al. 2009). 
Contract farming, which has recently become more widespread, links farm-
ers to output markets for high-value foods such as fruits, vegetables, meat, or 
milk (Birthal, Joshi, and Gulati 2005; Swinnen 2009; Reardon et al. 2009; 
Mergenthaler, Weinberger, and Qaim 2009; Bellemare 2012). When agree-
ments between buying companies and selling farmers are complemented by 
schemes to provide inputs, credit, or training, contract farming can also help 
to improve access to technology and overcome factor market inefficiencies 
(Masakure and Henson 2005; Minten, Randrianarison, and Swinnen 2009; 
Rao, Brümmer, and Qaim 2012).
While in developed countries there are strong institutions to enforce con-
tracts, in developing countries this is rarely the case (Key and Runsten 1999; 
Kirsten and Sartorius 2002). An environment of weak institutions can neg-
atively affect both buyers and sellers of farm output. For example, buying 
companies that provide finance or inputs as part of a contract lose if farmers 
renege on the agreement by diverting inputs to other crops or side-selling their 
output on the spot market (Gow and Swinnen 1998; Bellemare 2010). On 
the other hand, farmers may lose if the buying company has a nontranspar-
ent system of quality grading and thus the ability to manipulate prices. In this 
chapter, we focus on small-scale contract farmers who are negatively affected 
by information asymmetry with moral hazard resulting from weak institu-
tions. Since Akerlof ’s (1970) seminal work, the economics of information has 
received considerable attention. A relatively new and important application is 
the study of emerging markets for high-value agricultural products. In these 
This chapter was originally published as an article in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96 (4): 1220–
1239 (2014).
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markets, product quality is an important factor in determining farmers’ pay. 
As costly technology is required to assess nonvisible quality attributes, a harm-
ful asymmetry of information may occur. The buyer can accrue information 
rents from reporting lower than actual quality levels, thus downgrading the 
price paid to the seller. Rational sellers forming the belief that the buyer cheats 
will factor in the buyer’s opportunistic behavior, lowering their expectations 
about the product price. In this situation, contracts are characterized by addi-
tional price risk from the farmers’ perspective. This can result in underinvest-
ment in inputs and productive assets, leading to lower output (Gow, Streeter, 
and Swinnen 2000; Vukina and Leegomonchai 2006; Cungu et al. 2008). 
Such underinvestment by farmers can also increase the per-unit transaction 
costs of procurement for the buying company. Hence, weak contract enforce-
ment may prevent whole industries from attaining their full potential, which 
is especially important in economies where the agricultural sector plays an 
important role.
Here, we investigate whether improved institutions for contract enforce-
ment can break the information asymmetry and lead to higher investment and 
output produced. Specifically, we test the impact of an independent agency 
that can verify product quality resulting from the existing farmer produc-
tion intensity and output levels. We also explore whether this type of contract 
enforcement can improve farm-household welfare.
Previous research indicates that more transparency in the supply chain is 
one possible solution to overcome harmful information asymmetry (Balbach 
1998; Sykuta and Cook 2001; Young and Hobbs 2002). In a laboratory exper-
iment, Wu and Roe (2007) have shown that third-party contract enforcement 
can be one way to successfully mitigate underinvestment and enhance social 
efficiency. But as the laboratory systematically differs from natural environ-
ments, external validity of this type of studies may be limited (Levitt and List 
2007). Over the past decade, randomized controlled trials (RCTs), in which 
subjects take decisions in their natural environment, have been used exten-
sively. Only recently, RCTs have been carried out in the field of agriculture 
(Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2008, 2011; Ashraf, Giné, and Karlan 2009; 
Cole, Giné, and Vickery 2013a).
We contribute to the literature on RCTs in agriculture and information 
asymmetry in contracts through a randomized field experiment, using the 
example of the fast-growing Vietnamese dairy industry, in which crucial insti-
tutions to support contract enforcement are missing. The industry is char-
acterized by a great number of small-scale dairy farmers who are contracted 
by a large milk-processing company. This is a typical situation for emerging 
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markets for high-value agricultural products in developing countries (Reardon 
et al. 2009; Rao, Brümmer, and Qaim 2012; Bellemare 2012). In this field 
experiment, the contract of a randomly chosen subsample of farmers, the 
treatment group, is altered such that it becomes enforced; previously unob-
servable quality attributes are now measured and verified by an independent 
and certified laboratory. Control-group farmers continue to produce under 
the initial contract. For the field experiment, we collaborated with a private 
dairy company that provided access to weekly farm-level output data. This 
information is complemented with data that we obtained through house-
hold surveys.
We find that our intervention leads to higher input use and increased dairy 
output. There is also a positive treatment effect with respect to household 
consumption expenditures for a specific subgroup of the sample. We are able 
to attribute observed differences in output to a behavioral change of farmers 
rather than changes in the reporting strategy of the buying company. Hence, 
in this specific case, the buying company did not behave opportunistically, but 
the supply-chain architecture did not allow the buyer to signal its fair type 
to farmers. Third-party enforcement of contracts in an environment of weak 
institutions can move the supply chain to a first-best scenario, in which both 
smallholders and buying companies benefit from increased farm productivity.
The Vietnamese Dairy Industry
In Vietnam, much like in other countries of Asia, milk is becoming an increas-
ingly popular food item, leading to high growth rates in the dairy sector. For 
example, only two decades ago the consumption levels of milk and dairy 
products were almost nil due to cultural practices and low incomes. But with 
increasing income, urbanization, and the spread of Western lifestyle, the 
demand for milk has increased tremendously (Saenger et al. 2013). Today’s 
per capita consumption of milk in Vietnam has reached 15 kg per year, which 
is about 8 percent of the amount being consumed in the United States or 
Europe. Currently, the Vietnamese dairy sector is dominated by local process-
ing companies, importing large quantities of powdered milk from overseas to 
satisfy domestic demand. However, more and more milk is produced domesti-
cally, especially by small-scale farmers. Fresh-milk production in Vietnam has 
tripled between 2003 and 2009, but it still meets only one-fifth of domestic 
consumption (USDA 2011).
The leader in the dynamic dairy industry—and the cooperation partner in 
this field experiment—is the formerly state-owned milk processor Vinamilk. 
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This company collects the major share of milk produced in Vietnam and is 
also a main importer of powdered milk. Currently, the company has con-
tracted more than 5,000 small-scale dairy farmers, most of them located 
around Vietnam’s largest city and commercial capital Ho Chi Minh City.
Supply-Chain Architecture and the Standard Contract
In Vietnam, milk is produced mainly on specialized small-scale farms. 
Crossbreed dairy cattle are held in sheds all year round. The major input is 
fodder; rations usually consist of forage produced on farms, complemented 
with purchased fodder, primarily concentrate. Farmers usually sell the 
entire milk output to one dairy company. Alternative sales options are lim-
ited. Informal channels exist, but can absorb only small quantities due to low 
demand for highly perishable raw milk in rural areas. Hence, small-scale dairy 
farmers, who have undertaken relationship-specific investment, have little bar-
gaining power vis-à-vis large monopsonistic dairy companies.
The raw milk is channeled through milk-collection centers (MCCs) 
located in the vicinity of the dairy farms. An average MCC is supplied by 
about 100 farmers and is operated by a private entrepreneur working on com-
mission for the dairy processor, in our case Vinamilk. Each MCC carries out 
the following tasks: collection and handling of the milk twice daily, sampling 
of the milk, initial testing of quality (through staff deployed by the dairy pro-
cessor), and daily transport of raw milk to company processing plants, which 
are located in urban centers. The MCCs also administer the weekly payments 
to farmers.
The production contract between Vinamilk and the dairy farmers is a 
country-wide standardized written agreement, determining how much milk 
of what quality is purchased at what price. The output price per unit of milk p 
received by farmers is a function of milk quality ϑ:
p = f (ϑ) (1)
Quality is a composite measure of several parameters, most importantly 
milk fat and total solid content, as well as bacterial contamination, all of 
which depend on input use x (for example, type and amount of fodder, level 
of effort):
ϑ = g (x) (2)
Various factors, such as limited access to inputs, finance, and lack of 
skills, constrain farmers in developing and transition countries to pro-
duce high-quality milk (Dries and Swinnen 2004, 2010; Dries et al. 2009). 
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Vinamilk tries to address these limitations by supporting farmers through 
the provision of training to overcome technical gaps, while the MCCs pro-
vide farmers with prefinancing for inputs (concentrate). But incentive pricing 
remains the main instrument at Vinamilk’s disposal to promote the deliv-
ery of raw milk with high milk fat and total solid content, which is desired as 
raw material in the high-value segment. At the same time, the company uses 
price signals to discourage the supply of raw milk with high contents of psy-
chrotrophic bacteria or antibiotics, which are known to increase processing 
costs (Claypool 1984). Worse, adulteration of milk along the supply chain can 
even have adverse health effects for consumers, as the recent case of melamine-
tainted milk in China has shown (Jia et al. 2012).
In the early stages of dairy value-chain development in Vietnam, it was 
prohibitively costly to assess the quality of milk supplied by individual farmers. 
Instead, the milk was pooled at MCC level. Only one sample per MCC was 
taken to be analyzed at the dairy plant, and one common price was paid to all 
farmers delivering to the same MCC. Hence, the company lacked the ability 
to trace back the milk to its origin and thus to attribute milk quality to indi-
vidual farmers. As a result, the company was hardly able to incentivize quality 
milk production. Today, cheaper quality-testing devices allow dairy compa-
nies to assess quality individually for each farmer, which is a key requirement 
for incentive pay. This also reduces the risk of deliberate milk adulteration 
in the supply chain. Vinamilk employs tests to detect undesired substances; 
suspect batches of potentially tainted milk are not accepted, and farmers are 
banned from further supplying milk to the company. The high probability of 
being caught is a strong incentive for farmers to refrain from adulterating.
To assess milk composition (milk fat and total solid content), Vinamilk 
staff take milk samples individually from the daily delivery of each farmer 
to the MCC. One sample per week from each farmer is randomly selected 
for further analysis with sophisticated laboratory methods in the dairy plant. 
Producers have unique identification numbers and are paid individually 
according to their own output (quantity q and quality ϑ). The base price for 
top-quality milk is subject to harsh deductions if one or more of the quality 
parameters falls short of the requirements set by the company. One-tenth of 
a gram of milk fat below the threshold—a deviation far too small to be visu-
ally detected even by experienced farmers—can trigger financial penalties. As 
milk analyses are carried out in the company’s own laboratory and cannot be 
observed by farmers, milk quality remains private information of the dairy 
company. Currently, smallholders cannot overcome the information asym-
metry regarding milk quality by systematically cross-checking the results 
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provided by the company, because individual milk testing is prohibitively 
costly, and collective action fails.
It should be noted that Vinamilk’s technical capacity to assess milk quality 
individually for each farmer has shifted the informational advantage. Before 
individual testing was possible, farmers had an informational advantage about 
the quality of their milk; now, the company has an advantage. These dynam-
ics also have important implications for the distribution of gains in contract 
farming. This first step of supply-chain development in Vietnam—from the 
assessment of pooled milk to individual milk testing—may have led to a dis-
tribution of gains in favor of the company. This is in line with a model on 
rent distribution in global value chains developed by Swinnen and Vandeplas 
(2011). The subsequent step that restores the symmetry of information 
between farmers and the company, as intended by our intervention, could 
increase market efficiency, triggering a further round of adjustments in the 
distribution of gains—this time in favor of farmers.
A Simple Model of Underinvestment
The information asymmetry in the Vietnamese dairy contracts, where farmers 
do not know the exact price that the buying company will pay, can be under-
stood as a form of price risk. The effects of price risk on household behavior 
and welfare have received considerable attention in the theoretical literature. 
Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) analyzed the impact of price uncertainty 
on producer output and profit. This analysis was extended to consumers (for 
example, Deschamps 1973) and farm households that can be both producers 
and consumers (for example, Finkelshtain and Chalfant 1991; Barrett 1996). 
Recently, Bellemare, Barett, and Just (2013) further developed the framework 
to cover price volatility of multiple commodities for producing and consum-
ing farm households and also used this framework for empirical estimates.
In our analysis of dairy contracts in Vietnam, we only focus on milk for 
which farm households are pure producers.1 Hence, we build on the model for 
producers described by Sandmo (1971) to formally derive how the described 
asymmetric information on relevant quality attributes leads to lower out-
put and input use as compared to a situation with symmetric information. 
It is assumed that farmers maximize expected utility of profits from milk 
 1 Dairy farmers in Vietnam do not produce milk for home consumption. Overall, milk consump-
tion in rural areas of Vietnam is very low.
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production. The utility function is a concave, continuous, and differentiable 
function of profits. The farmer’s cost function is defined as:
T (q) = V (q) + F  (3)
where V (q) is the variable cost function, which depends on output quantity q, 
and F represents the fixed cost. Further, we assume that the cost function has 
the following properties:
V (0) = 0, V (´q) > 0, V´´ (q) > 0 (4)
In a contract with symmetric information, the profit function can be 
defined as:
π (q) = pq − [V (q) + F] (5)
where the product of output price p and quantity q is total revenue. Without 
price risk, farmers maximize profits where marginal cost equals marginal reve-
nue according to:
V (´q) = p (6)
We now take this as the baseline and analyze how optimal output and thus 
input use change when the buying company has private information about 
product quality ϑ. Exploiting its informational advantage, the company may 
report to the farmer a quality level that is lower than the one actually assessed 
in its own laboratory. According to equation (1), such underreporting of qual-
ity would negatively affect the output price, while increasing company profit. 
For dairy companies in the Vietnamese market this would be a tempting prac-
tice, given that they face competition not only from domestic processors but 
also from imports.
Such information asymmetry leads to price uncertainty for farmers. 
Output price becomes a random variable with an underlying density func-
tion h(p) and an expected value Ε[p] = μ. The expected utility of farmer 
profit becomes:
Ε{U [pq − V (q) − F ]} (7)
Hence, the first-order condition for a profit maximum is:
Ε{U (´π) [p − V (´q)]} = 0 (8)
which can also be written as:
Ε[U (´π)p] = Ε[U (´π)V (´q)] (9)
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If we subtract Ε[U (´π) μ] on both sides of equation (9), we get:
Ε[U (´π)(p − μ)] = Ε[U (´π)(V (´q) − μ)] (10)
Sandmo (1971) showed that the left-hand side of equation (10) is negative 
if p ≥ μ. This can be assumed in our case, because the price uncertainty comes 
from asymmetric information. Farmers who believe that the company under-
reports output quality will have a price expectation μ that is lower than p. In 
that case, the right-hand side of equation (10) must be negative as well, and it 
can be written as:
Ε[U (´π)] (V (´q) − μ) < 0 (11)
Since marginal utility is always positive, this implies:
V (´q) < μ (12)
Equation (12) shows that profit-maximizing output is less than the 
expected price, and, since μ < p, optimal output quantity with information 
asymmetry is clearly lower than without. This also implies lower input use.
The introduction of independent quality assessment to enforce the 
contract would mitigate the negative effect on the expected price level, 
because formerly unobservable quality attributes would become verifiable 
for farmers. This would force the dairy company to report the actual level 
of quality, leading to a situation where μ = p. Hence, we hypothesize that 
independent testing will induce farmers to increase their output.
How can dairy farmers practically respond to higher expected output prices? 
Generally, they can raise the output of milk fat and total solid—the value-
defining parts of the raw milk—in three ways: (1) increase the quality (milk 
composition) while keeping the milk quantity constant, (2) keep the quality 
constant while increasing the quantity, or (3) simultaneously increase quality 
and quantity. At the farm level, the goal of increasing the absolute quantity of 
milk fat and total solid can be achieved in different ways. In the short run, the 
main instrument would be to increase the amount of purchased fodder (that 
is, concentrate) to make the ration more nutritious. Hence, we hypothesize an 
increase in concentrate use through independent quality assessment. All other 
inputs are quasi-fixed in the short run. The supply of forage produced on the 
farm can only be increased in the medium or long run, as additional land would 
have to be acquired. Likewise, the herd size can only be increased in the medium 
or long run, as this requires significant investments for buying cattle or raising 
own female calves. In the long run, selective breeding may also improve the 
herd’s overall genetic potential for milk production.
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Experimental Design and Implementation
After having outlined the theoretical framework of third-party contract 
enforcement, we now describe the design and practical implementation of our 
intervention in which randomly selected dairy farmers were provided with the 
opportunity to verify milk-testing results provided by Vinamilk.
Every treatment farmer received three nontransferable vouchers, each 
valid for one independent analysis of milk quality (milk fat and total solid). 
Vouchers were meant to be executed whenever eligible farmers challenged the 
testing results reported by Vinamilk. Providing farmers with third-party qual-
ity verification involved complex transport and testing logistics. For each milk 
sample obtained at the MCC under the original contract (hereafter A-sample), 
an additional identical sample (hereafter B-sample) had to be taken for each 
treatment farmer. The B-sample was sent to an independent and certified 
laboratory in Ho Chi Minh City, where it was stored. If a farmer executed 
a voucher, the B-sample was analyzed by the third-party laboratory, and the 
testing results were reported by mail to the farmer. This allowed the farmer to 
compare if the results based on the A-sample reported by Vinamilk were iden-
tical to the results of the corresponding B-sample provided by the indepen-
dent laboratory.
While Vinamilk knew the identity of the treatment farmers, the actual 
execution of vouchers could not be observed, that is, the company did not 
know when an individual farmer in the treatment group executed her voucher. 
Hence, there was a constant threat to the company that any of the farmers in 
the treatment group could in any given week verify their testing result and 
detect potential opportunistic behavior. The combination of a constant threat 
to be caught and the associated high reputational costs,2 should effectively dis-
courage Vinamilk from behaving opportunistically. This is a central assump-
tion in our study and crucial for the intervention to work; we will substantiate 
this assumption further below.
Compared to validating the results of every sample analyzed by Vinamilk, 
the voucher mechanism enabled us to systematically overcome the informa-
tion asymmetry on milk quality attributes at relatively low cost. All outlays 
arising from setting up a parallel testing infrastructure for the B-samples and 
milk analyses were borne by the project, ruling out that farmers would not 
request independent milk testing for reasons of monetary costs.
 2 Before the intervention started there was substantial coverage in Vietnamese newspapers, alleg-
ing that Vinamilk mistreated farmers by paying too low and unfair milk prices. While Vinamilk 
was publically denying these allegations, the reports caused some reputational damage (Viet 
Nam News 2008).
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The logistics of the voucher treatment are complex. Thus, it was especially 
important that both the treatment farmers delivering milk and the Vinamilk 
staff taking the B-samples thoroughly understood the procedure. During a 
compulsory half-day workshop, treatment farmers were informed about the 
independent milk testing and learned how to use the vouchers. Every treat-
ment farmer received written instructions, supplementing the information 
presented during the workshop, and was provided with a phone number of 
trained field staff. To assure that farmers regarded the third-party testing as 
credible and independent, we had identified a certified laboratory that both 
farmers and Vinamilk explicitly agreed on. Further, to ensure the compara-
bility of the A- and B-samples, we calibrated the third-party laboratory and 
Vinamilk’s in-house laboratory using imported reference milk. By employing 
the same cooling technology we also assured that during transport and storage 
the A- and B-samples were kept in identical environments.
To avoid contamination in the sense that control-group farmers get access 
to the third-party milk testing and thus effectively become treated, the emer-
gence of a secondary market for vouchers had to be prevented. We handed out 
personalized vouchers tagged with a unique identification number. Vouchers 
passed on to other farmers (also outside the treatment group) automatically 
became invalid. A scenario in which control farmers sell their milk through 
treatment farmers to benefit indirectly from the independent quality verifi-
cation and higher expected milk prices is possible but seems unlikely. First, to 
maintain traceability within the milk supply chain, Vinamilk’s procurement 
policy includes a mechanism to control the quantity delivered by individual 
farmers, strongly discouraging milk producers from accepting milk from other 
sources. Specifically, milk producers are required to register their herd size 
with Vinamilk. This information, which is regularly verified through field vis-
its, enables the company to estimate the production potential of each farmer. 
Thus, Vinamilk would notice if a farmer were to accept milk from others and 
thus increase their delivery beyond expected levels. Second, if a treatment 
farmer accepts milk from a control farmer (or any other source), she would 
take the risk of mixing her own milk with milk of unknown quality, poten-
tially leading to financial loss.
If participation in field experiments is voluntary, individuals who are 
assigned to the treatment group may refuse to participate. This may lead to 
low compliance rates which can be a challenge for impact analysis. Cole et 
al. (2013b) found that uptake rates for innovative crop insurances in India 
were as low as 5–10 percent despite high potential benefits. Hill and Viceisza 
(2012) overcame the problem of low uptake in a framed field experiment by 
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imposing mandatory insurance. Our intervention is special with respect to 
compliance, as a high voucher-execution rate is not a necessary condition for 
the voucher treatment to be effective. The specific design of the third-party 
contract enforcement does not depend on an individual farmer’s decision to 
execute a voucher to build a direct threat to Vinamilk. Instead, it is sufficient 
if farmer A believes that farmer B or C may request an analysis. This belief—
from farmer A’s point of view—would be an indirect but sufficiently power-
ful threat to the dairy company being monitored, ruling out underreporting. 
Ultimately, this would imply that all farmers in the treatment group can be 
regarded as treated, regardless of their actual voucher execution. This is a fur-
ther necessary assumption for our experimental design to be effective, which 
we will also substantiate further below.
It should be noted that when designing the voucher treatment, we were 
interested in isolating the effect of third-party contract enforcement in gen-
eral, rather than evaluating a particular way of providing farmers with inde-
pendent testing of quality attributes. Our voucher-based approach is too costly 
to be easily scaled up. In a nonexperimental setting, complete outsourcing of 
milk testing to an independent laboratory would be more efficient than estab-
lishing a parallel structure for B-sample analyses.
Study Area, Sample, and Randomization
Almost 70 percent of the domestically produced milk in Vietnam stems from 
the region around Ho Chi Minh City. The study area is located in Long An 
and Tien Giang, two provinces south of Ho Chi Minh City where Vinamilk 
has contracted 402 dairy farmers. The milk supply is channeled through 
four MCCs.
At MCC level, differences with respect to average dairy output (quantity, 
quality) can be observed (Appendix Table 11.A1). Three out of the four col-
lection centers (MCCs B, C, and D) are spatially clustered, so it is unlikely 
that agroecological factors cause the performance differential. As farmers can 
choose freely which MCC to supply their milk to, we suppose that selection 
based on unobservables may cause the farmer population of one MCC to sys-
tematically differ from farmers at other MCCs. For example, dairy produc-
ers choose an MCC not only on the basis of the distance to their farm but 
also based on soft factors such as trust toward the management of the MCC. 
Beside the three clustered MCCs, there is also one more isolated collection 
center (MCC A) where farmers do not have the option to choose between dif-
ferent Vinamilk MCCs. However, a competitor of Vinamilk sources raw milk 
in the area of MCC A. Hence, farmers could switch to the competing dairy 
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company, if they were dissatisfied with Vinamilk, the contract, or the collec-
tion center management. We reckon that farmers who deliver to Vinamilk 
despite having an alternative may be systematically different from Vinamilk 
farmers without such an outside option. Such possible differences are 
accounted for in our analysis through MCC dummies.
Given the limited number of MCCs and significant mean differences 
in observable characteristics, a randomization of treatment status over 
MCCs—even though easier to manage—might have confounded our results. 
Hence, we randomized over the entire population of 402 dairy farmers. In 
May 2009, all farmers attended a public lottery in which 102 farmers were 
randomly assigned to the treatment group. Another 100 farmers were ran-
domly assigned to the control group, continuing to produce under the orig-
inal contract without third-party enforcement. Farmers were informed that 
due to a budget constraint and for the sake of a clear evaluation of the exper-
iment only a limited number of slots would be available in the treatment 
group. Owing to the complexity of the treatment design, the implementa-
tion had to be delayed several times. The intervention eventually started in 
May 2010 when the first batch of B-samples was obtained. It was continued 
for a period of 12 months.
Data
We collected detailed information for all farmers participating in the exper-
iment. Through two rounds of structured household surveys we generated a 
dataset comprising socioeconomic details on dairy production, income from 
agricultural and nonagricultural activities, household expenditures, and assets 
owned. Additionally, questions measuring social capital, trust, time, and risk 
preferences were included in the questionnaire. The first round of interviews, 
the baseline survey, took place in May 2009 before the experiment started. In 
May and June 2011, all farmers were revisited for the follow-up survey when 
the experiment was completed.
The household data were complemented with farm-level output data 
for each producer in the sample provided by the company. Vinamilk pro-
vided these data for the period from May 2008 to May 2011, covering 
24 months before the intervention and the time period of the intervention. 
On the one hand, it can be assumed that these data are of higher quality 
than self-reported recall data on output obtained through household sur-
veys, as this weekly reported information—disaggregated by milk quantity 
and three quality parameters—is the basis for farmers’ payment. On the 
other hand, the dairy company may have an incentive to strategically release 
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information, providing manipulated data to mask underreporting of milk 
quality and price in case farmers were cheated before the intervention. This 
would clearly undermine the internal validity of the results. If the company 
had underreported output quality before the independent quality verifi-
cation was implemented, we would not be able to easily attribute observed 
effects to changes in either farmer or company behavior. In an extreme case, 
higher output could be entirely the result of Vinamilk ceasing to underre-
port quality. We carefully address this issue in the discussion section.
Identification Strategy and Econometric 
Estimation
The impact of third-party quality verification is assessed in three dimen-
sions: (1) input use in milk production, (2) output generation in milk pro-
duction, and (3) welfare of the farming household. While (1) is measured by 
the amount of purchased fodder (concentrate) used per cow and day reported 
by farmers, (2) is captured by three variables, namely total amount of milk 
fat and total solid produced during the 12 months when the experiment was 
ongoing, as well as revenues from dairy farming for the same time period. 
Data on these output variables are provided by the company. For (3) we use 
total annual household consumption expenditures on food (own-produced 
food items were valued at the market price), other consumer goods, and dura-
bles obtained through the household surveys.
We seek to identify two types of treatment effects: first, the average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT), which is estimated according to:
ATT = E(y₁ − y₀|v = 1) (13)
where ATT is the difference between y₁, the average outcome of the treated, 
and y₀, the counterfactual outcome of the untreated, conditioned on the treat-
ment status v = 1, which means being treated. In view of the random assign-
ment of v, the control group constitutes an adequate counterfactual of the 
treatment group.
Second, we would like to assess the ATT conditional on specific baseline 
covariates x. To estimate this heterogeneous treatment effect, we condition 
ATT on x according to:
ATT(x) = E(y₁ − y₀|x,v = 1) (14)
Given that the voucher use was voluntary (we did not use an encourage-
ment design), one might argue that the intention to treat (ITT) analysis would 
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be a more suitable approach. In our view, the ATT analysis seems appropri-
ate because all farmers in the treatment group can be regarded as treated. As 
explained above, the effectiveness of the third-party quality verification scheme 
does not depend on an individual farmer’s decision to execute the voucher.
In order to estimate ATT econometrically, we first specify an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) according to:
y = α + βv + ε (15)
where the dependent variable y is the outcome variable of interest measured at 
the end of the experiment, and v is the treatment dummy.
To estimate average treatment effect on the treated, ATT(10), and thus to 
explore treatment heterogeneity, we modify the model by including a vector 
of variables , indicating baseline characteristics at time t₀, and an interaction 
term between treatment and baseline characteristics:
y = α + βv + yx + δvx + ε (16)
This interaction term allows for testing whether the relationship between 
baseline characteristics and outcome variables is different conditional on 
treatment status. One specification for ATT(10) includes the variable trust 
toward Vinamilk, which is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if farmers 
agreed with the statement “Vinamilk is a trustworthy business partner” in 
the baseline survey, and 0 otherwise.3 We suppose that initial trust levels may 
affect the impact intensity of the voucher. For example, farmers already trust-
ful in the baseline may be less affected by an intervention that aims at ruling 
out potential opportunistic behavior by Vinamilk. Another specification for 
ATT(10) includes dummies indicating the farmers’ delivery to milk-collection 
centers (MCC B, MCC C, and MCC D; MCC A was chosen as benchmark). 
These dummies capture the effect of unobserved characteristics that make 
farmers select a specific MCC.
Randomization
Before the impact analysis, we verified that treatment and control groups are 
similar statistically with respect to the large number of observables available 
from the baseline survey, including the outcome variables (Table 11.1). The 
 3 In the baseline survey, interviewees had to rate this statement on a four-point Likert scale 
(“very much agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” “very much disagree”; the option “I don’t know” was 
also included). We collapsed the responses into a dummy taking the value 1 if farmers opted for 
“agree” or “fully agree,” and 0 otherwise. It should be noted that the results are sensitive to the 
specification; when including dummies for each response level, the coefficients for these trust 
variables are insignificant.
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only statistically significant differences (at 10 percent level) are for the vari-
ables capturing road infrastructure and time preferences,4 indicating that 
treatment farmers are located slightly further away from paved roads and are 
more patient than their peers in the control group. It should be noted that 
given the random assignment of the treatment status, the observed differences 
are not systematic, that is, worse infrastructure and lower time preferences did 
not make a household more likely to be assigned to the treatment group.5
Attrition
Between the baseline survey in May 2009 and the implementation of the 
treatment in May 2010, a number of milk farmers ceased production or 
switched from Vinamilk to a competing dairy processor. The number of 
households in the treatment and control groups decreased from 102 and 100 
 4 In the baseline survey, we elicited—through a battery of choices between hypothetical pay-
offs—the discount rates at which farmers accepted to wait for one month to receive a significant 
lump-sum payment. The variable was converted into a dummy which takes the value 1 if farm-
ers agreed to wait for one month if a monthly interest rate of up to 3.5 percent is paid. These 
farmers have a lower time preference and can be considered more patient.
 5 As robustness checks, both variables were included in the regression models, but their inclu-
sion led neither to significant coefficients for these variables nor to notable changes in the treat-
ment effects.
TAbLE 11.1 Mean difference for baseline variables in treatment and control groups
Variable Control – voucher Standard error
Basic household (hh) characteristics
age of hh head (years)
education of hh head (years of schooling)
Number of hh members
Total land size (m²)
Distance to paved road (km)
If agree to postpone at interest rate ≤ 3.5 percent (1 = y)
1.233
0.556
0.073
893
0.270*
–0.183**
1.558
0.442
0.183
783
0.122
0.069
Dairy enterprise
Delivers milk to MCC a (1 = y)
Delivers milk to MCC B (1 = y)
Delivers milk to MCC C (1 = y)
Delivers milk to MCC D (1 = y)
Daily concentrate per cow (kg)
absolute milk fat (kg)
absolute total solid (kg)
annual revenue from dairy (US$)
0.033
–0.098
0.065
–0.000
1.626
–53.519
–173.342
–432.499
0.063
0.064
0.065
0.065
1.826
59.996
194.658
550.234
household expenditure
annual hh expenditure (US$) 36.410 111.463
Source: authors’ estimates. 
Notes: hh = household; MCC = milk-collection center; probability = * <.1, ** <.05.
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to 94 and 90, respectively. Those producers dropping out of the sample have 
significantly (at 10 percent level) smaller baseline herd sizes, are less pro-
ductive, and have lower revenues from milk. The attrition rate is balanced 
between treatment and control groups.
Compliance
As discussed above, the intervention did not require high compliance rates, 
that is, it was not necessary for a large number of treated farmers to actually 
execute their vouchers, for the treatment to be effective. Nevertheless, from a 
treatment farmers’ perspective a certain minimum level of compliance in the 
treatment group might be (psychologically) desirable to credibly build up the 
threat of effective monitoring vis-à-vis the dairy company.
We find that only seven farmers (out of 94) had actually requested inde-
pendent verification of milk-testing results despite it being easy, cheap, and 
safe to execute. Those farmers who had executed vouchers had larger herd 
sizes with more productive dairy cattle on average. A possible explana-
tion could be that these larger farmers had greater interest in verifying the 
milk-testing results, because even little underreporting of quality by the com-
pany would lead to substantial losses due to larger quantities involved. We 
systematically evaluated the voucher treatment in the follow-up survey to 
identify reasons for low execution rates. The survey results suggest that the 
majority of farmers who had not executed a voucher agreed that third-party 
quality assessment was useful and easy to request, and that the independent 
laboratory is trustworthy. Around 50 percent of all treated farmers stated they 
had not executed a voucher because they were satisfied with the milk-quality 
results provided by Vinamilk. A significant proportion (almost 40 percent) 
indicated that they would feel uneasy secretly checking up on Vinamilk. 
While we assured them that they would face no monetary cost for executing 
vouchers, these findings suggest that some might still consider it risky to dou-
ble-check the testing results in terms of jeopardizing the relationship with 
the company.
It is likely that this subjectively felt risk could foster free-riding among treat-
ment farmers, meaning here that individuals take advantage of the third-party 
enforcement while not actively contributing to the scheme through execution 
of a voucher. Such behavior does not necessarily undermine the scheme’s over-
all effectiveness (as perceived by individual farmers) in providing protection 
against opportunistic behavior by the company. Also, in other contexts, it is 
not uncommon that individuals choose to free-ride, while still believing in the 
effectiveness of the system as a whole. For example, in the area of public health 
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it can be observed that some free-ride on the protection offered by a vaccina-
tion scheme. Individuals may want to avoid possible risks of getting vaccinated, 
expecting that a sufficient number of other people will get vaccinated to ensure 
the desired level of protection (Bauch, Bhattacharyya, and Ball 2010).
We are confident that the low execution rate of vouchers in our case does 
not undermine the effectiveness of the intervention and does not pose a major 
problem for impact analysis. Based on the above discussion, we argue that 
all individuals assigned to the treatment group (except for dropouts) can be 
regarded as treated. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that for future research 
an encouragement design would be a good way to overcome this poten-
tial limitation.
Estimation Results
At first we investigate how the treatment affects self-reported fodder usage 
(concentrate fed per cow and day in kilograms). Results are presented in 
Table 11.2, columns (1) to (3). We find a significant positive treatment effect, 
which is robust across specifications. Farmers in the treatment group on aver-
age fed their cattle 0.83 kg more purchased concentrate than their peers in the 
control group, which implies an increase of 12 percent. The coefficients of the 
additional control variables, baseline trust toward Vinamilk, and the affilia-
tion to a specific milk collection center are mostly insignificant. As we do not 
find significant effects for the interaction terms, the treatment effect seems to 
be homogeneous. That is, we find a significantly positive impact of third-party 
enforcement on input use that does not differ across treatment farmers.
Beside the amount of purchased concentrate, which makes up the largest 
share of total input costs, we also analyzed treatment effects for labor input, 
veterinary services, and artificial insemination. For these other inputs we did 
not find significant differences between treatment and control groups.
The regression results for dairy output are also presented in Table 11.2. 
Without controlling for other covariates, the ATT for absolute milk fat and 
solid produced is positive but insignificant. Also the level of baseline trust 
does not seem to have an impact. But once we control for milk-collection 
center affiliation, we find significant treatment effects for both output mea-
sures (columns 6 and 9). Apparently, third-party enforcement of the contract 
increases not only concentrate use but also output quantity, as hypothesized. 
Yet the treatment effects for output quantity are not homogeneous across 
milk-collection centers. Considering the interaction terms in columns (6) and 
(9) of Table 11.2, we find significant effects for farmers delivering to MCCs 
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A, B, and C, but not for those delivering to MCC D. The treatment effects for 
farmers delivering to MCC A are particularly large. The coefficients for the 
treatment dummy imply an increase of approximately 40 percent for milk fat 
and total solid. We already explained above that farmers who deliver to MCC 
A may be systematically different. For farmers in MCCs B and C, the treat-
ment effects are smaller but remain positive and significant.
We also ran regressions using average fat and solid content per kilogram 
of milk as dependent variables,6 without finding significant treatment effects 
(results not presented here). Looking at quality, the relative composition of 
milk remained constant, as a comparison of fat and total solid content per 
kilogram of milk before and after treatment shows. This might seem sur-
prising given that the aim of the intervention was to break the asymmetry of 
information with respect to milk-quality attributes. A possible explanation 
for the observed increase in milk quantity instead of quality can be found in 
the physiology of dairy cattle. To produce large quantities of milk, the dairy 
cow requires a nutritious and balanced fodder ration, especially with respect 
to protein and energy. If the ration is unbalanced, for example if it contains 
too little protein relative to energy, milk yields will drop (Roth, Schwarz, and 
Stangl 2011). The concentrate purchased by farmers in Vietnam is rich in pro-
tein. It is therefore plausible that an increase in concentrate use, as observed 
among treated farmers, contributes to relaxing a protein constraint in the 
fodder ration, leading to higher milk quantity produced per cow. The same 
increase in protein-rich concentrate alone does not necessarily lead to higher 
fat and solid content per kilogram of milk.
Higher output leads to more revenues from dairy production, as shown in 
Table 11.3. The positive and significant coefficient of the treatment dummy 
in column (3), in which baseline characteristics are controlled for, points to 
a heterogeneous treatment effect, especially with respect to MCC affilia-
tion. As milk quality was not affected by the treatment and thus the average 
price received remained unchanged, the increment in revenue can entirely be 
attributed to increased production quantity.
Finally, we look at the intervention’s impact on total household consump-
tion expenditures, a commonly used measure of living standard and welfare. 
We do not find a significant ATT (Table 11.3, columns 4 to 6). This is not 
surprising, because households tend to adjust their consumption expenditures 
only slowly, that is, an increase in revenue or profit may not immediately be 
 6 In dairy farming, the output is usually quantified using weight measures such as pounds 
or kilograms.
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reflected in changed consumption behavior. To measure impacts on consump-
tion expenditure, the duration of the experiment may have simply been too 
short.7
But we observe a significant welfare increase for those treatment farmers 
who were more trustful toward the company before the intervention. This 
 7 In a recent impact assessment for a new agricultural technology in India based on observational 
panel data, Kathage and Qaim (2012) also found that technology adoption did not raise house-
hold expenditure in the beginning, in spite of sizeable profits gains, but significantly contrib-
uted to increased consumption after some time. In general, household consumption levels tend 
to change less rapidly than income levels.
TAbLE 11.3 Estimation results for revenue and household welfare
Parameter Revenue
Annual from dairy
(US$)
Welfare
Annual HH expenditure
(US$)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Voucher treatment 
(1 = y)
812.8
[830.7]
1,446
[1,179]
3,164*
[1,659]
82.95
[375.0]
–733.6
[358.9]
153.5
[931.4]
Trust toward Vinamilk 
(1 = y)
1,940
[1,725]
–661.5
[390.0]
Vinamilk trust * 
Voucher
–1,119
[1,855]
1,731**
[363.4]
MCC B (1 = y) 3,173*
[1,629]
–63.94
[907.6]
MCC C (1 = y) 874.4
[1,837]
–344.6
[972.8]
MCC D (1 = y) 1,931
[1,755]
–778.6
[940.5]
MCC B * Voucher –1,825
[2,342]
–1,185
[1,310]
MCC C * Voucher –2,704
[2,404]
658.8
[1,300]
MCC D * Voucher –3,859
[2,386]
–17.20
[1,294]
Constant 6,118***
[762.3]
5,232***
[693.1]
4,474***
[1,225]
4,106***
[181.2]
4,400***
[316.6]
4,401***
[687.9]
Observations a 172 170 172 184 182 184
r-squared 0.005 0.025 0.060 0.000 0.021 0.026
Source: authors’ own estimates.
Notes: hh = household; MCC = milk-collection center; robust standard errors, clustered at MCC level, in brackets; proba-
bility = * <.1, ** <.05, *** <.01; a The number of observations varies across models because of missing values for some of 
the variables. We also ran alternative estimates with equal number of observations across models, excluding farmers with 
missing values throughout. The results are similar, although with somewhat larger standard errors in some cases (see Table 
S2 in the supplementary material online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aau021).
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can be inferred from the positive coefficient of the trust–voucher interaction 
term in column (5) of Table 11.3. Interestingly, neither the trust variable itself 
nor the interaction term was significant in any of the previous models. The 
results here appear counterintuitive on first sight, as one would expect stron-
ger impacts for farmers who do not trust the company much. Yet, it should be 
noted that our trust variable may capture trust toward the company in multi-
ple dimensions, also beyond quality reporting. The statement “Vinamilk is a 
trustworthy business partner” that farmers were asked to rate may also involve 
expectations regarding the timing of payment, or beliefs about the compa-
ny’s long-term commitment to the contractual relationship. Hence, farmers 
with lower levels of trust may perceive the relationship with Vinamilk as risk-
ier, and thus act more cautiously, for instance by saving additional revenues 
instead of spending more on consumption. While we did not explicitly col-
lect data on savings, higher profits without higher consumption expenditures 
imply higher savings.
Discussion
Our findings confirm the hypothesis that third-party enforcement of con-
tracts mitigates underinvestment, and hence are in line with Wu and 
Roe’s (2007) results from laboratory experiments with college students. 
Furthermore, our study shows that, under real-world conditions, higher input 
levels observed under the enforced contract actually translate into higher 
output, a result that we hypothesized based on the theory but that would be 
impossible to obtain in the laboratory. The findings also suggest that specific 
subgroups are affected to differing degrees by the intervention. Differences 
occur especially between farmers delivering to different collection centers. 
Given data limitations, we are not able to further analyze possible mecha-
nisms that may explain these differences in the treatment effects. In part, they 
may be due to unobserved factors that determine farmers’ self-selection into 
specific MCCs.
Contamination
As pointed out before, by issuing personalized vouchers for treatment to farmers 
we avoided the possibility of control farmers getting direct access to third-party 
quality assessment. However, the random assignment of the treatment may still 
have led to contamination more indirectly through trust spillovers. For example, 
it is possible that a control farmer updated her belief about Vinamilk’s type  
from “unfair” to “fair” after communicating with a neighboring treatment 
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farmer. We evaluated this possibility through specific questions in the fol-
low-up survey.8 Trust levels of both treatment and control farmers signifi-
cantly increased (though more so for treatment farmers), pointing to the 
existence of positive spillovers. Hence, we conclude that the treatment effects 
that we measured possibly underestimate the real impact of third-party con-
tract enforcement.
A cleaner design, less susceptible to spillovers, would have required us 
to strictly separate treatment and control farmers, to avoid communication 
between groups. However, choosing the MCC as unit of randomization, as 
one possible way of separating treatment and control farmers, would have 
been much more costly due to the large number of collection centers needed 
for proper randomization. With only a small number of MCCs, as in our case, 
randomization among MCCs could have led to biased treatment effects due 
to systematic differences, as discussed above.
Data Provision and Incentive Compatibility
We attribute the entire treatment effects to a behavioral change of treatment 
farmers, not to a change in Vinamilk’s reporting behavior. This is justified, 
but deserves further explanation. We distinguish between the output (quan-
tity and quality) reported by Vinamilk and the true output obtained using 
laboratory methods. In the baseline scenario before the intervention, milk 
quality was private information of Vinamilk. If the company had exploited 
this informational advantage, reported output levels would have been lower 
than true output levels. If instead Vinamilk played fair, reported and true out-
put levels would have been identical.
We have shown that independent verification of quality attributes made 
farmers produce more milk fat and total solid during the intervention com-
pared to the baseline. This was a result of an increase in milk quantity q, while 
milk quality ϑ remained unchanged. It is important to note that the quantity 
of milk delivered has been observable to both farmers and the company at any 
point in time, before and during the intervention, because milk is weighed 
at the MCC under the eyes of the farmers. This implies that there has never 
been information asymmetry with respect to quantity. It follows that reported 
and true output must be identical. Thus, the observed treatment effect with 
respect to q can unambiguously be attributed to a change in farmers’ input use.
 8 Trust levels were measured before and after the treatment. The variable is constructed in the 
same way as baseline trust.
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While q increased, ϑ was not affected by the intervention. During the inter-
vention, when quality was verifiable through the independent laboratory, we 
know with certainty that reported ϑ and true ϑ must be identical. If Vinamilk 
had cheated before the intervention and stopped doing so when the third-party 
testing started, we would have been able to identify a discontinuity (jump) in 
the reported average quality. We do not observe such a discontinuity in the data.
But before we can infer that Vinamilk did not underreport in the period 
before the intervention, we need to rule out a possible alternative explana-
tion for the missing discontinuity: Vinamilk could have stopped cheating the 
farmers in the run-up to the intervention, as soon as they learned about its 
design and the fact that it would include third-party verification of the com-
pany’s testing results. In this case, Vinamilk would have ceased underreport-
ing at a much earlier point in time (that is, not covered by our dataset) to avoid 
providing evidence of cheating. This possibility, however, can be ruled out, 
because Vinamilk had already started providing production data (quantity 
and quality) at a very early stage of our cooperation, before we actually dis-
cussed the nature of the specific intervention. Hence, we had already received 
data at a time when Vinamilk could not anticipate that we were planning to 
look into independent quality verification. This precludes the possibility that 
the company provided us with “tailored” data to mask strategic underreport-
ing of quality. Also the mere fact that the company agreed to this intervention 
can be interpreted as a sign that Vinamilk did not cheat on quality reporting 
prior to the experiment.
Moving Toward a First-best Scenario in the Supply Chain
Putting these pieces of evidence together, we conclude that the company has 
not been deliberately underreporting milk quality and price, neither before 
nor during the intervention. Apparently, the company played fair but the 
supply-chain architecture prevented it from sending a credible signal of its 
fairness to the farmers, who in turn reacted with distrust. The finding that 
Vinamilk had not cheated the farmers has strong implications for the distri-
bution of gains from third-party monitoring. As the company did not behave 
opportunistically in the first place, it also did not accrue any information 
rents. Thus, in a situation in which the principal plays “fair” but is unable to 
send a credible signal, third-party verification can restore a first-best scenario, 
increasing the welfare of both actors in the supply chain, sellers and buyer—
while farmers benefit from unlocked productivity reserves, the company’s 
per-unit transaction costs decrease if procuring from farmers who are more 
productive in a situation with symmetric information.
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The distribution of gains is also driven by the stage of development of the 
supply chain. In the baseline scenario, without third-party contract enforce-
ment, the company holds an informational advantage that can be exploited to 
capture additional gains. Moving toward a more efficient market with sym-
metric information shifts the distribution of gains in favor of farmers and 
hence —from their point of view—a desirable outcome.
Generally, for a rational buyer to refrain from cheating, expected benefits 
from underreporting quality should be lower than expected costs. Such costs 
could arise from two sources: first, in the form of forgone operational profits 
from farmers’ suboptimal milk output (as we could show), and second, from the 
expected damage when cheating is detected. Reputational damage in particular 
could be severe for Vinamilk, given the company’s size and the fact that it has 
established several high-profile brands in the national market. But this may not 
be so obvious for farmers. While company decisionmakers have more informa-
tion to assess expected costs of cheating, contracted smallholder farmers may 
underestimate Vinamilk’s risk and damage of being caught. For example, farm-
ers may find it unlikely that Vinamilk would be convicted for fraudulent behav-
ior. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Vinamilk is perceived as a powerful and 
politically well-connected player, due to its history as a state-owned company.
Based on this argumentation, we cautiously conclude that for Vinamilk 
it is the dominant strategy to play fair, but that farmers may nevertheless 
form the belief that the company behaves opportunistically. It remains to 
be discussed why in this situation the company itself has not established an 
independent system of quality verification to signal its fair type, even though 
this could be profitable. One explanation could be that the credibility of 
any processor-driven initiative to increase transparency may be low. Duflo 
et al. (2012) showed for industrial pollution in India that—if incentives are 
not aligned—firms employ auditors who write favorable reports, actually 
understating pollution caused by the company. The current equilibrium of 
distrust that we find could probably be broken by a credible intervention from 
outside, such as by public research institutions—like in our experiment—or 
more generally by the government. A study by Olken (2007) found top-down 
monitoring to be relatively effective, even in an environment notorious for 
corruption. But governments do not necessarily need to undertake controls by 
themselves. As Yang (2008) has shown for import-tax fraud, governments can 
“hire integrity” from private firms, which is comparable to the independent 
laboratory in our case. The fact that no such attempt has yet been undertaken 
by the Vietnamese government may not surprise us, given that the local 
dairy industry is still emerging. Also in other sectors of developing countries, 
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such as health and education, market and policy failures are widespread 
phenomena (World Bank 2003).
Conclusion
Contracting has become a widely embraced approach to facilitate  supply-
chain relations between selling farmers and buying companies, especially 
in emerging markets for high-value agricultural products. Smallholders 
entering contractual relations with buyers of high-value products such as 
fruits, vegetables, meat, or milk often become highly specialized and derive 
a considerable income share from the output sold under contract. However, 
a harmful asymmetry of information occurs if product-quality attributes 
are observable to the buyer but not to the selling farmer. If buyers behave 
opportunistically and exploit this information asymmetry to increase their 
profit, output prices for producers are subject to risk, and expected prices are 
lower than in a situation with symmetric information. Farmers taking this 
into account will underinvest, that is, they may use suboptimal levels of input, 
which translates into lower output levels. This is a nondesirable outcome for 
both farmers and buyers.
In this study, we have shown that third-party contract enforcement 
can be one way to mitigate the adverse effects of information asymmetry. 
Conducting a field experiment with dairy farmers in Vietnam we found that 
the provision of third-party contract enforcement had a positive impact on 
input use (purchased fodder) and output levels (quantity of milk fat and total 
solid), ultimately translating into higher revenue and also higher household 
welfare for specific subgroups of the sample. While we carefully designed the 
intervention to retain the internal validity of the results, we are also facing 
some limitations. Given the design of our intervention, we cannot fully avoid 
positive contamination of the control group, and thus may actually underesti-
mate the treatment effects. While the postexperiment survey suggests that the 
intervention (which relied on a threat of selective double-checking rather than 
a comprehensive surveillance scheme) provided effective protection against 
cheating on the side of the buying company, residual doubts remain in view 
of the surprisingly low uptake rate (execution of vouchers for independent 
milk-quality testing). An encouragement design, with double-checking of 
milk quality being compulsory for treatment farmers, would be one option to 
consider in follow-up research.
From the available data, we infer that the observed treatment effects can be 
fully attributed to a behavioral change of farmers, instead of a change in the 
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company’s reporting strategy. It can also be concluded that, in this specific case, 
the company had not exploited the informational advantage when the contract 
was not yet enforced through third-party testing. Instead, the company was 
playing fair but could not credibly signal its type to the farmers due to the spe-
cific architecture of the supply chain. Hence, not only farmers can benefit from 
more transparency regarding quality assessment. If more output per farmer is 
generated, the per-unit transaction costs for the buying company are reduced.
Our results were obtained in an environment that is representative of the 
fast-growing Vietnamese dairy sector. The findings may also be transferable to 
other agricultural sectors, especially those where competition between buyers 
is low and information asymmetry exists. If quality attributes determine out-
put price but testing requires costly equipment, independent monitoring helps 
to overcome problems associated with information asymmetry, whether this 
is for fat content in milk, sugar concentration in cane, or protein content in 
grains—in Vietnam and beyond. The impact of third-party enforcement on 
the distribution of gains from contract farming depends on the stage of mar-
ket development.
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Appendix 
TAbLE 11.A1 Summary statistics of selected variables by milk-collection center
Characteristic
MCC A
(n = 113)
MCC B
(n = 103)
MCC C
(n = 86)
MCC D
(n = 83)
hh characteristics
No. of hh members 4.513
[1.536]
4.641
[1.514]
4.244
[1.255]
4.341
[1.399]
age of hh head 45.46
[11.53]
44.66
[9.161]
47.61
[11.74]
47.38
[11.39]
Total hh income (VND) 74,192,179
[49,567,765]
82,514,741
[69,491,153]
67,618,558
[58,362,681]
73,970,047 
[53,442,489]
Dairy income (VND) 45,968,059
[35,675,422]
53,551,420
[55,525,486]
44,313,419
[53,633,181]
52,171,927
[47,796,603]
Dairy production
herd size (heads) 7.611
[5.417]
8.194
[5.369]
7.744
[4.587]
6.398
[3.751]
productivity per cow (kg) 4,051.6
[2,888.4]
4,925.9*
[2,229.7]
4,477.3
[2,472.7]
n.a.
average milk price (VND) 6,850.0
[275.6]
6,730.9**
[294.7]
6,542.4***
[416.7]
6,671.4*
[772.3]
Total solid (%) 12.63
[0.520]
12.50
[0.496]
12.35***
[0.427]
12.61
[0.641]
Milk fat (%) 3.980
[0.280]
3.907*
[0.245]
3.862**
[0.221]
4.074
[0.482]
Milk hygiene score 3.572
[0.368]
3.642
[0.205]
3.686**
[0.162]
3.578
[0.465]
Source: authors’ own estimates.
Notes: hh = household; MCC = milk-collection center; VND = Vietnamese dong.  
Mean values are shown with standard deviations in brackets; mean differences are tested for MCC B–MCC a, MCC C–MCC a, 
and MCC D–MCC C; probability = * <.1, ** <.05, *** <.01. 
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LINKING SMALLHOLDERS TO THE NEW 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY: THE CASE OF THE 
PLATAFORMAS DE CONCERTACIÓN IN ECUADOR
Romina Cavatassi, Mario González-Flores, Paul Winters, 
Jorge Andrade-Piedra, Patricio Espinosa, and Graham Thiele
Smallholders and the New Agricultural Economy
Agricultural producers in developing countries, including smallholders, are 
increasingly relying on market transactions to procure agricultural inputs and 
concomitantly linking to long and complex value chains for high-value fresh 
and processed products. In these high-value markets, greater emphasis is being 
placed on private grades and standards for food quality and safety, leading to 
new organizational and institutional arrangements within the food-market-
ing chain (Reardon and Berdegué 2002; Dolan and Humphrey 2004). The 
growth of a dynamic food-marketing sector and the changes it implies for 
agriculture and related systems could potentially increase farm income and 
improve food security, particularly among smallholders (Eaton and Shepherd 
2001; Winters, Simmons, and Patrick 2005). However, access to input and 
output markets has proven difficult for many smallholders, who often remain 
at the margin of this new agricultural economy (Little and Watts 1994; 
Berdegué et al. 2003; Reardon et al. 2003; Johnson and Berdegué 2004). The 
process may in fact exacerbate poverty levels if smallholders are unable to 
take advantage of new market opportunities or benefit from increased labor 
demand. Additionally, agricultural market integration has been associated 
with negative environmental and health impacts, due to increased pesticide 
use and a deterioration of the crop genetic-resource base (Barrett, Barbier, and 
Reardon 2001; Dasgupta, Mamingi, and Meisner 2001; Pingali 2001; Singh 
2002; Winters, Simmons, and Patrick 2005).
In seeking ways for smallholders to access high-value markets while mini-
mizing negative consequences, there has been a growing recognition that stan-
dard production-oriented interventions designed to enhance productivity are 
insufficient unless they are accompanied by actions that target other parts 
of the production–distribution–retail chain. One intervention that has used 
This chapter was originally published as an article in the Journal of Development Studies 47: 1545–1573 (2011).
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this broader approach in the Andes is the Plataformas de concertación (mul-
tistakeholder platforms, or Plataformas), which seeks to link smallholders to 
high-value agricultural markets (Devaux et al. 2009). The Plataformas are 
alliances between small-scale farmers and a range of agricultural support-ser-
vice providers.1 The main objectives of the Plataformas are to increase yields 
and profits of potato-producing smallholders in order to reduce poverty and 
improve food security (Pico 2006). The program provides participants with 
new technologies and high-quality seeds in addition to facilitating access to 
high-value potato markets. Through the Plataformas, smallholder potato pro-
ducers are directly linked to restaurants, supermarkets, and processors that are 
willing to pay a premium for potatoes that meet their grades and standards. 
By establishing direct linkages between farmer organizations and purchas-
ers, the Plataformas have reduced the number of intermediaries within the 
value chain, providing smallholders with the opportunity to benefit from the 
changes in agricultural marketing systems.
The objective of this chapter is to understand whether, and to what 
extent, participating in the Plataformas impacts farmers’ well-being through 
enhancing the earnings from potato production in poor areas of Ecuador 
where potatoes are a key staple crop. The mechanisms by which program 
objectives have been achieved, and secondary environmental and health 
effects, are also analyzed. The results, although context specific, provide 
insights into the challenges of linking smallholders to high-value markets 
and of the possibility of meeting these challenges. The remainder of the 
chapter is organized as follows. Next, we present the logic of the Plataformas 
intervention. The methodological approach used is then described, followed 
by a description of the context and the data. Then we present the results, 
followed by a discussion of lessons learned and conclusions.
 1 The Plataformas program in Ecuador has been coordinated by the National Autonomous 
Institute for Agricultural Research (INIAP) through the Fortalecimiento de la Investigación y 
Producción de Semilla de Papa (FORTIPAPA; Strengthening of the Research and Production 
of Potato Seed) project working with local NGOs—Central Ecuatoriana de Servicios 
Agropecuarios (CESA); MARCO (Minga para la Acción Rural y la Cooperación); the Instituto 
de Ecología y Desarrollo de las Comunidades Andinas (IEDECA)—and other partners, 
including research centers and universities. It has been supported by the International Potato 
Center (CIP) through the Papa Andina Partnership Program, funded by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC).
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Linking Farmers to Markets: The Logic of the 
Plataformas Approach
While there are multiple structures for organizing production, the new insti-
tutional economics literature posits that the one that emerges is that which 
minimizes overall costs including transaction costs (Williamson 1985). Such 
costs include standard production costs, but also the ex ante costs of drafting, 
negotiating, and safeguarding agreements, as well as ex post costs of maladap-
tion, setup, and running of governance systems and bonding costs of secur-
ing commitments (Dietrich 1994). For agricultural industries where crops are 
sold in high-value markets or for processing, timely delivery and quality stan-
dards are often crucial to the decision of how to organize production. Using 
the open market for obtaining these commodities may involve high trans-
action costs and therefore may have limited appeal (Winters, Simmons, and 
Patrick 2005). Agribusinesses may then seek alternative structures for orga-
nizing production, such as through vertical integration or contract farming, if 
they view creating such a relationship as the least-cost alternative option.
The manner in which smallholders fit into a specific agricultural value 
chain depends on the costs that determine its organization. The primary cost 
advantage of smallholders is in their ability to supply cheap labor for labor-
intensive crops. In such cases, it may be worthwhile for an agribusiness to 
deal with numerous smallholders, since overall costs include a large share 
of labor costs. The agribusiness may choose to contract smallholders or 
groups of smallholders directly to minimize transaction costs. To ensure 
smallholder participation, some cost advantage or price premium must be paid 
to contracted smallholders. If the crop is not labor-intensive and it is possible 
to contract a smaller number of largeholders thereby minimizing transaction 
costs, this is a more likely outcome. If, alternatively, the agribusiness chooses 
to purchase the commodity in the open market, since it is the lowest-cost 
option and allows the agribusiness to meet its quality and timing needs, 
intermediaries are likely to play the role of obtaining the necessary product 
and providing it to the agribusiness. While these intermediaries may purchase 
the crop from smallholders, it will be at going market rates and provide no 
price premium or cost benefit to smallholders unless they are large enough 
suppliers that they can influence overall price.
The motivation for linking smallholders to agribusinesses is the presumed 
price premium for selling in these markets and thus overall income gains. 
When smallholders have no apparent comparative advantage in production, 
the challenge is to create that advantage or to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with purchasing from large numbers of farmers producing small 
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quantities. Linking smallholders to high-value purchasers is likely to require 
organizing smallholders to overcome transaction costs, as well as providing 
them with the necessary information to meet market requirements. While 
this adds costs for smallholders, since they must take the time to organize and 
obtain information, it lowers the costs to the industry.
This is exactly the logic of the intervention undertaken through the cre-
ation of the Plataformas; namely, reducing transaction and production costs 
so smallholders can be a low-cost option for high-value purchasers, and pro-
viding smallholders with the necessary tools to meet quality and quantity 
demanded. The primary mechanism by which the Plataformas reduce trans-
action costs is through providing support for smallholders from a range of 
agricultural support-service providers including the National Autonomous 
Institute for Agricultural Research (INIAP), nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), researchers, universities, and local governments, and through foster-
ing organization among smallholders. This support network comprises the 
Plataformas. The support and organization enable smallholders to improve 
production generally and meet the needs of high-value markets, allowing them 
to sell directly to restaurants, processors, and supermarkets. The Plataformas, 
therefore, reduces costs for two types of transactions: (1) between farmers and 
final purchasers; and (2) between farmers and suppliers of services (inputs, 
seeds, and technical assistance).
More specifically, the Plataformas ensure seed provision and seed invento-
ries are matched to detailed production plans established during regular meet-
ings held among farmers, coordinating NGOs, and other stakeholders in order 
to achieve monthly quotas for delivery to clients. Further, the Plataformas 
provide training through Farmer Field Schools (FFS) to enhance productiv-
ity and promote integrated pest management (IPM) techniques with the aim 
of improving quality and quantity of production while promoting decreased 
use of pesticides (or at least limited increases). Farmers are also trained to over-
see quality control during harvesting and commercialization, and to identify 
potential clients who can make a verbal commitment to buy their produce as 
long as the required standards are met.
Our main interest in evaluating the Plataformas project is to determine 
the feasibility of linking smallholders to the new agricultural economy in 
a context in which they have little obvious comparative advantage. The 
approach seeks to lower transaction costs and to improve overall cost- 
effectiveness through creating a support system to facilitate smallholder entry 
into this market. The three hypotheses we wish to test are: (1) participating 
in the Plataformas has increased farmers’ welfare as measured by potato yields 
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and gross margins; (2) greater potato sales and higher prices are the primary 
mechanism through which the program has improved welfare; (3) although 
high-value markets require high product quality, participation has not led to 
health or environmental degradation as measured by levels of agrochemicals 
used, their toxicity, precautions taken in their applications, and changes in 
varietal use. The methods for testing these hypotheses are discussed in the 
next section.
Empirical Approach and the Search for a 
Counterfactual
The key to identifying and measuring the impact of Plataformas participa-
tion is to have a proper counterfactual—that is, a comparison (control) group 
that is similar to the intervention (treatment) group in all ways except that it 
did not receive the intervention. The empirical problem faced in this analy-
sis is thus the typical one of missing data to fill in the counterfactual; that is, 
it is not known what the outcomes for participants would have been had they 
not participated. In experimental studies, households are randomly assigned 
to treatment and control ex ante and, given a sufficiently large sample size, it 
is reasonable to assume that the treatment and control are alike in all ways 
except in receiving the intervention. When assessment studies are set up ex 
post (after project implementation) and not as part of project design, experi-
ments are not possible and nonexperimental methods must be used to identify 
impact. This section describes the steps taken to ensure quality data to con-
struct a proper counterfactual was collected, followed by a description of the 
empirical approach used in the analysis.
Data Collection
The data used in this analysis come from household- and community-level sur-
veys that were administered from June to August 2007 in the Ecuadorian prov-
inces of Chimborazo and Tungurahua. Before administering the surveys, a 
series of steps were taken to facilitate an evaluation of the program. First, par-
ticipating communities (treatment communities) were identified in each prov-
ince and information on these communities was obtained. Second, using the 
2001 Ecuador census data (INEC 2001), the treatment communities and a set 
of potential control communities with similar geographic, agroecological, and 
sociodemographic characteristics were identified. This provided a list of all pos-
sible treatment and control communities to be included in the survey. Third, 
using propensity-score matching (PSM) (described more fully below), control 
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communities that were most comparable to treatment communities were identi-
fied—that is, control communities with similar propensity scores to the treated 
communities were kept as the potential set of communities for the sample. 
Fourth, the resulting list of potential control communities was discussed with 
key local organizations that had a central role in the Plataformas to determine 
if they were indeed comparable to the treatment communities. Some of the key 
characteristics considered were similarities in agricultural production, agroeco-
logical traits, and levels of community and farmer organization. Thus, the PSM 
selection was fine-tuned by local agronomists and leaders of organizations that 
had local knowledge. Through this process, the best control communities were 
identified. Further, treatment communities with distinct characteristics with 
no comparable control communities were excluded from the sample. The final 
community list contained 35 communities (18 treatment and 17 controls).
Within each treated community, there are community members who par-
ticipate in the program and others who do not (nonparticipants). There are two 
concerns about including nonparticipants in the treatment communities as part 
of the counterfactual. First, they may have chosen not to participate and there-
fore may be fundamentally different from the participants. The fact that par-
ticipant and nonparticipants self-select can lead to a potential bias in estimates 
of impact since the estimates may reflect fundamental differences between 
the two groups rather than the impact of the program. Second, since they live 
near beneficiaries they may obtain indirect benefits from the program (spill-
over effects). For both these reasons, using solely these households as a control 
group is potentially problematic. Yet, this is likely a useful group because their 
observable characteristics are probably similar to participants and so they were 
included in the sample. The final sample, therefore, includes three sets of house-
holds: (1)  beneficiaries of the program, (2) nonbeneficiaries in the treatment 
communities (referred to as nonparticipants), and (3) nonbeneficiary households 
in the control communities (referred to as noneligible). Lists of households from 
each of these subgroups were provided by Plataformas coordinators and com-
munity leaders. Households were randomly selected to be included in the sam-
ple. The final sample includes a total of 1,007 households of which 683 reside 
in treatment communities (324 beneficiaries and 359 nonparticipants) and 325 
in control communities (noneligible). Of those, full information on the pota-
to-production cycle is available for 660 households.2
 2 In this region, potato production can be conducted year round. Treated and nonbeneficiary house-
holds appear to be equally likely to have completed the production cycle and there are no system-
atic differences found between households that have completed the production cycle versus those 
that had not yet completed it, suggesting this should not influence results.
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This sampling strategy allows for different comparison groups, each 
offering interesting insights. The ideal comparison group partly depends on 
whether there are spillover effects on nonparticipants. If there are such effects, 
including nonparticipants in the counterfactual would lead to an underesti-
mation of program impact (Angelucci and Attanasio 2006). If spillover effects 
are substantial it may be desirable to include nonparticipants as treated house-
holds (intent to treat group: ITT) to get the total effect (direct and spillover 
effect) of the program and use only noneligible households as a counterfactual. 
These different options are considered below.
Empirical Approach
With the available data, four methods are used to identify impact: ordinary 
least squares (OLS), propensity-score matching (PSM), propensity score 
weighted least squares (WLS), and instrumental variable (IV) regression. The 
reason for these multiple methods is to ensure a reasonable level of confidence 
in our impact estimates. The methods and underlying assumptions are pre-
sented below. The approach also includes exploring alternative counterfactual 
groupings to determine the role of spillover effects. Ultimately, we argue that 
results are consistent when using approaches based on selection on observables 
(PSM and WLS), as well as when using an approach that deals with unobserv-
ables (IV). Further, we argue that spillover effects are minimal and that the 
main source of potential bias is related to program selection of beneficiaries.
The first approach is a standard OLS regression framework where the pro-
gram impact on outcome variable Yi can be determined by:
Yi = βXi + αdi + εi  (1)
where di = 1 if households participate, 0 otherwise;
Xi is a set of exogenous variables including socioeconomic characteristics of 
the households, agroecological conditions, geographic and location effects, 
and so forth;
α measures the treatment effect for household i;
β defines the relationship between Xi variables and Yi; and
εi is the error term.
This formulation assumes that the outcomes are linear in parameters and 
that the error term is uncorrelated with the exogenous variables Xi and with 
treatment. Conditional on these X variables, if the control group is like the 
treatment group in all characteristics except for having received the program, 
α, the measure of treatment’s effects provides an unbiased estimate of the pro-
gram effect. However, di may be correlated with the error term εi leading to 
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a biased estimate of the treatment effect α since it may capture not just the 
impact of the program but differences between treated and control house-
holds (Ravallion 2005). If the source of the problem is program-placement 
bias—differences due to characteristics of the household the program deemed 
desirable—the differences are more likely to be observable. If self-selection 
bias is the issue—certain types of households chose to enter into the pro-
gram—the differences are more likely to be unobservable.
Assuming the source of bias is observable, a way to obviate the problems 
outlined above is offered by our second method, the PSM approach. The main 
contribution of PSM3 is to construct a control group that has similar observ-
able characteristics (Xi) to the treated group, through a predicted probability 
of group membership calculated through a logit or probit regression, and then 
compare the outcomes. Given the unconfoundedness assumption (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1983) or selection on observables assumption (Heckman and Robb 
1985), if we call YTi  the value of the outcome for the treated household and 
YCi  the value of the outcome for the control, these are independent of the treat-
ment (di) but conditional on a set of observable characteristics Xi .
(YTi, YCi ┴ di) | Xi (2)
Since matching on Xi is the same as matching on the probability of being 
treated P(Xi) (Rosebaum and Rubin 1983), all dimensions of Xi can be sum-
marized into a predicted probability of being treated:
P(Xi) = Pr(di = 1 | Xi) = h (x i΄ b) (3)
where h is the standard normal distribution function.
Households in the untreated group that have a very similar probability of 
participating would be used as controls for their treated counterparts. So the 
effect of the treatment on the treated α can be defined as:
α = E(YTi – YCi | P(X), d = 1) (4)
Conditioning on the propensity score results in the balancing of covari-
ates across treatment and control groups, thus focusing the analysis on the 
area of common support by dropping those observations without a clear 
match. Further, PSM evades the arbitrary linear-in-parameters form of an 
OLS approach (Ravallion 2005). Heckman et al. (1996), Heckman, Ichimura, 
and Todd (1998), and Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) show that PSM does 
 3 See, for example, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998); Imbens (2004); Ryan and Meng (2004); 
Ravallion (2005).
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well in replicating experimental results provided researchers have access to a 
rich set of covariates or control variables and use the same survey instruments. 
These two requirements are fulfilled in this case since the collected data, as 
described in the next section, are rich in information, and were obtained using 
the same survey for treatment and control households. In the PSM approach, 
a common method of determining the statistical significance of results is to 
use bootstrapped standard errors since it provides reliable standard errors for 
all of the matching estimators and also accounts for the fact that the balanc-
ing score is estimated (Diaz and Handa 2006). Bootstrapped standard errors 
are therefore used to test the significance of the PSM estimates of impact.
An alternative to PSM, particularly when control and treatment, although 
not randomly assigned, are reasonably comparable, is a WLS method using 
weights calculated by the inverse of the propensity score (Sacerdote 2004; 
Todd, Winters, and Hertz 2010). Weighting by the inverse of the estimated 
propensity score has been demonstrated to achieve covariate balance and, in 
contrast to matching and stratification/blocking, uses all observations in the 
sample (Sacerdote 2004). Following Hirano and Imbens (2001), weights are 
calculated as follows:
ω(T, C) =
di + (1 − di)
p (Xi) 1 − p (Xi)
 (5)
where p(Xi) are the estimated propensity scores calculated as in equa-
tion (3), above.
Using equation (5), the weights created can be used to adjust the dis-
tribution of the two populations of interest (participants and nonpartici-
pants) to help account for the area of common support. The weights imply a 
greater emphasis on those treated households with lower scores and control 
households with higher scores. Further a regression framework as expressed 
in equation (1) can be used where Xi is included as a set of covariates and 
where standard tests of significance can be used (Robins and Rotnitzky 1995; 
Hirano and Imbens 2001). This approach retains full information from all 
households, while using weights ensures no correlation between treatment 
and covariates leading to a consistent estimate of the average treatment effect 
(Imbens 2004).
Each of these three approaches relies on an assumption of exogeneity, 
namely that program participation is exogenous to outcomes given a rich set 
of observable covariates Xi. When this assumption holds, treatment effects 
can be estimated without bias using observed estimands. Although we are 
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reasonably confident that this assumption holds, to explore the possibility of 
estimates being biased by unobservable differences between treatment and 
control groups, an IV approach is also used. An IV approach allows relaxing 
the exogeneity assumption, but requires identifying an instrument, Zi, which 
is correlated with program participation but uncorrelated with the error term 
(that is, would not capture the bias associated with unobservable differences 
between treatment and control). In an IV approach, two stages are estimated 
as follows:
Stage 1: di =  δZi + φXi + vi
Stage 2: Yi = βXi + αd_hati + εi 
 (6)
where
δ defines the relationship between instrument Zi and Plataformas 
participation; 
φ defines the relationship between instrument Xi and Plataformas 
participation; 
d_hati is predicted participation in the Plataformas as estimated from the 
first stage;
vi  is the error term in the first stage;  
and remaining variables are as previously defined.
The first stage is estimated as a linear probability model. Angrist (2000) 
suggests this approach when the first stage is a limited dependent variable 
model and argues that it is consistent and safer since predicting using a pro-
bit in the first stage is only consistent if the model is exactly correct. The main 
advantage of using an IV approach, when a valid instrument can be found, is 
that it deals with potential bias from observable and unobservable differences 
in control and treatment. In addition, the method can be used to test the exog-
eneity assumption used in PSM and OLS (Ravallion 2005).
To summarize, for the indicators analyzed (Yi) that test the hypotheses 
noted in the previous section, these four empirical approaches are employed. 
This allows for a clear assessment of the impact of the program. The next sec-
tion presents the data used to conduct these analyses.
Data
Two survey instruments (household and community) administered in the 
field were developed using qualitative information gathered by means of  
value-chain analysis, stakeholder consultations, and focus-group discussions. 
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Several revisions of the survey instruments were done based on field testing 
and conversations with key informants from the two study regions. The 
household survey included demographic information, economic and 
financial conditions of the households, social capital information, and 
agricultural production data, including detailed information on potato 
production. The community survey included information on the overall 
community population characteristics, access to infrastructure, and 
community organization.
Household Characteristics
Table 12.1 presents descriptive statistics of household characteristics along 
with t-test of difference for equality of means for the various counterfactual 
groups. Beneficiaries are contrasted with nonparticipants and noneligible 
households, as well as with the whole group of nonbeneficiaries (that is, non-
participants plus noneligibles). The t-test of difference for equality of means 
provides evidence of significant differences among the groups, offering an 
initial assessment of which group may represent a better counterfactual. The 
table presents statistics for 660 households used in the analysis for which full 
information on an entire production cycle is available.4 In the interest of space, 
the details of the descriptive statistics are not discussed and we focus only on a 
few key characteristics, and overall on the evidence regarding whether the sur-
vey design and data collection created a reasonable counterfactual. The excep-
tion is the social-capital variables which played a key role in the formation of 
the Plataformas and are therefore discussed in more detail.
Examining the first three sections of Table 12.1, the results suggest that 
households in the sample have many of the characteristics of smallholders in 
the Andes. They have limited amounts of land (2.58 hectares of land with 
less than half dedicated to potato cultivation), which tend to be spread across 
a few (about three), often steep plots. Household heads tend to be indige-
nous (62 percent) and have limited levels of education (around five years) with 
an average family size of nearly five members. Asset ownership is generally 
limited and diverse, so a PCA has been conducted to construct variables for 
assets ownership, grouped as durable assets, agricultural assets, and livestock. 
Although households tend to own their own homes and have access to a water 
system (95 percent), many have limited access to a sewage system (7 percent) 
and modern methods of cooking (54 percent cook with electricity or gas). 
Among the land, sociodemographic, and welfare variables, most do not show 
 4 See footnote 2.
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statistically significant differences between the beneficiary group and any of 
the nonbeneficiary groupings. The few variables that are significantly differ-
ent have similar magnitudes and could potentially be controlled for in the 
analysis. In general, the first part of Table 12.1 shows that the most similar 
possible control group would be the group of nonparticipants, since they have 
the fewest differences from the beneficiaries. However, even the  noneligible 
group seems to be reasonably comparable to the beneficiaries. The entire 
group of nonbeneficiaries thus is a reasonable counterfactual and it offers a 
greater number of farmers highly comparable to the beneficiaries.
Moving to the social capital section of Table 12.1, a broad set of variables 
is presented since social capital was a key element in the Plataformas program. 
These show that participation in nonagricultural community associations 
is quite high (83 percent) and over three times the membership in agricul-
tural community associations. While membership in nonagricultural associa-
tions is not different across the groupings, the membership in an agricultural 
association does show statistically significant differences: while 43 percent 
of beneficiaries belong to an agricultural association, the percentage adds up 
to 14 percent for both nonparticipants and noneligibles. At first glance, these 
results would indicate that there is something fundamentally different about 
the group of beneficiaries who participate in an agricultural association at 
higher rates than the possible control groups. However, while the Plataformas 
allowed all individuals and households to participate in the program, the 
program gave preference to those in associations. Thus, before joining the 
Plataformas, farmers may have been members of existing associations, may 
have joined existing ones, or may have formed new groups. This may explain 
the differences in the percentages of those who belong to an agricultural asso-
ciation across the three groups compared in Table 12.1.
A way to corroborate this hypothesis is to use data on the number of years 
that farmers have belonged to an agricultural association. If beneficiaries 
joined, or formed an agricultural association to qualify for the Plataformas, 
the maximum number of years belonging to such an association would be 
expected to be less than five years before the implementation of the sur-
veys, which is when the Plataformas were introduced in Tungurahua and 
Chimborazo. We would expect then that beyond five years prior the survey, 
the levels of social capital would be very similar across groups.
To this end, the bottom part of Table 12.1 presents an additional set of 
social-capital variables. First, there are no statistically significant differ-
ences in the number of years of membership and frequency of meetings for 
participation in nonagricultural associations. However, for agricultural 
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associations, while the number of meetings per year is not significantly dif-
ferent, membership is a relatively new event for beneficiaries who have been 
members for 3.96 years on average, as opposed to 10.03 years for nonpartic-
ipants, and 11.06 years for noneligibles. This seems to confirm that many 
beneficiaries recently joined an agricultural association. Another way to cor-
roborate this is by looking at the rate of participation for those who have 
been part of an agricultural association for more than five years. The next 
set of variables confirms this as 7 percent of beneficiaries belonged to an 
agricultural association for more than five years versus 8 percent for non-
participants and for noneligibles with all differences being statistically 
insignificant. Looking at the maximum number of years of membership 
for this subgroup, the data show that there are no differences across groups. 
Lastly, the final set of variables shows no statistically significant differences 
between beneficiaries and possible control groups in the rate of participation 
with outside agricultural and or nonagricultural associations. Based on this 
information, it is reasonable to assume that the differences that exist today 
across the groups are likely due to joining the Plataformas, which implies 
the willingness to create or strengthen social capital. Hence, potential unob-
servable differences, if existing, are likely to be captured by the social-capital 
variables that best proxy this selection criterion.
Indicator Variables
To test the hypotheses being tested, the following three sets of indicators are 
analyzed: (1) primary indicators, expressed by log of total harvest per hectare 
and gross margins per hectare; (2) mechanisms through which primary objec-
tives were reached, or why they were not reached; and (3) secondary indicators 
arising from participation, particularly related to use, knowledge, and practice 
of precautionary measures in agrochemical applications, and other environ-
mental impacts. Table 12.2 presents these indicators.
Among the primary indicators, the amount of potato produce harvested 
per hectare is the most direct indicator of productivity. The log of the quantity 
harvested is used and analyzed due to the expectation that the data are log 
normal. On average, the harvest per hectare is 7,006 kg or 7.94 in logarithms. 
Gross margins express returns to fixed factors of production, which provide a 
good indication of profitability, and are calculated as the total value of harvest 
minus the total variable costs incurred for their production. On average 
farmers earn US$112 per hectare of potatoes harvested.5
 5 All monetary indicators are in US dollars.
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There are multiple mechanisms through which farmers could increase yields 
and the income they generate from potato production. One key mechanism is 
through improved returns to potato production that can be obtained through 
selling more potatoes, getting a higher price for those potatoes, or requiring less 
time to sell. Four indicators for this mechanism are presented: (1) percentage 
of potato sold per hectare, (2) value of potato production, (3) price of sale, and 
(4) time required for sales transactions. Households on average sell almost half 
of their potato harvest (45 percent), which has a total value of $763 per hectare 
TAbLE 12.2 Program impact indicators
Indicator Whole sample
Primary indicators
Log of total harvest (kg/ha) 7.94
Gross margins (US$/ha) 112.72
Mechanisms
Total potatoes sold (share of harvest) 0.45
Value of potatoes harvested ($/ha) 763.49
price of potatoes sold ($/kg) 0.11
Time of transaction (hours) 1.29
Input costs ($/ha) 650.77
Cost of paid labor ($/ha) 97.48
Cost of seeds purchased ($/ha) 48.55
Value of seeds planted ($/ha) 181.45
Secondary indicators
preventive fungicide applied (kg or l/ha) 3.15
Curative fungicide applied (kg or l/ha) 4.16
Insecticides applied (kg or l/ha) 2.22
Cost of chemical fertilizer ($/ha) 124.68
Cost of organic fertilizer ($/ha) 46.04
applies traps (%) 26.7
environmental impact quotient 95.24
Can identify most toxic products (%) 34.1
always uses plastic poncho (%) 13.0
always uses mask (%) 6.4
Berger index of diversity 1.45
Most used variety—Fripapa (%) 29.0
Observations 660
Source: authors’ calculation using survey data.
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and sells at a price of about $0.11 per kg. On average, it takes 1.29 hours to sell 
their potatoes. The Plataformas also worked on the input side of the supply 
chain, introducing and supplying the most market-demanded varieties of 
which INIAP-Fripapa (hereafter referred to as Fripapa) represents the main 
variety. Changes in gross margins could reflect a change in input costs, while 
changes in yields could be due to additional input use and/or better farming 
practices. Four cost indicators are used to explore this mechanism. The average 
total input cost for households is $650 per hectare, of which $97 is paid labor 
costs per hectare, and $49 purchased seeds per hectare. The average value of 
seeds planted, however, is over three times that amount at $181 per hectare, 
suggesting that much of the seed is not purchased.
The secondary indicators capture the possible side effects of participation. 
The first set, which incorporates both health and environmental impacts, is 
the use of agrochemicals. To avoid increased agrochemical use and minimize 
their negative effects, FFS introduced an IPM approach that combines good 
management practices, including the use of insect traps for Andean weevil 
(Premnotrypes vorax), with the use of low-toxicity pesticides. Nevertheless, to 
comply with standards required, farmers might be inclined to use more pes-
ticides and chemical fertilizers to make sure harvested output is of a required 
physical quality (Orozco et al. 2007). To explore these possibilities, the amount 
of preventive and curative fungicides, the amount of insecticides, and the costs 
of chemical fertilizers are considered. Further, alternatives to chemical inputs, 
namely the cost of organic fertilizer and use of traps, are also examined.
FFSs teach the different risks associated with the toxicity of agrochemi-
cals, how to recognize toxicity levels of a product, and what precautions to use. 
The expectation is that participants use less-toxic pesticides, and that farmers 
recognize toxicity levels and take more precautions when applying agrochem-
icals. The methodology proposed by Kovach et al. (1992) was used to assess 
the environmental impact of pesticides. The environmental impact quotient 
(EIQ), which accounts for the toxicity level of the active ingredients of each 
agrochemical, was gathered and aggregated according to the field rate and 
concentration of each, obtaining the total environmental impact (TEI) per ha. 
The average value of the TEI is 95.
An indicator of knowledge of toxicity level is also included, and on aver-
age 34 percent of farmers can identify the most toxic products. A selected set 
of indicators for the use of protective gear is also reported. Data show that 
the percentage of households that use protective measures is in general very 
low, with 13 percent of farmers interviewed using plastic ponchos and only 
6 percent using masks.
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The final secondary indicators are related to the rate of agrobiodiversity 
maintained at the household level—that is, how the composition and share of 
potato varieties change due to market participation. The Plataformas focus 
on commercial varieties, and theory suggests that as farmers shift to market 
varieties and begin to specialize, the overall number of varieties cultivated is 
reduced (Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Pingali 2001) even though this does not 
necessarily imply genetic erosion (Smale 1997). The Berger–Parker index of 
inverse dominance, which expresses the relative abundance of the most com-
mon species (Magurran 1988; Baumgärtner 2006), is reported.6 Also included 
is the share of potato area planted with the Fripapa variety, a key variety pro-
moted through the Plataformas, which at the time of the survey was the domi-
nant variety in 29 percent of cases.
Analysis and Results
As noted, the approach used to select communities for inclusion in the sam-
ple focused on establishing a good counterfactual. To avoid remaining biases 
requires controlling for any further differences between treatment and con-
trol groups. Discussions with key informants and program leaders suggested 
that social capital is the key factor of program participation, and the data pre-
sented earlier support this. In particular, whether a household participated 
in an agricultural association for more than one year appears to capture the 
differences between treatment and control households. Since this is closely 
related to participation in the Plataforma, controlling for this variable in the 
regression model or using it in PSM should ensure controlling for those unob-
servables that may have driven certain households to participate. The assump-
tion is that this variable is correlated with unobservables related to being an 
“organization joiner,” which compels households to join the program, and thus 
any bias associated with self-selection should be eliminated. This variable is 
included in each of the regressions.
Since there remains the possibility of potential unobservable differences 
and, therefore, biased impact estimates, an IV approach is also employed as 
per equation (6). Finding a suitable and valid instrument is often a challenge, 
but a common solution used in impact evaluation is to use the intention to 
treat (ITT), since all households in the treated communities had the option 
to enter the program but not everybody participated (Galasso, Ravallion, 
 6 Additional diversity indexes (Shannon and Margalef) were used with similar results; these are 
not presented here.
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and Salvia 2001; Ravallion 2005; Oosterbeek et al. 2008). Provided that we 
control for location-specific effects which might have a direct effect on out-
comes, this should be a good predictor of participation. The eligibility criteria 
are shown to be, indeed, a valid instrument in our case being the instrument 
(ITT) highly significant in the first stage and the instrumented variable 
highly significant in the second stage. We also checked the null hypoth-
esis that the instrument is weak and reject this hypothesis as it passes the 
rule of thumb that the F statistic for excluded instruments is higher than 10. 
Lastly, the endogeneity test accepts the null hypothesis that Plataformas can 
be treated as exogenous to our specification, thus supporting the exogeneity 
assumption needed in the PSM and WLS.7
For each of the four specifications presented, all nonbeneficiaries are used 
as the potential counterfactual group and results are reported in Table 12.4. 
In general, the four approaches provide robust results suggesting impact esti-
mates are accurate. Since all nonbeneficiaries are used for this first set of 
results, they may be lower bound estimates due to the possibility of spillover 
effects of the program on nonparticipants in the treatment communities. Even 
if there are spillover effects, they are likely to be small, since nonparticipants 
would not have obtained the benefits of market access, which appear substan-
tial, and instead are only likely to receive indirect benefits from improved 
access to seed and transmission of new production technologies. Nonetheless, 
to make sure no spillover effects are found, we consider additional counter-
factual groups within the WLS framework. These include noneligibles, non-
participants, as well as the ITT group (beneficiaries and nonparticipants) 
contrasted with the noneligibles. The benefit of this last approach is that it 
potentially captures both direct and spillover effects. These results are pre-
sented in Table 12.5. Before proceeding with a discussion of these two sets of 
results, the probit on participation is first examined.
Participation in the Plataformas
Table 12.3 reports the results of the probit on Plataformas participation with 
marginal effects calculated at the sample mean. The model accurately predicts 
 7 With regard to the identification strategy, no tests for overidentification can be run since, given 
one instrument, the equation is exactly identified. To verify the endogeneity assumption, a 
test under the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors (participation in the 
Plataforma) can actually be treated as exogenous has been run. The test statistic is distributed as 
chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors tested and defined as the 
difference of two Sargan–Hansen statistics: one for the equation with the smaller set of instru-
ments, where Plataforma is treated as endogenous; and one for the equation with the larger set 
of instruments, where Palataforma is treated as exogenous.
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TAbLE 12.3 Probit on Plataforma participation
Lr chi2(26) = 84.37
prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = –375.80489  pseudo r2 = 0.1009
Parameter dF/dx P>|z |
Land owned (ha) –0.004 .506      
Owned plots (no.)   0.031 .003***
Black soil (%) –0.048 .451      
Flat land (%) –0.068 .216      
Irrigated land (%) –0.076 .156      
Family size  0.010 .369      
average education of hh head   0.006 .338      
Indigenous hh head –0.027 .549      
Female hh head   0.011 .860      
age of hh head   0.000 .964      
Dependency share   0.056 .631      
Livestock –0.015 .488      
agricultural assets   0.041 .068*    
Durable assets –0.004 .876      
house –0.043 .500      
Concrete/brick house –0.131 .051*    
access to water system –0.200 .025**  
Sewage –0.087 .258      
Cook with electricity/gas  0.076 .084*    
Distance to closest city (km) –0.003 .049**  
altitude   0.000 .846      
Chimborazo –0.065 .307      
agricultural association (>1 year)   0.327 .000***
Nonagricultural association –0.015 .774      
external agricultural associations –0.021 .786      
external nonagricultural associations –0.007 .901      
Observations 660
Sensitivity (%) 34.56
Specificity (%) 90.07
positive predictive value (%) 63.03
Negative predictive value (%) 73.75
Correctly classified (%) 71.82
Source: authors’ calculation using survey data.
Note: hh = household.
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71.8 percent of outcomes and shows the importance of a number of vari-
ables. The differences are as expected and reflect those reported in Table 12.1. 
Membership of an agricultural association within the community for more 
than a year is significant and has the expected sign.
Using the probit results, propensity scores are calculated for the treat-
ment and control group. Figure 12.1 shows the kernel-density estimates of 
the distribution of estimated propensity scores for each group. The scores 
obtained are almost entirely in the area of common support, suggesting that 
non beneficiaries represent a reasonable counterfactual to the treated popula-
tion.8 Furthermore, Appendix Table 12A.1 reports the punctual test of means 
showing a dramatic reduction of significant differences between the two 
groups and demonstrating the capability of the method to balance the base-
line covariates and to make the two groups highly comparable. Nevertheless, 
the difference in mean propensity score across the treatment and control 
groups (mean of 0.37 in the treatment group versus 0.29 in the control group, 
P <.000) implies that simply conditioning on X through an OLS specification 
 8 Figures assessing the common support for all possible counterfactual options were also 
constructed but are not reported as they all consistently suggested a similar area of common 
support, indicating high similarity across groups. For simplicity, only one figure is presented. 
The consistency of the common support across potential control groups is corroborated in the 
results of the various analyses presented in this section.
FIGURE 12.1 Kernel distribution and common support area across the two groups
0.8
Estimated propensity score
Program
control
0.2 0.4 0.6 10
0
1
2
3
4
Source: authors’ calculation using the “Linking small farmers to the new agricultural economy data” set.
Note: The common support area is marked within the black vertical lines.
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might not yield the correct average treatment effect if this effect is in fact het-
erogeneous. Given these results, PSM, WLS, and IV estimates are considered 
to ensure an unbiased estimate of impacts.
Assessing Results
Table 12.4 presents the results of the analysis using the OLS, PSM, WLS, and 
IV approaches reporting the impact estimate of Plataformas participation 
(α) on the indicator of interest (Yi). Table 12.5 reports results using the WLS, 
which we think best represents and approximates impacts, for the alternative 
counterfactual groups. The results are remarkably consistent across specifica-
tions (Table 12.4) and make sense for the different counterfactual groupings 
(Table 12.5), indicating that the program effects are well identified.
Table 12.4 shows that both primary indicators, log of yields and gross 
margins, are positively and significantly influenced by participation in the 
program with the estimated differences being similar and significant across 
specifications. Gross margins per hectare are around $200 higher for partici-
pants, which are substantial given average margins are only around $100 per 
hectare (see Table 12.2). The findings in Table 12.5 suggest results are simi-
lar even when using different counterfactual groupings. The results using the 
nonparticipants suggest there are few or no spillover effects and indicate that 
participating in the Plataformas program is associated with a successful wel-
fare improvement for beneficiary farmers.
The mechanisms leading to these results show that beneficiaries sell more 
of their harvest compared to nonbeneficiaries and at a significantly higher 
price, thus obtaining a greater value. Prices obtained are indeed about $3 per 
metric quintal more than nonbeneficiaries, corresponding approximately to 
30 percent higher price if looking at the differences in prices (Table 12.2). The 
results on the difference in the time taken for the transaction are mostly insig-
nificant, although the IV results suggest they are lower. Table 12.4 shows that, 
overall, total input costs do not appear to be significantly higher for the bene-
ficiaries; however, seeds purchased and used are significantly higher for treated 
households and for most specifications so are labor costs (the exception being 
the IV results).
Moving to the secondary indicators of Table 12.4, the increased use of 
some inputs suggests possible environmental and health problems if it is 
linked to increased use of agrochemicals. The evidence is somewhat mixed, 
but does not seem to imply a widespread problem. Beneficiaries do not use sig-
nificantly more fungicides, but do use more insecticides (although not accord-
ing to the IV results) and chemical fertilizers. Findings suggest, however, that 
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farmers are using less-toxic chemical mixes given that they are using more 
chemicals and the EIQ ratio is not significantly different from zero in any of 
the specifications, except for the IV where it is negative and moderately sig-
nificant. The finding is also supported by the evidence that beneficiaries can 
identify toxic products better than nonbeneficiaries. This is most likely due to 
the training participants received in FFS. Additionally, traps for the Andean 
weevil are more commonly used by beneficiaries than nonbeneficiaries. Lastly, 
program participants are generally more likely to use protective gear as evi-
denced by a greater use of a plastic ponchos and masks (this result, however, 
does not hold for the IV result which is insignificant).
With respect to the potential losses of agricultural biodiversity as mar-
ket demand pressurizes farmers to abandon traditional varieties, the evidence 
does not support this hypothesis as indicated by the insignificant impact on 
the agrobiodiversity indicator reported. Participants do seem to have switched 
to the Fripapa variety. Thus, Plataformas farmers seem to maintain the same 
diversity level although changing the primary market variety grown.
Linking Different Farmers to Market
Different organizations implemented the field training in the FFS in the two 
regions of Chimborazo and Tungurahua, however all trainers used the same 
methodology and curriculum. Likewise the process of incorporating farm-
ers to the Plataformas was the same in both regions. Although Chimborazo 
and Tungurahua are both relatively poor areas, it is important to note that 
there are significant differences between the two. Data from the Ecuadorian 
National Institute of Statistics and Census shows that about 54.1 percent of 
the population in Chimborazo lived in consumption poverty in 2006, while 
only 36.2 percent lived in poverty in Tungurahua (INEC, 2005–2006). 
These differences are reflected in our own data where land variables as well as 
sociodemographic indicators suggest that, although both provinces are rather 
poor, farmers in Tungurahua are, on average, better off than their counter-
parts in Chimborazo owning more land and generally having higher socio-
economic indicators. It is reasonable to assume that these differences may be 
reflected in divergent results in the two regions.
To determine how well the Plataformas perform in each area, the anal-
ysis is done for each region. Table 12.6 shows results for the two prov-
inces and seems to suggest that the effects of the Plataformas participation 
are stronger for farmers in Chimborazo who have clearer direct impacts: 
larger and strongly significant gross margins and a higher impact on har-
vest. In Tungurahua, on the other hand, while the signs for these indicators 
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TAbLE 12.6 Impact by region (using propensity-score weighted least squares)
Indicator Tungurahua Chimborazo
Diff. P>|t | Diff. P>|t |
Primary indicators
 Log of total harvest (kg/ha) 0.30 .060* 0.86 .000***
 Gross margins (US$/ha) 25.53 .686 366.47 .004***
Mechanisms
 Total potatoes sold (share of harvest) (%) 7 .034** 9 .027**
 Value of potatoes harvested ($/ha) 116.98 .151 672.28 .000***
 price of potatoes sold ($/kg) 0.02 .006*** 0.04 .001***
 Time of transaction (hours) –0.14 .391 0.03 .925
 Input costs ($/ha) 91.45 .109 305.80 .043**
 Cost of paid labor ($/ha) 3.26 .776 95.31 .027**
 Cost of seeds purchased ($/ha) 29.85 .021** 24.52 .375
 Value of seeds planted ($/ha) 55.72 .001*** 110.23 .032**
Secondary indicators
 preventive fungicide applied (kg or l/ha) 0.20 .831 –0.51 .462
 Curative fungicide applied (kg or l/ha) –1.56 .363 –0.10 .949
 Insecticides applied (kg or l/ha) 1.21 .107 1.23 .150
 Cost of chemical fertilizer ($/ha) 29.51 .173 68.09 .022**
 Cost of organic fertilizer ($/ha) 4.78 .445 22.21 .339
 applies traps (share) 0.55 .000*** 0.46 .000***
 Total environmental impact quotient 
(TeI/ha)
2.35 .944 –30.14 .310
 Can identify most toxic products (label 
color) (%)
36 .000*** 43 .000***
 always uses plastic poncho (%) 10 .047** 8 .054**
 always uses mask (%) 6 .056* 3 .415
 Berger index of diversity –0.07 .332 0.09 .132
 Most used variety—Fripapa (%) 31 .000*** 34 .000***
Observations 314 329
Source: authors’ calculation using survey data.
Note: probability: * ≤.1, ** <.05, *** <.01.
are positive, only the log of harvest per hectare is significantly (at 10 percent 
level of confidence) larger for participants. However, this difference does not 
translate into significantly higher gross margins. This is likely due to a com-
bination of factors led by a smaller difference in productivity between benefi-
ciaries and nonbeneficiaries but also by smaller differences in price of potato 
sold, in the percentage of produce sold, and in the value of produce harvested, 
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although for both the former indicators differences are significantly higher 
for beneficiaries in both regions. It is interesting to note that beneficiary farm-
ers in Tungurahua purchased a greater amount of seeds spending more than 
the control group, while the remaining input costs do not signficantly dif-
fer, as opposed to Chimborazo where participant farmers spent significantly 
higher amounts for inputs particularly in terms of hired labor. For the sec-
ondary indicators, the differences between the two groups are similar in both 
regions with the only exception of costs of chemical fertilizers that are signifi-
cantly greater for participants in Chimborazo. Overall, Plataformas farmers 
are successfully adopting the new production approach in both regions, even 
though participation seems to be having a greater effect on participants in 
Chimborazo. These differences may suggest that poverty levels and/or finan-
cial constraints are more of an issue for farmers in Chimborazo. If this is the 
case, we might conclude that program participation is more effective for less 
endowed and more financially constrained farmers. However, it may be that 
other regional factors are playing a role.
To explore better whether the differences in results are due to greater ben-
efits going to smallholders and less endowed participants, additional analyses 
by landholding size are included. Keeping in mind that generally all farm-
ers have relatively small landholdings, we divide landholdings into small (less 
than 1 hectare), medium (1 to 5 hectares) and large (more than 5 hectares) 
landholdings. The results presented in Table 12.7 show that medium farms 
have been able to gain the largest benefits of the program, obtaining signifi-
cantly higher yields and productivity which translates into higher gross mar-
gins. These have been achieved through a larger percentage of potato sold as 
well as through higher price gains of the produce sold, even though higher 
input costs, for both seeds and fertilizers, have been incurred. Beneficiaries 
with very small farms managed to harvest more than their control group and 
sold a significantly higher amount and share of potatoes, however these did 
not translate into higher gross margins. This is due to significantly higher 
input costs which did not lead to a high enough productivity increase, suggest-
ing that landholding, and thus smaller total amounts harvested and sold, are 
insufficient to compensate the sunk costs participant farmers incur in pro-
duction. To achieve higher benefits they would need either to further increase 
productivity or to cut costs. Importantly, it should be noted that small farm-
ers experienced a significantly shorter time to sell their produce. Looking at 
relatively larger farmers, significantly higher gross margins seem to be due 
mostly to economies of scale. What seem to have played a major role for larger 
farms are the reduced per unit costs supported for each type of input and 
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TAbLE 12.7 Impact by land size (using propensity-score weighted least squares)
Indicator Small farms 
(<1 ha)
Medium farms  
(1–5 ha)
Large farms  
(>5 ha)
Diff. P>|t | Diff. P>|t | Diff. P>|t |
Primary indicators
 Log of total harvest (kg/ha) 0.45 .004*** 0.67 .005*** 0.06 .799
 Gross margins (US$/ha) –23.16 .844      318.68 .004*** 111.81 .068*
Mechanisms
 Total potatoes sold (share of 
harvest) (%)
13 .001*** 4 .353 1 .912
 Value of potatoes harvested  
($/ha)
375.79 .012**  442.69 .009*** 43.34 .646
 price of potatoes sold ($/kg) 0.03 .000*** 0.03 .000*** –0.02 .119
 Time of transaction (hours) –0.40 .010*** 0.19 .559 0.16 .694
 Input costs ($/ha) 398.95 .002*** 124.01 .299 –68.48 .202
 Cost of paid labor ($/ha) 100.05 .042**  16.18 .608 –52.33 .005***
 Cost of seeds purchased ($/ha) 78.42 .097*    49.93 .012*** –6.67 .636
 Value of seeds planted ($/ha) 137.63 .017**  92.34 .000*** –7.88 .663
Secondary indicators
 preventive fungicide applied  
(kg or l/ha)
–0.20 .827      0.19 .745 –0.52 .574
 Curative fungicide applied  
(kg or l/ha)
–1.23 .630      0.25 .689 –0.71 .220
 Insecticides applied (kg or l/ha) 3.31 .032**  0.23 .546 –0.13 .423
 Cost of chemical fertilizer ($/ha) 83.33 .027**  22.99 .123 –1.42 .930
 Cost of organic fertilizer ($/ha) –2.41 .907      43.63 .005*** 11.46 .011**
 applies traps (share) 0.55 .000*** 0.49 .000*** 0.32 .007***
 Total environmental impact 
quotient (TeI/ha)
–11.93 .733      –8.69 .745 –18.10 .538
 Can identify most toxic products 
(label color) (%)
35 .000*** 41 .000*** 20 .124
 always uses plastic poncho (%) 3 .613      7 .136 11 .050**  
 always uses mask (%) 0 .888      2 .669 14 .120
 Berger index of diversity 0.14 .108     s –0.05 .422 –0.11 .478
 Most used variety—Fripapa (%) 34 .000*** 41 .000*** 11 .262
Observations 302 263 88
Source: authors’ calculation using survey data.
Note: probability * ≤.1, ** <.05, *** <.01.
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particularly for significantly smaller labor costs. Larger farmers are also not 
increasing other costs compared to those with smaller landholdings. This 
may be due to the fact larger farmers are already relatively efficient and do not 
get the level gains that medium farmers experience. In sum, while for larger 
farmers, economies of scale are sufficient to outweigh the costs and guaran-
tee higher gross margins, in the case of smallholders an intensification of tech-
nology adoption combined with a reduction of direct and transaction costs 
would be needed to guarantee that higher productivity translates into higher 
gross margins.
Conclusion
In this chapter, the challenges of linking smallholder potato farmers to high-
value markets are examined by looking at the experience of the multistake-
holder Plataformas program in the provinces of Chimborazo and Tungurahua 
in the Ecuadorian Sierra. An empirical analysis has been conducted to assess 
whether the program has been successful in increasing yields and profits of 
potato-producing smallholders while protecting farmers’ health and the envi-
ronment. Mechanisms by which these objectives have been achieved were 
also analyzed.
To ensure a proper and sound empirical analysis, the data were collected 
in a way that made it possible to create a reasonable counterfactual for com-
paring Plataformas participants. Additionally, multiple econometric meth-
ods were employed to ensure results were not driven by a specific methodology. 
Spillover effects are also considered using different counterfactual groupings. 
The results are strongly consistent across the different specifications and the 
use of different types of counterfactuals, suggesting that the success of the 
Plataformas is well identified. Our findings show that the Plataformas pro-
gram successfully improved the welfare of beneficiary farmers and that the 
benefits were limited to farmers who directly participated since there appear 
to be few spillover effects on nonparticipants.
Both primary indicators, namely yields and gross margins, are positive and 
significant for beneficiaries, with estimated differences very similar across 
specifications. The mechanisms through which the Plataformas achieve 
these primary benefits are through selling higher percentages and amounts 
of potato harvest than nonbeneficiaries in addition to selling at a 30 percent 
higher price. Although participant farmers incur higher input costs, partic-
ularly for seeds but also for hired labor and fertilizers, benefits are enough 
to outweigh these added costs. Clear benefits are achieved by medium-sized 
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farms while large farms achieve benefits mainly due to economies of scale. On 
the other hand, smallholders need to intensify technology and reduce direct 
as well as transaction costs to be able to achieve higher returns. The regional 
analysis has shown that farmers in Chimborazo, which are on average poorer 
than farmers in Tungurahua, have achieved higher and better results through 
participating in the Plataformas.
Results for secondary indicators are somewhat mixed. With respect to 
the use of agrochemicals, beneficiaries do use slightly more insecticides and 
chemical fertilizers, but most of the other indicators are not significantly dif-
ferent. Products utilized are likely to be less toxic given the TEI is not signifi-
cantly different from nonbeneficiaries and in general has a negative sign. The 
Plataformas is clearly having an impact on the utilization of traps and in dif-
fusing knowledge: a significantly higher percentage of participant farmers 
apply traps while a significantly higher percentage of farmers are able to recog-
nize the toxicity of agrochemicals. This latter translates into a higher utiliza-
tion of protective gears although percentages are generally relatively low.
Concerns related to potentially negative impacts on agricultural biodiver-
sity are unfounded since results suggest that participants and nonbeneficiaries 
maintain the same level of diversity. Given that most of the varieties cultivated 
are modern, it appears that genetic erosion, if any, happened in the past due to 
a combination of natural causes (El Niño), agro-industrialization and farmers’ 
preferences in response to changing market opportunities.
Overall, participation in the Plataformas suggests a successful way of 
linking smallholder potato farmers to the markets. The success of the 
Plataformas can be first explained by its intervention along the value chain. 
On the output side, this led to reduced transaction costs that resulted from 
circumventing intermediaries and making sure farmers obtain a greater 
share of the returns from their production. Value-chain interventions on 
the input side led to the introduction and supplying of market-demanded 
varieties, provided high-quality seeds, and taught efficient farming techniques. 
Secondly, the success of the Plataformas highlights the importance of social 
capital in identifying and organizing beneficiaries in a manner that effectively 
overcomes entrance barriers.
While this chapter has, overall, found important positive and significant 
impacts of the Plataformas on the welfare of farmers and no negative effects 
on farmers’ health and the environment, there still remains a question of 
cost-effectiveness and the potential effect on efficiency. For example, Thiele 
et al. (2011) note one question that has not so far been addressed because of 
data limitations: whether there is sufficient value-added in the new market 
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opportunities to cover the costs of the Plataformas and still provide farm-
ers with a sufficient income increment to justify program participation. The 
authors also observe that while the program received substantial subsidies 
through project funding, this was probably a reasonable investment given the 
positive results. In the long run and for scaling up the program, however, other 
funding mechanisms would need to be explored to achieve financial sustain-
ability (Chapter 8). Although we recognize the importance of assessing costs 
and shedding light on the sustainability of the Plataformas, it is not possible 
with the current available data. The total investments in the program have not 
been sufficiently identified since they came from multiple sources. Further, 
sustainability would need to be assessed with a new round of data collection 
that would examine how the program is currently operating now that much 
of the external support has been withdrawn. New initiatives are under way to 
gather the necessary information to arrive at a more accurate answer to these 
important questions, presenting a clear direction for future research.
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Appendix
TAbLE 12A.1 Punctual test of means comparing beneficiaries to all nonbeneficiaries
Variable Mean treated Mean control % reduction 
|bias|
P>|t |
Land owned (ha) 2.55 2.41 –230.7 .622
Owned plots (no.) 3.25 3.11 68.2 .617
Black soil (%) 0.77 0.78 60.3 .884
Flat land (%) 0.38 0.36 48.6 .857
Irrigated land (%) 0.54 0.52 49.1 .659
Family size 4.79 4.82 75 .930
average education of hh head 5.24 4.96 32.3 .462
Indigenous hh head 0.58 0.61 43.6 .532
Female hh head 0.12 0.11 –155.5 .913
age of hh head 42.20 42.38 –22.7 .953
Dependency share 0.29 0.29 64 .958
Livestock 0.06 0.05 –113.1 .893
agricultural assets 0.13 0.00 33.6 .788
Durable assets 0.04 0.01 30.5 .870
house 0.84 0.86 27.8 .570
Concrete/brick house 0.83 0.85 73.6 .732
access to water system 0.92 0.93 70.1 .759
access to sewage system 0.06 0.06 72.5 .954
Cook with electricity/gas 0.57 0.55 60.5 .751
Distance to closest city (km) 27.13 26.14 70.4 .362
altitude (m a.s.l.) 3,447.50 3,446.00 90.4 .918
Chimborazo 0.50 0.50 –20.8 .849
agricultural association (>1 year) 0.34 0.33 98.7 .943
external nonagricultural association 0.17 0.17 –221.9 .930
external agricultural association 0.07 0.06 3 .763
Nonagricultural association in 
community
0.82 0.85 –93.5 .595
Source: authors’ calculation using survey data.
Note: hh = household. 
406 ChapTer 12
References
Angelucci, M., and O. Attanasio. 2006. Estimating ATT Effects with Non-Experimental Data and 
Low Compliance. IZA Discussion Papers no. 2368. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of 
Labor.
Angrist, J. 2000. Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Dummy Endogenous 
Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice. NBER Technical Working Paper 
248. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Barrett, C. B., B. Barbier, and T. Reardon. 2001. “Agroindustrialization, Globalization, and 
International Development: the Environmental Implications.” Environment and Development 
Economics 6 (4): 419–433.
Baumgärtner, S. 2006. Measuring the Diversity of What? And for What Purpose? A Conceptual 
Comparison of Ecological and Economic Measures of Biodiversity. Working Paper. Heidelberg, 
Germany: University of Heidelberg. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.
cfm?per_id=363673.
Berdegué, J. A., F. Balsevich, L. Flores, and T. Reardon. 2003. Supermarkets and Private Standards 
for Produce Quality and Safety in Central America: Development Implications. Report to 
USAID under the RAISE/SPS project. East Lansing, MI, US: Michigan State University; 
Santiago, Chile: Rimisp – Latin American Center for Rural Development.
Dasgupta, S., N. Mamingi, and C. Meisner. 2001. “Pesticide Use in Brazil in the Era of 
Agroindustrialization and Globalization.” Environment and Development Economics 6 (4): 
459–482.
Dehejia, R. H., and S. Wahba. 1999. “Causal Effects in Non Experimental Studies; Reevaluating 
the Evaluation of Training Programs.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 94 (448): 
1053–1062.
—. 2002. “Propensity Score-Matching Methods for Nonexperimental Causal Studies.” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 84 (1): 151–161.
Devaux, A., D. Horton, C. Velasco, G. Thiele, G. López, T. Bernet, I. Reinoso, et al. 2009. 
“Collective Action for Market Chain Innovation in the Andes.” Food Policy 34 (1): 31–38.
Diaz, J. J., and S. S. Handa. 2006. “An Assessment of Propensity Score Matching as a 
Nonexperimental Impact Estimator, Evidence from Mexico’s PROGRESA Program.” Journal 
of Human Resources 41 (2): 319–346.
Dietrich, M. 1994. Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond. London: Routledge.
Dolan, C., and J. Humphrey. 2004. “Changing Governance Patterns in the Trade in Fresh 
Vegetables between Africa and the United Kingdom.” Environment and Planning A  
36 (3): 491–509.
LINKING SMaLLhOLDerS TO The NeW aGrICULTUraL eCONOMY 407
Eaton, C., and A. W. Shepherd. 2001. Contract Farming: Partnerships for Growth. FAO 
Agricultural Services Bulletin 145. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations.
Galasso, E., M. Ravallion, and A. Salvia. 2001. “Assisting the Transition from Workfare 
to Work: Argentina’s Proempleo Experiment.” Washington, DC: World Bank 
Development Research Group. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTISPMA/Resour
ces/383704-1153333441931/11255_Martin-PROEMPLEO-Evaluation.pdf.
Heckman, J.J., and R. Robb. 1985. “Alternative Methods of Evaluating the Impact of Interventions: 
An Overview.” Journal of Econometrics 30 (1/2): 239–267.
Heckman, J. J., H. Ichimura, J. Smith, and P. Todd. 1996. “Sources of Selection Bias in Evaluation 
Social Programs: An Interpretation of Conventional Measures and Evidence on the 
Effectiveness of Matching as a Program Evaluation Method.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences USA 93: 13416–13420.
Heckman, J. J., H. Ichimura, and P. Todd. 1998. “Matching as an Econometric Evaluation 
Estimator.” Review of Economic Studies 65 (2): 261–294.
Hirano, K., and G. W. Imbens. 2001. “Estimation of Causal Effects using Propensity Score 
Weighting: An Application to Data on Right Heart Catheterization.” Health Services and 
Outcomes Research Methodology 2 (3/4): 259–278.
Imbens, G. W. 2004. “Nonparametric Estimation of Average Treatment Effects under Exogeneity: 
A Review.” Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (1): 4–29.
INEC. 2001. III Censo Nacional Agropecuario. Quito, Ecuador: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 
y Censos del Ecuador. http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/censo-nacional-agropecuario/.
—. 2005–2006. Base de Datos de la Encuesta Condiciones de Vida ECV, Quinta Ronda. Quito, 
Ecuador: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos del Ecuador.
Johnson, N., and J. A. Berdegué. 2004. Collective Action and Property Rights for Sustainable 
Development: Property Rights, Collective Action, and Agribusiness. IFPRI Policy Brief, Focus: 
A 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment, No. 13. Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research Institute.
Kovach, J., C. Petzoldt, J. Degnil, and J. Tette. 1992. “A Method to Measure the Environmental 
Impact of Pesticides.” New York’s Food and Life Sciences Bulletin 39: 1–8.
Little, P. D., and M. J. Watts, eds. 1994. Living under Contract: Contract Farming and Agrarian 
Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Magurran, A. 1988. Ecological Diversity and Its Measurement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
408 ChapTer 12
Oosterbeek, H., J. Ponce, and N. Schady. 2008. The Impact of Cash Transfers on School Enrollment: 
Evidence from Ecuador. Policy Research Working Paper Series 4645. Washington, DC: World 
Bank.
Orozco, F., D. C. Cole, V. Muñoz, A. Altamirano, S. Wanigaratne, P. Espinosa, and F. 
Muñoz. 2007. “Relationships among Production Systems, Preschool Nutritional Status, 
and Pesticide-Related Toxicity in Seven Ecuadorian Communities: A Multi-Case Study 
Approach.” Food and Nutrition Bulletin 28 (2): S247–257.
Pico, H. A. 2006. “La Cadena Agroalimentaria de la Papa a Través de la Metodología de 
Plataformas de Concertación y Proyectos Compartidos.” Paper presented at the 1st National 
Ecuadorian Potato Congress, 2006, INIAP, Estación Experimental Santa Catalina Quito, 
Ecuador, May 17–19. www.quito.cipotato.org/presentambato/TEMATICAS%20DEL%20
CONGRESO/COMERCIALIZACION/HPICO.doc.
Pingali, P. 2001. “Environmental Consequences of Agricultural Commercialization in Asia.” 
Environment and Development Economics 6 (4): 483–502.
Pingali, P., and M. Rosegrant. 1995. “Agricultural Commercialization and Diversification: 
Processes and Polices.” Food Policy 20 (3): 171–185.
Ravallion, M. 2005. Evaluating Anti-Poverty Programs. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper, No. 3625. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Reardon, T., and J. A. Berdegué. 2002. “The Rapid Rise of Supermarkets in Latin America: 
Challenges and Opportunities for Development.” Development Policy Review 20 (4): 
371–388.
Reardon, T., P. Timmer, C. B. Barrett, and J. A. Berdegué. 2003. “The Rise of Supermarkets 
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85 (5): 
1140–1146.
Robins, J. M., and A. Rotnitzky. 1995. “Semiparametric Efficiency in Multivariate Regression 
Models with Missing Data.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 90 (429): 122–129.
Rosenbaum, P. R., and D. Rubin. 1983.” The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational 
Studies for Causal Effects.” Biometrica 70 (1): 41–55.
Ryan, J., and X. Meng. 2004. The Contribution of IFPRI Research and the Impact of the Food for 
Education Program in Bangladesh on Schooling Outcomes and Earnings. Impact Assessment 
Discussion Paper no. 22. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Sacerdote, B. 2004. “Fixing Broken Experiments Using the Propensity Score.” In Applied Bayesian 
Modeling and Causal Inference from Incomplete-Data Perspectives, edited by A. Gelman and X. 
Meng, 61–71. Hoboken, NJ, US: John Wiley.
Singh, S. 2002. “Multi-National Corporations and Agricultural Development: A Study of Contract 
Farming in the Indian Punjab.” Journal of International Development 14: 181–194.
LINKING SMaLLhOLDerS TO The NeW aGrICULTUraL eCONOMY 409
Smale, M. 1997. “The Green Revolution and Wheat Genetic Diversity: Some Unfounded 
Assumptions.” World Development 25 (8): 1257–1269.
Todd, J. E., P. Winters, and T. Hertz. 2010. “Conditional Cash Transfer and Agricultural 
Production: Lessons from the Oportunidades Experience in Mexico.” Journal of Development 
Studies 46 (1): 39–67.
Williamson, O. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press.
Winters, P., P. Simmons, and I. Patrick. 2005. “Evaluation of a Hybrid Seed Contract between 
Smallholders and a Multinational Company in East Java, Indonesia.” Journal of Development 
Studies 41 (1): 62–89.
410 ChapTer 12
LAPSES, INFIDELITIES, AND CREATIVE 
ADAPTATIONS: LESSONS FROM EVALUATION 
OF A PARTICIPATORY MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
APPROACH IN THE ANDES1
Douglas Horton, Emma Rotondo, Rodrigo Paz Ybarnegaray, 
Guy Hareau, André Devaux, and Graham Thiele
Introduction
Participatory approaches are often recommended to improve the efficiency 
and sustainability of international development programs or to contribute 
to local capacity development and empowerment (World Bank 1996; 
Chambers 2010). Participatory approaches have a long history in agricultural 
research and development (R&D), beginning with cropping- and farming-
systems research in the 1970s and evolving to a broad array of participatory 
approaches for rural assessment, plant breeding, natural-resource 
management, and market-chain development (Collinson 2000; Scoones and 
Thompson 2009; Devaux et al. 2009). Despite the extensive interest in and 
experimentation with participatory approaches over nearly a half-century, 
few of these approaches have been systematically evaluated and there is little 
evidence of their effectiveness and benefits (Martin 2009, 276; Johnson, Lilja, 
and Ashby 2003, 288).
Evaluators of participatory approaches have grappled with numerous 
challenges, including the broad range of expected project impacts, the large 
number of stakeholders with often differing interests, and the limited direct 
influence of evaluation results on funding decisions (Lilja and Dixon 2008a, 
2008b). In this chapter, we address three even more fundamental methodolog-
ical challenges to the evaluation of participatory approaches: the commonly 
1 Thomas Bernet, Jason Donovan, and two anonymous reviewers provided valuable comments on 
earlier versions of this chapter. Jacqueline Ashby and Carlos Arturo Quiros made many valuable 
contributions to discussions about evaluation of participatory approaches in the Andean 
Change network. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development provided 
funding for the Andean Change Alliance and for the study reported on here. We would like to 
thank our local partners, collaborating women and men farmers, and others who took part in 
the work of Cambio Andino, without whom this work would not have been possible.
This chapter was originally published as an article in Evaluation and Program Planning 39: 28–41 (2013).
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imprecise definition of the approaches themselves; frequent adaptation of 
the approaches by local implementers; and the long, complex, and little-un-
derstood pathways through which participatory approaches contribute to 
such development goals as food security, rural livelihoods, and environmen-
tal sustainability.
From 2007 to 2010, the Andean Change Alliance2 evaluated four 
participatory approaches to agricultural R&D (Thiele et al. 2011). Teams 
in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru implemented the approaches with 
support from specialists based in two international agricultural research 
centers.3 A separate team (the authors of this chapter) evaluated the 
implementation and results of the approaches. A third team was tasked with 
using the evidence generated through evaluations for advocacy to promote 
more inclusive agricultural-innovation systems.4 One of the approaches 
evaluated was the Participatory Market Chain Approach (PMCA), developed 
by the International Potato Center and its Papa Andina partnership program 
(www.papandina.org). The PMCA engages smallholder farmers, market 
agents, and agricultural-service providers in a facilitated process that builds 
trust among these diverse groups and promotes collective action, which 
in turn leads to innovations that benefit smallholders as well as other 
chain actors.
In this chapter, we seek to advance thinking and practice in the  planning, 
management, and evaluation of programs that involve partici patory approaches, 
by reflecting on three aspects of the Alliance’s evaluation work with the 
PMCA: (1) assessment of the fidelity of implementation; (2) identification 
of key factors that influence implementation and results; and (3) assessment 
 2 The Andean Change Alliance (Alianza Cambio Andino) was established to contribute to 
sustainable livelihoolds in poor communities by improving their participation in innovation 
processes (www.cambioandino.org). Funding and resources for the Alliance were provided by 
the United Kingdom Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) and by 
participating organizations.
 3 The two international centers were the International Potato Center (CIP) and the International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) (www.cgiar.org/about-us/research-centers/). 
Regional and national partners included: Programa para el Fortalecimiento de los Sistemas 
Gubernamentales de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Proyectos y Programas de Desarrollo Rural 
en América Latina y el Caribe (PREVAL); Asociación Colombiana de Organizaciones no 
Gubernamentales para la Comunicación Vía Correo Electrónico (COLNODO); Corporación 
para el Desarrollo Participativo y Sostenible de los Pequeños Agricultores (PBA Foundation, 
Colombia); Fundación para la Promoción e Investigación de Productos Andinos (PROINPA, 
Bolivia); and Instituto de Estudios Sociales y Económicos, Universidad Mayor de San Simon 
(IESE, Bolivia). The Alliance’s work with the PMCA was implemented with Papa Andina 
(http://cipotato.org/att_ui/iniciativa-papa-andina/).
 4 The importance of participatory approaches in agricultural innovation systems is noted in 
World Bank (2012).
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of the change model underlying the approach. We formulate lessons 
for improving future programs that employ the PMCA or other similar 
participatory approaches.
In the next section, we identify two contrasting perspectives found in 
the evaluation and innovation literatures on the importance of high fidel-
ity of implementation versus the need for adaptation of interventions to 
fit local circumstances. Then, we describe the concepts and methods used 
in our study. After that, we describe the main features of the PMCA and 
then report on four applications of the approach in Bolivia, Colombia, 
and Peru. We then discuss the case-study results in relation to issues of 
fidelity of implementation, factors that influence implementation and 
results, and the PMCA change model, and discuss lessons for improving 
the planning, management, and evaluation of future programs involving 
participatory approaches such as the PMCA. The final section presents gen-
eral conclusions.
Perspectives on Fidelity and Adaptation
One of the fundamental questions that drives evaluation is “‘Does an inter-
vention work?’ … in the end we want to know whether a program did work, 
is working, or can work” (Century, Rudnick, and Freeman 2010, 199). 
Answering this deceptively simple question leads us to more fundamental 
questions such as: What is the intervention? How should the intervention 
be implemented? And how is the intervention expected to contribute to the 
intended results? The first two questions relate to what Chen (2005) calls 
the intervention’s “action model”—a systematic plan for organizing resources, 
staff, and relationships in order to deliver the intervention faithfully. The 
third question relates to what Chen calls the “change model”—a broader con-
ceptual framework that links the intervention’s activities and outputs to the 
expected outcomes and impacts, and explains how and why the intervention is 
expected to lead to the desired changes.
The term fidelity of implementation refers to the extent to which a pro-
gram’s implementation is consistent with its action model. Researchers and 
evaluators have proposed frameworks for assessing fidelity of implementation 
based on such dimensions as adherence to protocol, exposure to services, qual-
ity of delivery, and participant responsiveness. Other frameworks for measur-
ing fidelity are based on critical components of the intervention. Structural 
components relate to how the intervention is structured, the people and 
resources it mobilizes, and the tasks carried out. Process components relate 
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to the principles and values underlying the intervention, the ways in which it 
is implemented, the skills, roles, and behaviors of the individuals involved in 
implementation, and the interactions among individuals and organizations 
(Zoch 2012). Based on the notion of critical components, Century, Rudnick, 
and Freeman (2010, 202) define fidelity of implementation as “the extent to 
which the critical components of an intended program are present when the 
program is enacted,” and propose a framework for assessing the fidelity of 
implementation built around structural and process components.
Implementation evaluations generally focus on relatively easy-to-measure 
structural components. However, complex process components may have a 
greater influence on program outcomes (Bisset, Daniel, and Potvin 2009). We 
assess the fidelity of PMCA implementation using a framework with both 
structural and process components. We identify three main reasons why 
implementers deviated from the initial design of the PMCA, and discuss the 
implications for planning and managing programs that employ participa-
tory approaches.
Publications on fidelity of implementation often stress the value of high 
fidelity and give the impression that infidelity is bad. This is because most of 
the fidelity literature is concerned with the measurement of intervention treat-
ment effects. As Bierman (2006, 88–90) points out, interventions may fail 
due to problems with the action model, the change model, or the fidelity of 
implementation. If an intervention is not implemented according to plan, esti-
mated treatment effects may be biased or misleading. Therefore, evaluators 
seeking to measure the validity of action or change models stress the impor-
tance of high implementation fidelity.
In contrast, studies concerned with innovation and the dissemination of 
new practices emphasize the positive aspects of adapting program procedures 
to fit local circumstances. Bierman (2006) highlights the need to balance ten-
sion between “research-based fidelity versus input and program adaptations 
offered by community members and local service providers.” Ashley (2009, 
37) notes that “diffusion theory anticipates modifications to interventions 
and purports that adaptability of the intervention to fit the context is crit-
ical to its adoption and maintenance over time.” Patton (2011) argues that 
interventions that address complex social issues need to evolve and continu-
ously adapt themselves to changing circumstances. Consequently, local teams 
should not be expected to implement intervention protocols mechanically, but 
should be encouraged to adapt interventions to achieve the best local results.
However, if local teams are encouraged to change any and all aspects of an 
intervention, they may forgo the potential value of applying key components 
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of an intervention that are essential for its performance and impacts. 
Mowbray et al. (2003, 327) usefully highlight the importance of determining 
which components of an intervention are essential and which are optional:
Adaptation may be necessary due to special needs of the target popu-
lation, differences in budget, community resources, or organizational 
factors… On the other hand, it is generally agreed that programs with 
higher fidelity to efficacious models produce superior outcomes… 
Determining which components of the program are essential, irrespec-
tive of context, and therefore require absolute fidelity to the original 
model, and which components may be modified, eliminated, or added, 
is an empirical matter.
In the work of the Andean Change Alliance, there was a continuous ten-
sion between the evaluators’ desire to evaluate the validity of the PMCA 
action and change models and the desire of local teams to adapt the PMCA to 
fit their local circumstances. Reflection on this tension has helped us to dis-
tinguish between essential and optional components of the PMCA and bal-
ance concerns for fidelity and creative adaptation.
Study Design and Methods
When the Alliance began its work, no action and change models were avail-
able for the participatory approaches that were to be evaluated. Guides for 
users and trainers (Bernet, Thiele, and Zschocke 2006; Antezana et al. 2008) 
laid out the main elements of the PMCA and a set of tools that could be used 
to implement the approach. But there was no protocol to guide implementa-
tion, nor were there indications of how the protocol should be used by indi-
viduals and organizations working with target populations within specific 
organizational and agroecological contexts. Similarly, PMCA specialists had 
general ideas about how the approach could contribute to changes at the level 
of individuals and groups, and how these changes could benefit smallholder 
farmers and other stakeholders, but these ideas had not been documented or 
critically assessed.
Elaboration of PMCA Protocol and Impact Pathway
One of the first activities of the Alliance’s evaluation group was to organize 
a workshop in which PMCA specialists and members of the Alliance formu-
lated an implementation protocol and a hypothetical impact pathway for the 
PMCA (Alvarez et al. 2008). The initial versions of these instruments were 
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subsequently revised periodically on the basis of experience and knowledge 
gained during PMCA implementation (Table 13.1 and Figure 13.1).
Based on the PMCA User Guide and specialist knowledge, the imple-
mentation protocol identifies key structural elements of the PMCA and the 
associated implementation processes. We later developed an instrument for 
scoring the fidelity of implementation of the PMCA, based on the imple-
mentation protocol (Table 13.3). Workshop participants also articulated a 
change model in the form of an “impact pathway,” drawing on a method-
ology known as Participatory Impact Pathway Analysis (Douthwaite et al. 
TAbLE 13.1 Participatory market chain approach (PMCA) implementation protocol
Structural components Process components
Phase 1. Diagnostic phase (3 months)
actor mapping • The facilitator leads activities that generate the interest of 
diverse market-chain actors in participating in the pMCa 
exercise
• The principal market-chain actors are identified and known
Qualitative diagnosis of the market 
chain, to identify problems, potential 
business opportunities
public event at end of phase 1 • The principal market-chain actors participate in the event
• potential business opportunities are identified
• Thematic groups are established
• results of the event are documented in a meeting report
Phase 2. Analysis of business opportunities (3–4 months)
Meetings approx. every 15 days with 
diverse market chain actors, for:
• analysis of market opportunities
• Market studies
• analysis of costs
• Business planning
• Interaction among diverse market-chain actors to generate 
confidence among them
• Development of at least one business plan
• Facilitators should ensure the ample participation of market-
chain actors, especially small farmers, in decisionmaking 
during phases 2 and 3
public event at end of phase 2 progress is shared and new participants / allies are included, 
who can enrich joint activities
Phase 3. Implementation of business opportunities (3–6 months)
Meeting approx. every 15 days with 
diverse actors, to implement business 
opportunities
• Joint activities/collaboration to implement new business 
opportunities with market-chain actors playing a leading role
• Communication and negotiation among market-chain actors
• Small farmers increase their knowledge of the market chainSpecific market studies
Specific technical studies
product development
public event at end of phase 3 • Innovations are launched
• Members of the press, opinion leaders, and relevant political 
authorities participate, to ensure ample communication and 
diffusion of results and support for the pMCa exercise
Source: authors.
Note: This formulation of the pMCa protocol is inspired by the framework proposed by Century, rudnick, and Freeman 
(2010).
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2007; Alvarez et al. 2010). The hypothetical impact pathway illustrates the 
main channels and processes through which the outputs of the PMCA are 
expected to contribute to the welfare of smallholder farmers. On the basis 
of the impact pathway, we developed an instrument for scoring progress 
toward achievement of the goals of the PMCA (Table 13.4). The coauthors 
of this chapter scored the fidelity of implementation and progress along the 
impact pathway for each case.
Analysis of Factors that Influenced Implementation and Results
Our analysis of the factors that influence PMCA implementation and results 
is based on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
developed by Ostrom (2005) and modified by Devaux et al. (2009) and 
Horton et al. (2011) (Figure 13.2). The innovation process is viewed as a com-
plex system that operates within a larger “macro context.” The heart of the sys-
tem is the “innovation arena” where interactions among diverse market-chain 
actors and service providers stimulate social learning, social-capital formation, 
and joint innovation processes. These processes strengthen the system’s capac-
ity for innovation and generate commercial, technical, and institutional inno-
vations. In this framework, innovation processes and results are influenced by 
four sets of independent variables:
1. Macro context: Includes the government policies, socioeconomic con-
ditions, and agroecological characteristics of the region that influence 
market-chain development.
2. Market chain: Biophysical and technological characteristics of the mar-
ket chain in which the PMCA is being applied.
3. Principal actors: Attributes of relevant market-chain actors and ser-
vice providers.
4. Rules in use: Formal and (mainly) informal norms and customs that 
govern the behavior of participants.
We return to this framework in our analysis of factors that influenced the 
implementation and results of the PMCA in the Discussion.
baseline Studies
Before initiating work with the PMCA, baseline studies were to be carried out 
at each local site. Information on livelihoods and household assets was gathered 
for a sample of households in communities where the PMCA was to be applied 
418 ChapTer 13
and in nearby communities that were considered to be comparable, and which 
were intended to serve as control treatments in a quasi-experimental research 
design. A substantial amount of time and resources went into the planning and 
administration of the household surveys needed to collect the baseline data. 
The data collected proved useful for characterizing the communities where the 
participatory approaches were being tested and for ascertaining that the com-
munities were comparable to others in the same geographic area. However, they 
were less useful for evaluation purposes, for four reasons: First, in some cases, 
the “control community” turned out to be substantially different from the 
community where the PMCA was to be tested. Second, planning and admin-
istering the household surveys took longer than anticipated, and in some cases 
the implementation teams began work with the PMCA before the surveys were 
completed. Third, in some cases, after the surveys were completed, implemen-
tation teams decided to work with different communities or groups. Fourth, 
when we planned the baseline studies there was a possibility of a second phase 
for the program, which would have given more time for measurable outcomes 
to emerge. Due to changes in funding policies for international agricultural 
research, this second phase never materialized, leaving us with less than two 
FIgURE 13.2 Framework for analyzing market-chain innovation processes
 
 
 
 
Macro context
market chain
Principal actors   
Rules
in use
social learning  
innovation
processes
social capital 
formation  
Outcomes 
-  innovation capacity
-  commercial, technical and  
 institutional innovations  
PMCA exercise
Innovation arenaCharacteristics of:
Source: horton et al. (2011).
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years between program completion and final evaluation. In light of the long 
and complex pathway connecting the PMCA with rural livelihoods and assets, 
when the Alliance ended its work it was too early to expect to be able to mea-
sure changes in household livelihoods or assets.
Process and Outcome Monitoring and Evaluation
The Alliance’s evaluation team periodically monitored PMCA implementa-
tion processes and products, evaluated outcomes at the end of each application, 
and produced a series of monitoring and evaluation reports. In 2010, an exter-
nal consultant led a synthesis exercise that documented overall results and 
drew lessons from a set of case studies (Horton et al. 2011).
Case Studies
Eight applications of the PMCA were initiated under the leadership of profes-
sionals in agricultural R&D organizations in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Peru. None of the professionals who were responsible for leading the PMCA 
exercises had implemented the approach previously. The Alliance organized 
PMCA training events and provided backstopping and coaching during the 
implementation of each case. Of the eight PMCA exercises initiated, five were 
completed (Table 13.2). There were various reasons for early termination of 
the other three exercises. Work with dairy products in northern Peru was one 
of the first cases implemented, and its supervision and facilitation were less 
than ideal. Rather than identifying a market opportunity, the group focused 
on a production problem. Since production problems were not the appropriate 
focus of a PMCA exercise, the Alliance shifted its support in Peru from the 
dairy case to the coffee case in San Martin, which was being implemented by 
the same NGO. In Santa Cruz, Bolivia, the agricultural research organization 
attempted to shorten the PMCA implementation period by skipping most of 
Phase 2, which is essential for building trust among market-chain actors. They 
jumped directly to joint action between farmers and processors, and were dis-
mayed when the farmers did not accept a contract to supply peaches to a cater-
ing company. Even though the price offered was attractive, farmers would 
have needed more personal interaction with company representatives before 
agreeing to such a contract.
Our analysis focuses on the four completed cases that we believe offer the 
richest potential for learning within the resources available for the study:
• Case 1. Developing and marketing new dairy products in Oruro, Bolivia
• Case 2. Conserving and marketing native potatoes in northern Potosi, Bolivia
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• Case 3. Developing new markets for yams in northern Colombia
• Case 4. Marketing high-quality coffee in San Martin, Peru
The fifth completed case (Promotion of native potatoes in Riobamba, 
Ecuador) was excluded from the in-depth study because there had been sig-
nificant departures from the PMCA protocol, and including fieldwork in 
Ecuador would have entailed substantial additional expense.
Following Yin (2009), a case-study protocol guided the collection and 
analysis of information in the four cases. Information sources included the 
Alliance’s extensive monitoring and evaluation reports, other published and 
unpublished documents, visits to each field site, and key-informant interviews 
with stakeholders.
Validation of Findings
Various approaches were used to validate case-study findings, including: tri-
angulation of information sources; presentation and feedback sessions with 
stakeholders at the end of each country visit; presentation and discussion of 
general findings in a regional workshop after completion of the four case stud-
ies; and circulation of drafts of a research report to stakeholders for comment 
and correction. This chapter’s authors independently scored implementation 
TAbLE 13.2 Participatory market chain approach (PMCA) applications associated with the 
Andean Change Alliance
Case Completed Included in this study
Bolivia
Developing and marketing new dairy products in Oruro Yes Yes
Conserving and marketing native potatoes in northern 
potosi
Yes Yes
Fruit in Santa Cruz No No
Vegetables in Santa Cruz No No
Colombia
Developing new markets for yams (north coast of 
Colombia)
Yes Yes
Ecuador
promotion of native potatoes, riobamba Yes No
Peru
Marketing high-quality coffee in San Martin Yes Yes
Dairy products, Cajamarca No No
Source: authors.
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fidelity and progress along the hypothetical impact pathway and discussed 
reasons for differences in reaching a consensus on the scores.
The Participatory Market Chain Approach
The PMCA was originally developed to stimulate innovation processes 
that would benefit small Andean farmers. The approach engages those who 
make their living from a market chain—market-chain actors—as well as 
agricultural-service providers in facilitated group processes aimed at iden-
tifying and exploiting new market opportunities in ways that benefit small 
farmers. The PMCA is designed to build the capacity of market-chain actors 
and empower them to innovate on their own. Applications of the PMCA 
should be guided by trained PMCA facilitators based in local R&D organi-
zations who understand the PMCA implementation protocol as well as the 
principles underlying the approach.
The PMCA is implemented in three phases (see Figure 7.2). During 
Phase 1, facilitators should familiarize themselves with the target market 
chain and its actors, share this knowledge with stakeholders of the market 
chain, and motivate them to participate in the PMCA application. This 
phase is expected to take 2 to 4 months and may involve 20 to 40 interviews 
with diverse market-chain actors. It ends with a public event that brings 
together individuals who have been involved, to discuss results of the market 
survey, exchange ideas, and set up thematic groups. Important actors who 
have not been involved so far are also invited to this event, to stimulate their 
interest and motivate them to participate in future activities.
During Phase 2, potential business opportunities should be identified 
and assessed. The PMCA facilitator organizes and facilitates regular 
thematic meetings where market opportunities are identified and discussed. 
These also build up mutual trust and knowledge sharing among participants. 
The participation of market-chain actors other than farmers is essential to 
maintain a focus on market demands and opportunities. Six to ten meetings 
are recommended and rapid market appraisal and focus-group studies 
are usually carried out to assess market potential and develop product 
concepts. At a final event, the business opportunities are discussed with a 
wider audience.
During Phase 3, market-chain actors are expected to work together 
to develop new products and production or marketing processes, with 
support from research or other service organizations, such as universities or 
food-technology laboratories. This phase focuses on the activities needed 
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to launch specific innovations. The time required may vary from 3 to 
6 months, depending upon the complexity of the innovation, the capacity 
of the group, and biophysical, socioeconomic, and institutional conditions. 
Phase 3 closes with a large public event where new market products and 
related innovations are launched. Although the PMCA formally ends with 
the public launch of innovations, the innovation processes may continue 
long afterward.
Four Applications of the PMCA
This section presents summaries of four case-study reports that are available in 
Horton et al. (2011). Each case summary includes information on:
• Context of the PMCA exercise: the macro context, biophysical and technical 
characteristics of the market chain, attributes of market-chain actors and 
service providers, and the prevailing norms and customs
• Implementation of the PMCA: participants and the timeline of main activities
• Results of the PMCA: commercial, technological, and institutional innova-
tions, changes in innovation capacity, contributions to welfare.
National Macroeconomic Environment
A country’s economic policies can strongly influence the use and results of 
 market-chain development approaches, such as the PMCA. When the PMCA 
was being applied, the governments of Colombia and Peru pursued economic 
policies that promoted market-led development through promotion of competi-
tive markets, international trade, and private-sector investment. In contrast, the 
Bolivian government emphasized state-led investment and regional and indig-
enous development, food sovereignty, and conservation of natural and cultural 
resources. The economic policies of Colombia and Peru could be seen as more 
favorable than those of Bolivia for the use of market-development interventions 
such as the PMCA.
Case 1. Developing a Local Market for Quality Coffee in Peru’s 
High Jungle
CONTEXT
Peru’s San Martin province produces high-quality coffee for specialty export 
markets, but local people consume little coffee, and mostly instant coffee. The 
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international NGO Practical Action worked in San Martin for more than a 
decade to promote sustainable and equitable development of the coffee industry. 
Until recently, together with the regional government and local R&D organiza-
tions, they focused on improving production and postharvest practices. A “cof-
fee round table” was set up to bring together stakeholders, market-chain actors, 
and agricultural-service providers. A local women’s group processed and mar-
keted regional foods, but did not work with coffee. With the PMCA, Practical 
Action and the women’s group took the lead in developing a local market for 
locally produced coffee.
IMPLEMENTATION
The PMCA was applied over a period of 16 months beginning in June 2007. 
An employee of Practical Action played a key role in facilitating the exercise 
and supporting local initiatives. The women’s group led the development of 
the local coffee sector with other stakeholders. After completion of the PMCA, 
Practical Action continued to support efforts to develop the local coffee mar-
ket, through establishment of an association of artisanal coffee processors.
OUTCOMES
Members of the women’s group gained knowledge and skills in coffee process-
ing and marketing, and developed a new coffee brand that has now been on the 
local market for more than 3 years. The new brand incorporates more careful 
selection of coffee beans and improvements in roasting, grinding, and packaging. 
The PMCA exercise and follow-up since 2008 have also motivated greater net-
working and relationship building among different stakeholders. In 2010, a pub-
lic event to promote the region’s coffee attracted local authorities, private-sector 
organizations, media, and about 500 members of the public. Success with cof-
fee marketing has helped consolidate the women’s group and raise its visibility 
in public and policy circles, as well as in emerging fairs and markets for organic 
produce. They now play a much more prominent role in the local food system.
Case 2. Developing and Marketing New Dairy Products in 
Highland bolivia
CONTEXT
Agriculture and livestock herding in Oruro, Bolivia, are challenged by the 
cold, dry environment, and low rural population density, raising the local pro-
duction costs. Over the past 30 years, micro-irrigation has stimulated small-
scale cropping and dairy herding near the city. The Danish International 
424 ChapTer 13
Development Agency and other development organizations have encour-
aged and supported farmer self-help groups that operate community-based 
dairy processing plants. Dairy specialists who worked in aid programs have 
established a foundation, Fundación de Servicios para el Desarrollo Rural 
Agropecuario, Bolivia (SEDERA), which offers technical services and sup-
port to small herders and dairy processors. In recent years, the market for dairy 
products has become increasingly competitive as multinational firms have 
developed sophisticated production and distribution systems that reach Oruro, 
making a wide range of products available at competitive prices.
IMPLEMENTATION
The PMCA was implemented during 20 months beginning in October 2007. 
SEDERA led and facilitated the PMCA application with the goal of diversi-
fying the production of community-based dairy plants. One objective was to 
produce mozzarella cheese to supply local pizzerias. Bolivia’s Foundation for 
Promotion and Research of Andean Products (PROINPA) and Papa Andina 
organized training events at the beginning of each phase. Technical training in 
mozzarella preparation was provided by cheese makers from Argentina, who 
adapted methods used in their country to the local environment and input sup-
plies. Market-chain actors and other stakeholders seldom came together for 
face-to-face meetings, partly because small herders live scattered over the rural 
landscape, and partly because SEDERA was more comfortable working with 
farmers than with market agents. Midway through the PMCA exercise, the 
farmer organization withdrew because they obtained a more attractive outlet for 
their milk, and a new farmer organization joined the process. This slowed down 
implementation of the exercise.
OUTCOMES
SEDERA and the local farmer group were successful in producing mozza-
rella cheese that met local quality requirements. The new cheese, marketed 
under the “Vaquita Andina” brand, has been available for two years in a store 
operated by SEDERA and in some high-end food markets, including a super-
market in Oruro. Work with the PMCA has motivated local dairy producers 
to diversify the types of cheese they produce and to upgrade quality and san-
itary standards. Due mainly to its relatively high price, the new mozzarella 
cheese is not used by local pizzerias—the original goal. The main consum-
ers are high-income households willing to pay a premium for a naturally pro-
duced local cheese. Economic benefits for small producers have been limited. 
SEDERA has gained expertise in market-chain analysis and in facilitating 
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innovation processes, and is now using a more integral, market-oriented 
approach to its development work.
Case 3. Conserving and Marketing Native Potatoes in Highland 
bolivia
CONTEXT
Known as a mining region and home to one of the poorest rural populations 
in Latin America, one of Bolivia’s northern Potosi underexploited resources 
is the genetic diversity of its native potatoes. PROINPA and the Center for 
Agricultural Development (CAD) have worked for several years to conserve the 
biodiversity of the potato and other Andean crops and to reduce rural poverty.
IMPLEMENTATION
Facilitated by CAD, the PMCA was applied over 17 months (beginning in 
May 2007) to develop markets for the native potatoes produced by small farm-
ers in the region. PROINPA, Papa Andina, and other service providers back-
stopped and also provided technical support for organic potato production 
and postharvest technology. CAD prioritized strengthening farmer associa-
tions and establishing a network of associations, to coordinate marketing and 
improve farmers’ negotiating power. They assisted these groups in marketing 
their potatoes and developing proposals for a potato-processing plant. There 
was little interaction with local market intermediaries.
OUTCOMES
A new potato product branded “Miskipapa” was developed, which consists 
of selected and washed native potatoes sold in net bags. It has been marketed 
for three years in supermarkets in La Paz and Cochabamba, in the store 
of a mining union, in two tourist hotels, and in farmers’ markets. Due to 
limitations in both the supply and demand of native potatoes, economic 
benefits to farmers appear to be small. However, increased awareness about 
their value has contributed to renewed efforts to conserve the biodiversity of 
native potatoes in the region. To market Miskipapa, farmers have improved 
the selection and sorting of their harvested potatoes. CAD continued to 
support the farmer organization with their marketing initiative. Despite the 
fact that they expressed interest, little support from local governmental bodies 
has materialized. Perhaps the most significant outcome has been the expertise 
gained by CAD, which prompted shifting its emphasis from production 
development to market-chain innovation.
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Case 4. Developing New Markets for Yams on the North Coast of 
Colombia
CONTEXT
Yams were introduced together with slaves from West Africa, and are now 
one of the main crops grown by poor farmers on the north coast of Colombia. 
Here, the distribution of landholdings is extremely skewed, contributing to 
rural poverty and social inequality. Combined with the presence of drug-re-
lated conflict, violence erupted at the end of the 1990s and continued for 
nearly a decade. Despite the insecurity, a few development organizations con-
tinued to work in the areas promoting rural development.
IMPLEMENTATION
The PBA Foundation is a nonprofit organization that works with interna-
tional development agencies and local partners to promote participatory inno-
vation processes among small farmers. In 2006, it launched an initiative to 
improve the marketing of the products produced by region’s small farmers. In 
April 2008, the Foundation incorporated the PMCA and facilitated its imple-
mentation in seven market chains over a 13-month period. An expert from 
Papa Andina backstopped the work. Three potential areas for commercial 
innovation were identified:
• Production of yam flour for specialty uses in cosmetology and baking
• Exportation of fresh yams to the United States
• Domestic marketing of high-quality fresh yams.
A local university carried out applied technical and market research in 
these areas, business plans were developed, and new products were pilot tested 
with potential buyers. After completion of the exercise, the Foundation has 
worked to establish a network of local associations to promote development of 
the yam sector.
OUTCOMES
Some progress was made in improving the domestic marketing of yams, but 
no distinctive new yam product was developed and marketed. To sell higher- 
quality yams at premium prices, small farmers have increased planting density, 
and improved the selection and cleaning of harvested tubers. A few shipments 
of fresh yams have been made to the United States, but development of this 
market faces steep competition from other Caribbean suppliers. Commercial 
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testing of high-quality yam flour has been hampered by lack of resources for 
construction of a pilot plant. The PBA Foundation has incorporated elements 
of the PMCA into its portfolio of participatory methods. In light of the small 
size of local farmer organizations, the PBA Foundation has worked to estab-
lish a regional network of local associations to improve the performance of 
marketing functions. One unanticipated result of this case has been the orga-
nization of venders within the local market, to coordinate the flow of produce 
and reduce price variability.
Discussion
This section analyzes the fidelity of implementation of the PMCA, the factors 
that influenced implementation and results, and the validity of the PMCA 
change model.
Fidelity of Implementation
Most of the activities prescribed for Phase 1—the diagnostic phase—
were implemented with reasonable or high levels of fidelity (Table 13.3). 
Diagnostic studies of the target market chains were carried out and the 
results were shared with stakeholders at public events. In three of the four 
cases, these public events were well attended by market-chain actors, service 
providers, and local policymakers, attracting 50 or more participants, 
reflecting stakeholder interest in developing the local dairy market 
chain. In Phase 2—the potential-business analysis phase—the fidelity of 
implementation was high in two of the cases, but lower in the other two 
cases. Case 2 (native potatoes in Bolivia) was particularly weak, with few 
group meetings and little diversity among the participants. Few market 
agents participated in these meetings, violating a core principle of the PMCA, 
which promotes innovation through the interaction of diverse market-chain 
actors, including market agents. In Phase 3—the implementation phase—
the fidelity of implementation was high only in the coffee-processing case in 
Peru. Here, group meetings were frequently held and market-chain actors—
in this case, a women’s processing and marketing group—played a lead role in 
new product development. In the other three cases, the facilitators continued 
to lead the innovation processes, rather than turning over responsibilities to 
local market-chain actors.
There are many possible reasons for diverging from the intervention pro-
tocol, and the cases show that not all of them are bad. Implementers often 
felt the need to creatively adapt implementation procedures to fit local 
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TAbLE 13.3 Scoring of the fidelity of implementation of the participatory market chain 
approach (PMCA)
Activity and quality parameter Scores for each case
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Phase 1. Diagnostic phase (3 months)
Market chain is mapped and main MCas are interviewed 
• at least 20–40 diverse MCas are interviewed 3 2 2 2
• Bottlenecks and opportunities are identified 3 2 2 2
• MCas are motivated to participate in pMCa 2 2 2 2
public event at end of phase 1
• Key MCas and service providers attend 3 1 2 3
• results of market study are presented and discussed 3 3 3 3
• Interest in further collaboration is generated 3 2 2 3
• Thematic groups are established 3 3 3 3
Phase 2. analysis of business opportunities (3–4 months)
Meetings to analyze market opportunities and plan business 
• Meetings approximately every 15 days 3 1 3 3
• Interaction among diverse MCas to generate confidence 2 1 2 2
• Development of at least one business plan 3 3 3 3
public event at end of phase 2
• Key actors attend 3 2 2 3
• progress is shared 3 2 2 3
• New participants are engaged to enrich joint activities 3 2 1 3
Phase 3. Implementation of business opportunities (3–4 months)
Meeting for joint implementation of business opportunities
• Meetings approximately every 15 days 3 1 1 0
• Diverse MCas engaged in pMCa application 2 1 1 0
• Market-chain actors play a leading role 2 0 0 1
Technical and market studies carried out
• Studies carried out 3 3 1 2
• Studies inform group decisions 3 3 1 0
New products developed
• prototype is tested with consumers and markets 3 3 3 1
public event at end of phase 3
• Innovations are launched 3 3 3 1
• Opinion leaders and political authorities participate 3 3 3 3
Source: authors.
Notes: 0 = absent; 1 = present with low quality; 2 = moderate quality, 3 = high quality; MCa = market-chain actor.
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circumstances, while respecting the basic principles underlying the action and 
change models. Many useful creative adaptations were made. For example, in 
Bolivia, a single set of training workshops was organized for two different 
cases; on the north coast of Colombia, a single set of training workshops was 
held for facilitators and chain leaders in seven different market chains. Such 
adaptations should be encouraged to improve the cost-effectiveness and results 
of the intervention.
Where implementers did not fully understand the intervention protocol 
or the underlying action and change models, or they lacked the capacity or 
resources needed to implement the intervention as designed, unintended lapses 
occurred. The two cases in Santa Cruz, Bolivia where facilitators attempted 
to skip over Phase 2 of the PMCA are examples of lapses. In many cases, lapses 
can be remedied through training or assisting local implementers to gain access 
to the resources needed to implement the intervention as designed.
The most problematic types of divergence from the intended protocol were 
true infidelities, which occurred when local implementers intentionally vio-
lated core principles of the intervention. Such infidelities are especially prob-
lematic in participatory interventions, which seek to empower local actors. If 
important goals of the intervention are empowerment and innovation, then 
local actors should be encouraged to take responsibility and creatively adapt 
the intervention to fit local conditions. In Case 2 (native potatoes), the focus 
on working with small farmers rather than diverse market-chain actors is 
an example of an infidelity that reflected local implementers’ belief that the 
intervention should focus on strengthening farmer organizations rather than 
bringing farmers together with market-chain actors to work on joint innova-
tions. This view may be valid in the local conditions of Bolivia’s altiplano—
one of the harshest and poorest regions in Latin America. However, the point 
remains that intentional deviations from the protocol that include elimina-
tion of essential components of the intervention—such as the engagement of 
diverse market-chain actors in the PMCA—are both difficult (or impossible) 
to correct during implementation, and make it impossible to test the validity 
of the intervention’s action or change models.
Factors that Influence Implementation and Outcomes
The IAD framework suggests four main groups of factors that may influ-
ence the implementation and results of the PMCA. Our studies bear out the 
importance of these factors and also suggest the importance of an additional 
group of factors related to the strategy used to develop local capacity for use of 
the PMCA.
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MACRO CONTEXT
The pro-market policies of Colombia and Peru provided a more favorable envi-
ronment for use of the PMCA than did the policies of the Bolivian govern-
ment, which emphasize the role of the state and “communitarian socialism.” 
The more favorable agroecological environments in which the Colombian 
and Peruvian exercises were carried out also appear to have favored the imple-
mentation processes and outcomes. In the Bolivian altiplano, where poverty is 
more severe than in practically any other part of Latin America, there appear 
to be severe limits to the potential contributions of agricultural market-chain 
development approaches to rural poverty reduction.
ATTRIBUTES OF THE MARKET CHAIN
Successful innovation is more likely in some market chains than in others. 
In the cases involving coffee, and to a somewhat lesser extent dairy, it has 
been possible to mobilize external knowledge to improve processing. In con-
trast, in the cases of native potatoes and yams, the global knowledge base is 
more restricted. Especially for yams, little scientific information is available 
in Spanish. Coffee and dairy products are also more amenable to processing, 
branding, and product differentiation than are potatoes and yams. Processing 
of native potatoes for chips has emerged as a viable enterprise catering to 
high-income urban consumers in Peru and to a lesser extent in Bolivia, but 
this type of industry is typically located in urban areas, and was not consid-
ered as a likely option for the potato case in Bolivia.
ATTRIBUTES OF INDIVIDUALS
Our cases indicate that three distinct types of champion may be crucial for 
successful implementation of the PMCA and for mainstreaming the approach 
in R&D organizations. The first type of champion is the PMCA facilitator, 
who forms commodity groups and mediates innovation processes; the second 
type is a senior manager / decisionmaker who facilitates resource mobilization 
for the PMCA, as well as mainstreaming use of the approach; the third type 
of champion is a recognized leader within the market chain. In Case 1, the facil-
itator based in Practical Action played a key role in identifying and supporting 
local actors and facilitating change processes within the coffee market chain. 
A senior manager within Practical Action provided strong institutional sup-
port for the work. Within the coffee market chain, the leader of the women’s 
processing group led in developing the new brand of coffee and networking 
with others to develop the local coffee sector; leadership and capacity to invest 
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in the private sector are crucial for the ultimate success of efforts to stimulate 
market-chain innovation.
RULES IN USE
Rules in use refer to the social structures, mechanisms, customs, norms, and 
rules—both formal and informal—that guide human behavior on a day-to-
day basis. In our cases, rules in use strongly influenced the marketing and 
innovation behaviors of individuals and groups. In fact, a central goal of the 
PMCA is to modify the customary patterns of behavior and interaction so as 
to stimulate innovation and improve the participation of smallholder farmers 
in dynamic markets.
The market chains we worked with were generally characterized by dis-
trust and limited communication and interaction among the different chain 
actors (for example, producers, rural assemblers, processors, and retailers), 
which limits coordination and collaboration. Distrust, poor communication, 
and limited interaction were perhaps most notable in the native-potato mar-
ket of highland Bolivia, where urban-based market agents consider themselves 
superior to indigenous farmers and discriminate against them in many ways. 
Notable racial and cultural differences were also present in the market chain 
for yams on the north coast of Colombia. In the local coffee market in Peru’s 
high jungle, the relative absence of ethnic and racial cleavages and discrimi-
nation facilitated the interaction of diverse market-chain actors and the emer-
gence of collective action.
The rules in use (or “standard operating procedures”) of R&D organiza-
tions are also important. The PMCA is facilitated by individuals based in 
R&D organizations that have particular mandates, program structures, cul-
tures, norms, and external relationships. The mandate and culture of agricul-
tural research organizations can pose challenges for successful application of 
the PMCA, because these organizations may be averse to working with private 
businessmen engaged in processing and marketing. The implementing organi-
zations in Bolivia and Colombia traditionally work with farmers to improve 
their operations, and this helps explain why they failed to thoroughly engage 
processors and other market actors during the PMCA. In contrast, the imple-
menting organization in Peru—Practical Action—has a strong tradition of 
working across sectors, and it readily incorporated the PMCA into its pro-
gram to develop coffee markets in Peru.
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CAPACITY-DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
The capacity-development strategy varied across the cases, explaining some 
of the differences in implementation fidelity and results. Some departures 
from the PMCA protocol occurred because facilitators lacked a thorough 
understanding of the principles underlying the PMCA and how they are 
reflected in the intervention protocol. In the Peruvian case there were 
no formal training events. Instead, a market-development specialist at 
the Andean Change Alliance traveled to San Martin to provide one-on-
one training, backstopping, and mentoring for the local facilitator and 
the group that was applying the PMCA. In the other three cases, formal 
training workshops were organized for local facilitators at the beginning of 
each phase of the PMCA, and the Alliance’s market-development specialist 
was less involved in these cases. In Bolivia, trainers from the Alliance and 
PROINPA delivered these workshops and backstopped local facilitators. 
PROINPA’s agricultural R&D mandate appears to have biased the training 
and backstopping toward working with groups of small farmers rather than 
market agents. Experience with these and other applications of the PMCA 
(Horton et al. 2012; Mayanja et al. 2012) shows the value of immersion-type 
training and visits to sites where the PMCA has been successfully applied, so 
that new users of the approach can meet with people who have successfully 
applied the PMCA, see the results for themselves, and appreciate the 
importance of collective action involving diverse market-chain actors.
Validity of the PMCA Change Model
The cases studied provide insufficient evidence to validate the change model 
underlying the PMCA. Nevertheless, variations in the fidelity of implementa-
tion of the PMCA and in progress along the impact pathway provide an oppor-
tunity to assess some aspects of the change model. By comparing results where 
the key components of the intervention were present with results where some 
components were absent, we may get some sense of the importance of the com-
ponents. The point of departure is to gauge progress along the hypothesized 
impact pathway in the four cases and to identify components of the intervention 
protocol that appear to have influenced results. This analysis is based on the 
scores for fidelity of implementation and progress along the impact pathway in 
the four cases (Tables 13.3 and 13.4, respectively) and on the authors’ firsthand 
knowledge of implementation processes and results in the cases.
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The case that was implemented with greatest fidelity was Case 1 (coffee 
processing in Peru). This case, in which most activities in the intervention 
protocol were implemented with reasonable or high fidelity, provides the 
best test of the validity of the PMCA change model. In this case, the PMCA 
facilitator was highly motivated and capable, facilitating substantial progress 
along the impact pathway. Market-chain actors learned and shared knowledge 
on a number of topics related to market-chain innovation. They developed 
a new brand of coffee and developed a new business around this idea. 
Implementation of this new business stimulated and entailed innovations 
in coffee harvesting, grading, toasting, grinding, packaging, and marketing. 
As the PMCA was implemented, market-chain actors strengthened 
interpersonal relations and mutual trust, and afterward many have continued 
to work together on common goals. Due to the relatively small scale of the 
intervention in Case 1 and the time required for new practices to diffuse 
throughout the local economy, at the time of the evaluation the PMCA 
had not yet had a significant impact on the welfare of the small-scale coffee 
TAbLE 13.4 Scoring of progress along the PMCA impact pathway
Outcomes and impacts Scores for each case
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
MCas learn and share knowledge 3 2 2 2
MCas generate ideas for new businesses 3 2 2 2
MCas develop new businesses 3 2 2 1
MCas generate joint technological, commercial, and institutional 
innovation
3 2 1 1
MCas improve interpersonal relations and trust 3 1 1 2
MCas improve use of market information 2 2 2 2
Services become better oriented to the needs of MCas 2 2 2 2
MCas establish new commercial channels 2 2 2 1
MCas use collective action to respond to market demands 2 1 1 1
MCas develop multistakeholder platforms 1 1 1 1
Smallholders improve their technology to fit market demand 2 1 1 1
Smallholders expand their market network 2 1 1 0
More favorable policies for market-chain development 1 1 1 1
Smallholders expand their sales and receive higher prices 1 1 1 0
Source: authors.
Notes: 0 = no progress; 1 = limited progress; 2 = moderate progress; 3 = substantial progress; MCa = market-chain actor.
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producers. As the volume of sales of the new coffee brands increases in the 
future, larger welfare impacts can be expected.
In the other three cases, where the fidelity of implementation was lower, 
less progress was also made along the impact pathway. Useful knowledge 
was acquired by participants, who also made contacts with other market-
chain actors and service providers. Smallholders expanded their knowledge 
of markets, market actors, and consumer requirements. R&D professionals 
learned a new approach for promoting market innovation and development, 
and farmer organizations were strengthened to some extent. However, in 
these cases, success in marketing new products has been limited. As indicated 
in the previous section, many factors have influenced the success of the 
PMCA. However, in these cases, and also in other cases studied in Uganda 
and Indonesia (Mayanja et al. 2012; Horton et al. 2013), success of the PMCA 
has been associated with one key component of the action model: engaging 
processors and other market agents in the PMCA exercise. Engagement of 
market agents seems to be the most critical single component of the PMCA.
Although high fidelity of implementation was associated with greater 
progress along the impact pathway, a thorough assessment of the validity of 
the PMCA change model would require additional evaluations where the 
approach was implemented with high fidelity under a range of conditions 
related to the macro environment, the type of market chain, personal 
attributes of participants, and local rules in use. Such a thorough assessment 
under what would constitute artificial conditions (not allowing local 
implementers to adapt the intervention in any way to fit local conditions 
and meet local needs) would be a complex and costly exercise, for which local 
partners and international donors have little interest. As Chen (2010) points 
out, such rigorous assessments of validity are of interest mainly to researchers. 
Potential users of the PMCA—of any development program for that matter—
are primarily interested in knowing if it would be viable and effective in 
meeting political, organizational, and community needs under their particular 
circumstances. For these reasons, CIP has partnered with donors and R&D 
organizations in different parts of the world to test the PMCA under their 
own conditions and then has conducted case studies to assess the results.
Lessons
In this section we present four lessons for planning, managing, and evaluating 
programs that employ the PMCA or similar participatory approaches.
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1. Explicit action and change models for participatory approaches, although 
challenging to develop, are useful aids for planning, management, and 
evaluation. Participatory approaches tend to be vaguely defined, as 
are the ways they are expected to contribute to outcomes. The lack of 
explicit program theories makes it difficult to monitor implementa-
tion and evaluate results. To our knowledge, this is the first case where 
designers of a participatory intervention have worked with evaluators 
and prospective implementers to prepare an explicit implementation 
protocol and impact pathway. These instruments were useful guides 
for implementation and evaluation, and they provided a basis for reflec-
tion and learning. In development projects with limited resources and 
tight deadlines, it is difficult to justify the time and resources needed to 
develop action and change models. For this reason, developers of partic-
ipatory interventions should allocate “research resources” for the elabo-
ration of action and change models that can later be refined and tested 
by local implementers. The action models should include intervention 
protocols, as well as indications of how these should be used by imple-
menters working with target populations in specific contexts.
2. When introducing a new participatory approach, fidelity of implementa-
tion should be carefully monitored to detect creative adaptations, lapses, 
and true infidelities. We found three types of deviations from the imple-
mentation protocol that are generally lumped together under the head-
ing of “infidelities.” Lapses occur when implementers do not understand 
the intervention well or do not have the skills or resources to implement 
it correctly; creative adaptations are useful deviations from the imple-
mentation protocol which improve the fit of the intervention to local 
conditions and improve its performance. True infidelities occur when 
implementers intentionally violate basic principles of the intervention, 
and are, in effect, implementing another intervention. It is import-
ant for managers to know which types of deviation from the interven-
tion protocol are occurring in order to respond appropriately. Early 
knowledge of lapses can allow managers to provide additional training, 
coaching, or resources for local teams that needed additional support. 
Creative adaptations made by one team could be encouraged and shared 
with other teams. Knowledge of true infidelities could trigger efforts to 
negotiate a reorientation of the work with the local team or terminate 
the collaboration expeditiously. Information gained through this type 
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of monitoring would have been useful for later interpretation of results 
of the cases.
3. For participatory approaches, detailed baseline studies of household live-
lihood and assets may be of limited use for evaluation. “Good evalua-
tion practice” is often assumed to include the gathering of detailed 
baseline data on the welfare of target beneficiaries and control groups, 
which will allow measurement of the net impacts of the intervention. 
However, it needs to be kept in mind that in the real world, resources 
for evaluation are generally available only during the life of the program. 
In the Andean Change Alliance, baseline studies generated informa-
tion that proved useful for planning and fine-tuning local interventions. 
But due to the long and complex pathways through which the PMCA 
contributes to outcomes, insufficient time elapsed during the life of the 
program for measurable impacts to be registered on household welfare 
and assets. Consequently, we derived relatively little benefit from the 
substantial investment we made in baseline-data gathering. Those who 
plan and manage programs employing participatory approaches need to 
consider the relative costs and benefits of alternative methods for data 
gathering and choose the most appropriate one for their own circum-
stances (Bamberger, Rugh, and Mabry 2012).
4. Adequate capacity strengthening needs to be provided to ensure that local 
implementers can distinguish between core principles and essential com-
ponents of the intervention and suggested procedures that may be adjusted 
to fit local circumstances. Participatory R&D approaches such as the 
PMCA are knowledge-intensive and local implementers cannot be 
expected or encouraged to implement them mechanically. Variations 
in socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional conditions make 
adaptations in implementation procedures desirable. Additionally, par-
ticipation is inextricably linked to notions of local autonomy, empow-
erment, and creativity. For these reasons, local implementers need to 
understand the basic principles underlying a participatory approach and 
know which components are essential for its success. This highlights 
the importance of adequate training, knowledge sharing, and related 
aspects of local capacity strengthening for the successful introduction of 
a new participatory approach.
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Conclusion
In the work reported on here, we applied evaluative thinking to assess the 
implementation and outcomes of a participatory approach in the field of agri-
cultural R&D. While common in evaluation practice, the use of action and 
change models had not to our knowledge been rigorously applied in this field. 
So, although we originally published this paper in a journal on evaluation and 
program planning, we believe it will also be of interest to agricultural R&D 
professionals. Good quality of implementation of participatory approaches is 
vital to increase the probability that they can achieve their intended results. 
But what counts as “good” and how can this be achieved without stifling the 
creativity and adaptation needed for a participatory approach to work at all? 
The distinction we draw between creative adaptations, lapses, and true infi-
delities—grounded in the action model and making the link to outcomes in 
the change model—helps answer this tricky question. We believe this kind of 
thinking is of broader relevance both to evaluators and to practitioners of agri-
cultural R&D.
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USING QUANTITATIVE TOOLS TO MEASURE 
GENDER DIFFERENCES WITHIN VALUE CHAINS
Lucia Madrigal and Maximo Torero
Introduction
A value chain is a linked set of activities that take a product from conception 
through production, delivery, and finally disposal (see Figure 14.1a). While 
some value chains are simple and straightforward, others can be complex. 
Many different economic agents can be directly involved in each step of the 
chain; in addition, inputs used during one stage of production might re- enter 
the chain at another stage if their residual value is recyclable. Figure 14.1b 
provides an example of a more complex value chain with more than one final 
product stemming from the initial inputs, each following a parallel process.
Multiple barriers affect people’s ability to participate in and benefit from 
value chains; these include a lack of access to capital and markets. Detailed 
study of value chains can address these barriers by identifying critical issues 
and bottlenecks that limit opportunities for specific populations.
One such population is women. Female workers make up a considerable 
proportion of the agricultural workforce worldwide, but significant gender 
inequalities remain when it comes to access to assets, land, labor, credit, and 
infrastructure (see Deere and Leon 2003 for Latin American countries; Doss 
2006, and Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka 2004 for Africa south of the 
Sahara). Research has shown evidence of gender discrimination in wages and 
employment conditions in rural markets, suggesting that women could ben-
efit from labor-market interventions (Maertens and Swinnen 2012). Further 
identifying such gender imbalances is the first step in improving the design 
of policies and interventions that will lead to greater gender equality and pro-
ductivity (both labor and agricultural) in developing countries, as well as to 
reduced poverty and hunger.
Using quantitative tools to study gender-related questions is essential for 
increasing gender inclusion and promoting economic growth in develop-
ing countries. In this chapter, we look at how to use such tools to examine 
gender in value chains. The proposed tools (available via CRP-PIM 2015) 
are based on widely known methods and have a straightforward empirical 
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implementation; they have been tested in several studies and haven proven to 
be useful indicators of gender differentials.
Specifically, we have developed indicators that quantitatively estimate the 
time women and men spend on diverse activities during the day, especially 
focusing on tasks performed at work. Measuring labor burden by gender could 
give useful insights into how to improve the gender balance and opportuni-
ties. When looking at the conditions in which men and women work, we pres-
ent an indicator on working conditions and develop an index on equality. The 
objective of this index is to assess key variables that characterize access to work 
and working conditions. The index has two categories: variables that charac-
terize working conditions, and variables that describe access to work. Finally, 
we have developed two indicators to assess differences in payments and occu-
pations for females and males. The wage gap calculates the gender wage gap 
and assesses the extent to which observed gender wage gaps corres pond to 
gaps in individuals’ demographic and job-related characteristics. How differ-
ent is remuneration by gender in each node/value chain? How much of that 
difference is due to observable characteristics? How much of that difference 
is due to unobservable characteristics? Finally, the Duncan Index estimates 
gender segregation at each node in the value chain by occupation. It could be 
extended to capture hierarchical segregation by occupation and tasks (skilled 
and non-skilled) depending on data available. Essentially, it tries to answer 
the question of how participation by occupation, node, or value chain differs 
between men and women.
In summary, these tools allow us to map different gender roles and to iden-
tify opportunities that could lead to increased productivity, cost reduction, or 
product upgrades that, in turn, can spur economic growth.
Why Is Quantitative Analysis Needed and What 
Can It Do?
Since the mid-2000s, there has been an increasing amount of literature that 
seeks to integrate gender issues into the study of value chains. Much of this 
literature relies heavily on qualitative sources such as scoping studies (rapid 
field appraisals), focus groups, and diagramming tools (see Senders et al. 2012; 
Mayoux and Mackie 2009; Laven and Pyburn 2012; Rubin, Manfre, and 
Barrett 2009; Dulón 2009; Chan and Barrientos 2010). Although qualita-
tive analysis provides the context needed to understand certain situations, it 
is mostly based on subjective responses that are difficult to categorize. Much 
of this literature fails to provide quantitative methods that can be used to 
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analyze information efficiently and to estimate gender differentials consis-
tently; it also does not discuss recommended sample size for information gath-
ering or sampling methodology. We thus see the need to enrich these existing 
manuals with sound quantitative analysis that can give a more precise idea of 
gender differentials.
To best address the issue of gender disparities in agriculture, researchers 
should utilize a combination of both qualitative and quantitative data. 
Quantitative data in which participants’ responses are coded, organized, 
and statistically analyzed would complement and enrich the qualitative 
analysis, helping improve investments and program targeting and leading to 
more effective design, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programs 
(Farnworth 2011). The quantitative tools we propose utilize indicators derived 
from survey questionnaires that could be easily adapted to different value-
chain contexts. Implementing the modules and questions proposed would 
require few or no additional resources either to modify the existing sections of 
the questionnaire or to incorporate complete modules.
Using qualitative tools begins with identifying, or mapping, women’s roles 
in a value chain. Mapping gender roles provides a picture of the relationships 
between different actors in the value chain. Understanding these relationships 
can help policymakers and researchers identify constraints and opportuni-
ties for women in each part of the chain and design strategies to increase gen-
der equality. After implementation, quantitative tools can be used to track the 
effect of the chosen strategy and to quantify changes. Figure 14.2 shows the 
phases in value-chain analysis; indicators created by quantitative tools can be 
used to support analysis throughout the entire process.
How can quantitative tools improve analysis of a specific problem? One 
major gender-related issue is employment. Increasing women’s equal partic-
ipation in productive activities, as well as providing income-earning oppor-
tunities for both poor women and poor men through wage employment 
or self-employment, are essential steps in reducing poverty. Maertens and 
Swinnen (2012) suggest that labor-market channels are more effective in 
reducing poverty than product-upgrading channels. They find that women 
benefit more, and more directly, through labor-market effects than through 
product-market effects. Also, women benefit more if they are hired employ-
ees in agro-industry because they have direct access to wages and because 
the wages they receive improve their household bargaining power; income 
derived from contract farming, on the other hand, is mainly controlled by 
male contractors.
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However, few studies have looked specifically at (1) the distribution of 
employment by gender in a value-chain context; (2) the circumstances in 
which workers seek or find employment; and (3) the job conditions generated 
by the production of a specific commodity or livestock (Barrientos and Dolan 
2003; Dolan and Sutherland 2005 are the most relevant studies). Moreover, 
as mentioned by Maertens and Swinnen (2012), development policies have 
focused mainly on the inclusion of smallholder farms in modern value chains 
and the promotion of smallholder contract farming, rather than on labor 
markets and employment by gender. Using qualitative tools to examine these 
latter indicators can complement existing efforts and lead to more effective, 
better-targeted policies.
Table 14.1 presents gender-related research questions that could benefit 
from the use of quantitative measurements. These questions are not meant 
to be all-inclusive; rather, they are designed to give a basic idea of the kind 
of analysis that could be done using the tools we propose. Depending on the 
available data, each tool can be extended to analyze different dimensions 
of the research question. The examples provided show some basic indica-
tors that can be obtained with minimal data; these examples are not exhaus-
tive, however.
FIGURE 14.2 Phases in value-chain analysis
Monitoring 
and evaluation
Mapping 
gender roles
identification 
of bottlenecks
implementation strategy design
Source: Authors.
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Quantitative Tools to Help Understand the Role of 
Gender in Value Chains
In this section, a series of quantitative tools is presented that can be used to help 
understand how value chains work, characterize labor distribution, and evaluate 
working conditions and access to work in the context of value chains and gender.
Tool: Non-Parametric Oaxaca Blinder Decomposition Analysis
Although women have made strides in entering the global labor force since the 
mid-1990s, this increased participation has not translated into equal earnings. 
In addition, labor and gender economics literature since the mid-2000s has 
found that women are often in the lowest economic percentiles of income dis-
tributions and face barriers in access to income-producing opportunities (see 
Atal, Ñopo, and Winder 2009; Ñopo, Daza, and Ramos 2011; World Bank 
2012). In order to address these disparities, it is first necessary to analyze both 
the size of the wage gap and the reasons behind the differences in pay. This 
information can then be used to generate solid gender-oriented strategies.
TABLE 14.1 Gender-related research questions 
Quantitative tool What questions can it answer? 
non-parametric oaxaca Blinder 
decomposition analysis to measure 
gender-earnings gaps 
(Using a unit identification and employ-
ment module)
• how is remuneration different for men and women in each 
node of the value chain or in the value chain as a whole? 
• how much of that difference is due to observable characteris-
tics, such as age or skill level? 
• how much of that difference is due to unobservable character-
istics, such as people’s preferences or possible gender-based 
discrimination?
time-use analysis 
(Using a unit identification and  
time-use module)
• do men and women spend their time differently throughout the 
value chain, especially for the major tasks in each node? 
• how do women’s burdens in terms of time spent compare with 
men’s? 
• how do women’s workloads in terms of leisure time, family 
care, and household chores compare with those of men?
• do transport time, transport fees, or childcare mobility form 
barriers for women in terms of market access?
duncan index for occupational segre-
gation 
(Using a unit identification and employ-
ment module)
• Within each node of the value chain or within the value chain 
as a whole, which occupations do men have and which occu-
pations do women have? 
• Are men and women equally represented within an occupation 
in proportion to their share of the population?
Working-conditions/access-to-work 
equality index 
(Using a unit identification and employ-
ment module)
• is there unequal access to employment for men and women? 
• do working conditions differ by gender? 
• What barriers to entry do men and women face in each node of 
the value chain or in the value chain as a whole? 
• Which barriers are more significant for women and which are 
more significant for men?
Source: Authors.
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The objective of this tool is to calculate gender wage gaps; the tool can also 
be used to assess the extent to which observed gender wage gaps correspond to 
other observable characteristics such as demographics or job characteristics, as 
well as characteristics which cannot be explained by the model.
The goal of the Oaxaca Blinder decomposition is to estimate differences 
in mean wages across two groups. The wage model is assumed to be linear and 
separable in observable and unobservable characteristics. The estimation for 
females and for males generates the following counterfactual: “What would 
the earnings for a male (female) with average individual characteristics be if he 
(she) is rewarded for his (her) characteristics in the same way that the average 
female (male) is rewarded?” The difference in average wages between males 
and females is broken into two additive components: one attributable to dif-
ferences in the average characteristics of the individuals, and the other attrib-
utable to differences in the average rewards for these characteristics. The latter 
component is thought to contain the effects of both unobservable characteris-
tic gender differences and possible discrimination in the labor market (Blinder 
1973; Oaxaca 1973; Oaxaca and Ransom 1994; Ñopo 2008).
The econometric procedure used in this tool is an extension introduced 
by Ñopo (2008) that uses a nonparametric matching approach. In this exten-
sion, Ñopo proposes to account for the fact that females and males do not 
all possess the same characteristics; he therefore creates matched groups in 
which it is possible to compare wages across genders and does not assume a lin-
ear relationship between variables. Additionally, he suggests a way to address 
the distribution of these unexplained differences, which is not possible in the 
standard Oaxaca Blinder decomposition.
TABLE 14.2 Data needed for nonparametric Oaxaca Blinder decomposition analysis to 
measure gender-earnings gaps 
Minimum Desirable for further analysis 
• hourly wage (daily/weekly)
• Age
• level of education or literacy
• gender
• religion
• ethnicity (minority groups)
• Marital status
• number of children, children’s ages, health of children, gender of 
firstborn child
• registered employment (contract)
• Payment in cash/kind
• Benefits
• type of job (specific to the value chain)
• occupation (specific to the value chain)
• temporary work
Source: Authors.
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In order to create comparable groups, females and males are only matched if 
they show exactly the same combination of observable characteristics (common 
support). Ñopo (2008) explains that these matching characteristics need to be 
discrete. This ensures that the match is done perfectly and does away with the 
need to use propensity scores or any notion of distance among the characteristics. 
The matching procedure resamples all females without replacement and matches 
each observation with one synthetic male with the same observable characteristics 
and with a wage obtained from averaging all males with those same characteristics. 
This one-to-many matching generates a partition of the dataset. The observations 
of working males and females are grouped into three sets: (1) males whose 
observable characteristics cannot be matched to those of any female in the sample, 
(2) females whose observable characteristics cannot be matched to those of any 
male in the sample, and (3) matched males and females, such that the distribution 
of observable characteristics for males is equal to that of females.
In this way, the estimation of the four components is reduced to computa-
tions of conditional expectations and empirical probabilities without the need 
to estimate the nonparametric earnings equations in four separate equations, 
as in Ñopo (2008):
ΔM = μM (Unmatched) (EM͵unmatched[Y|M] − EM͵matched[Y|M])
ΔX = EM͵matched[Y|M] − EF͵matched[Y|M]
Δ₀ = EF͵matched[Y|M] − EF͵matched[Y|F]
ΔF = μF (Unmatched) (EF͵ matched[Y|F] − EF͵ unmatched[Y|F])
The wage gap Δ, computed as the difference in average wages between 
males and females and expressed as a percentage of females’ average wages, is 
then decomposed into four additive elements:
Δ = (ΔX + ΔM + ΔF) + Δ₀
ΔX is attributed to the differences in observable characteristics between 
males and females (common support of both characteristics’ distribution);  
ΔM is the portion of the wage gap that is due to the existence of males with 
combinations of characteristics that are not matched by any women; ΔF is the 
portion of the gap that is due to the existence of females with characteristics 
that cannot be matched to any male characteristics. The sum of the first three 
components, ΔX + ΔM + ΔF, is the portion of the gap that can be attributed to 
differences in observable characteristics. Finally, Δ₀ is the portion of the gap 
that cannot be explained by these characteristics and could be attributable to 
differences in unobservable characteristics, including discrimination.
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The typical interpretation of the wage-gap decomposition applies, but only 
over the common support: ΔX is attributable to differences in the average char-
acteristics of the individuals and Δ₀ is attributable to differences in the average 
rewards for these characteristics. In this new construction, two new additive 
components have been included, ΔM and ΔF (out of common support), result-
ing in a four-element decomposition.
In a value chain, wage differences between males and females could be 
calculated for each node and/or at the whole value-chain level. Depending 
on sample size and available information, one can also compare how results 
change when controlling for different individual characteristics (age, educa-
tion, occupation, etc.).
This tool will produce tables and graphs like the ones shown (Table 14.3 
and Figure 14.3). Our example uses only age as a control; however, it is possi-
ble to add more controls such as education and occupation, and to compare 
changes in the unexplained part of the wage differential.
The results can be interpreted as follows.
The overall gender gap is 11 percent (Δ). Δ can be decomposed in four  
elements:
• Δ₀: Unexplained by the model. Only for the fact of being male wage 
increased in 30 percent.
• ΔX: Explained by observable characteristics (common support). The age 
distribution for women and men in the common support is such it that 
reduces the gender gap by ΔX.
TABLE 14.3 Gender wage-gap decomposition results
Gender wage gap decomposition
Δ 0.11459352
Δ0 0.30390245
ΔM –0.1104065
ΔF –0.0097561
ΔX –0.06914634
Source: Authors
Notes: Δ = the wage gap computed as the difference in average wages between males and females and expressed as 
a percentage of females’ average wages; ΔX = the differences in observable characteristics between males and females 
(common support of both characteristics’ distribution); ΔM = the portion of the wage gap that is due to the existence of 
males with combinations of characteristics that are not matched by any women; ΔF = the portion of the gap that is due to 
the existence of females with characteristics that cannot be matched to any male characteristics; Δ0 is the portion of the gap 
that cannot be explained by these characteristics and could be attributable to differences in unobservable characteristics, 
including discrimination.
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• ΔM: Existence of men with ages that cannot be matched by any women 
reduces the gender wage gap by ΔM.
• ΔF: Existence of women with unmatched age reduces the gender wage gap 
by ΔF.
The sum of ΔX + ΔF + ΔM is the portion of the gap that can be attributed 
to observable characteristics, which in this case is 18 percent. For technical 
details, refer to Ñopo (2008).
To apply this tool, it is important to control for a relevant number of char-
acteristics and to make revisions if the common support is large enough. It is 
also important to consider the sampling framework and possible section bias. 
As presented, the tool is calculated using the sample of employed individuals 
who have some characteristics that might differ from unemployed people. In 
this case, it is important not to extend these results to the whole population, 
but rather only to the employed population. When using a sample in which 
the entire population is available, it is necessary to correct the selected sample 
(see Mulligan and Rubinstein 2005; Rubli 2012). This tool could also be used 
to measure gaps in other individual characteristics, such as ethnicity, poverty, 
and education. However, further research is needed to consider selection bias 
using this tool.
FIGURE 14.3 Gender wage-gap decomposition
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Notes: Δ = the wage gap computed as the difference in average wages between males and females and expressed as 
a percentage of females’ average wages; ΔX = the differences in observable characteristics between males and females 
(common support of both characteristics’ distribution); ΔM = the portion of the wage gap that is due to the existence of 
males with combinations of characteristics that are not matched by any women; ΔF = the portion of the gap that is due to 
the existence of females with characteristics that cannot be matched to any male characteristics; Δ0 is the portion of the gap 
that cannot be explained by these characteristics and could be attributable to differences in unobservable characteristics, 
including discrimination.
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Tool: Time-Use Analysis
Time-use data can provide a detailed account of the time devoted to different 
activities and tasks during a particular period, usually a day. Collecting such 
information requires individuals to record their time used for each activity 
performed during the day; this can shed light on the time taken for various 
tasks within a value chain. This instrument not only describes the time that 
females and males dedicate to both productive and unproductive activities, it 
also shows differences in job activities. For example, time-use studies from 
Africa south of the Sahara reveal that women spend more time at work than 
men, particularly when their time spent on domestic and care work is included 
(Blackden and Wodon 2006).
The objective of this tool is to quantitatively estimate the time that 
women and men spend on different activities during the day, focusing on 
tasks performed at work. Measuring men’s and women’s labor burdens could 
provide interesting insights into how to improve gender balance and labor 
opportunities for both men and women. Several case studies have shown 
that women’s burdens tend to increase in value chains with higher quality 
requirements (value-chain upgrading), since women typically perform quality-
producing steps; however, this higher burden does not typically translate 
into higher remuneration. Many of the studies finding increased workload 
for women have relied mostly on qualitative information (Lyon, Bezary, and 
Mutersbaugh 2009; Bolwig and Odeke 2007).
In order to obtain time-use data, researchers must ask participants to list 
all activities undertaken in a typical day, from waking up to going to sleep, 
emphasizing time spent on different activities while at work. The question-
naire should be adapted to activities relevant to the value chain under analysis 
and should focus on the productive activities. A properly prepared and con-
ducted interview can yield information on: time spent working as a whole and 
TABLE 14.4 Data needed for time-use analysis
Minimum Desirable for further analysis
• relationship with head of the household
• gender
• occupation
• time wakes up
• time goes to sleep
• Activities: preparing food, transportation, working, 
leisure, and other activities specific to the tasks in 
the value chain
• Age
• ethnicity (minority groups)
• religion
• Marital status
• household size
Source: Authors.
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time spent on each separate activity while at work; time spent on household 
chores; and leisure time. From this information, it is then possible to compare 
and characterize differences between women’s and men’s time use using t-test 
analysis or regression analysis.
Depending on the value chain being analyzed, it might be important to 
capture the time spent on specific work tasks to assess the quality of activi-
ties performed by men and women (in other words, the division of labor in 
skilled and nonskilled activities: who trades, collects, loads, does marketing, 
sells, etc.).
The tool will produce tables and graphs like the ones shown (Table 14.5 
and Figure 14.4).
FIGURE 14.4 Differences in time use by gender
length
of day
hours
worked
0
20
15
10
5
leisure
hours
childcare
hours
household 
chores hours
males
Females
Nu
m
be
r o
f h
ou
rs
Source: Authors.
TABLE 14.5  t-test for differences between females and males
Differences in time use by gender
Variable Males Females SD 
males
SD 
females
No. 
males
No. 
females
P
Wake-up time 5.03 5.26 0.9 0.76 45 53 .18
sleep time 20.24 20.42 0.88 0.71 45 53 .30
length of day 15.21 15.15 1.25 1.02 45 53 .80
hours worked 5.63 0.82 3.98 2.21 45 53 .00
leisure hours 7.69 7.25 2.6 2.67 45 53 .41
Childcare hours 0.76 1.23 0.38 0.93 9 11 .15
household-chores hours 1.03 4.42 1.62 2.51 45 53 .00
Source: Authors.
Notes: sd = standard deviation; no. = number of observations; P = probability.
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Judging from these results, there are significant differences in the hours 
worked (typically outside the household) and the hours spent on household 
chores (typically performed by women). This distribution implies that women 
allocate a larger share of their time to activities that do not directly gener-
ate income.
Time allocation is a great tool to understand the dynamics of economic 
change and to model economic behavior. However, it has measurement errors 
that could complicate the results when people perform more than one activity 
at the same time. Since time use can also be impacted by seasonality, research-
ers should be careful to make repeated observations at the same time of year. 
Moreover, some populations may conceptualize time differently from those in 
industrialized countries, and illiterate individuals may have a different way of 
assessing their time use (see Masuda et al. 2012 for two approaches).
Tool: Occupational Segregation Using Duncan Index
Women continue to congregate in sectors and occupations traditionally char-
acterized as “female”—mostly low-paying jobs. According to the World Bank 
(2012), removing barriers that prevent women from working in certain occupa-
tions would reduce the productivity gap between male and female workers by 
one-third to one-half, and would increase output per worker by 3–25 percent in 
some countries. This tool estimates gender segregation at each node in the value 
chain by occupation and can be extended to capture hierarchical segregation by 
occupation and task (skilled versus nonskilled) depending on available data.
The Duncan Index for occupational segregation (Duncan 1955) by gender 
in each stage of a value chain can be measured by
D = ½∑i|mi – wi|
where mi is the percentage of males (among total males employed within 
the value chain) in occupation (or value-chain node) i, and wi is the similar 
percentage of females (among total females in the value chain) in value-
chain occupation i. The values range from 0 to 100, and measure the 
relative separation or integration of gender across occupations (or nodes). 
TABLE 14.6 Data needed for occupational segregation using Duncan Index
Minimum Desirable for further analysis
• employment total
• employment by gender
• occupation (specific to the value chain)
• type of job (specific to the value chain)
Source: Authors.
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If the D value equals 0 percent, it means that occupations are distributed 
evenly between males and females. If the value is 100 percent, it means that 
occupations are completely segregated. If the value is 60 percent, it means that 
60 percent of workers would have to change occupations to make the gender 
distribution equal. The benchmark for the Duncan Index for occupational 
segregation by gender is 25.86 percent. The tool will produce tables similar to 
Table 14.7.
These percentages show a high level of segregation in the production node 
of the value chain. Ninety-eight percent of male workers would have to be 
replaced by female workers in order to have equal gender distribution.
The Duncan Index is a dissimilarity index; it is a measure of the evenness 
with which two groups are distributed across component groups (in this case, 
females and males) that make up a larger whole. The index score can be inter-
preted as the percentage of one group that would have to move to different 
units in order to produce a distribution that matches that of the whole. The 
index of dissimilarity can also be used as a measure of inequality.
But the Duncan Index does face some constraints. As highlighted by 
Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz (2002), the dissimilarity index can be 
inflated by random factors when the number of minority members is small 
relative to the number of all potential groups (specifically they refer to the 
unequal distribution of social groups across aerial units of an urban area). The 
index is also insensitive to the redistribution of minority members among 
all potential groups with minority proportions above or below the overall 
minority proportion. Only transfers of minority members from areas in which 
these members are overrepresented to areas in which they are underrepre-
sented (below the minority proportion) affect the value of the index.
However, despite its imperfections, the Duncan Index remains the most 
widely used measure of evenness, and no other index has achieved such wide-
spread acceptance as a summary statistic of segregation (Iceland, Weinberg, 
and Steinmetz 2002). Further research could extend this segregation measure 
to different dimensions and could construct a Theil’s-type index that could 
include two or more variables simultaneously.
TABLE 14.7 Duncan Index
Node Duncan Index (%)
Production 98
Commercialization 85
454 ChAPter 14
Tool: Working Conditions / Access to Work Equality Index
Analyzing working conditions and equal access to work can provide infor-
mation regarding specific barriers to growth within a value chain. The objec-
tive of this index is to assess key variables that characterize access to work and 
working conditions. The index is based on three premises: (1) measurement 
of gender gaps, (2) ease of computation, and (3) a final value bound between 
0 (inequality) and 1 (equality) to facilitate comparisons and interpretation. 
It has two categories: (1) variables that characterize working conditions, and 
(2) variables that describe access to work.
This index follows the empirical methodology used by Hausmann, Tyson, 
and Zahidi (2012), as presented below.
Step 1: Calculate ratios by gender for each variable Xi in each observation. For 
example, if one is working with the production node (segment) and has infor-
mation on 100 farmers, a ratio needs to be calculated for each variable xi in each 
farm where the variable could be for example: wages, participation, literacy, etc.
ratioi = xi _ female/xi _male
where xi_ female refers to the value of the specific variable for females in 
the specific farm and xi_male refers to the value of the specific variable for 
males in the specific farm.
Step 2: Truncate at equality (1) when necessary; this must have bounds 
between 0 and 1, where 1 means an equal number of women and men.
ratioi = 1 if  xi _ female > xi _male
TABLE 14.8 Data needed for working conditions / access to work equality index
Minimum Desirable for further analysis
1. Working conditions
• Wage (hourly/weekly)
2. Access to work
• Participation (employment by gender)
• literacy or education level
1. Working conditions
• occupation (job activity)
• Category (owner, worker, family worker)
• tenure
• temporary/permanent
• Contract
• Physical safety / risk of task performed
3. Access to work
• education level
• skilled, semiskilled, nonskilled
• requirements for job (experience, abilities, etc.)
• Job training
Source: Authors.
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Step 3: Calculate sub-index scores (for each category of variables j = 1,2). 
To do this, it is necessary to calculate the weighted average of the variables 
within each category and create two sub-indices (one for working conditions 
and one for access to work). As mentioned by Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi 
(2012), a simple average would implicitly give more weight to the measure that 
has more variability; they suggest normalizing the variables by equalizing their 
standard deviations. Standard deviations over all farm-level data for each vari-
able need to be calculated (var_sdi); then a 1 percentage point change would 
be calculated:
var_sdi = 0.01/sd (ratioi)
where var_sdi is the standard deviation for each variables and sd(ratioi) is the 
standard deviation of the ratio for each variable (ratioi).
Sum var_sdi over each category j:
sumj = ∑j var_sdi
where var_sdi  is the standard deviation for each variable aggregated over j cat-
egories which could be for example wages, and participation (employment by 
gender and by literacy).
To construct the weight, divide each var_sdi by sumj , this will create the 
variable weighti.
These values should be used as weights to calculate the weighted average of 
the four variables. In this way, a variable with a small variability of standard 
deviation gets a larger weight; therefore, when there is a large gender gap in 
that variable, it would be heavily penalized:
subindex(w)category j =
∑in weighti ratioi
∑ weighti
where the sum is over all variables within each j category.
Step 4: Calculate the final score. An unweighted average for each sub- 
index is taken to create the overall working conditions / access to work 
 equality index. Sub-indices should include variables that characterize working 
conditions and variables that describe access to work.
Equality index  = 
∑in  ∑ subindex(w)category j
n
where the sum is over all j categories (n).
456 ChAPter 14
This tool could be applied to separate nodes (segments) or to the entire value 
chain. It allows for comparisons between nodes and between value chains, since 
it is based on ratios rather than levels. It will produce a table like Table 14.9.
In this production node, the working conditions / access to work equality 
index is 31 percent, suggesting a large gap between females and males in both 
working conditions and access to work. This implies that there is a gap of 
69 percent. Similarly, for commercialization the index is 55%, which implies 
45% inequality in working conditions and access to work.
This index could be more accurate if more variables describing access to 
work and employment conditions become available. Additionally, better analy-
sis could be drawn if each person was interviewed individually instead of getting 
their information through third parties (such as the employer). Further work 
could find a correlation between a country’s gender gap in agricultural produc-
tion and its agricultural competitiveness, because women account for a large 
proportion of the world’s agricultural workforce and thus long-term competi-
tiveness depends significantly on whether women contribute to the sector.
Implementation
Three things are needed to implement these tools: (1) a questionnaire mod-
ule applied partially or in full; (2) a do-file with additional information on the 
tool and an explanation of how to construct the indicator; and (3) an Excel 
file with a table and/or graph produced from the results. Examples of the ques-
tionnaire and do-file are given by CRP-PIM (2015), and examples of the Excel 
file are available at www.tools4valuechains.org.
The questionnaire module can measure either employment or time use. 
Additionally, a module of unit identification should also be available. Two 
types of modules are recommended: one for the production node and one 
for the commercialization node. The questionnaire provided on the website 
is a general example and should be adapted to the particular value chain and 
context under study. A list of activities that can be used as a guide to modify 
TABLE 14.9 Working conditions / access to work equality index
Node Working conditions / access to work equality index (%)
Production 31
Commercialization 55
Source: Authors.
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and improve the list of relevant job activities (question Q2.3_L) in the labor 
module, according to each value-chain node and commodity, can be found in 
CRP-PIM (2015).
The do-file describes the steps needed to create variables and estimate indi-
cators using the variables in the questionnaires. Additionally, there is a raw 
dataset with which to perform the example described in the do-file—this 
dataset is only to illustrate the tool.
The Excel file uses the outcome data to produce a graph and could be used 
to reproduce similar outputs with specific data. This file can be downloaded 
from www.tools4valuechains.org.
Data Collection and Sampling
When implementing value-chain surveys to be able to measure the proposed 
quantitative tools, one of the biggest challenges faced by researchers is gath-
ering appropriate gender-disaggregated data. As mentioned by Doss (2013b), 
gender-disaggregated data are data that are collected and analyzed separately 
on males and females. This typically involves asking the “who” questions in an 
agricultural household survey: who provides labor, who makes the decisions, 
who owns and controls the land and other resources, in which node of the 
value chains do they work, and under which conditions and wages.
Who to Survey
When talking about gender-disaggregated data, we are not referring to com-
parisons of male- and female-headed households. This type of data is already 
commonly collected, but is problematic because it confounds gender and 
household structure1 and we would miss important data on women living 
in male-headed households—the majority of the world’s women. It is in this 
sense that data collection for the proposed tools cannot focus solely on female-
headed households, but needs to include women living in male-headed house-
holds and males living in female-headed households.
 1 As mentioned by Doss (2013a, b), male- and female-headed households are not comparable in 
most cases due to the way in which they are defined. Male-headed households generally include all 
households in which women are married to men, while female-headed households are usually those 
households lacking adult men. Female-headed households are often more labor and resource 
constrained than male-headed households, but these disparities cannot necessarily be attributed 
to the sex of the household head.
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How to Ask the Questions
A number of empirical studies have proposed using female interviewers to 
make women more comfortable when responding to surveys; questionnaires 
designed separately for women and men have also been used to increase accu-
racy and to improve data collection. Similarly, a clear strategy is needed to 
interview the males and females in separate environments to assure freedom of 
response on the part of the females. Other strategies include interviewing the 
spouse or another member of the household (preferably of the opposite sex) in 
addition to the household head to capture household composition and behav-
ior (Fisher, Reimer, and Carr 2010). However, if it is not possible to interview 
multiple individuals within a household, researchers need to at least identify 
respondents based on their roles and responsibilities. Doss (2013b) also sug-
gests guidelines to improve researchers’ ability to capture gender disparities 
in specific areas such as land tenure, acquisition of land and other assets, and 
asset ownership.2
Questions to Ask
Once the sampling strategy is developed and appropriate care is taken on who 
is going to ask the questions, data-collection efforts need to make sure that 
women’s productive activities are considered and that their roles in agricul-
tural value chains are identified (Doss 2013a). Deere (2005) finds that rural 
women commonly report housework as their principal occupation even when 
they are actively engaged in agricultural production. This may be due to the 
fact that many rural women tend to participate in subsistence, household-level 
activities such as raising livestock, tending kitchen gardens, and agricultural 
processing. Therefore, it is particularly important to include survey questions 
about subsistence agriculture in addition to income-generating activities.
For the proposed indicators, the minimum demographic data needed 
are sex, age, education level, marital status, and relationship to household 
head or respondent for each of the members involved in the agricultural pro-
duction process of the value chain under study. In addition, and central to 
the proposed indicators, it is essential to collect data on labor. Collection of 
labor data for formal-sector employment is now standard practice and allows 
the collection of information on hours and days of work, wages, and ben-
efits. The major concern is how to collect this type of information for the 
 nonformal sector. For this purpose, for each indicator we also propose a series 
 2 For more on data collection issues, see Doss (2013b).
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of questions on the agricultural tasks being done disaggregated by age and sex, 
and important details on their subsistence agriculture activities. Similarly, the 
use of questionnaires to collect information on time use at  
the individual level helps substantially in understanding the activities of  
the female and male of the household. Examples of the questionnaire are given 
by CRP-PIM (2015), and examples of the Excel file are available at  
www.tools4valuechains.org.
One additional important issue is to identify the owners of and the peo-
ple who have access to key resources and production factors. On ownership 
of land, it is essential that—in addition to the typical question of title or 
other document for the land ownership—we ask which household member 
or members own the land and whose names are on the title or other owner-
ship documents to allow for gender analysis, given that it allows us to iden-
tify the gender of the owner(s) and not just if the piece of land has a title 
or not.
In places where the formalization of land ownership is minimal, it will 
also be important to have data on both the reported ownership and the 
specific rights over the asset. With respect to other inputs of production, 
such as livestock and agricultural equipment, it is important to also put the 
questions of ownership, management, and control to both the female and 
the male. Another important aspect of quantitative data collection and 
sampling is repeated individual observations—that is, interviews conducted 
with the same individuals over a period of time. This process allows 
researchers to analyze the evolution of quantitative indicators and provides 
a better understanding of an intervention’s possible effects. Conducting 
follow-up surveys is also important because it allows researchers to 
control for the impact of omitted variables and thus helps to understand 
people’s behavior as well as any changes seen, including the reasons behind 
those changes.
Finally, it is important to use appropriate sampling strategies in order 
to gather data that are statistically representative of the value chain under 
analysis. In other words, each node or segment of a value chain needs to 
be sampled so that the complete survey is statistically representative of the 
value chain as a whole. This can be a challenge because tracking down the 
people actively involved in each segment of the chain can be difficult and 
time-consuming, particularly in long and complex value chains. Taking a 
census of all possible participants in each node of the value chain could be 
a first step; researchers could then draw a representative sample from this 
census (for example, all farmers in a particular geographical area). It should 
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be noted that the sampling methods chosen will have a large impact on 
the researcher’s ability to make inferences from the sample; therefore, it is 
important to integrate sampling strategies in the analysis.
Depending on the sampling framework chosen, it is important to 
consider sample selection bias. If participants and nonparticipants are 
systematically different (as it is typical in the case of women and men in the 
household), substantive results may be biased in unknown ways, causing 
their external or internal validity to be compromised. A bias occurring from 
the use of nonrandomly selected data could distort the results. Additionally, 
some individuals may be lost over time due to migration, death, or other 
reasons—known as attrition bias. This attrition bias could bias the final 
sample if the individuals who are lost differ in some systematic way from the 
participants who remain.
The problem of bias can be addressed through the use of sample-selection 
models—these are a well-developed class of econometric models that can be 
used to detect and correct for selection bias. The use of a sample-selection 
model, such as the Heckman two-step estimator (Heckman 1976, 1978, 
1979), should be considered in any quantitative value-chain analysis.
Conclusion
The tools presented in this chapter are primarily intended to support the 
 integration of gender in agricultural value-chain development through the 
use of quantitative tools. Identifying gender imbalances through quantitative 
analysis is the first step in improving the design of policies and interventions 
that will lead to greater gender equality and increased productivity in develop-
ing countries. Quantitative analysis will provide solid indicators that could be 
used as instruments in monitoring and evaluation processes.
The quantitative tools proposed in this chapter are built on those available 
in existing gender and labor economics literature and have been adapted for 
use in a value-chain context. They have the advantage of having already been 
tested in several previous studies and have proven to be useful indicators 
of gender differentials. These tools can help researchers and policymakers 
understand how value chains work, characterize labor distribution, and 
evaluate working conditions and access to work.
It is important to keep in mind that development interventions in agri-
cultural value chains would benefit from additional gender analysis at 
 different levels—for example, household-level analysis (income and expendi-
ture  management) and contextual analysis (institutions, social norms). It is 
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also important to ensure that female participation leads to greater productiv-
ity, not just to an increased number of women in the workforce. This could 
be achieved by increasing women’s bargaining power in relation to other 
 value-chain actors (Riisgard, Escobar Fibla, and Ponte 2010).
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Governments, nongovernmental organizations, donors, and the private sector have increasingly 
embraced value-chain development (VCD) for stimulating economic growth and combating rural poverty. 
Innovation for Inclusive Value-Chain Development: Successes and Challenges helps to fill the current gap 
in systematic knowledge about how well VCD has performed, related trade-offs or undesired effects, 
and which combinations of VCD elements are most likely to reduce poverty and deliver on overall 
development goals. This book uses case studies to examine a range of VCD  experiences. Approaching 
the subject from various angles, it looks at new linkages to markets and the role of farmer organizations 
and contract farming in raising productivity and access to markets, the minimum assets requirement 
to participate in VCD, the role of multi-stakeholder platforms in VCD, and how to measure and identify 
successful VCD interventions. The book also explores the challenges livestock-dependent people face; 
how urbanization and advancing technologies affect linkages; ways to increase gender inclusion and 
economic growth; and the different roles various types of platforms play in VCD.
Innovation for Inclusive Value-Chain Development will be useful to agricultural researchers, decision makers 
in research or development organizations, and the private sector who wish to support appropriate 
policies, institutions, and markets for inclusive agricultural growth.
André Devaux (a.devaux@cgiar.org) is the director of the Latin American Regional Program at the 
International Potato Center (CIP), based in Ecuador.
Maximo Torero (m.torero@cgiar.org) is the director of the Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division at 
the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Jason Donovan (j.donovan@cgiar.org) is a research leader for value  
chains and transformational change at the World Agroforestry Centre, based in Peru.
Douglas Horton (d.horton@mac.com) is an independent applied researcher and evaluator currently 
working with CIP, based in the United States.
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